Issued by: The Department Of Foreign Affairs
3 NOVEMBER 1998
On 22 September 1998, Acting President Buthelezi informed Parliament about the SADC intervention in Lesotho. From some sectors of the opposition and media there was a barrage of criticism.
This was somehow understandable because it is possible that the individuals were responding from ignorance, lack of information or simply political opportunism. However, what was inexcusable was the spectacle of politicians falling over one another to discover Lesotho opposition forces critical of the SADC intervention. More remarkable was the orchestrated but unsubstantiated allegations that the SANDF had embarked on an orgy of rape, murder and looting and the prediction of a long drawn-struction of all possibilities of finding a political solution.
I am happy to inform Parliament that yesterday, within weeks of the SADC intervention and despite the prophets of doom and gloom, the Lesotho Parliament passed the Interim Political Authority Bill. In terms of this Bill and Interim Authority, composed of two members each of the twelve political parties, will be established to prepare for the holding of general elections within a period of eighteen months. Its task will be to create and promote conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections and the levelling of the playing fields for all political parties and candidates. Its powers are wide ranging and includes the review of the Electoral Code of Conduct; the review of the Independent Electoral Commission and to make recommendations on its structure and functions and a review of the Lesotho Electoral System with a view to making it more democratic and representative of the people of Lesotho.
This Bill is a triumph for stability and democracy and it confirmed our view that unless the coup in Lesotho was ended and the security situation normalised, it would be impossible to deal with the political problems.
In welcoming this development we must express our congratulations to the Lesotho Government and the opposition parties. We must also acknowledge the important role played by the SADC facilitating team led by Minister Mufamadi and the invaluable role of the SADC interventionist forces.
As we prepare to end this term of Parliament it is appropriate that we, as elected members of Parliament and as responsible representatives of the people, objectively and honestly analyse the Lesotho crisis. This must empower us to draw the right conclusions and learn from our experience.
The events of 1998 were no aberration. I wish to remind those who have short or selective memories that since 1970 there have been six coups in Lesotho.
When the 1994 coup took place, SADC strongly condemned it, and gave warning that in the post-cold war period, we would act collectively to ensure that no coups against democratically elected governments would be tolerated.
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa were mandated to act on behalf of SADC to restore the democratically elected government. After intensive negotiations and the threat of military intervention by SADC forces, the democratically elected government was restored to power and the soldiers returned to their barracks.
At that time it was clear that the army and police were highly politicised and hostile to the government led by the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and that long term stability and democracy demanded that, with the assistance of SADC, steps should be taken to create a truly professional defence and police forces.
In 1996 a new Defence Act was passed in an attempt to create such a professional army. Tragically before this process could be fully implemented, junior officers carried out another coup in September 1998.
The pretext for the latest coup was the May elections, in which the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 seats and the Basotho National Party (BNP) one seat.
The opposition parties alleged that massive fraud had taken place and organised protests and demonstrations. In the wake of growing instability, all role players in Lesotho requested the assistance of the South African government to help normalise the situation.
On August 10, 1998 Deputy President Mbeki led a delegation to Lesotho and after intensive consultations it was agreed that a SADC Commission should be appointed to investigate the allegations of electoral fraud. All parties agreed to be bound by the findings and to stop all demonstrations and protests. Unfortunately the commitment to stop all demonstrations was not carried out.
The Langa Commission which was established to investigate the allegations of electoral fraud, found that there were some serious irregularities in the electoral process but could not find conclusive evidence of government fraud.
While discussions were continuing about the handling of the report and the consequences flowing from it, demonstrations in Maseru intensified and junior officers at the levels of captains and lieutenants, started a mutiny.
The entire command structure of the Lesotho defence force was forced at gun point to relinquish their positions. Twenty seven officers were put into prison and the others placed under house arrested. The mutineers took over the National Radio Broadcaster; government offices were forced to close; government cars were confiscated; ministers were attacked and threatened with arrest; civil servants were prevented from going to work; and the police were so intimidated that they were immobilised.
The government was in a state of paralysis, there was a state of anarchy, tension was growing and sporadic violence had erupted. It was obvious that a dangerous situation was developing which could explode resulting in serious consequences for Lesotho and South Africa.
On 12 September 1998, Prime Minister Mosisili requested a SADC intervention to end the coup. We, however, believed that further efforts should be made to find a negotiated solution.
The SADC delegation continued to have numerous discussions with the government, the opposition, the King and the mutineers in order to find a negotiated solution. On several occasions the mutineers were warned of the consequences of the coup and urged to normalise the security situation.
The SADC intervention led to the release of the 27 army leaders. However, despite assurances that the coup would be ended, the mutineers reneged on agreements reached and it became clear that the mutineers were intent on holding onto power.
We concluded that if we failed to act, the consequences would have been too ghastly to contemplate. It was, therefore, decided that the SADC forces should intervene on 22 September 1998. The total number of SADC interventionist forces was 3 500.
Within two days the military objectives were achieved and the security situation normalised. The SANDF has announced that 800 South African soldiers would be withdrawn from Lesotho. This normalisation as I indicated earlier, enabled the political process to proceed. We must, however, remain vigilant because there are still forces in Lesotho and in South Africa who are intent on sabotaging the process.
Yesterday the SANDF gave the Defence and Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committees an open, frank and constructively critical assessment of lessons learnt from the intervention. I do not believe that such a briefing would have been given anywhere else in the world. I sincerely hope that such transparency and frankness will be correctly interpreted and reported and not misused.
I am sure that all the members of Parliament and the people of South Africa, will join me in congratulating the SADC interventionist forces for their contribution.
We must also express our condolences to the families of those 41 South African and Basotho soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice.
They gave their lives so that the future of millions would be more secure and stable.
The South Africans who died gave content and meaning to our vision of a new South African patriotism, we must emulate them.
ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CAPE TOWN 3 NOVEMBER 1998