OPENING OF THE BRAHIMI WORKSHOP BY THE DG OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SIPHO M PITYANA

22 February 2001

Date: 21 February 2001
Time: 09:10
Venue: Wits Club on West Campus, Jhb

Chairperson, professor John Stremlau
The Acting Vice-Chancellor,
Professor Leila Patel
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen

I would like to commend the joint organisers Wits University and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs at Makerere University for taking the initiative of bringing together so many outstanding African scholars and security experts from across the continent in order to deliberate on the important Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping and its implications for the African continent.

At our Heads of Mission Conference held in Cape Town last week, President Mbeki observed that: unless and until Africans can find better ways to prevent and resolve the deadly conflicts that afflict our region all our other dreams of sustainable development and playing a more central role in shaping the course of globalisation in ways that help rather than harm Africa will flounder. It is hard to imagine anyone who would disagree with this.

I will attempt to highlight some issues in the Brahimi Report, which this workshop could, among others, deliberate upon. It is important that we in Africa reach consensus, act jointly and decisively to ensure that our interests in the sphere of peacekeeping and related matters are known and integrated in the emerging dispensation in order to realise stability and security on the continent.

You will no doubt be aware that as mandated by the OAU, Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika are engaged in an historic effort to define a development agenda for the African continent (MAP). This for the benefit of all our citizens. We have an ambitious agenda to enhance political and economic co-operation by establishing the African Union and its related institutions.

These process raise major issues of the reform of the OAU and the appropriate balance between continental, sub-regional and national organisations.

There is an emerging commitment that cannot be taken lightly to ensure that our people have constitutional democracies, that their human rights are respected and guaranteed, that there is good governance and the rule of law. Increasingly, the current African leadership is recognising the dialectical relationship between sound macro-economic and social policies and sustainable peace, stability and security. These are pre-determinants for creating employment, developing human resource capacity, achieving sustainable economic growth and developing basic infrastructure for the benefit of Africa's people.

There can be no doubt that the continent needs all the conditions referred to in order to neutralise the causes of instability and conflict on the African continent. Given the above agenda that pre-occupies the African Leadership, the timing of these deliberations could not be better.

It must be born in mind that the UN's mission was rooted in the European political catastrophe that precipitated World Wars I and II. The limited, but vital provisions for collective security contained in the UN Charter and the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions were historic attempts at conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction and development. The founders of these great institutions could not have envisaged the kind of challenges that the world face today. In this regard, there can be no disputing the fact that Africa has become the 21st century's testing ground for the complete range of UN's peace operations.

It is in this context that consideration should be given to, among other matters, the present structure and composition of the UNSC, the mandate of the UN in terms of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and the overall commitment of the UN and individual member states to the promotion and maintenance of global peace.

Our view is that we should be proactive in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, preferably through timeous and appropriate diplomatic interventions leading to negotiated settlements before there is an escalation of dispute into conflicts. However, as we have learnt from historical experience, this is not always possible, and hence the need to revisit and pay closer attention to the necessity for effective peacekeeping operations in Africa.

In the recent period we have seen a trend where increasingly regional grouping such as NATO take it upon themselves to engage in military intervention under the pretext of peacekeeping and peace enforcement exercises. At the same time there is hesitancy and reluctance to get involved in more deserving African peacekeeping interventions.

On the other hand the African leadership has put in place several measures to address some of the causes of conflicts on the continent. These include the Harare and Algiers Declaration of the OAU on the unconstitutional take-over of governments and the establishment of the OAU Central Organ, which deals specifically with matters concerning conflicts. At present efforts are underway to build the capacity of the OAU Centre for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The Brahimi Report recognises that the use of force alone cannot create peace, but can help provide an environment for peacebuilding. It further states that in order for peace missions to have a lasting impact, it is important for member states of the UN to summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and operationally to enable the UN to be credible as a force for peace.

In am certain you have all been following the debate on the Brahimi Report at the UN. An interesting facet that has evolved from this is that the countries of the North generally appear to favour the recommendations almost unreservedly. The Developing World, on the other hand, and African states in particular, have expressed some reservations. The concern revolves around the question of intervention. I have already alluded to the recommendation of the Report that proposes more robust rules of engagement by peacekeeping forces.

We in Africa have bitter experiences of interventionist actions by non-African powers. It is therefore understandable that we express wariness - no because we disapprove of the philosophical basis pertaining to these recommendations, but because we would need assurances and guarantees on how they will be translated into reality. Therefore, the report's recommendation that member states should be invited to consult with the member of the Security Council during mandate formulation is of vital importance to us. It is this consultation that will help us build consensus on its recommendations.

Regarding the concept of conflict resolution and the high premium that the Report places on it, we need to understand that at the continental (OAU) level there is no superpower that can claim to have hegemony. The OAU has not been as successful in resolving African conflicts as we would all have wished. Individual member states often have national interests at stake. Hence the inclination to support conflict resolution initiatives rhetorically rather than by action. However, at regional level, the situation is sometimes different. Some countries have on their own, played a significant role in the area of conflict resolution in their regions, but would possibly be less inclined to enter into a peacekeeping operation sponsored by the OAU with the same fervour.

This seems to point towards placing a focus on regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives and then consolidate that capacity at continental level.

Critical issues raised in the Brahimi Report which require in depth analysis are inter alia:

I order for Africa to be better prepared to effectively deal with challenges threatening its peace and stability there is an urgency with which issues around the building of peacekeeping capacity, resource mobilisation, information communication technology would need to be addressed. How does Africa meet these challenges?

Given the reluctance of the North to contribute troops to conflict areas on the continent has the time not come for Africa to consider the formation of its own peacekeeping contingent? If indeed this is the case, in light of the resource constraints (both human capacity and financial) and the fact that maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the UN, how does Africa identify and chart its own role with regard to achieving peace?

If Africa does form its own peacekeeping force, should these be quasi-independent sub-regional structures under the command of a defined collective leadership of the region, accountable to regional blocs and ultimately the OAU? If so, should the regional peacekeeping structures form the building blocs for the continental force or be a stand-alone? Will neutrality be guaranteed given the nature of geopolitics?

Who will Africa's strategic partners be in assisting with regard to capacity building and the equipping of the Regional Early Warning Centres?

I am hopeful that this is but the beginning of a process that will lead to further interaction amongst us on such issues of national and regional importance. As the Department of Foreign Affairs is primarily concerned with issues of both political and policy in nature, it is my Department's view that such fora are essential in government and civil society coming together to exchange views and add value to policy formulation and implementation. We in government would welcome any further contact and consultation with experts, academia, and civil society at large in order to take informed decisions, which will not only be in South Africa's national interest, but the continent's and perhaps even more importantly the world.

I thank you.

Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs