White Paper

A
Minerals and Mining Policy
for
South Africa


October 1998

Department of Minerals and Energy
Private Bag X59
Pretoria
0001
Tel: (012) 317-9000
Fax: (012) 322-3416

 

Contents

Introduction Chapter Four: 
Environmental Management
Chapter One: 
Business Climate and Mineral Development
Chapter Five: 
Regional Co-opertion
Chapter Two: 
Participation in Ownership and Management
Chapter Six: 
Governance
Chapter Three: 
People issues
Appendix
List of Abbreviations and Names
Legislation Cited
Commissions Cited

 

Introduction

South Africa’s mining industry is supported by an extensive and diversified resource base, and has since its inception been a cornerstone of South Africa’s economy. The changes which have come about in our country make it necessary to prepare the industry for the challenges which are facing all South Africans as we approach the twenty-first century.

The review process has taken account of the problems and opportunities confronting the mining industry against the backdrop of changes in the country’s policy and institutional environment. In particular, the passage to the Mine Health and Safety Act of 1996 will have far-reaching impacts on the industry in the areas of health and safety and human resource development. Changes in labour legislation and the introduction of employment equity legislation, as well as the reform of the environmental regulatory system, create a dynamic context for this policy review. Beyond our borders increasing competition, both in commodity markets and for investment, from mineral-rich countries that have liberalised their economic and political systems to attract investment are significant influences on the policy reform process.

The policy review process took account of problems and opportunities facing the mining industry. The gold mining sector, particularly, is re-examining its production techniques in the light of a static gold price, deep levels of working and higher operating costs. Undoubtedly some of the older mines are reaching the end of their lives, leading to job losses and the other attendant negative effects of downscaling, but these problems are being tackled energetically within the sector, through restructuring of mining groups, technological advances and innovative methods of improving productivity. Apart from gold mining, there are many other minerals being produced, for some of which South Africa is the leading producer and holder of reserves. The White Paper also has a chapter on small-scale mining which is intended to encourage the small and medium sized operator, to the benefit of employment and the overall economy. Government mineral policy had to take account of the international nature of the mining industry in order to ensure the continuing prosperity of our own mines.

In September 1995, the Mineral Policy Process Steering Committee was formed consisting of representatives from both the executive and legislative branches of Government, as well as organised business and organised labour. The mandate given to the Steering Committee was to conduct an extensive consultative process to canvass stakeholder opinion for the preparation of a new minerals and mining policy for South Africa. In November 1995, a Discussion Document on Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa was published and extensive written comments were received. Four hundred people attended public mineral policy workshops held in March 1996, at which a wide range of issues were debated. Bilateral meetings were held with inter alia provincial governments, ministries, departments, investment analysts, foreign-owned mining companies and environmental interest groups. In addition, written submissions were received from several interested parties during the consultative process. The end result of this, the most comprehensive consultative process yet conducted for a review of a minerals and mining policy in South Africa, was a document containing proposals that have been drafted after careful consideration of a very broad range of views. The submission of the document to the Minister of Minerals and Energy concluded the task of the Steering Committee.

The Minister requested the Department of Minerals and Energy to consider certain adjustments to the document in line with his budget speech in the National Assembly on 21 May 1997. The views of stakeholders, such as small-scale miners, environmental groupings and communities, who felt that they were not properly consulted by the Steering Committee, as well as the outcomes of other policy processes, were also considered in the final editing of the document. The document was then ratified by the Minister of Minerals and Energy and Cabinet as a Green Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa.

The Green Paper was published on 3 February 1998 and the public was invited to respond not later than 31 March 1998. The Department of Minerals and Energy received more than a hundred written submissions from the public, and in addition, submissions were received from interested parties during public hearings held by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Minerals and Energy.

The Department of Minerals and Energy established working groups to consider the various inputs and to effect appropriate amendments. The document was then ratified by the Minister of Minerals and Energy as a Draft White Paper. The Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs requested further amendments, whereafter Cabinet on 23 September 1998 approved the document as a White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa.

The Draft White Paper is organised into six main themes:

Each chapter and subchapter contains a general background to the particular issue, a statement of intent (policy objective), the views of the different stakeholders and, finally, the policy statements by Government.

Policy making occurs in a dynamic setting, and minerals and mining policy, which is necessarily broad in its scope, needs to be co-ordinated with other policies which properly fall within the remit of other forums and spheres of government. Reference is therefore made in the document to matters that are being considered by other policy forums, and policies developed by other spheres of government.


Chapter One:

Business Climate and Mineral Development

This chapter covers seven topics relevant to the climate for mining business and mineral development.

Section 1.1 stresses the importance of a stable macro environment for economic growth in which measures that encourage investment in mining, as in other industries, are adopted.

