



MACRO-SOCIAL REPORT

2022

A research report produced by the Presidency of South Africa,
the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA)
and the University of Johannesburg (UJ).

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ART	anti-retroviral treatment
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative
B-BBEE	Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
BBSDP	Black Business Supplier Development Programme
CEE	Commission on Employment Equity
CGE	Commission for Gender Equality
CISI	Co-operative Incentive Scheme
CLARA	Communal Land Rights Act
CLTP	Communal Land Tenure Policy
CRAM	Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey
CWP	Community Works Programmes
DoHET	Department of Higher Education and Training
DPME	Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
EAP	economically active population
EE	Employment Equity
FPL	Food Poverty Line
GBVF	Gender Based Violence and Femicide
GDP	gross domestic product
GEM	Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GHS	General Household Survey
GSMI	Global Social Mobility Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMMR	Institutional Maternal Mortality Ratio

IPID	Independent Police Investigative Directorate
ISP	Incubation Support Programme
IUDF	Integrated Urban Development Framework
LBPL	Lower-bound Poverty Line
LGBTQIA+	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual
LTC	long-term care
LOLT	language of learning and teaching
MEC	Minerals-Energy Complex
MISTRA	Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MSR	Macro-Social Report
NCD	non-communicable diseases
NDP	National Development Plan
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NGP	New Growth Path
NIDS	National Income Dynamics Study
NIDS-CRAM	National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey
NPC	National Planning Commission
NSNP	National School Nutrition Programme
NSP	National Strategic Plan
NUP	National Urban Policy
PCSA	Policy Coordination and Advisory Services
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAMPI	South African Multidimensional Poverty Index
SAMRC	South African Medical Research Council
SAPS	South African Police Service
SASAS	South African Social Attitudes Survey
SBI	Small Business Institute
SMME	small, micro and medium enterprise
TB	tuberculosis
THRIP	Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme
TKSLA	Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act
TLGFA	Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UBPL	Upper-bound Poverty Line
VAP	voting age population
WEF	World Economic Forum
WGSS	Washington Group Short Set

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) of the Presidency published the Macro-Social Report (MSR) in 2006. This document discussed major macro-social trends in South Africa, with a specific focus on core nation-building pillars such as social identity, social cohesion and socio-economic transformation. These themes were explored within the overall context of the political economy that shaped the country's development from 1994–2005. South Africa's society has experienced significant changes since 2006, and the 2022 MSR captures these shifts in the political, social and economic spheres. It primarily explores how these structural changes impact macro-social trends, which are comprised of social networks; demographic changes in society; socio-economic mobility; and the organisation of social life and identity. The 2022 MSR also draws attention to the major domestic and global contextual shifts that continue to shape macro-social trends in South African society.

There are several insights that emerge from the report's overall analyses of macro-social trends. First, socio-economic inequality has a significant impact on social networks, social cohesion, organisation of social life and identity. In order to understand the trajectory of macro-social trends in South Africa, it is essential to recognise disparities in material conditions. Second, the socio-economic and political changes in the first decade of democracy produced some positive results. However, these gains have been undermined by weak governance and poor economic performance in the past 16 years. Third, South Africans' increased access to digital platforms has transformed macro-social trends in several ways. The opportunities for obtaining information, establishing social networks, participating in politics and exploring new economic activities have been broadened. This report highlights the importance of digital technologies in political and socio-economic developments in the country. Fourth, the macro-social trends discussed in the report are crucial for determining the legitimacy and consolidation of South Africa's democracy. There are several findings in the report that point to crucial insights for strengthening South Africa's democracy over the next years, especially in the areas of governance, social cohesion and socio-economic development.

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The year 2022 marks 28 years since South Africa transitioned towards democratic governance. This milestone requires deep societal reflection on the successes and challenges encountered in the nation's evolving democratisation process. The 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR) examined the relationship between macro-economic changes and social trends in South Africa. It defined macro-social trends as social networks (capital); social identity; the organisation of social life; socio-economic mobility; and the extent of social cohesiveness in post-apartheid society. The 2006 MSR explored these macro-social trends within the context of South Africa's political economy between 1994 and 2005. The report concluded that South Africa had been transformed on the basis of constitutional imperatives, and this contributed positively to nation-building and reconciliation after decades of discriminatory authoritarian governance. It equally cited positive public policy outcomes, which led to transformations in political, socio-economic and cultural spheres (PCAS, 2006: 94). Yet, persistent inequality, crime, micro-level racism and uneven migration countered the positive macro-social trends. Overall, the 2006 MSR findings highlighted the necessity of developing collective social partnerships to address the concerns of South Africans who still experience socio-economic exclusion and persistent discrimination.

This 2022 MSR builds on the research findings of the 2006 report cited in the preceding paragraph in several ways. However, it adds the following dimensions which differentiate this iteration from the previous one. First, it offers updates on the human development indicators and macro-economic changes that impact significantly on macro-social trends. Various sections cover important developments such as structural changes in the global economic context, state capture, the growing influence of digital technologies in all areas of human development and new research on social cohesion in South Africa.

Second, the 2022 MSR primarily examines democratic consolidation rather than focusing on transitional policy outcomes and institutional changes, which characterised the first decade of democratic governance. MISTRA's (2020) comparative study of democratic consolidation in post-colonial societies notes that 'scholars recognise the consolidation of democracy as being a defining feature of a country's democratic experience as it arguably measures the width and depth of the democracy' (MISTRA, 2020: 11). Nearly 30 years have passed since the democratic transition, and it is imperative to examine the depth of democracy using macro-social indicators.

Third, this report is part of a broader social compacting initiative led by the Presidency, in conjunction with several societal partners, in 2019. The main aim of this initiative is to facilitate nationwide dialogues from 2022 onwards on the state of democracy in South Africa, using the Macro-Social Report findings as a primary reference point. The report factors in the following central themes which emerged out of this 2019 social compacting initiative: citizenship and identity, socio-economic transformation, governance and leadership and global dynamics.

The social compacting initiative highlights the importance of including private sector organisations in the evaluation of public policy. Discussions aimed at assessing and improving South Africa's macro-social conditions should factor in the centrality of business organisations. These enterprises implement important socio-economic policies that support national development goals, and should also be held accountable for policy outcomes, especially in critical areas such as employment creation and inequality reduction.

The 2022 MSR aims to address the core questions posed in the 2006 version while considering the significant changes that have occurred on a macro level. The report acknowledges and cites the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation's 'Towards a 25 Year Review' publication (DPME, 2019). It equally draws from other evidence-based country reviews on the state of the nation published in the last 16 years. These review reports cover a wide range of research themes that cut across varied dimensions of public policy in South Africa. This document specifically focuses on macro-social trends within the context of an evolving political economy. These social trends have a significant impact on democratic consolidation and the realisation of core values captured in the founding provisions of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). It is important to highlight that the 2022 MSR is a timely intervention because the last iteration was published in 2006. Government is urged to publish the MSR regularly, with the aim of strengthening national social cohesion strategies through evidence-based policy dialogues.

The report is based on relevant primary and secondary literature obtained from academic publications, reports from reputable institutes, government-led macro reviews and international institutions that specialise in socio-economic development policy. Some primary examples of the literature sources include the World Bank, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Social Surveys. Additionally, this report makes use of qualitative and quantitative data to develop a comprehensive understanding of macro-social trends in South Africa. The findings from different quantitative surveys are complemented by a qualitative literature analysis. Several sections of the report draw on literature sources that developed findings using interviews with South African citizens. This is important for ensuring that the 2022 MSR reflects the nuances of citizens' democratic experiences over the past 28 years, especially those related to the social trends described in this report.

This publication draws on research in different disciplines and areas of speciality. Thus, the report examined macro-social conditions in an integrated manner in order to avoid a 'silo'-like

analytical approach. The report is structured around the core thematic areas explored in the 2006 MSR, ensuring continuity and alignment between the two reports' overall structures and core research questions. It commences with sections that explore social structure, mobility and the macro socio-economic context. Then the report proceeds to discuss demographics with a focus on age, gender, race, nationality and disability. The sections on demographics are followed by an examination of migration, crime and mortality trends in communities. Finally, the report concludes by linking the themes cited above with an analysis of social life, networks and identity. The conclusion summarises the overall macro-social trends from the report and links them with democratic consolidation and social cohesion.

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CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL CONDITIONS: MAJOR TRENDS IN THE PAST SIXTEEN YEARS

Introduction

This chapter examines significant macro trends that have shaped South African society over the past 16 years. It draws from researched literature on socio-economic development and public governance. The aim is to investigate socio-economic structural changes and relate them to social conditions in South Africa. These macro trends have a significant impact on democratic consolidation, social cohesion and nation building. Thus, it is important to examine how they have developed since the publication of the 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR). The discussion also considers recent developments in political economy and governance institutions, namely, the AI-driven digital economy transition, low carbon economy policy shifts and state capture debates. It introduces new insights from the literature on socio-economic development and governance, which are useful for reorientating South Africa's governance system and development path. The discussion is divided into four main themes: economic development; an assessment of major social programmes; governance; and the role of traditional authorities.

Economic development

The previous MSR places emphasis on connecting economic development with macro-social trends in society, which include identity, social cohesion, demographic changes and social mobility (PCAS, 2006). It examines intersections between different human development areas in order to conduct a holistic analysis of the state of the nation. This approach is equally used in MISTRA's publication titled *Nation Formation and Social Cohesion: An enquiry into the hopes and aspirations of South Africans* (MISTRA, 2014a). It studies social cohesion using socio-economic, political and cultural factors. A socially cohesive nation systemically decreases 'inequalities, disparities and exclusions based on ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age, disability, or any other distinctions which engender distrust, division and conflict' (MISTRA, 2014a: 95). This conception informs the discussion on the major economic trends in the following sections.

These indicators are discussed with the aim of addressing and factoring in long-standing societal inequalities, such as race. Consequently, South Africa's post-apartheid development trajectory is examined using themes such as Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), gross domestic product (GDP), macro-economic stability and the efficacy of major social policy programmes.

The section employs a wider definition of economic development, which transcends the narrow focus on GDP. Chang (2003) and Fioramonti (2013) encourage political economy researchers to measure development using redistribution and structural change patterns. This perspective highlights the limits of elevating GDP without investigating whether growth coincides with industrial diversification, innovation, market structure reforms and substantive income redistribution (Chang, 2003; Fioramonti, 2013). In addition, it is imperative to explore if economic development is aligned with two global political economy policy shifts: the digital and low carbon economy transitions (Fioramonti, 2013; MISTRA, 2021). The externalities (including opportunity costs) of pervasive socio-economic inequalities and traditional, fossil fuel-dominated economic structures are well documented in development literature (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010; Ostry et al., 2014; Word Bank, 2018). Digital and low carbon technologies provide myriad opportunities for shifting away from these exclusionary and ecologically unsustainable development paths. This iteration of the MSR adds a new dimension by factoring these two major structural changes in human development.

South Africa's GDP trends in the post-apartheid era have been mixed. In the previous MSR (2006), emphasis was placed on successful growth in preceding years and macro-economic stability. The country experienced one of the longest periods of sustained economic growth in its history from the early 2000s to 2011/12 (Marais, 2011). Average annual growth during the first decade of the post-apartheid era stood at 3 per cent (from 1993 and 2003). This figure increased between 2004 and 2007 with annual GDP averaging 5 per cent (Du Toit & Van Tonder, 2009; PCAS, 2008). However, the country's economic growth declined substantially since the last 2006 MSR was published. The DPME's 'Twenty Year Review' captures this GDP decrease in the following words: '... from 2009 to 2012 the South African economy grew by only 3.1 per cent a year, while other upper middle-income economies averaged 4.3 per cent a year' (DPME, 2014: 86). This pattern continued from 2012, culminating in the country experiencing a technical recession in 2018 and an overall annual growth rate of 0.8 per cent (DPME, 2019: 122). South Africa's economy grew by only 1.5 per cent in 2020 and 1.2 per cent in 2021.

The GDP figures cited above must be examined with other indicators, especially those that assist in illuminating redistribution, industrial diversification and economic restructuring trends. A good starting point is an investigation into GDP per capita, which highlights some pertinent lessons for examining economic development broadly. The National Planning Commission's 2020 economic review reveals that South Africa's GDP per capita income grew by only 1.2 per cent every year from 1960 to 2015 (NPC, 2020). This is well below the expansion of per capita incomes in other middle income or developing nations. Other significant indicators include

wealth and income inequalities that exemplify broader race, class and gender disparities. By 2014 South Africa's income Gini coefficient stood at 0.68 and 50 per cent of the national income went to 10 per cent of households (DMPE, 2014). This pervasive inequality persists in the contemporary period (0.65 Gini coefficient), and the World Bank (2018) states that it is higher than 1995. The share of wages in the national income has also declined from 1995 to 2015, and the pay-gap differences between workers and executives are rising (Isaacs, 2017). The country's monthly median wage rate was R3,640 in 2017 and the 'ratio of a company's average CEO compensation to the average wage is 73: 1' in JSE-listed companies (Isaacs, 2017). Chapter two on social structure and mobility will provide detailed data on all the inequality trends cited in this paragraph.

