PART FIVE

THE BACKGROUND TO THE DEATHS IN THOSE AREAS OF THE FORMER BOPHUTHATSWANA OTHER THAN THE MMABATHO/ MAFIKENG AREA

Unlike those deaths that occurred in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, where many of those killed were the victims of the right-wing invasion of the area, most of the deaths in the other areas of the former Bophuthatswana occurred in shooting incidents during the looting of shopping complexes on 11 March 1994.

As was the case in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, the atmosphere in the other areas during the week commencing 7 March 1994 was tense as a result of the political situation throughout Bophuthatswana. Furthermore, as happened in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng civil servants throughout the other areas of Bophuthatswana had gone on strike. The staff at several hospitals had also gone on strike. Captain Oupa Peter Mothibi, of the Bophuthatswana Police Force, who in March 1994 was a lieutenant and a staff officer in the District Commandant's office in the Temba area and had also worked with the Security Police, stated that in the other areas of Bophuthatswana as in the Mmabatho/ Mafikeng area, the majority of the citizens were demanding a return to the Republic of South Africa so as to enable them to participate in the April 1994 general election there.

His evidence in this regard was confirmed by Inspector Mpho Thomas Thibedi, who in March 1994 was the commander of the Police Post at the Central City Complex. He and Captain Mothibi both also testified that civil servants were deeply concerned about what was to happen to their pensions, as were their counterparts in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. This, as set out above, was another cause of general disenchantment by the majority of the public with the Mangope regime. The Police, as was the case in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, were seen as the instruments of the Mangope Government and were extremely unpopular with the public, according to both Inspector Thibedi and to Captain Mothibi, who said that many of the policemen had to move their families to "safe" places, as they were in danger. Police continued, however, to carry out their duties conscientiously.

Both police officers testified that on Thursday, 10 March 1994, it was announced on television that President Mangope had fled Mmabatho and that his Government had fallen. It was also announced that Police in Mmabatho had joined forces with the public. According to the news the situation in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area was chaotic. This news and the announcements mentioned were the trigger for crowds throughout the other areas of Bophuthatswana to attack shopping complexes in those areas, causing extensive damage to them and in some cases setting them alight and burning them to the ground, and to indulge in widespread looting, resulting in conditions of chaos wherever this occurred. It was during these events that many of those whose deaths the Commission investigated were shot. These deaths were therefore mainly criminal in origin.

Among the shopping complexes that were attacked and looted were the Ga-Rankuwa Shopping Complex, a large shopping complex in Ga-Rankuwa; the Temba City Shopping Complex (also known as the Checkers Complex) in Temba; the Central City Shopping Complex, a large shopping complex in Mabopane; a small shopping complex at Makapanstadt; a small shopping complex known as Rantol Complex and a small shopping complex in Ga-Rankuwa known as "Uncle Nats". The Central City Complex and the "Uncle Nats" Complex were both, according to the evidence, totally burnt down during the looting.

Many of the complexes were guarded by employees of private security companies and they and members of the Bophuthatswana Police and Defence forces tried to prevent the looting and to disperse the attackers and looters. In so doing some of them fired shots at the latter resulting in certain of the deaths. Members of the Internal Stability Unit of the South African Police were also deployed in order to restore law and order and stabilise the situation and from the evidence it would appear that certain of those killed were shot by members of that Unit. In many of the cases that the Commission investigated, however, because of the chaotic situation existing at the time, no witnesses to the shootings could be found and thus it was impossible to determine exactly where, in what circumstances and by whom the deceased had been shot. In several of the cases the bodies of the deceased had not been identified by relatives or friends or by virtue of the injuries that had caused their deaths, they could not be identified. It was therefore impossible for the Commission to come to any finding as to the identity of the deceased in those cases.

In the remaining cases the evidence pointed to the deceased having probably been shot by either members of the Bophuthatswana Police or by members of the Internal Stability Unit of the South African Police or by personnel of one or other of the Security Companies who had provided guards at the various shopping complexes. There was no evidence that any of the deaths were caused by members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force.

There was also no evidence of any involvement, either in the events leading up to the violence of the period 10 to 13 March 1994, or in that violence, of any right wing elements. Whereas the role of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was central to the violence leading to the deaths in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, there was no significant presence of any Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members in the other areas of Bophuthatswana. It is convenient to refer briefly to what evidence there was of their presence. A security manager at the Carousel Hotel in Hammanskraal, David Hattingh, said that in the week of 7 to 12 March 1994 he and his colleagues were on the alert following a warning of an attack by members of the public on the hotel when he was told that there were some members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging at the gate of the hotel complex. He suspected that they wanted to help to guard the hotel. He gave instructions that they should be told to leave, which they did. The only other evidence of the presence of possible Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members came from two witnesses in Case B2 1: Ronnie Moloantoa, who said they saw white men in khaki camouflage clothing in bakkies in Hammanskraal. They were Martha Moloantoa and her sister-in-law,Wilhelmina Mokoatlo. The latter said that on Friday, 11 March 1994 she and her husband went shopping at a Spar store in Hammanskraal. As they left the shop she saw four bakkies of which two had canopies and two did not. In them were white men in camouflage uniforms. Two of them had on camouflage caps. The men were bearded. At a roadblock set up by black policemen outside Hammanskraal the men had a long discussion with the police who eventually allowed them to pass by. They stopped at a cafe situated near a 4-way stop on the Hammanskraal-Temba road, where the men were seen by her arguing among themselves. Two of the men had "long guns" with them. They were behaving peacefully as she and her husband drove past them. Apart from these minor instances of what would seem to have been the presence of Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members in the area, there was no evidence of their having taken part in any of the violence there or, indeed, of they or any other right wingers having been present at the time.

The evidence as to the role the various security bodies played during the events of 10 to 13 March 1994 is conflicting and confused. Nevertheless the Commission has been able to piece together a picture of what happened at the time from the testimony of the many witnesses from the Bophuthatswana Police, from the members of the Internal Stability Unit of the South African Police and from the members of the various private security companies who gave evidence before the Commission. It is not necessary to set out in detail the evidence of all these witnesses but reference will be made to the relevant testimony where appropriate.

As set out above, it is clear that the political situation in the areas of the former Bophuthatswana other than the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area was as in the case of the latter, exceptionally tense in the period prior to 10 to 13 March 1994. As mentioned, the members of the public service were on strike and various hospitals had ceased to operate. There was a general desire on the part of most members of the public to see the re-incorporation of Bophuthatswana into the new South Africa and to be able to take part in the upcoming elections on 27 April 1994 in South Africa.

The reluctance on the part of the government of President Mangope to give effect to these wishes and the curbing by that government of free political activity had, as had happened in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, had a twofold result viz. (a) a disillusionment on the part of a large proportion of the population with the Mangope regime and (b) an hostility on the part of many of the citizens of Bophuthatswana towards the Bophuthatswana Police, who were obliged to carry out the dictates of the government and prevent the exercise of free political activity These sentiments were the underlying cause of what happened on the evening of Thursday, 10 March 1994 and on Friday, 11 March 1994.

A number of witnesses testified that in the television news services on the evening of 10 March 1994 it was stated that the Mangope Government had fallen and was no longer in control. The television news also pictured scenes of looting in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area and showed that all policing there had ceased to exist, some of the police associating themselves with the mobs.

This was the signal for the public in the other areas to also go on the rampage. Almost immediately after the news large crowds gathered throughout the area and started to loot properties, targeting in particular the larger shopping complexes such as the Central City Complex and the Ga-Rankuwa Complex. In many of these complexes there were guards of private security companies who suddenly found themselves confronted by crowds of hundreds, if not thousands of people, intent on entering the complexes, using violence and even destroying them if necessary, and in looting the goods and stocks in the shops and other premises within the complexes. Being made aware of the situation immediately it occurred, the Bophuthatswana Police attempted to disperse the crowds, to prevent their entering the complexes and to curb the looting but due to the huge size of the crowds involved and the small number of police who were available, it became an impossible task for the police.

The situation at Central City was described to the Commission by a security officer of ASC Security Company in Pretoria who was on duty as a guard from 18:00 on Thursday, 10 March 1994, Thomas Motaung.

He said that at about 21:00 when he and his colleagues were having their tea break, members of the Bophuthatswana Police warned them to look outside. They saw a large, unruly noisy crowd coming chanting towards the Complex. The crowd was in an aggressive mood. As none of them was armed he and his colleagues ran away to a nearby filling station from where he saw the crowd entering the Complex. Members of the Bophuthatswana Police also went into the Complex and he heard gunshots and saw teargas being fired to try and disperse the crowd. There were, however, only about 30 policemen and the crowd was so vast that they could not control them. Soldiers, as he put it, arrived at about dawn. He could not say if they were from the Bophuthatswana or South African Army. Most of the crowd had dispersed by then. Motaung said that at about 07:00 to 07:30 he went into the Complex to retrieve equipment in their offices there. On the way he saw six bodies. They all seemed to be those of looters. A man with head and chest wounds was lying dead in a butchery, still holding a sheep's carcase in his arms. In Pep Stores the body of a middle aged man was in a sitting position against a money safe. In a clothing store known as Patrick Daniels the bodies of two women were lying on top of and across one another. One was shot in the head, the other in the chest. Two plastic bags with clothes in them were lying next to the bodies. He then went to the subway leading to Mabopane railway station. In the subway he found the body of a 14-year old boy with a large hole in his chest. He and a companion who was with him decided to return to the Complex. At a clothing store known as Webbers he saw the body of a man with blood flowing from his side. Shoes were lying all around him.

Motaung said theirs was the only security firm in the Complex. Their firm had no armed response unit. Only the area manager carried a firemen and it had been impossible to contact him. Motaung said he believed the "soldiers" had shot the people as the gunfire had intensified after their arrival. He could not, however, say this with any certainty. The "soldiers", he said, were white whereas the policemen were both black and white. The police were clad in their green uniforms, the "soldiers" in camouflage uniforms. They arrived in camouflaged military vehicles. It behoves to be noted at this stage that, as will appear shortly, no members of the South African Defence Force, other than an ambulance unit, entered Bophuthatswana until 13:00 on Friday, 11 March 1994. No "soldiers" from the South African Defence Force could therefore have been at Central City on that day. Bophuthatswana Defence Force members, apart from some of their officers, were black. It would seem doubtful, therefore that what Motaung described as "soldiers" were either members of the South African Defence Force or Bophuthatswana Defence Force but probably policemen of the Bophuthatswana Police Force.

Motaung said he saw nothing wrong with the actions of the Bophuthatswana Police who were doing their utmost to disperse the crowd and protect the properties. Shop owners also tried to do so but to no avail. He did not see any who were armed. Despite Motaung's assertions as to the positive actions of the Bophuthatswana Police, the probability remains that as it was they who were inside the Complex and protecting the shops there, they were the ones who shot these looters who were clearly caught red-handed looting in the various shops in which they were shot.

It seems clear from Motaung's evidence that a number of people were shot dead at Central City Complex during the night of Thursday, 10 March 1994. It would also seem clear from the evidence that, as would appear from the detailed investigations into the deaths of those who were killed during the period of, and as a result of, the unrest between 10 and 13 March 1994, a number of the deceased were found lying dead at Central City but that nobody could testify as to how exactly when or by whom they had been shot. It is, however, also clear that the deceased in these cases were looters. And it is furthermore also clear that those shot during the night of 10 March 1994 could not have been shot by members of the Internal Stability Unit. The evidence is overwhelming that apart from escorting some South African citizens from the Morula Sun Hotel and out of Bophuthatswana on 10 March 1994 the Internal Stability Unit only entered Bophuthatswana from South Africa at 13:00 on Friday, 11 March 1994. This appears from the testimony of Andre Herbst, who was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the South African Defence Force Medical Corps in March 1994, who was attached to Unit 1 of the Internal Stability Unit. He said that at about 10:00 on Friday, 11 March 1994 he and 10 men under him were deployed at Rietgat Police Station waiting to enter Bophuthatswana to render medical services to members of the South African Defence Force and South African Police. Their Unit - not the Internal Stability Unit - was given permission to go to Central City shortly after 10:00. They did so in an armoured ambulance, a Caspir.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst also described the chaotic conditions there with widespread, full-scale looting. He said he saw members of the Bophuthatswana Police trying to restrain the looters by firing teargas and rubber bullets at them and taking away looted goods from them. Many of the police were clad in civilian clothing and were armed with R4 rifles. He and his men entered Central City Complex. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst said he saw bodies under the burnt and collapsed roof of part of the Complex. He saw a man in civilian clothes, who later left the scene in a Bophuthatswana Police car shoot a looter in the complex. The body of this man was lying with a massive head wound on the floor of a shop. He identified the man from a photograph shown to him. This is the deceased in Case B 13: Maphuti Marcus Makgoka, referred to below. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst said his unit also went to other areas. In a cul-de-sac near a clothing factory there he found a man shot through the hip. He was in a serious condition. Two security guards with .303 rifles were present. They said the man was a looter. Emergency medical attention was given to the man and he was taken by the Caspir to Hammanskraal Police Station where other medical services took him over. Behind the factory near the railway line there he found the body of a man who had been shot under the left armpit. Nobody could say who had shot him or when. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst said he and his men attended to a number of people who had been injured by light-type shotgun pellets and rubber bullets.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst said that other than their Medical Corps unit no members of the South African Defence Force had entered Bophuthatswana until Monday, 14 March 1994. It was therefore completely untrue that members of the South African Defence Force had shot at people during the period 10 to 13 March 1994.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst said that no members of the Internal Stability Unit had entered Bophuthatswana before noon on Friday, 11 March 1994 as permission had to be obtained from diplomatic sources for South African personnel to enter Bophuthatswana which was then still an independent state. When the Internal Stability Unit were instructed to enter Bophuthatswana to help to try to stabilise the chaotic situation there, they received no cooperation from the Bophuthatswana Police, who appeared to resent their presence there. Relationships between the Bophuthatswana Police and the Internal Stability Unit were extremely strained. The former were quite unable to control the masses of looters and he saw two incidents where members of the Bophuthatswana Police were also taking part in the looting and putting stolen goods on to vehicles. Captain Van Rhyn who was in command of the Internal Stability Unit also saw members of the Bophuthatswana Police looting. The Internal Stability Unit stabilised the situation by fast, aggressive action against the mobs. He and his unit were withdrawn on Saturday, 12 March 1994 by which time the situation was under control.

