CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGICALLY ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES & TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE SANDF

INTRODUCTION

Based on the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, the SANDF has defined a comprehensive list of technologies, systems and capabilities it considers ‘strategically essential’. The decline in the defence budget has, however, made it impossible to maintain all these required technologies and capabilities within the broader South African industrial base. In the foreseeable future it is also unlikely that armed conflict in the African environment will reach the level of sophistication or intensity requiring certain of these capabilities. The SANDF thus faces the dilemma of reconciling the likely needs of African conflict with the ideal of maintaining a broad spectrum of advanced technologies and capabilities within a very tight budget. South Africa’s defence related industries, in turn, must balance the ability to supply the likely needs of the SANDF with the need to compete effectively in the international market It is thus necessary to focus the state’s limited resources on those technologies and capabilities that satisfy the SANDF’s requirements, as well as on areas where the domestic defence related industry is internationally competitive.

There is a global trend toward the internationalisation of defence production. Weapons systems are increasingly being developed collaboratively across national boundaries and the ability to independently produce a main weapons system is becoming the exception rather than the rule. This will inevitably impact on the South Africa’s defence related industry. Both the SANDF and the relevant industries will have to accept that independence is rapidly being supplanted by interdependence, co-operation and collaboration. This again emphasises the need to focus the state’s resources in those areas where independence is truly of strategic importance, or where the industry is internationally competitive. This situation requires the SANDF to prioritise technologies and capabilities in order to make choices within the context of resource constraints.

The dual challenges of supplying the needs of South Africa’s security services and of competing successfully in the international market may not be identical or even entirely compatible. While success will only be achieved in the international market if technologically appropriate solutions can be provided at competitive prices, there is a strategic imperative for the local fulfilment of certain defence needs. In other areas local industry will have to compete with foreign suppliers.

The determination of local needs and strategic necessities and the implications for local industry must therefore be guided by South African defence policy, as contained in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. Relevant aspects have already been discussed in this document. This policy has also been elaborated in the strategic planning process of the DoD, which provides important lower level guidelines.

THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

The White Paper elucidates a broad concept of security, encompassing all aspects of human security, and states unambiguously that the greatest threats to the South African people are non-military (Chapter 2: par. 1 to 5). The analysis of the strategic environment (Chapter 4) indicates that, notwithstanding the uncertainties of a turbulent world, there is no apparent or foreseen conventional threat against South Africa. Instability and inter-state conflict originating in socio-economic factors, however, poses a considerable immediate and long-term threat to the region.

While military means admittedly do not provide a solution to these threats, military deployment is nevertheless often essential to create or maintain conditions in which solutions can be sought by other non-military means. The White Paper provides that `the primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression’ (Chapter 2: par. 11.9, reiterated in Chapter 5: par. 2). The White Paper does, however, acknowledge that `provision will have to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace support operations’ (Chapter 5: par. 3) and that `the acquisition and maintenance of military equipment shall take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations’ (Chapter 5: par. 26).

THE DEFENCE REVIEW AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Defence Review states that South Africa will employ the following strategies to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats (Chapter 2: par. 4):

political, economic and military co-operation with other states,
the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means, and
the deployment of the defence force (implicitly in a directly defensive role) as a measure of last resort.

The tasks of the defence force relating to self-defence are categorised under four broad headings (Chapter 3: par. 5, expanded in Chapter 8: par. 3):

Defence against external military threats.
Defence against internal threats to the constitutional order.
The promotion of regional security.

Only contingencies related to external military threats against South Africa are, however, considered to fall within the primary function of the SANDF. The force design subsequently approved in the Defence Review is based on the core-force principle and is intended to provide defence against a range of short-term contingencies, to provide early warning of conflict or crisis and to provide a nucleus for future growth (Chapter 3: par. 7). The secondary functions will be fulfilled chiefly with the capabilities vested in the core force but, as in the White Paper, it is acknowledged that these may have to be expanded accordingly (Chapter 3: par. 9.7-9.8).

In the analysis of contingencies (Chapter 3: par. 20 - 36) major contingencies like invasions and neutralising attacks are categorised as highly improbable but still requiring consideration. Defence against such high-level contingencies is, however, un-affordable within present budgetary limits, despite the considerable impact the higher level contingencies would have. The recommended growth core force design is accordingly based on lower level contingencies.

The Defence Review manifests a tension between the primary role orientation and the recognition of current realities. This is evident in its acknowledgement that capabilities required by the core force may have to be augmented to fulfil secondary functions. It also pragmatically accepts the lower level contingencies as a basis for force design in response to budgetary restrictions. It is evident that, notwithstanding the policy of primary function orientation, the realities of the environment - political and operational - are inducing the DoD to adopt an ever more pragmatic approach. This trend has important implications for force design as well as the design of force structure, support and technology requirements.

DEFENCE SCENARIOS

Global Developments in Defence

The defence debate in the developed world is currently dominated by the concept of a `Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) brought about by the general availability of advanced technology. Proponents of the RMA argue that developments in technology, particularly in the fields of sensors, precision guidance and command, control, communications, computing and intelligence (C4I) have enabled an ability to observe the battlefield with high resolution in real time, co-ordinate actions and deliver precision firepower as never before. This is held to herald a revolution in the organisation of military forces and in the conduct of war. In its extreme form - cyber-war - information becomes both goal and target, and bloodless combat would be waged against the informational infrastructure of the opposing state or society.

While these developments in military technology may have a profound effect on the future conduct of war between technologically advanced states, sceptics argue that the theoretical value of the RMA is diluted and perhaps even negated under certain conditions. More specifically, the vast majority of wars since the Second World War have been fought by or against non-state entities and there is a significant body of opinion that this reflects a general trend away from inter-state toward intra-state or sub-state warfare. Much of the precision and sophistication of RMA weaponry is held to be ineffective or irrelevant against unsophisticated enemies, in guerrilla or urban warfare and in difficult terrain. On the other hand, the availability of real time remotely sensed information can be a real force multiplier, even against unsophisticated enemies.

RMA technology may thus be only partially applicable in the most prevalent manifestations of war. To establish which advanced technology would be applicable in future African conflicts is thus a question of critical importance. Moreover, an over-investment in inappropriate high-technology weaponry may drain funds away from those capabilities required to fight the actual wars of the future.

Conflict in the African Scenario

15. In order to refine and contextualise the force design, the DoD has formulated scenarios based on an appreciation of global, regional and domestic trends and realities. These scenarios, while developed independently, agree with and expand on the environmental analysis of the White Paper on Defence. The scenarios also highlight certain environmental trends, leading to a number of critical assumptions for defence planning. These critical trends and assumptions are:

The global balance of power will remain relatively stable, though subject to evolutionary change, for several decades. A sudden global re-polarisation is not foreseen.
There will be no major aggressive projection of military power into sub-Equatorial Africa by foreign powers for the purpose of conquest or occupation.
African conflict, rooted in non-military factors, will remain primarily intra-state, although inter-state conflict of a limited scale and intensity is by no means excluded. Inter-African interventions and support to favoured parties by neighbouring states will remain a common feature. Foreign interventions will also take place. These may include anything from peace support operations sanctioned or endorsed by the United Nations to unilateral interventions to extract foreign nationals, protect interests or aid a threatened government.
African countries will not, even with sustained positive economic growth, be able to afford and support substantial conventional military capabilities for several decades.
In the absence of ideological imperatives, large donations of arms to African countries by foreign powers are unlikely.

African conflict is therefore expected to manifest itself mainly as civil unrest, domestic insurgencies and civil war, sometimes supported by sympathetic states in the region. The instability or collapse of states could result in incursions of armed bands into neighbouring territories, with or without the sanction of their government, to support a favoured party, pursue rivals or simply to loot and pillage. Such conflicts may be extremely destructive and lead to large numbers of displaced people and refugees.

At the inter-state level, there will be instances of protracted inter-state tension and low-key military exchanges across borders, punctuated by flare-ups of more intense localised military activity including limited cross-border incursions. Such conflict will not, however, exceed the level of limited war. It is also the kind of conflict where some technologies central to the RMA (like cyber-war or precision guided weapons) are held to be irrelevant or ineffective.