Section 1.2 is concerned with fiscal policy as an integral part of mining and minerals policy. Several aspects of exploration and mining which have a major bearing on fiscal policy are raised together with policy statements that are prerequisites for minerals development. The Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (Katz Commission) is currently considering mining taxation and the taxation of mineral rights. In due course the Commission’s findings should be considered in conjunction with the broad objectives of minerals and mining policy. The topics of taxation of mineral rights and allocations from national revenue collection to provinces in which mining takes place are raised in section 1.3 and in chapter 6, respectively.

Section 1.3 deals with mineral rights and prospecting information. The nature, scope and content of rights to prospect and mine are central to any policy on minerals and mining. It has been contended that the system of mining and mineral rights currently in place in South Africa has frustrated new investment. Equally, however, others have argued that the legislative framework has helped materially in the exploration and mining of South Africa’s unique mineral deposits. In reaching policy conclusions Government weighed these and other contending views. In order to improve current arrangements, Government seeks changes and adjustments that are conducive to increased minerals investment and address past racial inequity without disturbing investor confidence in the mining industry in South Africa. Several new policy statements are made.

Section 1.4 focuses on small-scale mining and a number of policy statements are made directed at encouraging and facilitating the development of the small-scale exploration and mining sectors.

Section 1.5 looks at mineral beneficiation in broad outline. Several policies aimed at the development of South Africa’s mineral wealth where this is economically justifiable are given.

Section 1.6 lists policy that endorses market principles and a supportive role for Government in the area of mineral marketing.

The last section focuses on research and development infrastructure conducive to the optimal development of the country’s resources. A number of policies directed at stimulating such development and ensuring the continuing competitiveness of the minerals industry are given.

1.1 Investment and Regulatory Climate

1.1.1 Background

1.1.2 Intent

Government will create a stable macro-environment that supports economic development at national, provincial and local level and in which business, subject to appropriate regulation, can operate profitably, be internationally competitive and satisfy their shareholders’ and employees’ expectations. In this way Government will encourage investment in mining as in other industries.

In addition, Government will facilitate access to business opportunities and resources to those previously excluded, including helping equip such individuals/groups with the necessary skills to enable them to compete effectively in the market-place.

1.1.3 Policy Requirements

1.1.3.1 Views of the investment community and mining companies

1.1.3.2 Other views

1.1.4 Government Policy

1.2 Taxation

1.2.1 Background

1.2.1.1 The current system of mining tax

The taxation of mining activities follows the normal rules of taxation, subject to the following particular features:

a) Income

A mining company may derive income from mining operations and non-mining operations. Different rules and tax rates are applied according to the nature of such income. Differences also apply according to whether the mining income is derived from gold or other operations.

b) Deduction of expenditure

A mining company incurs a wide range of expenditure. Some of this is in the nature of current expenditure (deductible in terms of the general deduction formula), and some in the nature of capital expenditure. The capital expenditure provisions of the Income Tax Act provide for the immediate deduction of capital expenditure and of expenditure on prospecting and incidental operations. Capital expenditure includes expenditure on shaft sinking, mine equipment, development, general administration and management. Some assets such as housing for residential accommodation, motor vehicles for private use of employees, and some railway lines and pipelines qualify only for a partial annual redemption.

c) Ring-fencing

The Income Tax Act applies a ring-fence to the taxable income of a mine, by restricting the deduction of its capital expenditure to the taxable income from mining on that mine. In certain circumstances the ring-fence may be breached by up to 25% of taxable income to allow a company to apply a portion of its expenditure on one mine against the taxable income of another of its mines.

d) Capital allowance

To encourage high capital investment during times of inflation, the Income Tax Act provides, in the case of gold and natural oil, for a capital allowance, calculated as a percentage per annum of total expenditure, which is transformed into a deduction against current capital expenditure.

e) Environmental funds

Mining companies are required by law to make financial provision for mining-related environmental rehabilitation. If in the form of a trust fund, the Income Tax Act permits the deduction of this provision from income, and exempts from tax the receipts and accruals of registered environmental funds established to hold these provisions.

f) Tax rate and formula tax

Non-mining income, as well as mining income not derived from gold mining is taxed at the flat company rate. Income from gold mining is taxed on a formula basis. The effect of the formula is that gold mines which are marginally profitable pay tax at a lower rate than the normal company rate, or no tax at all, and more profitable gold mines pay tax at a rate greater than the normal company rate. The intention of this is to encourage the mining of marginal orebodies, while retaining an overall tax rate for the gold industry at approximately the same rate as the standard company rate. The formula tax, therefore, has the effect that a gold mine can continue to operate at marginal profit levels without paying tax until it regains profitability sufficient to attract tax. In this way it preserves employment in an industry which has a large number of employees and is prone to fluctuations in profitability.

g) Royalties

For purposes of this chapter, royalties are not regarded as a tax and are discussed in section 1.3.

h) Other

No severance tax is imposed. Mining companies are liable, in certain circumstances, to the secondary tax on companies. Indirect taxes paid by mining companies include value-added tax, regional services levies, transfer duties, customs and excise duties and donations tax. (In the case of value-added tax, a mining company does not pay the tax on its export sales, since all exports are zero-rated, and the mine is entitled to a refund in respect of all input taxes paid by it.)