Race is an equally determining factor of inequality, and this is vividly evident in different human development areas such as health and education (World Bank, 2018: 18). Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) and Employment Equity (EE) legislation are cited as key policy programmes in the government's race-based redress strategies. Yet, both have produced minimal results and failed to meet intended policy targets (B-BBEE Commission, 2018; DoL, 2018). Combined black ownership (which includes direct and indirect ownership) in the JSE-listed companies stood at 27 per cent, and direct ownership was only 3 per cent in 2018 (DMPE, 2019: 109).

All the disaggregated data on economic development cited above is shaped by macro-economic stability. The 2006 MSR highlights the importance of macro-economic stability and prudent fiscal policy management. Between 1994 and 2007 government decreased its debt from 43 per cent of GDP to 22 per cent. This culminated with the state attaining a budget surplus in 2007 and 2008 (PCAS, 2008). According to the DPME (2014), government implemented an expansive fiscal policy programme from 2009 and this policy shift increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to 36 per cent by year-end in 2013. It grew further from 2014 reaching 54 per cent in 2018 and 61 per cent in 2020 (National Treasury, 2019; National Treasury, 2020). South Africa's post-apartheid government has pursued inflation targeting as its main monetary policy tool, with the CPI band set between 3 and 6 per cent (Biniza, 2020). The policy goal was mostly not achieved between 1994 and 2003, except for the years between 1999 and 2001 where it was under 6 per cent (PCAS, 2008: 12). This performance improved from the mid-2000s onwards 'averaging about 5.5 per cent per year over the period 2009 to 2012' (DPME, 2014: 95). South Africa's inflation rate continued to stabilise (within the target) from 2012 and stood at 5.9 per cent by December 2021 (Stats SA, 2021b).

The final dimension of examining economic development relates to industrial diversification and trends in market structure. Sector contributions to GDP are a good indicator of industrial diversification and growth drivers in key sectors. South Africa's post-apartheid growth path has largely been driven by mining value chains, financial sector expansion, telecommunications and business services (DMPE, 2014; DMPE, 2019). However, the direct mining sector contribution to GDP decreased after the 2000s commodity boom ended. But the sector has since rebounded, and

the share price performance of most JSE-listed mining companies continues to improve. Further, from 1994 to 2018 mining still accounted for over 50 per cent of the nation's exports (DMPE, 2019). Sectors with the highest potential for labour absorption and industrialisation multiplier effects have contributed minimally towards GDP. This explains the prevalence of unemployment and deindustrialisation in South Africa's economic structure (Ashman et al., 2013).

Climate change trends and just transition policy debates have become central in deliberations about South Africa's economic restructuring. The country's dependence on a largely fossil fuel-driven economy has produced adverse socio-economic and ecological effects. Climate shocks such as droughts and floods are destroying infrastructure, increasing food insecurity and leading to the loss of livelihoods in vulnerable economic sectors. In addition, the degradation of essential natural resources like water, land and soil diminishes the sustainability of the country's development path. The social costs and externalities associated with the current fossil fuel dependent economy are mostly absorbed by low-income communities and households. Climate change exacerbates the long-standing socio-economic inequalities in society, highlighting the innate connection between social, economic and ecological development trends. Low carbon policy alternatives in the energy, agriculture, transport, construction and services sectors provide practical solutions for pursuing a more sustainable development trajectory (MISTRA, 2017). However, these policy propositions need to be discussed further in negotiations between stakeholders so that South Africa's low carbon economy transition does not reproduce socio-economic exclusions or deepen inequalities

Overall, these economic developments have shaped South Africa's development path since the publication of the 2006 MSR. The macro-economic trends discussed above have a direct impact on policy choices and policy environment limitations. Social cohesion and compacting interventions operate within this context, and the creation of a conducive macro-economic policy framework is imperative for strengthening these interventions. We provide some strategic policy insights emerging from the preceding discussion in the next sections.

Policy insights: Economic restructuring and political economy choices

There are four major political economy lessons that emerge from the discussion above. These lessons have a significant impact on the intersection between economic development, social cohesion and economic restructuring. First, South Africa's economic growth challenge cannot be resolved without addressing systemic inequality and aggregate demand (NPC, 2020). There are several existing national socio-economic programmes aimed at tackling these issues. The interventions include the national minimum wage, social grants and public employment programmes. However, all these policy interventions have fallen short in terms of creating substantial demand and addressing inequality. Thus, it is important to expand these efforts through additional proposals such as a national income policy, introducing a basic income grant, expansion of small, micro and medium enterprise (SMME) business credit and increased

infrastructure spend (Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019).

Second, policymakers are advised to focus on sector configurations in the structural make-up of the economy. The current sector growth and GDP contributions have locked South Africa into a traditional finance-led Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) (Ashman et al., 2013). South Africa needs to diversify its industrial base using policy levers that catalyse innovation, reforms in market structure and the development of new product markets (Hirsch, 2019; Cawe, 2021). This intervention should be underpinned by a long-term development planning paradigm, which is anchored around the low carbon and digital economy transitions (MISTRA, 2017; MISTRA, 2021). Several MISTRA publications present case study recommendations in mining, energy, transport services and infrastructure sectors that illustrate how to achieve industrial diversification (MISTRA, 2013; MISTRA, 2017; MISTRA, 2021). The recommendations emphasise social compacting, market coordination, investment in research and development, SMME development and establishing local value chains.

Third, it is imperative to broaden ownership patterns in the economy through different B-BBEE and SMME development strategies. These entail, amongst others, connecting B-BBEE with economic restructuring, focusing on transforming value chains, linking B-BBEE policy benefits with more inclusive socio-economic targets, and including informal entrepreneurs (Mondi, 2017; Mabasa & Cawe, 2020). In addition, macro- and micro-economic policy frameworks need to be suited for attaining broader socio-economic impacts in B-BBEE transactions and empowerment deals. The NPC review specifically cites the salience of competition and monetary reforms in decreasing market barriers for smaller businesses (NPC, 2020: 17).

Fourth, socio-economic redistribution, industrial diversification and broadening ownership cannot take place without a stable macro-economic environment. The country needs a measured macro-economic policy mix, which balances fiscal stability and economic restructuring. The macro-economic framework will determine how the social programmes discussed in the following sections are rolled out.

Impact of major social programmes

The 2006 MSR highlights the expansion of social security, especially the social grant, as a significant policy achievement in the post-apartheid era. South Africa's social transfer system has expanded since the early 2000s as a result of the macro-economic gains cited in previous sections. The 'percentage of individuals that benefited from social grants consistently increased from 12.8 per cent in 2003 to 31 per cent in 2018. Simultaneously, the percentage of households that received at least one social grant increased from 30.8 per cent in 2003 to 44.3 per cent in 2018' (Stats SA, 2018: 31). Close to 18 million social grants were paid out by the end of the financial year in 2019 and the figure has increased with the introduction of the special COVID-19 grant, with an additional six million people receiving the Social Relief of Distress COVID-19 social transfer by December 2020 (Stats SA, 2021). The number of people accessing

the Social Relief of Distress COVID-19 grant increased to 10 million by January 2022. National Treasury (2019) estimated that state expenditure on social grants will grow from R162.9 billion in the 2018/19 financial year to R202.9 billion by the end of March 2021 (National Treasury, 2019: 3).

In addition to social transfers, government has continued to provide substantial monetary support for basic services such as housing, water and electricity since the last MSR publication. According to the Stats SA General Household Survey (GHS) (2019), households with access to government housing grants expanded from 5.6 per cent in 2002 to 18.7 per cent in 2019 (Stats SA, 2019: 33). Eighty-two per cent of South Africans reside in formal houses while informal and traditional households account for 12.7 and 5.1 per cent respectively (Stats SA, 2019: 31). The percentage of households residing in ‘formal dwellings’ increased to 84 per cent by 2020 (Stats SA, 2020: 30). Access to energy within households has improved, with connections to the national electricity grid increasing from 76.7 per cent in 2002 to 85 per cent in 2019. By 2020, 90 per cent of South African households were connected to the mains electricity supply’ (Stats SA, 2020: 43). Electricity is increasingly becoming the main energy source for preparing food, as the number homes using electricity for cooking reached 75.1 per cent in 2019 from a 57.5 per cent figure in 2002 (Stats SA, 2019: 34–36). Similarly, household water access stood at 88 per cent in 2019, which is a four per cent increase from 2002. The provinces with the highest water access were Gauteng and Western Cape while Limpopo and Eastern Cape had the lowest (Stats SA, 2019: 37). Sanitation access in households improved more than water, with the figure rising from 61.7 per cent in 2002 to 82.1 per cent in 2019 (Stats SA, 2019: 42). Again, Gauteng and Western Cape had the highest access levels with the worst levels recorded in Limpopo and Eastern Cape. The 2020 figure for household access to water stood at 89 per cent and 83 per cent of households had access to sanitation (Stats SA, 2020: 32–35).

Government’s food security strategy is another salient social security and poverty intervention in South Africa. The state ‘has implemented the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP), which provides daily meals to about 9 million children in over 20,000 public schools across South Africa’ (Devereux et al., 2018: 1). Additionally, government supports household and community subsistence food production through the Community Works Programmes (CWP) and funding for ILIMA/LETSEMA, a dedicated agricultural policy intervention targeting subsistence producers (SPII, 2018). South Africa’s absolute hunger levels have decreased: the sections of the population experiencing daily hunger fell from 52 per cent in 1999 to 26 per cent by 2013/14 (Shisana et al., 2014: 145). But many citizens still experience some level of food insecurity, with 28 per cent households at risk of missing or skipping some meals (Shisana et al., 2014: 145). In other words, only 46 per cent of households could be classified as being fully food secure in 2013 when the South African National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey was conducted. This is based on the strict food security conception employed in most studies adopted from the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Statistics South Africa uses a different methodology to examine food security in society. The

latest food security report from the organisation found that '78 per cent of households reported that they have adequate access to food, about 2.5 million (15.8 per cent) reported that their food access is inadequate and almost 0.9 million (5.5 per cent) of households described their food access as severely inadequate' (Stats SA, 2019: 14).

The data on the major social programmes discussed in this section points to substantial progress in essential human development areas. Yet, there is still community discontent, and advocacy organised around grievances, in different parts of South Africa. (MISTRA, 2013; Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019; Von Holdt et al., 2011). This relates to the point raised in the Introduction about balancing quantitative socio-economic indicators with qualitative social trends captured in studies on governance. It is important to interrogate why residents still highlight daily grievances even though statistics on basic services indicate substantial improvements in the areas of access to water, sanitation and energy. Society needs to explore why protests, which often become violent, persist when there is progress in terms of accessing basic services.

The protests around myriad socio-economic, political and governance demands are complex and varied. One primary issue is the poor quality of service provision, which delegitimises the improved access cited in previous sections. South Africans have better access to water, housing and electricity. But the quality and nature of access to public goods remain prevalent challenges expressed in communities. Responses from community participants to questions about supply interruptions, pricing and infrastructure satisfaction reflect poor quality in all these basic service areas (Stats SA, 2018; Stats SA, 2019). This is equally expressed in several non-governmental organisation (NGO) research documents which examine access to food, water, energy and housing (SPII, 2018; Greenpeace, 2019).

Corruption and patronage are two additional socio-political causes of community discontent (Von Holdt et al., 2011; MISTRA, 2013). These two factors erode legitimate public service processes governing access to basic services in communities. There is ample evidence pointing to local actors using basic services as a tool for dispensing patronage or excluding citizens who are outside patronage networks (MISTRA, 2013). MISTRA's study on patronage politics illustrates how this practice 'breaks community ties and divides residents into winners and losers. Social cohesion suffers. Communities no longer function as a cohesive whole' (MISTRA, 2013: 129).

Van Holdt et al.'s (2011) extensive research into protests in different South African communities is also instructive. These authors conclude that exclusionary political identities, formed around narrow ethnic or national citizenship, are an equally important factor in community grievances. These identities are employed in distributing social services unevenly to sustain political support or to mobilise groups against sections of the population. This report also emphasises underlying class politics that shape protests within communities. Access to state contracts and employment has fuelled several protests. In some cases, they are led by local political figures

who represent rival business interests competing over government contracts (Von Holdt et al., 2011; Von Holdt, 2019). This discussion of protest in society is closely related to law and governance issues investigated in the following sections.

Governance and legitimacy of the system

South Africa has held successful free and fair elections since its transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Several sources highlight the negotiation period that heralded the transition and the importance of it for the establishment of a democratic culture in which electoral outcomes and basic political rights are respected. The transition is viewed positively in these accounts and considered as the anchor of South Africa's democratic political culture (ANC, 1992; Ramphela, 2008). International studies monitoring the state of democracy laud South Africa for protecting civil liberties and creating an environment conducive to elections (APRM, 2007; Freedom House, 2020; IIAG, 2020). These comparative democracy indexes equally examine other indicators such as the status of the judiciary, respect for the rule of law, security and human development. South Africa is ranked sixth in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 2020 report, with its best performances in the areas of rule of law, political and civil liberties (IIAG, 2020: 131). However, the country's socio-economic inequalities and barriers lowered its score in the economic and human development areas. It is imperative to note that South Africa has a vibrant participatory civil society sector, which is comprised of trade unions, religious formations, a multi-party system, organised business, cultural groups and different non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The rights of these organisations are respected, and they continue to shape public policy and to hold state authorities accountable in different ways.