The Dilemma of South African Defence Planning

The realities of the African environment, as reflected in the environmental analyses of the White Paper and Defence Review and in the scenario analysis, contrast starkly with global developments in military technology and the capabilities of the South African defence related industrial base. The nature of warfare in an African conflict will differ sharply from warfare between developed countries. In addition to these factors, new threat patterns include the following:

Piracy.
International terrorism, including the emerging threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction.
International crime syndication.
Organised cross-border crime.
Threats to military computer and management information systems.
Threats to off-shore assets, examples being embassies, ships and aircraft.

The resource and technology base of advanced post-industrial information-based societies enables warfare involving a wide range of technologies, but the emphasis is on high technology weapon systems (including the capabilities envisaged by proponents of the RMA) and the conduct of precision operations. While the capabilities of less developed societies are more limited and certain high technology capabilities are excluded, the emphasis is still toward the high technology end of the more restricted spectrum. The mode of warfare might involve large forces with a mix of old and new equipment, perhaps even weapons of mass destruction, to conduct conventional operations.

The limited industrial and technological base of less developed societies, however, means the mode of warfare of such societies favours low intensity operations utilising unconventional, para-military and conventional forces with decentralised command networks to conduct political and military attrition operations. The technology spectrum is further narrowed and the emphasis is toward the basic end of the spectrum.

The dilemma facing the SANDF and the local defence related industry is that their capabilities are inclined toward the high technology orientation of the developed countries, while the African environment is characterised by serious developmental backlogs. Most of Africa will, even under the most favourable conditions, take several decades to develop an industrial and technological base even approaching that of a developed country. Until that base is established, advanced military capabilities will not be sustainable.

To configure the SANDF for the mode of conflict of a developed country would therefore be inappropriate to African realities. Under present budgetary restrictions it is also un-affordable. The ideal would thus be to acquire from the local defence technology base only those advanced technologies that are appropriate to and have a distinct force multiplier effect in lower level conflict, and as needed to combat new threat patterns. Defence related industries face the added complication that, in addition to supporting a hybridised defence force, they must compete in the high-technology markets of the developed countries. Again, however, the ideal would be to focus limited resources in those areas where high technology applies to all levels of conflict, including the tasks anticipated by the SANDF.

THE SANDF’S REQUIREMENTS

Factors affecting the SANDF in the Future

The following factors, which are spelt out in the White Paper on Defence, initiate the core force approach:

Due to the imperatives of the RDP, defence spending has to be kept to an appropriate level.
There is no foreseeable major external military threat to South Africa in the short- to medium-term.
The possibility of lesser military contingencies cannot be ruled out; parts of the world and the Southern African region are politically unstable and the long-term future is necessarily uncertain.
While the political dimension of conflict normally develops over a long period, the features of modern weapon systems (such as range, fire power, flexibility, mobility, destructiveness and speed of deployment) make it possible to project military force relatively quickly.
Defence capabilities and expertise that are lost may take longer to re-establish than the period in which a military threat can emerge. Major weapon systems may take up to 15 years to develop and commission, and combat leadership needs many years of experience and training. Start-up costs for acquiring such systems and expertise are high.
A credible conventional deterrence is a proven way of preventing aggression. It is a prudent means of preventing the hardships and loss of life associated with armed conflict.
At the same time, the establishment of a peace-time force with a non-threatening posture will contribute to confidence-building in Southern Africa.
The SANDF will be required to participate in regional defence arrangements; to engage in peace support operations; to co-operate with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and border protection in the short- and medium-term; to restore law and order in exceptional circumstances; and to support the civil authority in various secondary tasks.

The SANDF’s Core Force Capability

The White Paper on Defence provides that a core defence capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with the following features:

The ability to deal with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature;
The ability to deal with a range of contingencies;
The ability to expand the size of the defence force to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly;
The maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry; and
An effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises.

A force design with the ability to execute the above tasks in an African environment would, in addition, have to conform to the following requirements:

Comprehensive capabilities are required at an appropriate level including land, air and maritime capabilities, addressing the functions of mobility, surveillance and firepower.
The focus should be on balanced land, air and maritime components.
The emphasis should be on light, mobile forces, with a limited heavy support component. Air and sea mobility is essential for stability projection.
The technology level should be appropriate, driven by affordability and cost-effectiveness.
The force design, structure and support capabilities must enable credible stability projection - this implies using external lines of communication and organisational support.
The design must take due cognisance of new threat patterns, as listed earlier, and the corresponding high-level-technology available to non-state actors.