1.2.1.2 Aspects of exploration and mining which have a bearing on mining tax

Any mining taxation system needs to recognise the following aspects:

  1. The risk to reward ratio in exploration is high, and mining itself is attended by a high degree of geological, project and market risks.
  2. Particularly in big-scale and deep-level operations large amounts of capital are required. This capital is at high risk over long periods.
  3. Mining companies are usually required to provide their own infrastructures because of the remote location of mineral deposits.
  4. Mining involves the realisation of a wasting asset and the mine has little or no residual value. Continuing investment is therefore necessary in exploration, the acquisition of rights to mine and the development of new mines. All these activities form an essential part of the mining business cycle.
  5. Increasing the cost of mining from whatever sources, has the effect of increasing the cut-off grade of ore, thus reducing the life of a mine and sterilising mineral resources.
  6. Legitimate expenses should be treated in an appropriate way, the efficient use of resources should be encouraged and not retarded, and the system should not be subject to frequent change, change at short notice or change with retrospective effect.
  7. In view of international competition for investment funds, the tax system should be designed to assist in attracting and retaining investment in South Africa.

1.2.2 Intent

Government will maintain and promote a stable legal and fiscal climate that does not inhibit the mining industry from making the fullest possible contribution to the national, provincial and local economy.

1.2.3 Policy Requirements

1.2.3.1 Views of the investment community and mining companies

  1. There must be a consistent and stable fiscal regime that compares favourably with those in other jurisdictions.
  2. The tax system should be such as to allow for attractive returns on capital.
  3. The tax system should recognise, through appropriate measures, the risks inherent in mining, such as high capital commitment, long lead times, geological uncertainty and cyclical and volatile markets.
  4. Mineral beneficiation projects share many of the risks referred to above.
  5. Mines should be taxed on profits and not in a way which increases costs.
  6. The total tax burden is highly relevant to investment decisions so the levels and structures of national, provincial and local taxes, levies and imposts should be assessed in their entirety. The industry should be consulted when decisions regarding mining taxation are to be made.
  7. The tax system should not discourage, in particular through ring-fencing, the use of the financial strengths of an existing company to invest in the establishment of new mines.
  8. Severance taxes should not be imposed.

1.2.3.2 Other views

  1. The mineral industry should make its rightful contribution to tax revenues, both through taxes and royalties.
  2. The tax system should encourage the adding of value to raw materials.
  3. Levies and taxes should be used to fund environmental rehabilitation of land affected by past and current mining activities.
  4. Inter-sectoral equity in terms of taxation should be achieved.
  5. Consideration should be given to using tax measures to improve access to mineral rights.
  6. The tax system should promote the optimal utilisation of South Africa’s mineral resources.
  7. The tax system should be used to empower the provinces to influence the economic development process and to deal with the effects of downscaling.

1.2.4 Government Policy

In developing mining tax policy, Government is committed to ensuring that the tax regime will be consistent and stable and that the aggregate rate of tax will be internationally competitive.

The Katz Commission is investigating mining tax in South Africa. The Commission’s recommendations will need to be considered in conjunction with the policy options set out here. It is understood that the Commission will be considering a number of tax issues, for example:

    1. redemption of capital expenditure in mining;
    2. capital allowances for gold mining;
    3. ring-fencing;
    4. tax deductions for exploration;
    5. a tax on mineral rights; and
    6. the extension of the gold-mining formula taxation to other types of mining.

1.3 Mineral Rights and Prospecting Information

1.3.1 Background

1.3.1.1 Nature and content of mineral rights

The South African system of mineral rights has developed over many years to its present state under a dual system in which some mineral rights are owned by the State and some by private holders. The State controls the exercise of prospecting and mining rights under the administrative system of prospecting permits and mining authorisations referred to below.

Under common law, ownership of the land includes ownership of the minerals in the land. The law developed in such a way that the right to minerals in respect of land can be separated from the title to the land, for example upon original grant of the land or by subsequent transactions. The owner of land from which mineral rights have not been separated may separate the mineral rights from the land ownership by ceding them to another person or by reserving them to himself or herself. The mineral rights are then held under separate title which may include all the minerals in the land concerned or only a particular mineral or minerals.

Mineral rights constitute rights in land. They are officially registered by the State, and are a form of property protected under the Constitution.