Another crucial area in assessing governance and the legitimacy of the political system is government's institutional status in society. The post-apartheid bureaucracy and public administration has been transformed since the early 1990s. This process has been guided by constitutional prescripts and the ruling party's vision of a democratic and responsive public service (ANC, 1992; DMPE, 2014). Some of the essential policy measures introduced over the past 28 years include creating a single public administration, deracialising public-sector labour markets, introducing public service regulatory frameworks and establishing a three-tiered cooperative governance model (DPME, 2014; Kuye, 2006). South Africa's government institutions have been broadly legitimate for most of the post-apartheid period (APRM, 2007; IIAG, 2020; Graham, 2020). The 2014 APRM report attributes this legitimacy to the plethora of participatory democracy regulatory practices embedded in the country's governance system. Prominent examples include public meetings (izimbizo), citizens' access to legislators, participation in policymaking, media freedom and oversight conducted in ward committees (APRM, 2014). Some gains in the legitimacy of governance and government mentioned in preceding sections are captured in the MSR 2006 report. But several adverse post-2006 political developments require some exploration and discussion.

The legitimacy of South Africa's transition 'miracle' has been challenged and critiqued over the past decade. This criticism is mainly led by marginalised citizens, especially the youth, who feel excluded from the socio-economic and political benefits associated with the transition. Students, youth in communities and other members of the working class express their discontent in different ways. For example, the FeesMustFall movement questions the legitimacy of the ANC-led government and its policy orientation, using the negotiated settlement as a starting point (Chinguno et al., 2017; Chikane, 2018; Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019). The overall feeling of resentment is captured in the following statement cited in MISTRA's 2019 social cohesion research: 'There was widespread feeling among our participants that South Africans do not have a shared understanding of our history, nor do they agree on who has (or has not) benefitted from the transition' (Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019: 27). In addition, protests continue in society, and they sometimes culminate in violence. These marches take place in varied institutions and locations such as local communities, education institutions and workplaces (Chinguno et al., 2017; Ngwane, 2010).


South Africa's government has continued implementing varied programmes aimed at creating social cohesion and nation building. Yet, social conflict persists, eroding the legitimacy of government and the broader polity (Netshitenzhe, 2020). This legitimacy crisis is exacerbated by the phenomenon of state capture, which undermined governance and implicated individuals in both public and private sectors (Chipkin & Swilling, 2018; Von Holdt, 2019). State capture is broadly defined as a perverse governance system that shifts public resources and institutions towards the sectarian interests of selected business and political groups in society. It functions through subverting established public management laws and policy prescripts in order to dispense resources through patronage networks. This requires systemic control of government departments, public enterprises and the justice system (Chipkin & Swilling, 2018; Von Holdt, 2019). According to Chipkin and Swilling (2018), state capture cannot take place without 'repurposing state institutions' in order to change '... the way in which a given state institution is structured, governed, managed and funded so that it serves a purpose different to its formal mandate' (Chipkin & Swilling, 2018: 5).

Von Holdt (2019) extends the state capture analysis by focusing on the underlying causes that relate to class formation. He argues that state capture reports and literature sources reduce it to a moral phenomenon. Von Holdt (2019) says this view misses the class contestations driving state capture. His account draws attention to the material dimension of conflict over B-BBEE contracts and implementation, especially at provincial and local levels. Von Holdt (2019) locates patronage networks, social conflict and subsequent political contestations within post-apartheid class formation dynamics. This emphasis on class formation is a reminder that some large private sector corporates facilitated state capture in several ways. It equally highlights how systemic socio-economic and political inequalities create conditions conducive to state capture. Overall, the legitimacy of state institutions has been significantly eroded and levels of public trust in government institutions have dwindled (Chipkin & Swilling, 2018). The details of

how this phenomenon developed have been extensively reported, but the main takeaway here is the corrosive impact of state capture on state and society relations. In 2018 former President Jacob Zuma established a commission of inquiry to investigate this phenomenon based on the Public Protector's recommendations. The commission has concluded its investigations and commenced with publishing its main findings.

According to Transparency International, perceptions about South Africa's corruption stabilised at an average score of 43 in the past 15 years. The latest score of 44 in the past two years represents an insignificant one-point improvement since 2018. The decade began with a lower score of 41 and only moved three points up within that period. This represents a dismal performance by the country. And certainly, keeps South Africa within the 43 global average score in the past year. This means that the country is part of a majority of countries which score poorly on governance and corruption. Figure 1.1 provides a detailed description of corruption perceptions between 1995 and 2020.

Figure 1.1: South Africa's corruption rank



Source: Trading Economics and Transparency International, 2020


South Africa's justice system was resilient throughout the 10-year period of state capture, even with attempts to undermine its independence and institutional integrity. Several cases were brought before the courts, which related to the governance failures associated with state capture. The judiciary was asked to rule on conflicts that created impasses in political institutions such as parliament. A prominent example was the case surrounding the Public Protector's role and mandate in relation to corrective recommendations. In addition, civil society groups lodged several cases aimed at holding the executive accountable for poor governance. These groups brought to the fore evidence and legal arguments which served to strengthen judicial processes and oversight functions. The trends cited above illuminate how

South Africa's judiciary maintained independence, albeit in a hostile political context. MISTRA's discussion on South Africa's democratic consolidation captures this point succinctly (MISTRA, 2020: 101):

While large swathes of the state machinery (including state-owned companies, intelligence agencies, the police, the tax administration and parts of the legislature) were severely compromised, the judiciary and organs such as the Public Protector's office distinguished themselves as a shield against the repurposing of the state.

Several international governance studies rank the country's judicial independence highly (APRM, 2014; Freedom House, 2020; IIAG, 2020). However, the reports raise some concerns regarding political interference in National Prosecuting Authority structures which occurred mainly in the past decade (Freedom House, 2020). The discussion on state capture highlights the significance of accountability in maintaining state legitimacy and developmental governance. Power is an important component of accountability, and it is 'the central concern of governance – power and the ability to hold it to account' (Everatt, 2019: 20). But poor governance is not only about rules, systems and processes of accountability. It is also about social outcomes. Improvements in the living conditions of people in terms of the key indicators of economic development are important to establish state legitimacy. That is why even at the height of the state capture project and its daily public reportage, concerns about living conditions ranked higher than corruption. Figure 1.2 from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) about the most important challenges facing South Africa between 2003 and 2018 amplifies this point.

Figure 1.2: Public views regarding the three most important challenges facing South Africa



Source: Human Sciences Research Council, 2019

Note: Discrepancies in the graph are due to rounding.

Unemployment, crime, safety and poverty rank higher than corruption which ranks fifth in the SASAS survey. In other words, corruption remains important but is not seen as the most important challenge facing South Africa. Therefore, a narrow focus on fixing the rules or perceptions about weakening institutions is not the panacea for rebuilding the legitimacy of the South African state. The country needs an approach that addresses corruption while extending socio-economic redistribution and fostering employment.

South Africa's governance system is multi-layered and includes a variety of actors. We examine the role of, and developments surrounding, traditional leadership authorities in the next theme.¹

Rural governance and traditional authorities in a liberal democracy

South African society is made up of diverse communities spread over the length and breadth of the country. These societies are comprised of diverse ethnic groups (both migrant and indigenous), with some communities concentrated in specific geographic locations. Consequently, the issue of traditional leadership applies only in specific instances defined by geography (communal/rural areas) and cultural affiliations associated with indigenous nationalities. The country's urban population has grown from 60 per cent in 2007 to 66 per cent by 2017 (DPME, 2019). On the other hand, the rural population, which is subject to the authority of traditional authorities, was at 34 per cent in 2017, down from the 2007 figure of 40 per cent.

In its 2019 traditional leaders study, MISTRA reflects on two distinct types of governance structures that have had an impact on traditional authority since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Traditional systems predominate in rural-based communal areas where AmaKhosi/DiKgosi and Traditional Councils are not only heavily involved in issues of land and its use, but also act as mediators of disputes, custodians of customs, wardens of natural resources and local development champions. This then places traditional leaders at the centre of governance in rural South Africa. But there are laws directing how traditional authorities exercise their governance power within the confines of a democracy. Legislation such as the Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act, 2003 (TLGFA) and the Communal Land Rights Act, 2004 have, for many years, been used to detail the workings of traditional authorities. While the latter piece of legislation was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and rendered obsolete in 2010, the former was replaced by the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act (TKSLA) in 2019, the impact of which is still to be felt.

At the dawn of South Africa's democracy, the country adopted a Constitution that, in its Bill of Rights, enshrines a governance system based on the will of its citizens. The same Constitution recognises the institution of traditional leadership, which is based, in the main, on hereditary or

¹ The 2022 Macro-Social Report (MSR) structure and themes are the same as the previous iteration. Thus, the authors had to retain the traditional leadership theme.

appointed – as opposed to elected – leadership. Even though the Constitution recognises this institution, it does not elaborate, except to accord it recognition, ‘subject to the Constitution’, and further goes on to urge Parliament to pass relevant legislation to clarify the role of traditional authorities in a democracy (Constitution of South Africa, 1996). This role was then elaborated in the TLGFA, and recently, in the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act, which was signed into law by the President in November 2019 (Republic of South Africa, 2019).

The Constitution further acknowledges the institution of traditional leadership in its various manifestations and informs the establishment of Houses of Traditional Leaders in some provinces, and at national level. The powers of traditional leaders, as defined in legislation, range from cultural duties, traditional roles and certain judicial functions to land governance. To ensure consistency with basic human rights and administrative justice, various pieces of legislation address the extent of the authority of Traditional Councils, with issues such as gender and jurisdiction still being contentious (Weeks, 2019; Motaung, 2019). For example, in relation to matters such as traditional courts, provisions for voluntary affiliation, as well as for individuals to opt out of customary court processes, were narrowed in the successive versions of the Bill, though they were included in the earlier versions of the Traditional Courts Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2017). This, in part, has been the basis of present contestations against the Bill, that it infringes on people’s rights of choice and affiliation (Pikoli, 2020). Furthermore, detractors argue that the Bill will enable the concentration of power in one individual, the traditional leader (Van Dalsen, 2019). However, it is important to note that the Bill still recognises the supremacy of the judicial systems of a democratic state.

In 2003 and 2004, a higher level of clarity about the role of traditional authorities in South Africa’s post-apartheid democracy was achieved when Parliament passed the TLGFA and the Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) respectively. The objective of TLGFA was to establish and recognise Traditional Councils and define the parameters and principles defining their operations. A Traditional Council, according to section 3(1), will be established in an area that has been recognised by the premier of a province as a traditional community. The Act’s preamble asserts that this would take place within the context of transforming ‘the institution of traditional leadership ... in line with constitutional imperatives ... so that democratic governance and the values of an open and democratic society may be promoted’ (Republic of South Africa, 2003). The Act provided for a role for traditional leadership, not only in the local government sphere, but in all three spheres of government. However, the Act did not specify an exact role for traditional authorities in land administration, which has led many to believe that traditional leaders still ‘continue to exercise disproportionate power over land and tenure issues, in some instances dominating access through their control of exclusive management trusts within ostensibly communal areas’ (South African Government, 2019).

The Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) of 2004 recognised apartheid-era so-called ‘Tribal Authorities’ as the basis on which Traditional Councils would be established. In terms of this Act, Traditional Councils established under the TLGFA were empowered to have land allocation

and administration powers and functions in the communal areas they controlled under apartheid (Ntsebeza, 2020). Thus, section 21(2) of the Communal Land Rights Act reads as follows: 'If a community has a recognised Traditional Council, the powers and duties of the land administration committee may be exercised and performed by such council' (Republic of South Africa, 2004). This gave enormous powers to a structure with a majority of unelected members (Ntsebeza, 2020).

In the past decade or so, the country has witnessed some propensity towards the appropriation of powers that are akin to executive authority by traditional leaders. This has prompted legal battles by civil society on behalf of rural communities to challenge the impact of laws such as CLARA on rural people. A massive legal battle was won in 2010, when the CLARA – which gave traditional leaders control over communal land occupation, use and administration – was invalidated by the Constitutional Court. However, there is an argument that this 'victory' was subsequently threatened when the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) introduced the Communal Land Tenure Policy (CLTP) in 2013 (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2013). The CLTP proposed to 'resolve' the problem of insecurity of land tenure and unaccountable land management structures by transferring land titles to Traditional Councils. According to the CLTP, 'the land shall be administered by Traditional Councils in areas that observe customary law, or communal property institutions outside these' (DRDLR, 2013). Such an approach, however, was likely to exacerbate a patriarchal monopolisation of natural resources. Partly to address this patriarchalism, regulations attached to the TLGFA 'stipulated that woman should hold at least 30 per cent of the seats on the council, and that 40 per cent of representatives on the council should be elected rather than appointed' (Buthelezi & Vale, 2019).