This differs from a force design, structure and support concept based on self-defence against external aggression by a medium or major power in several important aspects, especially when peace support operations are taken into account:

The emphasis is on light, mobile forces rather than armour and heavy artillery.
Conventional air defence requirements are limited since the air capabilities, particularly stand-off capability, of likely opponents will remain limited for some time. Efficient defence under these conditions remains essential, however.
The control of South African airspace, aimed at effective and efficient border control, is extremely important to combat the emerging threat of organised cross-border crime.
Air mobility and sea-lift is vital.
The ability to maintain long external lines of logistic support is essential.
The ability to operate away from main bases and maintain equipment far from support infrastructure is vital.
Logistics, medical support and engineering services assume an even more prominent position.
The ability to protect own forces and assets from attacks while deployed far away from any supporting forces and while assuring a defensive posture is essential. Any losses seriously jeopardise the credibility of a peace support operation.
The ability to independently sense the movement and intent of warring parties in an unfamiliar setting, far away from own fixed infrastructure, is very important. From this data information must be extracted, distributed, processed and used in an efficient command and control system. In addition, it is important to record this information in such a way that it can be used to apportion blame and, if necessary, respond appropriately. Since peace support operations are multi-national in character, the requirements outlined above do not have to be met entirely or exclusively by the SANDF.

The Expectations Placed on the SANDF

The expectations of the White Paper, the Defence Review and subsequent scenario planning of the SANDF are that the defence force should be equipped and ready to carry out the following tasks:

The SANDF must have an affordable and sustainable force structure appropriate to its peace-time role and capable of expanding timeously to meet defence contingencies which may arise in the future.
The SANDF must maintain the necessary systems and expertise to ensure flexible and responsive defence for low-risk defence contingencies which may arise in the short-term.
The SANDF must maintain effective intelligence and early warning capabilities to enable it to respond timeously to changes in the strategic environment.
The SANDF must provide a conventional military deterrence, which demonstrates the capability and political will of the state to defend South Africa against aggression.
The SANDF must maintain and develop the capabilities and skills required to contribute to regional security.
The SANDF will comprise a relatively small regular component, backed up by a sufficiently large part-time component. This structure is cost-effective and will promote regional confidence.
The SANDF will perform its secondary functions chiefly with its core defence capabilities. Additional force structure elements may have to be added and funded for functions such as peace support operations and deployment in co-operation with the SAPS.
Similarly, the SANDF will rely on its core defence capabilities if employed against internal threats to the constitutional order. Additional force structure elements may be required according to the circumstances.
Certain military industrial capabilities must be maintained to support local defence requirements.

SANDF Capabilities and Requirements

From an analysis of the requirements stated in both the White Paper and the Defence Review, and bearing in mind South Africa’s potential involvement in peace-support operations, the following requirement for capabilities and equipment exists:

Logistic support over long distances.
28.2 Field equipment that can be maintained and repaired far away from base.
Precision re-supply from the air in hostile terrain.
Advanced vehicles protected against rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, small arms and cannon fire.
Precision weapons to defend against attack from anti-air artillery.
Counter battery, mortar and rocket radar.
Electronic and border surveillance systems, including audio.
Electronic countermeasure systems against communications systems and shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles.
Wide area, high resolution observation systems in the optical, infrared, radar and communication bands (Examples are long endurance manned aircraft or remotely piloted vehicles equipped with synthetic aperture radar, infrared and optical sensors, electronic support measures and communication and intelligence systems)
Command and control over widely dispersed forces, using long range, independent, secure communication channels.
Means of enabling the emplacement, sustenance and extraction of observers.
Navigation, positioning and range-finding.
Technologies for the self-protection of aircraft, ships, vehicles and personnel. (This may range from advanced electronic warfare and infrared protection systems to intruder alarms).
Protection of CMI systems.
Effective monitoring of borders: land, sea and air.
Medical support.
Appropriate clothing.