Mineral rights are tradeable. They have been and continue to be the subject of considerable financial investment that has resulted in the acquisition and registration of rights by prospectors and miners over relevant areas of interest.

Mineral rights represent a parcel of rights including the rights to prospect and mine together with ancillary rights to do what is reasonably necessary in order to effectively carry on prospecting or mining operations. The holder of mineral rights may grant subordinate rights to prospect under a prospecting contract or grant subordinate rights to mine under a mineral lease or may sell or otherwise dispose of the rights.

The mineral rights owner is compensated by the exploiter of the minerals for the depletion of the non-renewable resource through the payment of royalties. It is generally accepted that in principle royalties are charged on production or revenue.

1.3.1.2 Ownership of mineral rights

The two main categories of owners of mineral rights are the State and private holders. Unfortunately, the current deeds registry system does not provide reliable overall figures indicating what percentage of the mineral rights is owned by each of these categories of holders. Statistics kept by the Department of Minerals and Energy since 1993 indicate that with the exclusion of the coastal zone and sea areas, the mineral rights in respect of which prospecting permits and mining authorisations have been issued are divided in the proportion 1/3 state-owned and 2/3 privately owned. This does not necessarily imply that for the country as a whole, including the coastal zone and sea areas, mineral rights are held in these proportions, but illustrates that the private sector is a substantial holder of mineral rights. A distinguishing feature of the South African mining industry at present is that almost all privately-owned mineral rights are in white hands.

In the former TBVC states and self-governing territories mineral rights were largely owned by those states and territories but, for the purposes of prospecting and mining legislation, administered as if they were privately owned. It has been estimated that mineral rights in respect of some 19 million hectares, which represent 15% of the land area of the Republic, fall into this category, including mineral rights held by Government in trust for specific tribes and communities. This category also includes those mineral rights which vest in the Lebowa Minerals Trust under the Lebowa Minerals Trust Act, 1987, and the Ngonyama Trust under the Kwa-Zulu Ngonyama Trust Act, 1994. In terms of the present Constitution, mineral rights in this category vest in the State except for those held by the abovementioned two trusts as well as mineral rights held in trust for specific tribes.

The acquisition of mineral rights by the governments of the TBVC states and the self-governing territories was a result of the implementation of the South African Development and Trust Act, 1936, which provided for the vesting of these rights in the SA Development Trust (SADT) on behalf of Blacks. In terms of the Constitution of Self-governing Territories Act, 1971 and various statutes, these rights were transferred to the governments concerned.

Provision was also made for the vesting of trusteeship in the South African Government in cases where land together with mineral rights held by communities was incorporated into the jurisdictional areas of the governments of the TBVC states and the self-govering territories as well as land together with mineral rights which fell outside the jurisdictional areas of the aforementioned governments.

The State is the owner of mineral rights in various areas of surveyed and unsurveyed State land as well as in privately-owned land where mineral rights have specifically been reserved to the State. Under prior legislation the latter class of land was known as "alienated State land" in respect of which prospecting rights together with the exclusive right to obtain mining rights were vested in the landowners or their nominees. According to section 43 of the Minerals Act, such rights were replaced with similar rights for a period of only five years which ended on 31 December 1996.

Mineral rights in certain rural areas, situated mainly in Namaqualand and in the Northern Cape (governed by the Rural Areas Act, 1974), are regarded as state-owned for the purposes of the minerals legislation. However, management boards in those areas exercised through the years extensive authority in respect of the granting of prospecting and mining rights. These management boards have after April 1994 been replaced by transitional local councils.

Provision has been made in the Constitution read with the Restitution of Land Rights Act, for relief to persons or communities who were dispossessed of rights in land under any racially discriminatory law after 19 June 1913. Mineral rights are rights in land and can therefore be subject to the Act.

There is an active market and continual movement in mineral rights, some 6 000 mineral cessions and prospecting contracts having been registered in deeds offices in South Africa for the five year period from 1991 to 1996.

1.3.1.3 Provisions for intervention by the State

In addition to the modes of acquisition of mineral rights referred to in paragraph 1.3.1.1 iv) above, the State can intervene under section 17 of the Minerals Act to grant prospecting rights in circumstances where an intending prospector cannot trace the holder of the mineral rights or where an heir has not taken cession of the mineral rights in an estate. According to section 24 of the Minerals Act, mineral rights and other rights in land may be expropriated in the public interest against compensation payable by the person requesting expropriation. It is therefore possible to expropriate the right to prospect and the right to mine. Under the current law, the State may, by virtue of section 18 of the Minerals Act, conduct an investigation on any land to establish the presence, nature and extent of minerals in or on that land, provided that such an investigation is in the national interest.