In 2019, the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act (TKLA), 3 of 2019 was passed. Above all, it gave Traditional Councils permission to enter into agreements or partnerships with municipalities, government departments and, most importantly, 'any other person, body or institution'. These laws have given Traditional Councils administrative, controlling and decision-making powers, more especially at the local level (Ntsebeza, 2020). At present, the TKLA is relatively new and therefore too early to have a solid view of its impact. However, early criticism of the Act is that it will rob millions of rural people, especially women, of their human rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights by granting traditional leaders the green light to sign deals with investment companies without the consent of those whose land rights are directly affected (Pikoli, 2020). It is expected that another round of litigation from civil society and communities may follow. MISTRA's publications on land (2021) and on mining (2018) provide country-wide case studies which illuminate how traditional authorities contravene constitutional provisions in signing agreements with large corporations about the use of land. The court cases that have emerged mostly concern the mining sector, especially in Eastern Cape, Kwazulu-Natal, Northwest and Limpopo (Mnwana, 2018; Delius & Beinart, 2021; Ncapayi, 2021).

To date, the problem bedevilling the traditional leadership sphere is whether this system of governance can co-exist with a liberal democracy, which revolves around multi-party electoral politics. Historically, the institution of traditional leadership has been comprised of members who are unelected. This gives rise to tension between a leadership based on the democratic principles of representative government, and another comprised of unelected leaders. The contradiction arises more intensely at local levels with wall-to-wall municipalities that are based on electoral principles. This then is the nub of the contestation which requires resolution. The country needs to resolve the conceptual question: how should traditional leaders relate to local government (municipalities and districts), and how should the rights in the Constitution find full expression in the communal areas, while at the same time allowing for some form of traditional governance? These questions will be addressed through litigation processes and subsequent public policy debates on the matter.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter elevates several crucial factors for policy consideration. First, economy-wide restructuring is imperative to address long-standing socio-economic inequalities, which impact on social trends such as social cohesion in South Africa. This structural reform must be anchored around redistribution and long-term shifts such as one to a low carbon economy. The country needs to create a macro-economic context conducive to building macro-social conditions that contribute positively towards nation-building efforts.

Second, the quality of basic public goods and services deserves attention. The evidence presented in this chapter illustrates that improved access to these goods and services is not sufficient without addressing quality issues. In addition, it reveals that perverse governance practices undermine equal access to public services in society.

Third, the discussion draws attention to governance challenges which have largely delegitimised public institutions. The debate on state capture and how to address this phenomenon provides instructive lessons. A primary one is appreciating that both public and private sectors need improved governance oversight mechanisms. Another important lesson is the need to address systemic socio-economic disparities, which provide a material basis for developing patronage networks within institutions.

Fourth, improving training on leadership ethics in both public and private sectors is crucial. But this training must be accompanied by institutional changes that deter individuals from engaging in unethical practices within organisations. The impact of training is minimal in contexts where institutional structures and operations are not transformed to support ethical behaviour.

Chapter two explores the socio-economic trends cited in this chapter in more detail, with a particular emphasis on social mobility and structure.

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CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Introduction

Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, the South African government has gone to great lengths to restructure its society from one which was rigidly organised around race, class, ethnic and gender social divisions. Contemporary democratic South African society has provided some opportunities for social mobility among previously disadvantaged groups. This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of South Africa's social structure and social mobility from the period of 2006 to 2020. It does so through an intersectional lens of race, class, gender and age, within the contextual changes created by the growing influence of digital technologies and policy shifts towards a more ecologically sustainable development path.

In its assessment of South Africa's social structure and social mobility, the previous 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR) arrived at the following five observations (HSRC, 2006). First, the MSR found that while there was a marked increase in poverty between 1993 and 2000, this subsequently decreased as a result of the R22 billion expansion in social grants. Second, South Africa experienced a widening in income inequality with less income mobility in the top and bottom income quintiles. Third, it found a rapid increase in the percentage of black South Africans joining the middle strata. Fourth, South Africa has a large degree of 'survivalist' entrepreneurial activity. Fifth, high levels of education are closely linked to more dynamic and sustainable entrepreneurial activity.

Three macro-economic policies have been adopted which sought to democratise South Africa's social structure and facilitate greater upward social mobility of previously disadvantaged groups: the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) adopted in 2005; the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010; and the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2013. All three policy frameworks emphasised the need to reduce poverty and inequality while increasing employment.

These policies have led to some positive changes in South Africa's socio-economic structure. However, the country continues to reel from the structural legacies of apartheid 28 years into its democracy and, as such, there has not been significant fluidity within its social structure to

allow for greater social mobility among previously disadvantaged groups. This chapter presents evidence of the underlying factors which account for the limited social mobility of previously disadvantaged groups. It is organised around the following research focus areas: (a) poverty and inequality trends; (b) income and social mobility; (c) small, micro and medium enterprises (SMME); and (d) the relevance of education to entrepreneurship. The chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations relevant to the challenges raised in the research focus areas.

Assessing poverty and inequality trends


This first section assesses South Africa's poverty and inequality trends between 2006 and 2020 according to the following three categories: money-metric (lack of income), multidimensional poverty (lack of basic services) and inequality (Stats SA, 2015). South Africa uses the following three national poverty lines to measure money-metric poverty: the Food Poverty Line (FPL), the Lower-bound Poverty Line (LBPL) and the Upper-bound Poverty Line (UBPL). Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 illustrate South Africa's inflation-adjusted national poverty lines (per person, per month) for the period of 2006–2020.

Table 2.1: Inflation-adjusted national poverty lines, 2006–2020 (per person, per month), measured in South African Rand (ZAR)

Year	Food Poverty Line (FPL)	Lower-bound Poverty Line (LBPL)	Upper-bound Poverty Line (UBPL)
2006 (March)	219	370	575
2007 (March)	237	396	613
2008 (March)	274	447	682
2009 (March)	318	456	709
2010 (March)	320	466	733
2011 (March)	335	501	779
2012 (March)	366	541	834
2013 (March)	386	572	883
2014 (March)	417	613	942
2015 (April)	441	647	992
2016 (April)	498	714	1 077
2017 (April)	531	758	1 138
2018 (April)	547	785	1 183
2019 (April)	561	810	1 227
2020 (April)	585	840	1 268

Source: Stats SA, 2020a

Figure 2.1: Inflation-adjusted national poverty lines, 2006–2020 (per person, per month)




Source: Stats SA, 2020a

Between 2006 and 2015, vast improvements have been made in eliminating poverty according to all three national poverty lines. South Africa's poverty headcount ratio decreased by at least three percentage points during this period across all three national poverty lines (World Bank, 2018: 7). More specifically, during this time period, the percentage of South Africans living under the FPL decreased by 3 per cent; those living under the LBPL fell by 11 per cent and those living under the UBPL declined by 11.1 per cent (World Bank, 2018: 7). In other words, a total of 2.3 million South Africans were uplifted from poverty at the LBPL and 1.2 million at the UBPL (World Bank, 2018: 7). That being said, an increase of approximately 343,000 South Africans were recorded as poor according to the FPL between 2006 and 2015 (World Bank, 2018: 7). In 2020, just over a quarter (24.5 per cent) of South Africans lived under the FPL, 40 per cent below the LBPL and 56 per cent under the UBPL (BTI, 2020). Figure 2.2 illustrates the overall changes in South Africa's national poverty lines between 2006 and 2020.


Changes in South Africa's overall national poverty rates between 2006 and 2020 were also reflected in trends in international poverty lines. Figure 2.3 shows an overall positive trend in the reduction of poverty at the US\$1.9 international poverty line between 2006 and 2020 (World Bank, 2018; UNDP, 2020). Between this time period, an estimated 1.8 million South Africans were uplifted out of poverty based on the US\$1.9 a day international poverty line. Nevertheless, figures from the United Nation's 2020 Human Development Report show that 18.9 per cent of the population – which roughly translates to 11 million people – live on less than US\$ 1.9 a day (or R28 a day and approximately R800 per month) (UNDP, 2020).

Figure 2.2: Overall changes in national poverty rates (2006–2020)



Source: World Bank, 2018; BTI, 2020

Figure 2.3: Trends in US\$1.9/day International Poverty Rates (2006–2020)




Source: World Bank, 2018; UNDP, 2020

Figure 2.4 illustrates the poverty headcount by population group on South Africa's three national poverty lines for the year 2015. In terms of race, all race groups experienced an overall decline in poverty rates between 2006 and 2015 (World Bank, 2018). Black Africans and

coloured groups recorded the sharpest decline (World Bank, 2018). However, between 2011 and 2015, poverty rates increased 3.7 per cent among black Africans and 2.5 per cent among coloured South Africans (World Bank, 2018). More recent figures from 2020 show that 49 per cent of black Africans live below the UBPL (BTI, 2020); thereafter, 23 per cent of coloureds, 0.9 per cent of Indians and 0.4 per cent of white people (BTI, 2020).

Overall, when assessing poverty in terms of gender, results from the latest 'Men, Women and Children: Findings of the Living Conditions Survey' (LCS) 2014/15 indicate that women were more vulnerable to poverty in contrast to men. Women experienced a poverty headcount ratio of 52 per cent, whereas the headcount for men was recorded at 46.1 per cent (Stats SA, 2018). Findings from the LCS 2014/15 also show that children under the age of 15 years are at a greater risk of experiencing poverty than adults. Poverty rates among children (33 per cent) are twice as high in comparison to adults (14 per cent) for the year 2015 (Stats SA, 2018). Again, there are discrepancies among racial groups in society. The highest poverty headcounts were recorded among black children with 37.6 per cent, 57.1 per cent and 73.6 per cent falling under the FPL, LBPL and UBPL, respectively (Stats SA, 2018). This stood in stark contrast to white children wherein 0.2 per cent, 0.4 per cent and 1.4 per cent fell below the FPL, LBPL and UBPL, respectively (Stats SA, 2018).

Figure 2.4: Poverty headcount by population group on South Africa's three national poverty lines, 2015




Source: Stats SA, 2018

The majority of South Africa's poor are concentrated within rural areas: 60.3 per cent of the poor lived in rural areas by 2006 (World Bank, 2018). This decreased slightly by 0.6 percentage points to 59.7 per cent in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). In sum, a poor South African household

is characterised by the following features: rural, headed by a black female over the age of 51 years, low education levels, unemployed individuals, and consisting of approximately 4.9 family members, the majority being children (World Bank, 2018).

The outbreak of the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has had a significant effect on South Africa's poverty rates. According to World Bank (2021) estimates, the 7 per cent contraction in the economy has resulted in the increase of 2 million people living below the poverty line for upper middle-income countries (US\$5.5 per day in 2011 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates). According to the 2020/2021 National Income Dynamics Study-Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS-CRAM), the outbreak of COVID-19 and the ensuing lockdown restrictions resulted in approximately 3 million net job losses in South Africa between February and April 2020 (Spaull et al., 2020). Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of NIDS-CRAM respondents experiencing net job losses or furlough between February and April 2020. As shown in Figure 2.5, women made up 2 million of the total job losses. As such, black African uneducated women employed in the informal sector faced a 'double disadvantage' in the labour market (Spaull et al., 2020). After accounting for factors such as race, class, gender, education and location, loss of employment was singled as the strongest predictor of household hunger since the onset of COVID-19 in South Africa (Spaull et al., 2021).

Figure 2.5: The percentage of NIDS-CRAM respondents experiencing net job losses or furlough between February and April 2020




Source: NIDS-CRAM Wave 1, 2020

During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, households in which the head experienced job loss stood a 14 per cent greater chance of experiencing hunger (Spaull et al., 2021). Figure 2.6 illustrates the prevalence of running out of money to buy food; weekly household hunger and weekly child hunger between April 2020 and March 2021. Out of the four NIDS-CRAM surveys conducted, a total of 67 per cent of the respondents reported at least once that their household did not have enough money to pay for the foodstuff in the previous month (Spaull et al., 2021). The rate of food insecurity among black South Africans was distinctly higher and recorded at 70 per cent (Spaull et al., 2021).

As shown above, the outbreak of COVID-19 has exacerbated and flagged South Africa's already pronounced poverty and inequality rates. However, two plausible scenarios and associated policy lessons may be derived from the government's initial response to the pandemic (Francis et al., 2020). The first scenario sees the South African government continuing down its path of fiscal consolidation as reflected in its budget of June 2020. This will inevitably result in the widening and deepening of existing inequality and poverty. The second scenario sees the government adopting a more 'egalitarian' approach as witnessed in its offering of a R350 monthly grant given to unemployed persons in April 2020 (Francis et al., 2020). Here, it is envisioned that government will adopt a more inclusive policy position through forging a broad-based social compact between constituencies in the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) – and labour in particular (Francis et al., 2020). The COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress grant has been extended to March 2023 and provides a basis for expanding South Africa's social transfer system.