CATEGORISATION OF SANDF REQUIREMENTS

The DoD currently classifies SANDF requirements in three categories, namely strategically essential, cost effective local sourcing and export, and non-strategic capabilities. The first category, strategically essential, is however defined in such wide terms that the majority of systems and capabilities fall within it at present. The nature and characteristics of these key technologies and capabilities are:

They have to be few in number, for practical and financial reasons.
They have to be very specific and well defined and should give industry a clear idea of where resources are going to be applied.
They have to be realistic within the context of South African economic capacity and resource constraints.
They may not solely have a defence application but may also have significance for other non-defence applications as well.

It is therefore necessary to reduce the broad and ill-defined current categorisation to just two categories for the purposes of enabling prioritisation in terms of importance and resource constraints. These categories are:

Strategically Essential. Technological or logistical capabilities are classified ‘strategically essential’, if they potentially satisfy a unique environment-dependent need which cannot be satisfied through procurement of standard equipment. This includes technologies which can provide an operational winning edge, or which ensure self-sufficiency in areas for which high-priority operational requirements exist. These capabilities can ensure faster turnaround times for the servicing or upgrading of systems and battle damage repairs, and can lead to import substitution resulting in foreign exchange savings, local employment and export opportunities.

Non-Strategic Capabilities. Other components, sub-systems and systems are not considered strategically essential can be sourced either locally or on the international market.

a. International Sourcing. In the case of armaments sourced on the international market, the domestic defence industrial capability should be able to understand and support these systems, in order to enable informed specification and selection, and to maintain and upgrade them locally with support from the overseas supplier.

b. Domestic Sourcing. Due to an already established local capability, or where South Africa has a global competitive edge, certain niche systems are more cost-effective, over the life cycle of the system, to source locally rather than to buy from foreign suppliers.

The latter category of requirement, Non-Strategic Capabilities, is fulfilled through the usual acquisition and technology management processes. Technologies and capabilities which are regarded as being strategically essential have been identified, and for these, programmes to sustain the technologies or capabilities within South Africa will be maintained or established.

STRATEGICALLY ESSENTIAL DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES

Taking into account the list of requirements as reflected in the Defence Review and current environmental realities and resource limitations, choices have had to be made and as a result five technologies and capabilities are identified. They are common to the mode of warfare of both advanced and underdeveloped countries and are also common across the four Arms of Service of the SANDF. The following are considered strategically essential:

Logistic support, repair and maintenance of equipment and systems
Systems integration
Command, Control and Communication systems
Sensors, signal processing and data processing
Combat systems software and support.
Simulation systems and war gaming.

Logistic Support, Repair and Maintenance of Equipment and Systems

Logistic support, repair and maintenance capabilities consist of a wide variety of skills, techniques, processes and facilities for the manufacture of parts, components and consumables, storekeeping, supply, documenting and record keeping, as well as the test, evaluation, analysis, servicing, repair, modifying and quality assurance of military systems.

The SANDF has subcontracted nearly all of its logistic support base to industries doing defence work, primarily due to the fact that the SANDF does not have, and is not likely to have, the skills necessary for these logistic services. The current industry role of maintenance, logistic support and battle damage repair will assume a greater prominence. Defence forces internationally cannot afford to retain scarce and therefore expensive technical skills in the abundant way they used to. It has become sensible, in terms of economy of scale, to locate such skills in clusters within industry and outsource major maintenance and support to such industries. Without these industry capabilities the defence force would be completely inoperable, particularly in the a time of national defence.

These technologies and capabilities are primarily situated in the industries associated with the major systems in use by the SANDF, e.g. the aeronautics industry for military aircraft, the vehicles industry for military vehicles, the electronics industry for radar, communication and other military electronic systems, the ammunition industry for weapons, etc.

Due to South Africa’s geographic position it is essential, and generally cost effective, to be self-reliant in the maintenance and support of major weapons systems, including battle damage repair. In the past, all new major system purchases, especially those procured from overseas suppliers, have included the establishment of a total logistic support base in South Africa, together with the necessary training.

As these services are required throughout the life-cycle of weapons systems, there will be ongoing contracts to the defence related industry for the supply of these services. These ongoing contracts will sustain this strategic capability.