Captain (now Superintendent) Johannes van Rhyn testified that in March 1994 he was in command of Unit 1 of the Internal Stability Unit that was deployed to guard the boundary between South Africa and Bophuthatswana. At about 22:15 on Thursday, 10 March 1994 he and a few of his men went to the Morula Sun Hotel complex to escort South African citizens who were trapped there, out of Bophuthatswana. The next day, Friday, 11 March 1994 they were deployed at the Rietgat Police Station. The unit came under fire from the crowd at the station and teargas was fired at the crowd. At 13:00 on the Friday they received permission to enter Bophuthatswana and were instructed to cooperate as far as possible with the Bophuthatswana Police. He entered with 150 men of whom half were black and half were white. He got reports of shooting at Babelegi and went to inspect the situation there. He saw a body near the railway line behind the Tiger Clothing factory and was told by a white man there who was armed with a .303 rifle that he had shot at the crowd when they attacked the factory. He arrested a number of people and took them to Temba Police Station. Superintendent Van Rhyn said he then went to Central City Complex. In the loading zone behind OK Bakers in the Complex he found about 20 men in Bophuthatswana Police uniform and others in civilian dress loading household appliances such as refrigerators and cupboards onto Police and private vehicles.

All were clearly armed with R4 rifles, shotguns and side-arms. He had about seven members of his unit in two Caspirs with him. Superintendent Van Rhyn said he confronted the men and asked to talk to their senior member. Captain Sello Lucas Lelaka came forward and introduced himself. He was in civilian clothing. An argument developed, he contending that the men were not entitled to take the goods, Captain Lelaka saying that Superintendent Van Rhyn could not stop his men from doing so. Superintendent Van Rhyn said he would call in the South African Defence Force if necessary and told his men to stop and take strong action against anyone trying to take stolen goods away in a vehicle. Captain Lelaka spoke to his men who then off-loaded the goods and stacked them in the loading zone. The men all then left. One of his men, Warrant-officer Willem Smit, stopped a Sergeant of the Bophuthatswana Police with looted goods on a vehicle and took his identity card from him. He then heard shots being fired at the front of the Complex and he and Warrant-officer Smit went to investigate. What happened there is described later in this Report in the detailed discussion on the death of the deceased in Case B34: Sedima Springbok, a youth who was probably shot by a member of the Bophuthatswana Police. Superintendent Van Rhyn said he found it unacceptable that the latter were shooting youngsters with groceries when they were looting themselves. He reported the looting to his Operations Centre. Superintendent Van Rhyn said the situation between the Bophuthatswana Police and the Internal Stability Unit was explosive. He decided to see Colonel Diale Mokubyane who was the Police Commissioner for the Eastern Division. He met him at Soshanguve Police Station. Captain Lelaka was also present. He told Colonel Mokubyane that Captain Lelaka was in command of police who were looting and he also gave him the sergeant's identity card that Warrant-officer Smit had taken from him. Superintendent Van Rhyn said the Colonel said he would investigate the matter. He was not asked to submit a report on it in writing. Superintendent Van Rhyn said there was no cooperation between the Bophuthatswana and the Internal Stability Unit. The relationship was a hostile one. He denied that the Internal Stability Unit had adopted a "shoot-to-kill" policy. All incidents had been reported and no member of the Internal Stability Unit had acted in a manner that would embarrass the unit. Superintendent Van Rhyn said he had seen Captain Lelaka personally loading household appliances on to a vehicle. He told him his actions were criminal. He told him he and his men must vacate the Complex. He did not know of the shooting by any member of the Internal Stability Unit of one of Captain Lelaka's men, Constable Makgokgoa, during the confrontation between him and the men under Captain Lelaka. Captain Lelaka gave evidence and denied that he or any of his men had engaged in any looting at Central City Complex. He had gone to the Complex during the night of Thursday, 10 March 1994 where full-scale looting was in progress. The Bophuthatswana Police had dispersed the crowd from within the Complex using teargas but they were still congregated outside the Complex trying to get into it. Early in the morning the northern side of the Complex was burnt down. Somewhere between 16:00 and 17:00 he was confronted by Captain Van Rhyn of the Internal Stability Unit who had arrived by then who told him the Bophuthatswana Police Force had ceased to exist and that the Internal Stability Unit had taken over. He then heard that Constable Makgokgoa had been shot and he decided to withdraw his men. He said he later met Colonel Mokubyane and told him they had been chased away by the Internal Stability Unit. They went to Central City to try to find Internal Stability Unit members but did not find any. Captain Van Rhyn, however, later came to Soshanguve Police Station to talk to Colonel Mokubyane. He alleged that "we were stealing". Captain Lelaka denied this. Captain Lelaka believed that Captain Van Rhyn's allegations were made "out of hatred". It was a "question of superiority". Captain Lelaka said he had seen the household appliances stacked in the loading zone of the OK Bazaars. He had seen some of them on private vehicles loaded there by private looters. His men had offloaded some of them before they left. He knew that the allegations of police looting had been contemporaneously recorded in the Occurrence Book.