Figure 2.6: The prevalence of running out of money to buy food, weekly household hunger and weekly child hunger, 2020/2021



Source: NIDS-CRAM Waves 1–4, 2020, 2021

However, there is a fear that those falling within the informal sector may be marginalised by these existing participatory structures (Francis et al., 2020). This would be a missed opportunity given the great potential of the informal sector to reduce poverty through the creation of sustainable livelihoods outside of the formal economy (Hovsha & Meyer, 2015).

In line with the above-mentioned monetary poverty trends, South Africa has made notable improvement with respect to reducing multidimensional poverty. Factors that have assisted in the reduction of multidimensional poverty include near-universal access to primary education, as well as increased access to telecommunications, water, sanitation and electricity (World Bank, 2018). The latest figures from 2016 show that South Africa's Multidimensional Poverty Index (SAMPI) is recorded at 0.025 and 12.2 per cent of its population is vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (UNDP, 2020). Table 2.2 provides an overview of South Africa's non-monetary poverty levels using the South African Multidimensional Poverty Index (SAMPI) for the period of 2001–2016. South Africa experienced a 10.9 percentage point drop in its multidimensional poverty headcount. However, the intensity of multidimensional poverty over the same time period fell by a meagre 1.1 percentage points. This means that while there was a reduction in the number of multidimensionally poor, their overall living conditions did not improve significantly. Multidimensional poverty is most concentrated within rural areas in comparison to urban areas. In 2016, 15 out of the 20 poorest districts were found in rural areas (World Bank, 2018). Furthermore, lack of education and unemployment continue to be the two main sources to multidimensional poverty in South Africa.

Table 2.2: Multidimensional poverty at a national level, 2001–2016

Year	Headcount	Intensity	SAMPI
2001	17.90%	43.90%	0.08
2011	8.00%	42.30%	0.03
2016	7.00%	42.80%	0.03

Source: World Bank, 2018

Despite the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa is still characterised by a dual economy in which wealth is still concentrated within the minority white population. It remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. South Africa's high rates of inequality stem from its apartheid legacy of socio-economic exclusion as well as the inability of the economy to generate sufficient employment opportunities for the poor (World Bank, 2021). In 2006, South Africa's per capita expenditure Gini Coefficient was recorded at 0.67, further dropping to 0.65 as of 2015 (Statistics SA, 2020b). In that same year, the Palma Ratio showed that the richest 10 per cent of the population collected 8.6 times more of the share of national income as the poorest 40 per cent. In 2015, the Palma Ratio decreased slightly to 7.9 (Stats SA, 2020b).

Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 outline the Gini Coefficient and Palma Ratio based on sex of household, race group and settlement type for the period of 2006–2015, respectively. Overall, Table 2.3 shows that inequality among individuals living in male-headed households was higher than those living in female-headed households (World Bank, 2018): The Gini Coefficient recorded in 2015 was 0.66 among male-headed households and 0.61 in female-headed households. Likewise, in 2015, the Palma Ratio was recorded at 7.7 among male-headed households and 6 among female-headed households (World Bank, 2018).

Table 2.3: Gini Coefficient and Palma Ratio based on per capita expenditure by sex of household head; 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015

<i>Sex of household head</i>	Year	Gini Coefficient	Palma Ratio			
			Bottom 40%	Middle 50%	Top 10%	Ratio
<i>Male</i>	2006	0.66	6.10%	40.10%	53.80%	8.9
	2009	0.64	6.20%	44.80%	49%	7.9
	2011	0.64	6.40%	43.70%	49.90%	7.8
	2015	0.64	6.40%	44.40%	49.20%	7.7
<i>Female</i>	2006	0.63	9.20%	35%	55.80%	6.1
	2009	0.63	8.80%	36.7%	54.50%	6.2
	2011	0.61	9.30%	38.30%	52.40%	5.6
	2015	0.61	8.70%	39.50%	51.80%	6
<i>Total population</i>	2006	0.67	6.60%	36.20%	57.20%	8.6
	2009	0.65	6.50%	40.20%	53.30%	8.1
	2011	0.65	6.80%	39.90%	53.30%	7.9
	2015	0.65	6.60%	40.80%	52.60%	7.9

Source: Stats SA, 2019b

Table 2.4 indicates that inequality among black South Africans was higher than among white South Africans (World Bank, 2018). The Gini Coefficient recorded in 2015 was 0.41 among the white race group and 0.57 among the black race group. Likewise, in 2015, the Palma Ratio was recorded at 1.9 among the white population and 4.8 among black South Africans (World Bank, 2018). Table 2.4 also shows that inequality increased among black South Africans, while remaining constant among the coloured population and decreasing among the Indian/Asian and white population groups (World Bank, 2018).

Table 2.4: Gini Coefficient and Palma Ratio based on per capita expenditure by race group 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015

Race Group	Year	Gini Coefficient	Palma Ratio			
			Bottom 40%	Middle 50%	Top 10%	Ratio
<i>Black African</i>	2006	0.54	11.4%	43.7%	44.9%	4.0
	2009	0.57	10.0%	43.2%	46.8%	4.7
	2011	0.55	10.4%	44.7%	44.9%	4.3
	2015	0.57	9.6%	44.2%	46.2%	4.8
<i>Coloured</i>	2006	0.56	9.9%	45.9%	44.2%	4.5
	2009	0.53	10.1%	51.2%	38.7%	3.8
	2011	0.53	10.5%	49.2%	40.3%	3.8
	2015	0.56	9.2%	48.6%	42.2%	4.6
<i>Indian/Asian</i>	2006	0.52	11.2%	48.2%	40.6%	3.6
	2009	0.50	11.4%	50.2%	38.4%	3.4
	2011	0.45	12.9%	54.3%	32.8%	2.5
	2015	0.45	13.5%	53.8%	32.7%	2.4
<i>White</i>	2006	0.43	14.7%	53.8%	31.5%	2.1
	2009	0.39	16.3%	55.4%	28.3%	1.7
	2011	0.41	15.4%	54.2%	30.4%	2.0
	2015	0.41	15.4%	54.8%	29.8%	1.9
<i>Total population</i>	2006	0.67	6.6%	36.2%	57.2%	8.6
	2009	0.65	6.5%	40.2%	53.3%	8.1
	2011	0.65	6.8%	39.9%	53.3%	7.9
	2015	0.65	6.6%	40.8%	52.6%	7.9

Source: Stats SA, 2019b

Table 2.5 indicates that inequality is more concentrated in urban than in rural areas. Moreover, between 2006 and 2015, the total expenditure for the top 10 per cent decreased 4.5 percentage points within urban areas while it increased 1.6 percentage points in rural areas (World Bank, 2018).

Table 2.5: Gini Coefficient and Palma Ratio based on per capita expenditure by settlement type 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015

Settlement type	Year	Gini Coefficient	Palma Ratio			
			<i>Bottom 40%</i>	<i>Middle 50%</i>	<i>Top 10%</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
<i>Urban</i>	2006	0.54	6.6%	41.6%	51.8%	7.8
	2009	0.62	6.9%	45.8%	47.3%	6.9
	2011	0.62	7.0%	45.0%	48.0%	6.9
	2015	0.61	7.2%	45.5%	47.3%	6.6
<i>Rural</i>	2006	0.53	12.7%	41.9%	45.4%	3.6
	2009	0.51	13.0%	43.3%	43.7%	3.4
	2011	0.55	11.9%	41.4%	46.7%	3.9
	2015	0.55	11.2%	41.8%	47.0%	4.2
<i>Total population</i>	2006	0.97	6.60%	36.20%	57.20%	8.6
	2009	0.65	6.50%	40.20%	53.30%	8.1
	2011	0.65	6.80%	39.90%	53.30%	7.9
	2015	0.65	6.60%	40.80%	52.60%	7.9

Source: Stats SA, 2019b

The South African government's social wage has played a significant role in reducing poverty and inequality in the latter part of the 2000s (2009–2011). South Africa's social wage accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the government's budget and aids a quarter of the population (World Bank, 2018: 1). Statistics from 2015 show that the social wage has decreased the poverty headcount rate by 7.9 per cent and the poverty gap by 29.5 per cent (World Bank, 2018). Moreover, had it not been for the social wage, South Africa's Gini Coefficient would be a startling 10.5 per cent higher than its current record (World Bank, 2018).


However, in light of the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on South Africa's rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment, pressure has been put on government to expand its existing social wage programmes. Government will require additional resources from the private sector if it augments the social wage. According to Fourie et al. (2021), '(t)he government still has the primary responsibility to provide social support and build a more inclusive society, but we should not underestimate the role a competitive private sector can play in contributing to the social wage'. In this regard, the private sector has the potential to contribute to an expanded social wage through job creation and 'access to contributory social security benefits, such as unemployment insurance, [which] can protect workers against social risks' (Fourie et al., 2021). Despite progress made in the areas of poverty reduction, South Africa's poverty rates remain unusually high for an upper middle-income country (World Bank, 2018). This is

primarily because its macro-economic policies (ASGISA, NGP and NDP) have produced limited impacts in the area of socio-economic development. According to Ramnath (2015: 69), ‘there should be a move away from the heavy emphasis placed on the social assistance system so that government can make a deeper impact on poverty and create a more sustainable economy’. This proposition cannot be achieved without improving household incomes, which are analysed in the next sections.

Dynamics of income mobility

This second section will assess the economic factors relating to income mobility in South Africa between 2006 and 2020. Within South Africa, there exists a negative correlation between inequality and intergenerational income mobility (World Bank, 2018). High rates of inequality (in all forms) in South Africa continue to constitute a major hurdle to equal access to income for all citizens (Bittar, 2020). As shown in Figure 2.7, South Africa’s labour market is the largest contributor to income inequality at 74.2 per cent (Stats SA, 2019b). At present, the labour market continues to be highly racialised and gender biased: women earn approximately 30 per cent less than their male counterparts and white South Africans earn three times more than black South Africans (Stats SA, 2019b).

Figure 2.7: Income contributions to income inequality, 2015



Source: Stats SA, 2019b

When assessing income across generations, Table 2.6 outlines the frequency of transmission from fathers to sons according to their respective income quintiles (no comparative data on female income transmission is available from the source). Sons of poor fathers (those in the first quintile) have a greater chance (22.77 per cent) themselves of falling within the same

quintile and a lesser likelihood (16.19 per cent) of falling within the fifth income quintile (World Bank, 2018). Conversely, sons of rich fathers (those in the fifth income quintile) have a lower chance of falling within the first income quintile (9.88 per cent) and a higher probability (42.71 per cent) of falling within the fifth income quintile (World Bank, 2018).

Table 2.6: Frequency of transmission across income quintiles (multiple imputation estimates) between fathers and sons


Father quintile	Son Quintile				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	22.77	19.43	21.22	20.38	16.19
2	15.98	16.61	21.21	22.52	23.67
3	13.19	15.44	20.35	22.25	28.77
4	10.86	14.67	16.79	22.70	34.97
5	9.88	12.42	14.12	20.88	42.71

Source: World Bank, 2018

*Notes: The values of each row add up to 100.

Globally, South Africa ranks the worst in terms of intergenerational income mobility. According to the World Economic Forum's (WEF) 'Global Social Mobility Report 2020', it would take South Africans born into low-income families approximately nine generations to reach the country's median income (Omarjee, 2020). In contrast, it would take Denmark two generations to reach median income (WEF, 2020). Figure 2.8 ranks 11 economies according to the number of generations it would take for those born in low-income homes to reach median income.

Figure 2.8: Income mobility across generations



Source: OECD, 2018; WEF, 2020

According to the World Bank (2018), the following seven factors drive intergenerational mobility in South Africa between fathers and sons: education, labour, race, location, family structure, migration and neighbourhood variables. Table 2.7 summarises the strength of each factor in relation to mobility where ‘s’ symbolises a strong factor and ‘w’ represents a weak factor. As shown in Table 2.7, education is associated with a high probability of upward or downward mobility. Having a secondary education translates to a 17 per cent increase, a matric certificate equals a 34 per cent increase and tertiary education corresponds with a 40 per cent increase in the probability of rising to the top 60 per cent (World Bank, 2018). Fathers with a high-skilled occupation also increases the chances of upward mobility for their sons. Employment within the formal sector decreases the likelihood of falling within the lower 40 per cent of South Africa’s social strata by 19 per cent (World Bank, 2018). While location and family structure had no bearing on upward social mobility, race continues to play a significant role. White South Africans have a 69 per cent higher chance of falling within the top 60 per cent social tier than black South Africans (World Bank, 2018). Furthermore, there is a strong correlation (13 per cent) between upward social mobility and sons moving to a new suburb, village, town or province (World Bank, 2018). Ultimately then, policy interventions in South Africa should focus on ensuring fair wages, social protection, skills development and better working conditions in order to improve income mobility.