Systems Integration

Systems integration is the ability to design, specify, procure, assemble and test the sub-systems, their interfaces and the resultant major system. It consists of specialised know-how, skills and facilities, in which systems engineering is the specialist engineering profession which is found primarily in the past and present local suppliers of major systems.

In future, it is likely that the majority of major weapons systems will be procured from abroad. However, it is essential that the capability to integrate locally developed and foreign sub-systems into these major systems and to adapt, modify and upgrade such systems to meet the unique local user requirements, is retained. To do this effectively, it is necessary to have a local systems integration capability for major weapons systems.

There is currently little systems development activity contracted by the DoD to the defence related industry, and hence little work for systems integration. There will, however, be system integration projects associated with major weapon systems being considered by government. e.g. the corvette programme will entail the integration of a possible local combat suite. The ongoing retention of these capabilities across the spectrum of all major systems, will require some technology and capability retention.

Command, Control and Communications Systems

Command, Control and Communication (C3) Systems are considered strategic by the military. Without these any battle, conflict or operation, (e.g. peacekeeping support or emergency) will be unsuccessful. It is therefore essential to have total control over the technology, supply and operation of the software and equipment, which must also conform to the unique SANDF organisational doctrine and tactical requirements. C3 systems consist of hardened, robust, reliable and secure communications equipment, networks, and supporting infrastructures. The capability to design, develop, manufacture, and maintain such systems are found in the South African electronics and software industries.

This is a strategic area that has limited export potential or commercial application. At present some technology retention projects are in operation.

Sensors, Signal Processing and Data Processing

Intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, electronic countermeasures and precision guidance of weapons are essential military capabilities on the modern electronic battlefield. The key technologies in these capabilities are sensors, signal processing and data processing. These technologies, which generally cannot be procured through normal channels, and which each defence force requires its own unique codes, capabilities and technologies make them strategic. It is one of the areas where secrecy still gives advantages on the battlefield.

The range of sensors, signal and data processing technologies are quite extensive and consists of items such as radar, sonar, acoustic, infrared, microwave, laser, radio, fibre-optic, and electronic sensors and equipment. The ability to design, develop, manufacture, modify, upgrade and maintain such equipment and systems locally is essential. There exist some technology retention projects, as this strategic area has limited export potential or commercial applications, due to the secrecy of the technology needing to be retained.

Combat Systems Software and Support

Developments in computer and software technologies are currently far more rapid than in other defence technologies. Weapons systems have long life cycles and therefore will require upgrades as new technologies become available and user requirements change. Combat systems software and support have therefore become a strategic technology and capability..

This technology and capability resides in the electronics and software industries where it does have some export and commercial application potential, but still requires some assistance to ensure the technologies are retained.

Simulations and War Gaming

The quality of the SANDF’s training will be a major determinant of the SANDF’s future effectiveness in executing its defence function. The impossibility of duplicating actual combat situations for training purposes and the immense cost and physical danger of conducting live field exercises, make simulation and war gaming vital tools for preparing soldiers, both on a single service and a joint basis. They are invaluable for teaching combat drills and procedures and are essential for the evaluation of doctrine, operational concepts and command and control concepts.

Simulations. Simulations vary from simple mechanical or electronic aids to teach basic skills and coordination to soldiers, to computer-driven systems that enable the development of complex skills such as flying an aircraft or air combat manoeuvres against an opponent in a linked simulator.

War Gaming. War gaming may range from board and sand-box games to sophisticated computer controlled systems that enable the simulation of combat between imaginary forces of opposing command cadres. The level of desired complexity and realism are the main determinants of cost.

A local simulation and war gaming capability is considered to be of strategic importance due to the following two criteria:

It is important to understand the technicalities and mechanics of simulation and war gaming in order to be able to develop and tailor such systems to own specifications.
The maintenance and running of complex simulations and war games invariably requires technical support. Due to confidentiality requirements, local support is therefore essential if such tools are to be used to exercise and evaluate SANDF strategies, doctrines, operational concepts and battle plans.

A DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY BASE

Technology can be defined as any knowledge, process or technique which, when used, will increase effectiveness to achieve a specific goal. In the case of the defence technology base (DTB), the goal is to effectively support the DoD (specifically the SANDF) in the execution of its various roles. This support is mainly of a scientific and engineering nature.