1.3.1.4 Other jurisdictions

South Africa and the USA are two of the few major mining countries which have a dual system of public and private ownership of mineral rights. In most other countries the right to minerals is vested in the State. However, in some countries, of which Chile and Australia are good examples, the state system is such as to allow a mining company de facto permanent title to such rights.

In jurisdictions where mineral rights are publicly owned, a system of licensing is usually applied which provides security of tenure sufficient to attract exploration and mining. Many countries, notably in South America but increasingly elsewhere, which employ licensing systems for publicly-owned mineral rights, have successfully attracted large and continuing investment in exploration and mining.

1.3.1.5 The exercise of prospecting and mining rights in South Africa

In South Africa, the mineral right owner is not permitted to prospect or mine for minerals without having obtained a prospecting permit or mining authorisation from the State. These licences are not transferable. They are aimed at controlling prospecting and mining, having regard to considerations of health and safety, environmental rehabilitation and responsible extraction of the ore. Conversely, a prospecting permit or mining authorisation cannot be granted unless the applicant is the holder of the relevant mineral right or has acquired the holder’s consent to prospect or mine.

Reconnaissance work can and does take place without the necessity to hold a permit, provided the work does not fall within the definition of ‘prospecting’ in the Minerals Act.

1.3.1.6 Records of prospecting work

According to section 19 of the Minerals Act, the holder of any prospecting permit or mining authorisation is obliged to furnish certain prospecting information to the State within one year after completing the digging of any excavation or drilling a borehole for the purpose of prospecting. The information must be kept confidential by the State. When 15 years have elapsed from the date of the completion of the excavation or borehole concerned, the State may disclose the information unless any person with a pecuniary interest in the excavation or borehole satisfies the State that his or her interest will be prejudiced by such disclosure.

In most other jurisdictions confidentiality against disclosure to third parties of basic prospecting information furnished to the State is afforded during the currency of the prospecting licence or for very short periods. In such jurisdictions, where public ownership of mineral rights prevails, the policy is directed at assembling a public record of exploration work as a resource for future exploration.

1.3.2 Intent

Government will:

  1. promote exploration and investment leading to increased mining output and employment;
  2. ensure security of tenure in respect of prospecting and mining operations;
  3. prevent hoarding of mineral rights and sterilisation of mineral resources;
  4. address past racial inequities by ensuring that those previously excluded from participating in the mining industry gain access to mineral resources or benefit from the exploitation thereof;
  5. recognise the State as custodian of the nation’s mineral resources for the benefit of all;
  6. take reasonable legislative and other measures, to foster conditions conducive to mining which will enable entrepreneurs to gain access to mineral resources on an equitable basis; and
  7. bring about changes in the current system of mineral rights ownership with as little disruption to the mining industry as possible.

1.3.3 The Present System: Views For and Against

Many differing views have been expressed in support of or against the current arrangements in respect of mineral rights and prospecting information.

1.3.3.1 Private ownership

Proponents of private ownership maintain that:

  1. It has been and remains ideally suited to effective utilisation of South Africa’s distinctive ore bodies, for example, by providing the absolute security of tenure necessary in the development of very deep gold mining along the West Wits line. The capacity to retain mineral rights securely for the development of new mining ventures when these become possible is a positive feature of private ownership.
  2. Holding of mineral rights is a critical parameter in the valuation of a mining company by international investors. The company is valued according to its future potential ("blue sky") which depends on an ongoing flow of new projects derived from such mineral holdings.
  3. Private ownership of mineral rights based in the law of property is preferable to a pure licensing system of rights based in administrative law and involving administrative discretion. Private ownership affords the absolute long-term security of tenure that attracts investment in exploration, mining and marketing.
  4. South Africa has the ability to produce at a level far exceeding the world’s ability to consume several commodities such as manganese, chrome, platinum and vanadium. Mineral rights in such commodities are held as part of long-term mining plans. Owners have a record of having expanded production in line with growth in demand and have also invested substantial funds in new product development and other forms of promotion to foster market growth.
  5. Private ownership is consistent with a market economy and with an international trend towards reducing the direct role of Government in the mining industry.

Private ownership encourages trade in and utilisation of mineral rights, as is evident from the figures referred to in paragraph 1.3.1.2 above.

Critics of private ownership of mineral rights argue that:

  1. Minerals are part of the nation’s endowment so that the State is the rightful custodian of this endowment.
  2. South Africa (along with the USA) is out of step with other major mining countries, where public ownership of mineral rights has led to successful exploration and mining industries.
  3. Private ownership of mineral rights suppresses exploration activity as well as the opportunity for alternative views to be taken of the economics of mining an unexploited ore body.
  4. It allows hoarding of mineral rights. As such, the system is a barrier to entry against potential investors.
  5. Complex and fragmented mineral right holdings and the multiplicity of owners in South Africa militate against new investment by prospective new entrants who encounter difficulty and cost in identifying holders of mineral rights and obtaining mineral rights.
  6. The system is inaccessible to small-scale miners, and inhibits the development of a vibrant junior mining sector.
  7. Private ownership of mineral rights limits equal and equitable access to mineral rights and resources.