Table 2.7: Drivers of intergenerational income mobility between fathers and sons

	Upward Mobility	Downward Mobility
<i>Education</i>	+,s	-,w
<i>Labour market (occupation skill level)</i>	+,s	-,s
<i>Race</i>	+,s	-,s
<i>Location (urban/rural/province)</i>	0	0
<i>Family Structure</i>	0	0
<i>Migration</i>	+,s	0
<i>Neighbourhood variables</i>	+,s	-,s

Source: World Bank, 2018


Mobility and the middle strata

While the above section dealt primarily with the economic factors pertaining to income mobility, this section will briefly investigate social mobility by way of assessing class/social mobility. South Africa’s high level of wealth inequality coupled with unequal opportunity for children and a low rate of intergenerational mobility has ultimately resulted in dwindling middle strata. A 2016 working paper written by Anna Orthofer found that 90–95 per cent of the wealth in

South Africa is owned by 10 per cent of the population, while the middle class (accounting for 40 per cent of the population) owned a meagre 5–10 per cent (Orthofer, 2016). Figures from 2017 show that approximately one in four South Africans fall into the middle class or elite bracket (Stats SA, 2019a). The outbreak of COVID-19 has put an enormous strain on South Africa's middle class. South Africa's weak economy, coupled with high unemployment rates (32.5 per cent), waning salaries and rising debt, has resulted in an estimated third (34 per cent) of the middle-class falling into the vulnerable category (*BusinessTech*, 2021).

Figures 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate sizes of various socio-economic classes, the proportion of households by social class and race group, and by the social class and education level of household heads between 2008 and 2017 respectively. South Africans are classified according to five categories: chronic poor, transient poor, vulnerable, middle class and elite (Stats SA, 2019b). Figure 2.9 shows that the middle class increased slightly by 3.2 per cent between 2008 and 2017. As such, the growth rate of South Africa's middle class has been sluggish, growing a mere 3.2 per cent between 2008 and 2017. Data from 2017 shows that the middle class only comprises 22.4 per cent of the population. It is considerably small, particularly in comparison to other countries such as Mauritius where the share is close to 80 per cent (World Bank, 2018). According to Figure 2.10, while black and coloured South Africans are the only two race groups who are characterised as chronically poor, black South Africans still make up the majority of the middle class (66.2 per cent) and a fifth (22.6 per cent) of the elite class. Concerning the middle strata, Figure 2.11 shows that household heads within this class predominantly held tertiary (36.6 per cent) and secondary (33.9 per cent) qualifications.


Figure 2.9: Socioeconomic class size between 2008 and 2017²



Source: Zizzamia et al., 2019


² The data within Figure 2.9 is based on calculations made using NIDS Waves 1 to 5 pooled sample.

Figure 2.10: Proportion of households by social class and race group of household head, 2008–2017



Source: Zizzamia et al., 2019


Figure 2.11: Proportion of households by social class and education level of household head, 2008–2017



Source: Zizzamia et al., 2019

The latest findings from the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Social Mobility Report 2020’ places South Africa 77th out of 82 countries with a score of 41.4 on the Global Social Mobility Index (GSMI) (WEF, 2020). Denmark, which ranked first on the index, recorded a score of 85.2, followed by Norway with a score of 83.6 (WEF, 2020). Factors affecting South Africa’s low ranking on the GSMI include the following structural impediments. First, a low score on the index of health access and quality (49.7) (WEF, 2020). Second, a low score on access to education (26.5) (WEF, 2020). Third, high rates of unemployment: 33.3 per cent among citizens with a basic education and 28.5 per cent among those with an intermediate level of education (WEF, 2020). Fourth, South Africa also has a high incidence of low pay and subsequently scores low on the Fair Wages pillar (26.0) (WEF, 2020). Fifth, the country also scores low on the Inclusive Institutions pillar (60.8). This is a direct result of high incidences of corruption and overall government incompetence and inefficiency (WEF, 2020). Figure 2.12 details South Africa’s overall performance on the ‘Global Social Mobility Index 2020’ in comparison with the leading country, Denmark. According to the WEF, education and poor health are among the two greatest factors suppressing upward social mobility in South Africa (Omarjee, 2020). Small, micro and medium enterprises development and expansion can potentially contribute towards decreasing inequality and boosting economic growth. It is, therefore, important to examine SMME development trends in South Africa.

Figure 2.12: Social Mobility Index 2020: South Africa and Denmark



Source: WEF, 2020

Trends in small, micro and medium enterprises

This section discusses the trends of South Africa’s SMME sector from 2006–2021. The NDP has projected that by the year 2030 SMME will generate 90 per cent of the 11 million new jobs and


contribute 60–80 per cent to the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Small, micro and medium enterprises are, therefore, considered to be the engines of inclusive economic growth, development, innovation and job creation in South Africa. Small, micro and medium enterprises also play a vital role in South Africa's transition towards a low carbon economy. They have a greater capacity to use innovative, environmentally sustainable business models which are often overlooked by larger firms (Marks & Hidden, 2017). Similarly, SMMEs have an important role to play in South Africa's transition towards a digital economy, which is largely driven by artificial intelligence technologies. 'Digital literate micro-entrepreneurs' are able to 'leverage technology platforms so that they create self-employment and economic sustainability' (Bam & Adao, 2019: 1). Contrary to larger firms, they are better able to exploit digital and new technologies to 'reach efficiency at lower cost' and 'focus on key areas of competitiveness in their value chain, product, and/or operations and identify the best technology levers to enhance competitiveness' (Kalidas et al., 2020: 8).

Reports on SMME development highlight minimal success in attaining the policy targets articulated in South Africa's NDP (World Bank, 2018). According to a 2018 Small Business Institute survey, the total number of SMME with formally employed workers stands at an estimated 250,000 firms (SBI, 2018). Between 2011 and 2016, the number of micro firms increased by 6,347, small firms by 4,630 and medium firms by 2,140 (SBI, 2018). The SMME sector accounts for only 28 per cent of formal jobs: small firms contribute 11 per cent, micro accounts for 5 per cent and medium firms for 12 per cent (SBI, 2018). The number of employees in small firms increased by 8 per cent between 2011 and 2016, 4 per cent within micro firms and 14 per cent within medium firms (SBI, 2018). Globally, South Africa's formal and informal SMME sector is considered to be an outlier both in terms of its contribution to GDP as well as the number of people employed. While in comparative middle-income countries the SMME sector contributes 95 per cent to the GDP and 70 per cent to employment, South Africa's figure stands at 56 and 45–50 per cent respectively (World Bank, 2018). South African SMME low contributions to employment and GDP are partly a result of 'structural hurdles including access to funding, lack of access to markets, inadequate skills, uncompetitive regulatory frameworks and technological disruptions' (Liedtke, 2019).

Trends indicate that jobs within the SMME sector comprise predominantly low-skill and wholesale operations (World Bank, 2018). Moreover, Figure 2.13 shows that economically inactive or unemployed individuals are twice as likely to find employment within small as opposed to large firms (World Bank, 2018). This probability is greater for new entries into the labour market (World Bank, 2018). When assessing the frequency of employment by age group, Figure 2.14 shows that workers of prime age (between 24 and 55 years old) are 10 per cent more likely to enter a job within a small firm (World Bank, 2018). Figure 2.15 suggests however that while individuals are more likely to find employment in small firms, employees of large firms tend to benefit from greater pay (World Bank, 2018). Table 2.8 shows that while females own three times more SMME than large businesses, males own most business firms


– regardless of size (Bhorat et al., 2018). The youth (aged 15–34) make up a large proportion of SMME owners (Bhorat et al., 2018). With regard to race, while Africans own the majority of SMME, large firms are predominantly owned by whites (Bhorat et al., 2018).

Figure 2.13: Frequency of employment, comparing small and large enterprises, 2014




Source: NIDS–CRAM Wave 4, 2016

Figure 2.14: Frequency of employment by age, comparing small and large enterprises, 2014



Source: NIDS–CRAM Wave 4, 2016

Figure 2.15: Wages by firm size, 2014



Source: NIDS-CRAM Wave 4, 2016

Table 2.8: Characteristics of owners by firm size, 2013


	Own-Account	Micro (1–4)	Small (5–9)	Medium (10–49)	Large (50+)	SMME Overall	Ratio of SMME to large
<i>Female</i>	46.3	23.7	22.3	14.9	12.8	37.4	2.92
<i>Youth (15–34)</i>	31.3	25.7	16.3	13.4	25.0	27.9	1.11
<i>African</i>	82.1	66.1	38.8	28.7	33.2	72.2	2.17
<i>Coloured</i>	3.9	5.5	5.7	5.8	3.9	4.5	1.17
<i>Indian/Asian</i>	3.4	5.1	5.2	7.0	10.4	4.1	0.40
<i>White</i>	10.6	23.4	50.3	58.5	52.5	19.2	0.37

Source: Borat et al., 2018

Figures 2.16, 2.17 and 2.18 illustrate the percentage contribution to total turnover in the formal sector by enterprise size and sector between 2013 and 2019. As shown in Figure 2.16, the formal business sector generated a total R10.5 trillion in 2019, of which small and medium enterprises contributed 22 and 10 per cent, respectively (Stats SA, 2019a). Small enterprises contributed R2.3 trillion, slightly over a fifth, of the total turnover for the year 2019 (Stats, SA, 2019). Figure 2.17 shows that the percentage share of small enterprises' contribution to the total turnover within the formal sector has increased by 6 per cent between 2013 and 2019 (Stats SA, 2019a).


In addition, Figure 2.18 indicates that the presence of small enterprises has grown within the business and construction services. Between 2013 and 2019, the percentage share of small enterprises' contribution to the total turnover increased by 13 per cent in the business services sector and 17 per cent in the construction sector (Stats SA, 2019a). Conversely, the utilities and mining sector continues to be dominated by large firms such as the national utility, Eskom, and Anglo American. In the final sections, we explore the impact of education on SMME trends in South Africa.

Figure 2.16: Percentage contribution to total turnover in the formal sector by enterprise size, 2019




Source: Stats SA, 2019a

Figure 2.17: Percentage contribution to total turnover in the formal sector by enterprise size, 2013–2019



Source: Stats SA, 2019a

Figure 2.18: Percentage contribution to total turnover in the formal business sector by industry and enterprise size, 2013 and 2019



Source: Stats SA, 2019a

The relevance of education to entrepreneurship

This section concerns the relevance of education to entrepreneurship in South Africa. Having an educated labour force is considered to be one of the crucial characteristics of a competitive, robust, productive economy capable of sustained socioeconomic growth (Herrington & Kew, 2017/18). The provision of good quality education is, therefore, regarded as indispensable to high and sustained growth rates needed for employment creation (Herrington & Kew, 2017/18). As such, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has pinpointed a direct relationship between the level of education achieved and the likelihood that an entrepreneur would be capable of growing and sustaining a business beyond its early stage (Harrington & Kew, 2017/18). However, South Africa's low standard and quality of education is highlighted as one of the main obstacles to entrepreneurial activity within the country (Harrington & Kew, 2017/18). Education is, therefore, an important determinant of the long-term sustainability of a business in South Africa given that the country 'has one of the highest business start-up failures in the world' (Kriel, 2020). According to the Enterprise Observatory of South Africa, approximately 31 companies (with taxable income below R10 million) dissolve every week (Kriel, 2020). Furthermore, Rob Davies, former Minister of Trade and Industry, noted that an estimated 70 per cent of all business do not succeed past their two-year mark (Kriel, 2020). Factors influencing

SMME failure in South Africa, particularly among previously disadvantaged groups, include 'lack of finance, insufficient government support and limited access to information on services available to SMME from government and NGOs' (Nodada, 2011: 3). However, government has instituted the following four main policy development incentives and schemes to assist SMME in achieving long-term sustainability: Black Business Supplier Development Programme (BBSDP), Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS), Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme (THRIP) and Incubation Support Programme (ISP) (SME South Africa, 2014).

Table 2.9 illustrates the educational levels of early-stage entrepreneurs between the ages of 18 and 64 years in South Africa for the period of 2001 up until 2017. During this period, a little over half of entrepreneurs (52 per cent) possessed a secondary and 21.3 per cent possessed post-secondary qualifications.

Table 2.9: Educational levels of early-stage entrepreneurs (aged 18–64 years) in South Africa, 2001–2017

Educational qualification	2001	2005	2009	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<i>None/primary</i>	0	0	13.3	5.2	5.8	4.9	4.7	4.3
<i>Some secondary</i>	48.7	34.2	30	33.4	34.1	31.1	21.8	22.4
<i>Secondary degree</i>	35.9	44.8	42.5	48.1	43.4	47.3	49.6	52
<i>Post-secondary</i>	15.4	21	14.3	13.3	16.6	16.8	23.9	21.3

Source: Herrington & Kew, 2017/2018

Additionally, Table 2.10 indicates that for the year 2013, owners of large firms have educational levels which supersede secondary schooling. Owners of SMME, however, have, for the large part, not completed secondary schooling (Bhorat et al., 2018).

