This report highlights the necessity for an urgent and thorough review of Armscor's operational systems and organisational culture.
The review should have the following specific goals:
7.2.1 to identify and eliminate all systems and methods which were designed to evade the arms embargo (eg the use of front companies)
7.2.2to identify and eliminate all systems and methods which undermine control over the end destination of arms exports (eg reliance on foreign intermediaries; and free-on-board shipments);
7.2.3 to identify and introduce or strengthen means of ensuring that arms exports end up at the authorised destination (eg pro-active verification of end-user certificates; direct dealing with recipient countries);
7.2.4 to identify and address any aspect of Armscor's management and organisational practise and culture which encourages or tolerates a disregard for the destination of arms exports; and
7.2.5 to make recommendations on the appointment of a representative Board of Directors for Armscor through a process which enjoys public confidence.
The Commission will contribute to the review in the form of its public hearing in June and subsequent report to the President. But the transformation of Armscor lies beyond the Commission's mandate and is properly the responsibility of the Executive and Parliament.
The criteria for determining which categories of weapons may be exported, and to which countries, should be thoroughly overhauled.
The new criteria should be based, above all, on South Africa's commitment to democracy, human rights and international peace and security.
More specifically, the criteria should seek to avoid the export of arms to repressive and authoritarian regimes and to illegitimate rebel movements.
Attention should also be paid to the political and economic stability of the prospective recipient state and the surrounding region. This is not to say that South Africa should act as a moral watchdog over other states, but rather to acknowledge that South Africa bears moral and political responsibility for the use to which its arms exports are put.
7.3.2 Decision-making
Criteria for regulating arms exports will be meaningful only if they are applied in a politically sensitive and responsible way.
The bodies which comprised the Defence Foreign Policy Committee have not demonstrated the requisite degree of responsibility in the past. These bodies include the Defence Force, Armscor and the Department of Foreign Affairs.
It will therefore be necessary for government to play a more active role, at ministerial level, in the process of considering and approving applications to market or sell South African arms abroad.
This raises the question of which is the appropriate Ministry to exercise control over arms exports. There is no consistent pattern internationally. Executive control resides in different countries in the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Trade and Industry. This matter will be explored during the public hearing.
7.3.3 Separation of functions
The Commission's investigation has underlined the obvious point that it is inappropriate for the same body to have responsibility for marketing and selling arms on the one hand, and for controlling and regulating arms exports on the other.
Accordingly, at an administrative level the control function should reside in a body other than Armscor. This will require an amendment to the Armscor Act.
At ministerial level, it would similarly be inappropriate for the controlling authority to have an immediate and direct interest in promoting arms sales.
There are several reasons for this recommendation. First, Armscor acts in the name of South Africa and employs public funds in the form of a substantial state subsidy (R190 million in the 1995/6 Defence Budget).
Second, the principles of openness and accountability are enshrined in the new Constitution. The applicability of these principles to arms trade is heightened by the political sensitivity of the subject.
Third, the Commission's investigation has highlighted the importance of independent scrutiny and oversight of arms trade. Institutional irresponsibility and individual mischief may occur in any circumstances, but they may flourish in an atmosphere of secrecy.
Fourth, there is an international tendency towards greater transparency in conventional arms sales. This tendency has led to the establishment of the United Nations Arms Register. Fifth, at a pragmatic level there are few secrets in the world of arms trade. Given the expertise of the arms trade research community, the sophistication of intelligence communities and the vigilance of the press, the details of international arms transactions are inevitably revealed to a broad audience.
The Commission is in no doubt that Parliament should play an active role in the control and regulation of arms exports. The nature of this role requires further deliberation and may be addressed at the public hearing.
7.6.1 The Attorney General should conduct an investigation with a view to prosecuting Mr M T S Vermaak on charges of fraud and theft.
7.6.2 The Attorney General should investigate the prosecution of Mr Vermaak for refusing to answer questions which the Commission found to lie outside the legitimate exercise of the right of silence against self-incrimination.
7.6.3 Armscor should terminate the employment of Brigadier A Savides.
7.6.4 Armscor should terminate the employment of Mr P C Smith, or any contract in terms of which he is engaged as a consultant to Armscor.
Throughout the proceedings we were struck by the detached way in which witnesses described their business of selling weapons. We wondered whether any of them had ever given thought to who used the weapons, against whom, for what reason, and with what consequences.
Finally, we put these questions to Vermaak. He told us frankly that he never thought about such issues. He was a salesman after all, not a politician.
Most of the other Armscor witnesses and the foreign actors involved in the Lebanon transaction appeared to share this approach. Our story has revolved around the exploits of these characters.
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people killed or hurt by South African weapons were also intimately involved in the story. They had no voice in our inquiry and have no name in this report.
Yet at all times in our investigation and subsequent deliberations, we have felt their presence like the burden of a shadow.
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