Captain Lelaka's second in command, Captain (then Lieutenant) Prince Kubu said he was with Captain Lelaka and his men when Captain Van Rhyn and Captain Lelaka had their confrontation. He was not present at their discussion but Captain Lelaka told him that Captain Van Rhyn was alleging that their men were stealing. Captain Kubu denied that there had been any looting by the police. He said some of the owners were taking goods, which were legitimately theirs, away on private vehicles. Captain Kubu was referred to a statement he had made in which he said that people were complaining that members of the Internal Stability Unit were shooting people at random. He said he had not seen any member of the South African Police shooting anyone nor had he been able to confirm any of the complaints of their having done so. He said, however, that the Bophuthatswana Police Force had operated at Central City throughout the night of Thursday, 10 March 1994 and that members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force had been there in the morning of Friday, 1 1 March 1994. There had been no shooting, he said, during the night. Shooting had only started when the Internal Stability Unit arrived.

Colonel Diale Mokubyane, who has since retired, also told the Commission of the chaotic conditions at Central City. Captain Lelaka had reported to him that people were trying to steal everything from the Complex and that the police were trying to prevent them from doing so. Colonel Mokubyane said that Captain Lelaka said there had been a misunderstanding between them and the South African Police and that the latter had removed them from the Complex.

Later Captain Van Rhyn came to see him. He told Captain Van Rhyn that he had heard that there was no cooperation between the two forces and asked him what He problem was. Captain Van Rhyn said the "reason for his sadness" was that the Bophuthatswana Police were stealing from Central City. He pointed to Captain Lelaka as one who was doing so. The latter started to deny it but Captain Van Rhyn said he had nothing to say to him. Colonel Mokubyane said he asked Captain Van Rhyn to give him a written report so that he could initiate an independent investigation. He had, however, never received such a report. He had reported the matter to his superior at Bophuthatswana Police Force headquarters, Colonel Sedumedi, and before his retirement had enquired what had happened about it. Colonel Sedumedi said he had the same problem in Mmabatho where there were also allegations of police looting. Colonel Mokubyane said that in other parts of Bophuthatswana such as Temba, cooperation between the Internal Stability Unit and the Bophuthatswana Police had been good.