Table 2.10: Average years of education of owners by firm size, 2013

	Own-Account	Micro (1–4)	Small (5–9)	Medium (10–49)	Large (50+)	SMME Overall	Ratio of SMME to large
<i>Average years of education</i>	9.4	10.7	12.2	13.1	12.9	10.1	0.79

Source: Bhorat et al., 2018

It is also important to note briefly that social capital is vital to enterprise development in South Africa. Although the aspects of social capital that relate to entrepreneurial networks are often neglected in major discussions, establishing a solid social capital base is necessary to inculcate a 'strong entrepreneurial culture' (Urban, 2011: 418).

The section of the MSR below provides policy recommendations to address the policy trends discussed in the chapter.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

As indicated in this chapter, limited access to quality education remains an impediment for policies aimed at higher growth rates and more equitable socio-economic redistribution. Increasing access to quality education will produce many positive spin-offs such as the alleviation of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Enhanced access to quality education equally improves social and income mobility by aiding the growth of a middle class. Finally, it contributes to the creation of more dynamic and sustained entrepreneurial activity.

South Africa's struggling SMME sector is characterised by a diverse set of enterprises differentiated by market access, sector participation, size and turnover (Bhorat et al., 2018). Thus policy interventions aimed at supporting SMME need to be calibrated, so that they accommodate the above-mentioned differences. For example, one of the areas that requires urgent attention is the future of informal SMME in South Africa and how they are incorporated into formal economic activities (Bhorat et al., 2018). In addition, South Africa has to address the long-standing structural barriers impeding SMME sustainability in the country. The evidence cited in this chapter illuminates the following primary causes of SMME failure in South Africa: limited access to finance, markets, business management training opportunities and technology. The last barrier is particularly significant in light of the evidence cited in this chapter which shows how SMME are more suited for incorporating digital and sustainable development technologies into their operations. This presents an opportunity to reconfigure sector market structures in the planned restructuring of South Africa's economy.

The ability of South Africa to eliminate poverty and inequality by the year 2030 as stated by the NDP will ultimately rest upon inclusive socio-economic growth and development through the reduction of glaring income inequalities (World Bank, 2018). As such, policymakers should not tackle poverty and inequality in a piecemeal manner. Rather, they should implement policies which simultaneously stimulate inclusive economic growth and eliminate inequality (World Bank, 2018). Government is advised to focus on addressing the root causes of poverty and inequality (i.e., the historical structural legacies of apartheid) rather than the symptoms in order to foster growth which is sustainable and inclusive.

In this regard, South African policy-makers are advised to focus on several policy interventions aimed at ameliorating economic exclusion. These include targeting and prioritising previously

disadvantaged and marginalised participants in the informal economy in order to reverse the enduring historical legacies of apartheid (Hovsha & Meyer, 2015). Additionally, the country can explore the recommendation made by the WEF (2020), which encourage South Africa to increase social and income mobility. This necessitates ensuring fair wages, social protection, skills development and better working conditions. The themes of poverty and inequality are explored further within the context of race relations in chapter three.

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CHAPTER THREE

DIVERSITY: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RACE AND LANGUAGE

Introduction

South Africa has a long history of racial segregation. Despite the dismantling of apartheid and the transition to democratic rule in 1994, the effects of apartheid-era racial segregation persist. Apartheid South Africa gave rise to a society with racially polarised political, economic and social institutions. With the ushering in of democracy in 1994, a narrative of a racially united and culturally diverse nation emerged on the basis of constitutional principles. However, 28 years later, the legacy of apartheid persists. This chapter highlights that, at its core, post-apartheid South Africa continues to be characterised by structural racism and unequal power relations based on race, class and gender through an in-depth analysis of factors such as the demographics of race, language and related aspects (e.g. education attainment and outcomes; employment outcomes; living conditions; and marginalisation vs. privilege on the basis of racial and linguistic identities). These, in turn, have varying implications for the make-up of contemporary South African society and social cohesion. The chapter shows that much still needs to be done to create a just, equitable and inclusive South African society. It concludes with several policy lessons drawn from the analysis.


Demographics of race and power relations

In the 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR), black Africans constituted the majority of the population, followed by the coloured, white and Indian populations. With regard to labour market prospects, black Africans had the highest unemployment rate. Along with the coloured population, black Africans' Std 10/Grade 12 completion and post-secondary education were below the national average. These groups' living standards were also far below those of the Indian and white populations.

In the 1996 census, South Africa's total population was at 40,583,573 (Stats SA, 1998a: 4). Females made up 51.9 per cent of the population, and males made up 48.1 per cent (Stats SA, 1998a: 5). South Africa's total population reached 60,142,978 by 2021. Notwithstanding the significant growth in population in the past 28 years, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a discernible impact on the national 2020/2021 population growth. This impact was demonstrated by an increase in the annual death rate between 1 June 2020 and 30 June 2021, and a decline in the population growth rate for all age groups, except for youth aged 15–24 years (Stats SA, 2021a: 17).


In 1996, black Africans made up the majority of the South African population, at 76.7 per cent, followed by the white (10.9 per cent), coloured (8.9 per cent), Indian (2.6 per cent) and Other (0.9 per cent) populations. The proportion of black Africans has increased steadily over the past 25 years, while that of the Indian population has remained the same. There has been a 0.1 per cent decrease in the coloured population's proportion since 1996. The white population has declined, at 7.8 per cent in 2021, compared to 10 per cent in 2006 and 10.9 per cent in 1996. The 2021 population breakdown by race is indicated in Figure 3.1, and Figure 3.2 shows the population composition by province.

Figure 3.1: Population by race in 2021



Source: Stats SA, 2021a

Figure 3.2: Population by province in 2021




Source: Stats SA, 2021a

In South Africa, there is an inextricable link between race and class due to apartheid-era social engineering. Despite the significant strides made since 1994, South Africans' material conditions continue to be fundamentally shaped by race. Some of the ways in which racial and class inequalities continue to play out are in living conditions, and education and employment patterns, as detailed in the sub-sections below.

Living conditions by race

Respondents to a 2015 Afrobarometer survey (2016: 7–8) reported persisting inequalities in accessing basic necessities (including clean water, food, the means to cook meals, a cash income and medical treatment) along racial lines (Figure 3.3). Based on their access to all the specified basic necessities, only 28 per cent of black African respondents in that survey reported not having experienced material deprivation 'within the past year' (the phrase used in the survey wording). The proportion of black African respondents who had never been materially deprived had increased from 8 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2015. Forty-seven per cent of coloured respondents experienced no material deprivation. Among this group, the proportion of those who had never been materially deprived had hardly changed, at 46 per cent in 2000 and 47 per cent in 2015. In contrast, the majority of white and Indian respondents had never experienced material deprivation (79 per cent and 81 per cent respectively). The proportion of white and Indian respondents who had never experienced material deprivation in 2015 had increased since 2000, when 68 per cent and 63 per cent respectively reported never having been materially deprived. Although there had been an increase in living standards for all race groups over a 15-year period, the majority of individuals in the coloured and black African population groups remained materially deprived.


Figure 3.3: Never going without basic necessities by race from 2000 to 2015



Source: Afrobarometer, 2016

The above findings are compatible with those of a living conditions survey on households, conducted by Statistics South Africa in 2014/2015 (Stats SA, 2015: 13): it showed that average household expenditure differed substantially by race (see Figure 3.4). South African households spent R103,293 per year, on average, between 2014 and 2015. Average expenditure for white-headed households was the highest among all race groups and was significantly higher than the national average. Indian/Asian and coloured-headed households' average expenditure also exceeded the national average, at R195,336 and R124,445, respectively. Black African-headed households' average expenditure was lowest, and far below the national average, at R67,858.

Figure 3.4: Average annual household consumption expenditure by race of household head



Source: Stats SA, 2015

Race-based disparities in living conditions reflect apartheid-era societal make-up, 28 years into democratic rule. Disparities in living conditions also mean that access to various types of resources, such as housing, education and healthcare services, as well as quality of life continue to be broadly determined by race. This illustrates structural racism, which is defined as follows (Bailey et al., 2017: 1453):


The totality of ways in which societies foster racial discrimination through mutually reinforcing systems of housing, education, employment, earnings, benefits, credit, media, health care, and criminal justice.

The main function of structural racism is to bring about the distribution of resources according to race and to reproduce racial privilege for some sections of society while disadvantaging the racially marginalised groups. On this basis, findings of the Afrobarometer and Living Conditions surveys highlight negative trends, particularly for the general prospects of the black African population and the coloured population in contemporary South Africa.

Education by race

In 1996, across all population groups, only 6.2 per cent of those aged 20 years or more had attained higher education; 16.4 per cent had matriculated, and 19.3 per cent had no education. Only 3 per cent of black Africans had attained higher education, compared to 24.1 per cent of whites, 10 per cent of Indians and 4.3 per cent of the coloured population (see Figure 3.5). A further 40.7 per cent of whites had completed matric (grade 12), relative to 30.4 per cent of Indians and only 12.1 per cent of black Africans and 12.3 per cent of the coloured population.


Figure 3.5: Highest level of education completed per population group among ≥20-year-olds in 1996



Source: Stats SA, 1998a

In 2016, 9.1 per cent of black Africans aged between 20 and 64 years had attained post-secondary education, compared to 3 per cent of black Africans aged more than 20 years in 1996 (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). Moreover, 68.7 per cent had attained secondary education, compared to 12.7 per cent in 1996, and only 7.1 per cent had received no schooling, compared to 24.3 per cent in 1996. In addition, 8.1 per cent of the coloured population had attained post-secondary education, compared to 4.3 per cent in 1996. A further 71.9 per cent of the coloured population had attained secondary education, compared to 12.3 per cent of those aged more than 20 years in 1996. These statistics illustrate substantial gains in education for these population groups since 1996. Increases in educational attainment were also observed for the Indian and white populations, compared to 1996. Both groups' post-secondary education attainment in 2016 far exceeded the national average of 12.1 per cent. There were substantial differences, however, between the educational attainment of black African and coloured populations, and that of Indian and white populations. This places black African and coloured population groups at a relative disadvantage, considering that income inequalities mostly result from inequalities based on educational qualifications and skills (Stats SA, 2016: 15).

Figure 3.6: Educational attainment among individuals aged 25–64 years by race in 2016



Source: Stats SA, 2016

Employment by race and gender


The stark inequalities in living conditions and educational attainment by race in South Africa, as shown in the sub-sections above, are in line with national employment patterns. In 1996, the national unemployment rate among those aged 15 to 64 years was 19.5 per cent and was highest among the black African population at 23.4 per cent, followed by the coloured population at 13.6 per cent (Stats SA, 1998a: 44). Whites' unemployment rate was marginal,

at 3.1 per cent; the Indian population's unemployment rate was also relatively low, at 7.1 per cent. Women made up the majority of the unemployed population, at 56.3 per cent. In terms of race and gender, the unemployment rate then was highest among black African women, followed by black African men.

Between January and March in 2021, the national unemployment rate among individuals aged 15 to 64 years was at 32.6 per cent (Stats SA, 2021b: 26). A total of 7,242,000 individuals were unemployed. The unemployment rate among the black African population was 36.7 per cent, followed by the coloured population at 25.2 per cent (Stats SA, 2021b: 28). The Indian and white populations' unemployment rates were lowest, at 14.9 per cent and 8.1 per cent, respectively (Stats SA, 2021b: 29).

Similar to the unemployment trajectory, employment patterns in South Africa follow a distinct racial pattern, with white and Indian populations at a distinct advantage compared to the coloured and black African populations. In 1996, the majority of coloured (41.0 per cent) and black African (56.2 per cent) women were employed in low-skilled occupations, followed by coloured (32.5 per cent) and black African (25.2 per cent) men (Stats SA, 1998a: 53; see Figure 3.7). In contrast, less than 7 per cent of Indian men and women were employed in such positions. Moreover, a marginal proportion of white men (3.8 per cent) and women (2.8 per cent) were employed in such positions. Nearly half of all white men and women were in managerial/professional occupations, followed by 36.2 per cent and 35.5 per cent of Indian men and women, respectively.

Figure 3.7: Occupational category by race and gender in 1996



Excluding unspecified

Source: Stats SA, 1998a

From 2018 to 2020, black Africans constituted the majority of the national economically active population (EAP), at 79.3 per cent, followed by white South Africans (9 per cent), the coloured population (8.9 per cent) and the Indian population (2.8 per cent) (CEE, 2021: 15; see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: National economically active population (EAP) by race and gender

Male		Female		Total
Black African	43.7%	Black African	35.6%	79.3%
Coloured	4.8%	Coloured	4.1%	8.9%
Indian	1.8%	Indian	1.0%	2.8%
White	5.1%	White	3.9%	9%
Total (male)	55.4%	Total (female)	44.6%	100%

Source: CEE, 2021

The national EAP enables us to appraise a population group's representation across various occupational categories, in relation to its total representation in the labour market. Table 3.2 shows the representation of different race groups in top and senior management, and in professionally qualified and technically skilled occupational categories, in 2001 and 2020.