1.3.3.2 State ownership

Those in support of the transfer of privately-held mineral rights to the State contend that:

  1. Transfer of mineral rights to the State will release mineral terrains for new entrants, which will stimulate private sector activity.
  2. State control of mineral rights will remove difficulties in cost and delays surrounding fragmented mineral right holdings.
  3. A system of state-owned mineral rights would enable the State to enforce the submission and release of exploration information, thereby avoiding duplication of exploration activities.
  4. State ownership of mineral rights is more prevalent in the world than is private ownership of mineral rights.
  5. State ownership will prevent the hoarding of mineral rights and allow equal and equitable access to potential investors, in particular small-scale miners.

Contentions raised against a transfer of mineral rights to the State are that:

  1. Transfer of mineral rights to the State will require the payment of compensation, which would be an inappropriate use of the State’s limited financial resources.
  2. The blanket transfer of mineral rights to the State could easily lead to administrative difficulties in a system not geared to the management of mineral rights, extensive delays and hence a loss of investor confidence that could seriously damage the South African mining industry.
  3. There is no indication that the transfer of mineral rights to the State will automatically result in more successful exploration and mining. It is argued that in South Africa there is evidence to the contrary in that state ownership of mineral rights has made these rights subject to policies that have impeded rather than promoted mineral development. As indicated above, it has been estimated that two-thirds of the mineral rights in respect of which prospecting and mining activities are conducted are privately held. Management of deposits that will be brought to account in the future requires a long-term perspective attuned to changes in technology and markets that is more likely to be found in the private sector.
  4. State ownership based in a system of administrative law offers less security than a system of private ownership based in the law of property, and is susceptible to inefficiency and corruption.
  5. A bias towards state ownership would run counter to the Government’s philosophy and policy on competition and privatisation.
  6. Prospecting information and mineral rights are separate forms of property. Ownership of the latter does not automatically confer title to the former.

1.3.3.3 Disclosure of prospecting information

In relation to prospecting information there are broadly two contending views. On the one hand, it is argued that more data on prospecting results should be made publicly available as a resource for future exploration efforts by new prospectors and prospectors with new techniques. Against this it is held that prospecting data are the product of effort and investment by prospecting companies, the data constitute property that can be bought and sold and an incentive should be provided for the prospecting effort to be undertaken by protecting the confidentiality of the data for a reasonable period. As a further complication, contentions in support of the public release of prospecting data after fixed periods ignore the nature of prospecting programmes that do not have a readily determinable point of completion.

1.3.4 Tax on Mineral Rights

One view is that a tax should be imposed on privately held mineral rights to open access to such rights. Such a tax would not be payable by operating mines or where the retention of mineral rights is part of a long-term mining strategy that is in the national interest, or where there is active exploration taking place. If the owner of the mineral rights is unable or unwilling to pay a mineral rights tax, the rights may either be sold to a willing purchaser or at no cost to the owner be transferred to the State.

Opponents of such a tax reject the view that the rights would be better utilised if transferred to the State. They have also contended that it would be contrary to the Constitution to use a tax to induce taxpayers to surrender assets to the State without payment for these assets. In addition to questions about the constitutionality of such a tax, and whether it will achieve its objective, opponents of such a tax contend that there are practical difficulties in applying such a tax; for example, how could this be done equitably across a range of mineral rights where commercial values may differ greatly and which may be held by a multiplicity of holders? They argue that the tax would be contentious, wrongly burden the holding of rights intended for future use, raise the investment threshold, delay investment decisions, generate uncertainty about mineral right holdings and require considerable administrative effort. It could become a source of litigation, for example in so far as its application to property held in trust is concerned. In addition, such a tax directed at a policy purpose, as opposed to revenue generation, would be inconsistent with the guiding principles articulated by the Katz Commission and hence detract from the evolving coherence of the country’s fiscal policy.

It is also contended that, if a tax on mineral rights were introduced, expenditure on market development (such as R & D on possible new products and promotion of long-term growth in the market) incurred by the taxpayer should be allowed as a credit against the tax liability, in addition to the current value of past prospecting-related expenditures. Proponents of this view observe that ownership of mineral rights affords the long-term predictability of security of tenure on which major commitment to future development depends.

1.3.5 The Need and Capacity for Change

Whilst the Government recognises that the system currently in place has some positive features, it concludes that the status quo must be changed with a view to achieving the policy objectives set forth in paragraph 1.3.2 above. Government believes that changes will be implemented on an incremental basis. Notwithstanding changes to the current mineral rights dispensation, the State shall guarantee security of tenure.

1.3.6 Government Policy

1.3.6.1 Ownership of mineral rights

1.3.6.2 A new system for granting access to mineral rights

As a transitional arrangement in persuance of the objective stated in section 1.3.6.1 ii above, the following new system for granting access to mineral rights will apply:

  1. The right to prospect and to mine for all minerals will vest in the State.
  2. Government will develop detailed legislative proposals for the introduction of the new system of access to all mineral rights. In developing such proposals provision will be made for:
    1. guaranteeing the continuation of current prospecting and mining operations in accordance with the "use-it and keep-it" principle;
    2. a transitional period to allow holders of prospecting, mining and mineral rights to licence the operations referred to in (a) above, as well as extensions which are necessary to provide for the continuation of such operations;
    3. a transitional period to allow holders of prospecting, mining and mineral rights to licence bona fide intended prospecting and mining operations in cases where (a) and (b) above do not apply;
    4. a general notification to allow holders of prospecting, mining and mineral rights to substantiate in respect of areas other than those contemplated in (a), (b) and (c) above, why licences for prospecting and mining should not be granted to another party in accordance with the "use-it and keep-it" principle;
    5. granting of prospecting and mining licences to applicants without the consent of the holders of prospecting, mining or mineral rights who have not been licensed in terms of (b), (c) and (d) above;
    6. security of tenure by granting prospecting and mining licences for specified periods which are capable of cancellation or revocation only for material breach of the terms and conditions of the licence;
    7. registerable prospecting and mining licences which will be transferable with the consent of the State;
    8. the holder of a prospecting licence to be entitled to progress to a mining licence on compliance with prescribed criteria;
    9. annual minimum work and investment requirements to discourage the unproductive holding of prospecting and mining licences;
    10. a retention licence which may, upon written application, be granted to an applicant in cases where the applicant, having explored the area and established the existence of an ore reserve which is, at the time of completion of the exploration programme, considered to be uneconomical due to prevailing commodity prices (market conditions) or where the exploitation thereof might lead to market disruption not in the national interest. Such licence will enable the holder thereof to retain the reserve without the commitment to minimum work and investment requirements. The licence will be granted for a limited period in respect of the property concerned;
    11. precluding the granting of a prospecting or mining licence over an area in respect of which a currently valid prospecting retention or mining licence is held for the same mineral;
    12. predetermined standard terms and conditions, for all prospecting and mining licences;
    13. the reduction, as far as possible, of discretionary powers by applying standard requirements or objective criteria;
    14. payment of prospecting fees or royalties by the holder of the prospecting or mining licence to the registered holder of mineral rights. Such prospecting fees or royalties will be determined by the State after consultation with the registered holder of the mineral rights. In determining such fees and royalties, prospecting fees and royalties payable to the State will be used as a guide. The quantum of prospecting fees and royalties will be internationally competitive and will not inhibit the initiation of new projects;
    15. payment of a surface rental, determined by the State after consultation with the landowner, by the holder of a prospecting or mining licence to the registered land owner; and
    16. the processes of considering the granting of a prospecting or mining licence and the approval of an environmental management programme to run concurrently and to grant the prospecting or mining licence and approve the environmental management programme simultaneously.
  3. Persons, including their successors in title, or assigns or nominees, who could lay claim, under section 43 of the Minerals Act, 1991, to the exclusive right to prospect for a mineral to which the right was reserved to the State, shall after the lapsing of the period that ended on 31 December 1996, or the approved longer period, no longer be deemed to be the holder of such right.

1.3.6.3 Reconnaissance work

A non-exclusive permission for broad-based, non-destructive exploration will be implemented. Such permissions will be for a limited period in respect of the area required. A reconnaissance permission will not entitle the holder thereof to a prospecting or mining licence.

1.3.6.4 Disclosure of prospecting information

It will be a condition of any prospecting licence or reconnaissance permission that all information and data from prospecting shall be submitted to the State after completion or abandonment of any particular prospecting activity. The State will release such information to the public at any time from the date of submission of such information unless the prospector retains a prospecting retention or mining licence in respect of the land concerned or an application therefor is pending. Such information submitted to the State will be used to create a national exploration data base.

1.3.6.5 Data base of mineral rights holdings

Government will through the Departments of Land Affairs and Minerals and Energy seek to obtain the aditional resources which will be necessary in order to compile a readily-accessible data base.

1.3.6.6 Disincentive for non-utilisation of mineral rights

Government will investigate the feasibility of imposing disincentives which would be intended to discourage the non-utilisation of privately-owned mineral rights. Such disincentives will not apply in respect of areas where currently valid prospecting, retention or mining licences are held. Such investigation, which will be undertaken by the Department of Minerals and Energy in association with the Department of Finance, will take into account the findings of the Katz Commission.