Because of the evidence of Captain Lelaka that one of his men, Constable Makgokgoa, had been shot while he and Captain Van Rhyn were having their confrontation, the Commission called Constable Makgokgoa to testify. He said that on Friday, 11 March 1994 he was on duty with other policemen outside the Central City Complex. He was in civilian clothes, the others were in uniform. He was armed with a 9 mm pistol and also had a teargas canister. A young policeman from the Internal Stability Unit approached him and asked him if the people were allowed to loot. He said "No" and that was why they were using teargas to disperse the crowd. Constable Makgokgoa said he threw his teargas canister at the crowd. As he turned around after doing so he was shot from the front. From X-ray pictures shown by Constable Makgokgoa to the Commission it is clear that the shot was fired from a shotgun. The shot, he said, came from the side of the Internal Stability Unit and although he could not identify who had shot him, he could say for certain that it was a member of the Internal Stability Unit. They were the only ones standing around there and they were only ones who had "pump-actions" (shotguns). He was taken to hospital but before that occurred Captain Lelaka, who was present, came to check how badly he was injured. Constable Mokgokgoa said he was standing between the Internal Stability Unit members and the looting crowd who were about 40 - 50 paces away. He was in civilian clothing but he did not think he could have been mistaken for a looter because he had nothing in his hands. He did not know why he was shot. While in the car before being taken to hospital the same Internal Stability Unit member came up and pointed his shotgun at him. The person who was taking him away told the Internal Stability Unit member that Constable Mokgokgoa was a policeman. The Internal Stability Unit member was in camouflage uniform. He was a tall, slimly built, young white man who spoke to him in English.

It would appear from a totality of the evidence that the people who were shot during the unrest period, particularly in or about the Central City Complex, were shot either by personnel from the security firms, or by members of the Bophuthatswana Police or by members of the Internal Stability Unit. It is certain that some of the deceased were probably shot by the former. As will appear from the details of the deaths, the deceased in CASE B9: MOLEKO THOMAS LEKGETHO was certainly shot by a security guard and in the following cases were probably shot by security guards viz CASE B14: DOROTHY TEBOGO MASANGO; CASE B23: SOKISE LUCAS MOREMANG; and CASE B30: OBAKENG PEETE.

It is also probable that the Bophuthatswana Police shot some of the looters. It is clear that only members of the Bophuthatswana Police were in Central City during He night of 10 March 1994. It is also clear from the evidence of Thomas Motaung that a number of people were shot dead during that night. The only security guards in Central City were not armed. The probabilities are therefore that members of the Bophuthatswana Police shot them. Captain Kubu said that there was no shooting at Central City Complex during that night. That statement cannot be accurate in the light of Motaung's evidence, corroborated as it is by that of Lieutenant-Colonel Andre Herbst who saw bodies in the Complex when he entered it.

Captain Kubu sought to put all the blame for the shootings on the Internal Stability Unit. Again that statement cannot be accurate as many of the deaths had already occurred before the Internal Stability Unit entered Bophuthatswana. Earlier in this Report the Commission has had occasion to be critical of Captain Kubu and his failure to ensure that the deaths were adequately investigated by the police soon after the unrest period. Some of these may well have involved members of the Bophuthatswana Police. It also seems probable that members of the Internal Stability Unit were responsible for certain of the deaths. Despite the evidence of Captain Van Rhyn that the members of his unit were instructed to use minimum force, and that they did not use sharp-nosed ammunition, there is evidence that the public laid complaints with the police and there is the evidence from Lieutenant-Colonel Herbst that the Internal Stability Unit brought the situation under control by fast aggressive action. There is also the indisputable evidence of Constable Makgokgoa that he was probably shot by a member of the Internal Stability Unit even if the latter may possibly have mistaken him for a looter. The Commission is, however, unable to find how many or which of the deaths can be attributed to either the Bophuthatswana Police Force or the Internal Stability Unit. It is also probable that members of the public may have been responsible for some of the deaths.

The Commission heard that on several occasions members of the security forces came under fire. Although nobody could see for certain who was responsible for this shooting it is possible that it may have come from members of the public who were in possession of firearms and who may also in so doing, have hit members of the hordes of looters who attacked the various complexes.

Finally, there is the issue of the alleged looting by members of the Bophuthatswana Police Force and, in particular, Captain Lelaka, at Central City and elsewhere during the unrest on 10 and 11 March 1994. The Commission was urged to make a finding in regard thereto. It was not, however, an aspect falling within the Commission's Terms of Reference and was, as such, on the instructions of the Commission, not fully investigated by the Investigating Team. Rather, it is a matter for an internal investigation by the South African Police Services but whether the latter would choose to do so at this stage i.e. four years after the events and with the former Bophuthatswana Police Force and any of the members possibly involved now absorbed into the South African Police Services, is for the South African Police Services to decide and is a matter on which the Commission expresses no opinion.