The Role of the Defence Technology Base

The primary role of the DTB can be summarised as:

Providing technical support to the DoD, enabling it to be a knowledgeable purchaser during acquisition projects.
Providing technical support to the DoD, enabling it to be a knowledgeable user (operational test and evaluation, training, force preparation, intelligence gathering and interpretation and operations).
Ensuring continued effectiveness of military systems, while minimising the cost of ownership by performing pre-planned maintenance, logistic support, and modifications to improve reliability.
Developing equipment with unique capabilities or, when conditions or doctrines change or equipment becomes obsolete, by continued product improvements or upgrades.
Providing equipment to satisfy unique requirements.
Providing strategic independence in key strategic areas, or certain niche areas, by enabling independent South African military product development, manufacturing and commissioning, thereby reducing supply vulnerability and improving the probability that special, differentiating features remain secret.

The Importance of the Defence Technology Base

The retention of a local DTB is of direct importance to the defence of South Africa for reasons explained above. The importance of retaining the appropriate technological capabilities at the appropriate level in the national DTB can be classified as follows:

Military-strategic. From a military-strategic point of view, the defence technology base is an important key asset. The aim of the DTB is to help ensure the supply of strategic military equipment and services to the SANDF in times of national defence.

Military-operational. From a military-operational point of view, a local DTB has important operational advantages for the SANDF. These fall into three categories:

Technological advantages. Having access to a local capability, which is able to implement unique solutions and to keep equipment updated to perform optimally under changing conditions, ensures that a technologically based winning edge over adversaries is possible.

Tailor-made equipment. Southern Africa has unique climatic, geographic, demographic and doctrinal circumstances, requiring in some instances tailor-made equipment.

Logistic support. All armaments, whether procured overseas or locally, require cost-effective logistic support throughout their operational life. A local capability is the only guarantee that this support will be available when required.

Socio-economic importance. From a socio-economic point of view, the DTB contributes significantly to the general standard of technical sophistication of the national industrial base and therefore its ability to produce high value-added goods and services.

STRATEGIES FOR RETAINING STRATEGICALLY ESSENTIAL DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES

It is neither affordable nor necessary to strive for complete self-sufficiency in armaments production and all the technologies to support it. However, the SANDF requires that in certain strategic areas, limited self sufficiency must be retained and maintained and that in others, the SANDF needs to remain an informed buyer and user of equipment.

Where the retention of the strategic technologies and capabilities is required, but is not viable on its own, either in the private sector or the public sector, a number of alternatives are to be used for their retention. This is particularly important to enable the DoD to retain a balanced core technology base to match the core force concept defined in the Defence Review. Where required by technical, economic or political considerations, special organisational solutions have to be pursued to retain these strategically important technologies and capabilities.

There are a number of different strategies that can be used to retain technologies and capabilities. These are discussed below.

R & D Projects in Industry Carrying out Defence Work

The high-risk nature of defence equipment development programmes, coupled with the current world-wide decline in the production demand for such equipment, results in a very high ratio of development to production costs. Consequently, the funding of defence R&D development programmes by industry is highly unlikely. If the technologies are required, then the R & D will have to be funded by the customer.

Development times for major weapon systems range from four to eight years, followed by production and commissioning for an operational life of a further 15 to 20 years, before replacement or life extension is required. These long lead times shape the long-term relationship between the DoD and defence related industries. The DoD’s commitment to defence related industries is furthermore based on the reality that skills and technology age and become obsolete (often at a much faster rate than the wear and tear on machines), unless they are continuously and consciously renewed through specific technology development efforts.

A co-operative effort between the DoD, identifying future needs for technology (requirement pull) and industry, identifying the future capabilities and opportunities (technology push) is needed. This is provided by technology development programmes, also enabling industries doing defence work to export technologically competitive products.

Cardinal Technology Projects

The DoD will support defence related industries in running a limited number of long-term core programmes to enable it to maintain the necessary width and depth of engineering and production skills to produce products for local use and export in some carefully selected niche areas, and to provide logistical support.

Advanced Technology Demonstrators

In a small number of selected areas where strategic independence is required or where unique requirements exist, important technologies will be maintained at an advanced level in defence related industries through the design and development of advanced technology demonstrators.