1.4 Small-scale Mining

1.4.1 Background

A flourishing small-business sector usually increases competitiveness in an economy and is an efficient vehicle for the creation of jobs. The fall in the real price of minerals has led to the closure of numerous large-scale operations. Well-managed small-scale mining has the potential to take over and mine economically where large-scale mining is unable to operate profitably. In this way small-scale mining can make a meaningful contribution to the total global production.

The development of small-scale mining alongside mining in underdeveloped regions would also increase the portfolio of minerals being produced and could lead to the exploitation of resources that would otherwise be sterilised. In addition, it could provide a channel for increased access to the mining industry.

For the sake of clarity, the concept of small-scale and artisanal mining needs to be defined. There are significant potential environmental and health and safety problems associated with artisanal mining, which is often the only means of subsistence available to individuals. By artisanal mining is meant small-scale mining involving the extraction of minerals with the simplest of tools, on a subsistence level. There is no generally agreed definition of the term small-scale mining - although it is often defined with regard to mine’s output, capital investment, numbers employed or managerial structure. Small-scale mining is a relative term; thus the choice of limiting criteria to distinguish between small and larger-scale mining (such as production rate, capital and labour employed) will differ from commodity to commodity and from country to country. In South Africa, small-scale mining ranges from very small operations that provide subsistence living (artisanal mining), to the "junior" companies for which revenue is such that subsistence living is not the prime motivator.

In many countries with large mining industries, both small and large exploration and mining companies compete aggressively and successfully side by side. This allows for the exploitation of small (low capital) and large (high capital) projects and provides opportunities for more entrepreneurial operators.

Worldwide, it is apparent that many new and major ore deposits have been located by small and lean exploration companies, who make decisions efficiently and rapidly. Typically these companies locate deposits and either sell them off to larger companies or, because they wish to be involved in the mining phase, enter into joint ventures with larger companies which provide expertise and/or capital to develop the project. This provides a healthy synergy between large and small operators.

The interests of the country and the community demand that all forms of mining, whether large, small or artisanal, should be subject to the same requirements in respect of licensing, safety, health and the environment.

Small-scale mining already takes place on a sizeable scale in South Africa. Opportunities for small-scale mining projects are found mainly in gold, diamonds, coal, industrial minerals and in minerals derived from pegmatites. These opportunities are often confronted by problems, such as:

  1. access to mineral rights - the present South African mineral rights ownership system is seen by many as a major blockage in the development of small-scale mining.
  2. access to finance - financiers are seldom willing to participate in small-scale mining ventures which often provide limited security and financial returns.
  3. incoherent structure - there is a lack of appropriate structures that assist small-scale mining development.
  4. location of operations far from major markets.
  5. lack of management, marketing and technical skills - new small-scale mine operators face technical barriers to participate in mining, including lack of skills in dealing with aspects such as complex metallurgical processes, practical mining problems and business skills.

1.4.2 Intent

Government will encourage and facilitate the sustainable development of small-scale mining in order to ensure the optimal exploitation of small mineral deposits and to enable this sector to make a positive contribution to the national, provincial and local economy.

1.4.3 Policy Requirements

1.4.3.1 Views of small-scale miners

1.4.3.2 Other views

1.4.4 Government Policy

1.4.4.1 Mineral rights

Information on mineral rights and mineral deposits available for development will be made accessible, particularly for the benefit of small-scale miners.

1.4.4.2 Access to finance and technology

1.4.4.3 Regulation and administration

1.4.4.4 Environmental management

1.5 Mineral Beneficiation

1.5.1 Background

1.5.2 Intent

The aim of the policy will be to develop South Africa’s mineral wealth to its full potential and to the maximum benefit of the entire population. Government, therefore, will promote the establishment of secondary and tertiary mineral-based industries aimed at adding maximum value to raw materials.

1.5.3 Policy Requirements

1.5.3.1 Views of the mining industry and minerals industry

1.5.3.2 Other views

1.5.4 Government Policy

1.6 Minerals Marketing

1.6.1 Background

1.6.2 Intent

Mineral marketing policy will be based on market principles. Government’s role will be supportive, and intervention will generally be limited to addressing market failures.

1.6.3 Policy Requirements

1.6.3.1 Views in favour of state intervention in marketing

1.6.3.2 Views against state intervention in marketing

1.6.4 Government Policy

1.7 Research and Development

1.7.1 Background

1.7.2 Intent

Government will undertake and promote research, technology development and technology transfer that will stimulate the optimal development of the country’s resources in the longer term and ensure that the industry remains competitive.

1.7.3 Policy Requirements

1.7.3.1 Views of the minerals industry

1.7.3.2 Other views

1.7.4 Government Policy


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