Read the full judgment on Saflii

[1] Historically, the criterion adopted by our courts in regard to the question of leave to appeal was whether there was a reasonable prospect of success. The benchmark now finds legislative expression in sec 17 of the Superior Courts Act[1] which provides that leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.

[2] Procedurally, the grounds upon which an application for leave to appeal are predicated are required to be clearly and succinctly tabulated in unambiguous terms to enable both the prosecuting authority and the court to determine its parameters. The first applicant’s notice of application for leave to appeal is unfortunately not a model of clarity and offends against the spirit and purport of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act[2]. It constitutes an amalgam of inane and vituperative comment, and is moreover interspersed with belligerent innuendo. Such deficiencies ordinarily warrant that the application be struck from the roll but to do so would ultimately serve no useful purpose and merely delay the inevitable outcome of this application.

[3] The grounds upon which leave is sought on behalf of the second and third applicants are, in essence a regurgitation of the submissions advanced at the trial, matters which were fully addressed in my judgment.