This requires continuous development and upgrading of prototypes of new weapons systems with state-of-the-art technology, without necessarily going into full-scale development or production, unless there is a need for the replacement of equipment due to age or obsolescence, or for force-expansion.

Centres of Expertise

The management of long-term strategic interests such as national defence technology development programmes, may require the selection of `preferred suppliers’ and `centres of expertise’ to achieve the necessary long-term commitment from both the state and industry to build up and maintain certain levels of expertise at a level above a sustainable minimum.

Defence Evaluation and Research Institute (DERI)

Government will consider retaining strategic, non-profitable facilities with limited commercial application in the public sector. This includes specialised defence research and development facilities, test ranges and test laboratories. Technology development in the defence manufacturing industry needs to be driven by military-technical considerations and the retention of facilities which are not able to be privatised due to unviability, will be considered.

Technology developments which are of strategic importance to the SANDF and the defence related industries, will be retained with public funding at an appropriate defence evaluation and research institute (DERI). The following main features of such organisations can be identified through international comparisons:

A specific budget exists in the DoD for funding the DERI. Work is formulated in terms of projects, and payments are made upon the achievement of agreed milestones to facilitate effective management.
DERI’s usually comprise at least a core of civilian technical experts who are specialists in their fields and who have made their careers as technologists or scientists in that field.
DERI’s perform a significant amount of leading edge, high risk research, in addition to subcontracting the local industry in a nationally co-ordinated programme.
They are not considered to be part of the defence related industry, but often place contracts on it for specific R&D. They retain their independence from industry.
They have close contact with the end users in the military, either by partial staffing with military personnel, or by structural relationships with the DoD concerned.
They manage high-technology military contracts placed on defence related industries, and are considered to possess sufficient technical insight to assess the merit, relevance and conformance of project proposals and reports.
They often undertake performance evaluation of equipment and procedures as part of their role. This includes participation in acceptance testing and certification of equipment.

Government will consider establishing a South African DERI with the following roles:

Technical support to the SANDF.
Operational support for the SANDF.
Acquisition support to the DoD.
Test and evaluation.
Focused research and development.
South African military product development and maintenance.
Technical support for other state institutions, especially the SA Police Service.
Support to the RDP.

Acquisition Policies

Acquisition and procurement policies are set out in Chapter 5, under Acquisition and Technology Management. Acquisition policies should take into account the strategic technologies and capabilities required by the SANDF when awarding contracts.

Outsourcing

The SANDF has already implemented a policy of outsourcing, particularly in the facilitation of logistic support. This policy will be extended in some of the remaining areas of activity to support the retention of strategic capabilities and technologies. DAPD will be responsible for all outsourcing of the DoD requirements.

Diversification

By giving support to diversification, technologies and capabilities which are strategically essential may be retained at a lesser cost.

Defence Industrial Participation Schemes

Defence industrial participation (DIP) programmes are structured to provide direct support for a sustainable indigenous defence related industries as required by the SANDF. Under these programmes all defence imports above $10m value are required to have at least a 50% local industrial participation in the defence related industries. This is in addition to the participation requirements stipulated in the National Industrial Participation Policy (NIP) administered by Department of Trade and Industry .

Defence industrial participation programmes will be particularly orientated to supporting those technologies and capabilities which have been identified as being strategically essential to the SANDF.

Export Marketing Facilitation

Some of the strategically essential technologies and capabilities should be supported by government assistance in facilitating the export of those skills, technologies, products or. This will be in the form of export marketing assistance, which in turn will enable the retention of the skills, technologies and capabilities.

STRATEGIES FOR PRIORITIES AND CHOICES

While the strategically essential technologies and capabilities that are relevant to the situation today have been identified above, in time these may change. The SANDF will review these on an annual basis and this review will form part of the annual acquisition report to Parliament. It is important to have regular reviews, particularly as new forms of conflict arise and new technologies are developed. The DoD must indicate to industry what its strategic choices are and where it aims to invest strategically.

With the strategic technologies and capabilities having been identified, it is a matter of choice as to how they should be retained. The decisions should be made by the DoD in co-operation with other relevant government departments, such as the Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, as other departments may be able to optimise the resources needed.