Table 3.2: Occupational category by race from 2001 to 2020

Occupational Level	Period	White	Black African	Coloured	Indian
Top management	2001	87%	6%	3%	4%
	2020	64.7%	15.8%	5.7%	10.6%
Senior management	2001	81%	9%	5%	5%
	2020	52.5%	24.7%	8.0%	11.6%
Professionally qualified	2001	56%	33%	6%	5%
	2020	32.1%	46.7%	9.7%	9.1%
Technical skilled	2001	18%	58%	18%	6%
	2020	17.6%	63.7%	11.6%	5.4%

Source: CEE, 2018: 3; CEE, 2021

Table 3.2 shows a substantial increase in the representation of black African and coloured populations in top and senior management since 2001. When considering the representation of race groups by their respective EAP rates, it becomes evident that black African and coloured populations are inadequately represented in senior occupational categories. Despite an EAP of 79.3 per cent, the black African population group occupies only 15.8 per cent of top

management positions, 24.7 per cent of senior management positions and 46.7 per cent of the professionally qualified employment category. The coloured population's EAP is 8.9 per cent, yet this group occupies 5.7 per cent of top management positions and 8 per cent of senior management positions. Representation for this group improves substantially in the professionally qualified category, at 9.7 per cent in 2020.

The white and Indian populations are over-represented in senior occupational categories, and least represented in lower occupation categories, relative to their EAPs. With an EAP of only 9 per cent in 2020, the white population occupied 64.7 per cent of top management positions, 52.5 per cent of senior management positions, 32.1 per cent of the professionally qualified employment category and 17.6 per cent of the technical skilled category. With an EAP of only 2.8 per cent, the Indian population occupied 10.6 per cent of top management positions, 11.6 per cent of senior management positions, 9.1 per cent of the professionally qualified employment category and 5.4 per cent of the technically skilled category.

Despite considerable progress with regard to female representation in the workplace since 2000, women remain severely under-represented in managerial occupational categories. From 2018 to 2020, women's representation in top management ranged between 23.5 and 24.9 per cent, while that of men ranged between 75.1 and 76.5 per cent, decreasing by only 1.4 per cent since 2018 (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Further, white men and women, and Indian men and women, are over-represented in the top and senior management categories. Black African men and women and coloured men and women are under-represented in these categories. Despite their EAP of 35.6 per cent, black African women occupied only 5.7 per cent of top managerial roles in 2020. Black African men occupied only 10.1 per cent of top management roles, despite their EAP of 43.7 per cent. Coloured women occupied 2.2 per cent of top management roles in 2020, in contrast with their EAP of 4.1 per cent. Coloured men's representation in this occupational category is 3.5 per cent, whereas their EAP is 4.8 per cent. In contrast, Indian women occupy 3.4 per cent of top managerial roles, exceeding their EAP of 1 per cent. Indian men occupy 7.3 per cent of top management roles, despite an EAP of 1.8 per cent. White women occupy a considerable 13.1 per cent of top management roles, contrasting with their EAP of 3.9 per cent. White men occupy a substantial 51.6 per cent of top management roles, contrasting with an EAP of 5.1 per cent.

Representation in terms of gender and race in the senior management category (Figure 3.8) followed a trajectory similar to that of the top management category, with an over-representation of Indian and white populations. With regard to gender, white and Indian women constituted the majority female representation; black African and coloured women's representation had hardly increased since 2018, considering their EAP.

Table 3.3: Top management – total percentage change for women by race from 2000 to 2020

Group	2000 (%)	2020 (%)	Total % point change
Female	12.4	24.9	12.5
Black African	1.2	5.7	4.5
Coloured	0.7	2.2	1.5
Indian	0.5	3.4	2.9
White	10.2	13.1	2.9

Source: CEE, 2021; MSR, 2006

Table 3.4: Top management – total percentage change for men by race from 2000 to 2020

Group	2000 (%)	2020 (%)	Total % point change
Male	87.6	75.1	-12.5
Black African	5.0	10.1	5.1
Coloured	2.0	3.5	1.5
Indian	3.3	7.3	4
White	77.3	51.6	-25.7

Source: CEE, 2021; MSR, 2006

Figure 3.8: Senior management by race and gender from 2018 to 2020



Source: CEE, 2021

In the professionally qualified and skilled occupational categories, black African men and women were the only under-represented groups from 2018 to 2020, relative to their EAPs (CEE, 2021: 33–37). White and Indian men and women remained over-represented in these

categories, relative to their respective EAPs. Illustrating the representation of black Africans in inverse proportion to occupation level, the black African population consistently had the highest representation in the semi-skilled (more than 76 per cent) and unskilled (more than 82 per cent) occupation categories between 2018 and 2020 (CEE, 2021: 40–43). These were the only categories in which the black African population's representation neared or exceeded their EAP (79.3 per cent). The coloured population's representation was slightly higher than their EAP (9.7 per cent) in the semi-skilled (11.8 per cent) and unskilled (10.9 per cent) occupational categories (CEE, 2021: 40, 43). The representation of the coloured and black African populations in this category further signifies their relegation to lower occupational levels across the South African labour market.

The Indian population's representation in 2020 was slightly lower than their EAP (2.8 per cent) in the semi-skilled occupational category (2.5 per cent), and substantially lower in the unskilled occupational category (0.7 per cent) (CEE, 2021: 40). The white population's representation in the semi-skilled (4.9 per cent) and unskilled categories (0.9 per cent) was much lower than this group's EAP (9.0 per cent). Under-representation in these occupational categories mirrors the two population groups' consistent over-representation in higher occupational categories.

Statistics South Africa further reports that 'wage income accounts for 70 per cent of income in South Africa', and that in turn, 'labour income accounts for 85 per cent of inequality' (Leibbrandt et al., 2010, as cited in Stats SA, 2016: 15). This suggests that poverty and inequality largely correlate with income disparities. Therefore, the high concentration of black African and coloured populations in low occupational categories, coupled with the high concentration of white and Indian populations in high occupational categories, continues to perpetuate racialised disparities in income and, broadly, living standards in post-apartheid South Africa. This necessitates more effective implementation of redress policies, to facilitate maximum benefits for racial groups that remain marginalised. The substantial advancements made in the representation of the Indian population and white women over the years, contrasting with the persisting under-representation of members of other designated groups, demonstrate lack of commitment to transformation particularly in the private sector (Matotoka & Odeku, 2021: 47).

Despite the grossly disproportionate employment patterns reported above with regard to race and gender, 80 per cent of employers reported no barriers to employing individuals from designated population groups (CEE, 2021: 48). The over-representation of white males on the one hand and gross under-representation of black African women in influential positions in the workplace are compatible with the belief that 'white people are intellectually, and otherwise, superior to non-white people' (Reuben & Bobat, 2014: 7).³ For black women in the workplace, this struggle is twofold. Hierarchical stereotyping places black African women at the bottom of both racial and gender hierarchies, and white men at the top of the intellectual hierarchy

3 The authors acknowledge that the term 'non-white' is racially loaded because it suggests that marginalised racial groups lack whiteness, and this is a fundamental defining characteristic. But this term is taken directly from the quote cited in the paragraph.

(Motileng et al., 2006: 13–14). Reflecting the patterns observed regarding black African women's under-representation in managerial categories, reports have indicated that black African men are reluctant to be led by a woman, while coloured and Indian women are reluctant to be led by black African women (Motileng et al., 2006: 13–14).

These trends illustrate the cumulative influence of marginalised identities on individuals' employment outcomes, in line with critical race theory's principle of intersectionality (Solorzano, 1998: 122; Thomas, 2019: 70). Black African women are marginalised on the basis of intersections between their race and gender identities. In contrast, white men simultaneously assume privileged racial and gender identities, which explains their positioning on the racial and gender hierarchy, as evident from their over-representation in high-ranking occupational categories. These trends are interlinked with apartheid-era social engineering, which entailed the bestowal of superiority on the white race and the male gender. The apartheid state's systematic placing of white men at the top of the social hierarchy, followed by white women, then Indian, coloured and black African men and women, respectively, continues to be reflected in post-apartheid South African society. In the labour market, continuing persistence of this hierarchy is further demonstrated by the subordination of black African women to coloured, Indian and white women and men, respectively, as well as attitudes towards black African women's assumption of leadership positions, as described above. Apartheid also entailed the meticulous channelling or limiting of resources or opportunities towards individuals according to their positioning in the race and gender hierarchy.

It is important to note that structural racism and patriarchy, and the intersection between the two, are not unique to apartheid-era South Africa. The pervasiveness of these trends across contexts is reflected in the plight of black and brown peoples, women, and black and brown women globally. With regard to race, Reuben and Bobat (2014: 7) have concluded that 'racial stereotyping remains embedded within South African society', and that racism is embodied in everyday practices in South Africa. This observation can logically be extended to discrimination on the basis of gender, coupled with race for black African women. Racism, patriarchy and misogynoir (Bailey & Trudy, 2018: 762–763) persist in the institutions and structures of post-apartheid South African society. The persistence of these forms of systemic discrimination in a democracy shows that the custodianship of power remains racialised and gendered in post-apartheid South Africa.

With regard to the willingness to address discrimination in the corporate workplace, Ndzwayiba (2017: 244) found that Indian and white South Africans tend to invoke narratives of colour-blindness, as opposed to acknowledging racial issues in the workplace as inherently racial. This has been attributed to the tendency by those socialised as privileged – in this case informed by race – to be less aware of the role played by race dynamics in the social conditions of those with no racial privilege (Steyn, 2015: 383). Critical race theorists posit that the meanings historically attached to blackness and whiteness, respectively, continue to inform the present. This is readily demonstrated by the black–white economic gap in contemporary South Africa. A colour-

blind approach would overlook the need for redress and, broadly, undermine social justice (Thomas, 2019: 77). This point, along with the findings by Ndzwayiba (2017: 244) and Steyn (2015: 383), has dire implications for the prospects of transformation especially in the white male-dominated private sector, which has indeed proven to be slow to transform (Ndzwayiba et al., 2018: 1267–1269). Strict, centralised measures to enforce the implementation of redress policies at organisation level and accelerate transformation in the labour market are required. The trends of racial demographics in labour markets have a substantial influence on public perceptions of race.

Public opinion on race relations

The South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) of 2003 showed considerable shifts in racial attitudes since 1994 (MSR, 2006: 30–31). Fifty-seven per cent of respondents reported improved race relations; 29 per cent reported no change. Black African and Indian populations held positive views regarding race relations, compared to coloured and white populations. Contemporary post-apartheid South African society continues to be characterised by racial prejudice, discrimination and mistrust in various settings, including in interpersonal, intergroup and institutional settings. In this section, distinctions are drawn between reports discussing racial relations within institutions and those examining race in broader society, based on surveys and narrative reports.

At institutional level, racial prejudice and discrimination are observable in racially exclusionary policies, practices and cultures within institutions. Institutional racism occurs in a variety of settings in South Africa. As one measure of public opinion on institutional racism, racism in the education sector has been brought to the fore through sporadic protests against racist institutional cultures in South African schools and higher education institutions. In higher education institutions, these have included campaigns such as *#RhodesMustFall*, *#Luister* and *#OpenStellebosch* primarily at historically white institutions. In the basic education system, organised demonstrations by learners and parents have taken place in various parts of the country at formerly whites-only public and private schools.

Racism is equally prevalent in interpersonal and intergroup settings in the broader South African society. Two-thirds of equality-related complaints received by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2018: 11) in the period between April 2015 and March 2016 were those related to race. For decades, farm murders have been framed by white farmers as a black-on-white racial crime. In July 2021, racial violence broke out in Phoenix, KwaZulu-Natal, amidst civil unrest in various parts of the country during that period. The death toll resulting from the unrest in Phoenix is reported to be in excess of 30 (eNCA, 2021). Beyond these incidents, violent racial crimes take place from time to time in various parts of South Africa. In 2016, video footage emerged of Victor Mlotshwa being intimidated and forced into a coffin. The perpetrators were Mpumalanga farmers, Willem Oosthuizen and Theo Martins,

who were subsequently convicted of attempted murder, kidnapping, intimidation and assault (Al Jazeera, 2019). The intimidation and attempted murder charges were later set aside, and the perpetrators' sentences were reduced accordingly.

In 2018, Pieter Doorewaard and Phillip Schutte were convicted of the murder of 16-year-old Matlhomola Moshoeu in Coligny, in the North West province (Mitchley, 2020). The state had contended that the two had thrown Moshoeu off a moving bakkie following his alleged theft of sunflower heads from a farm. The Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently overturned these convictions and accompanying sentences. In 2011, Bees Roux was convicted of culpable homicide after beating Tshwane Metro police officer, Ntshimane Johannes Mogale, to death (*Mail & Guardian*, 2011). Roux received a suspended sentence of five years and was ordered to pay Mogale's widow a sum of R750,000 for his crime. These are but a few examples of violent racial incidents that continue to plague post-apartheid South African society. Such incidents reflect persisting racial tensions, at the root of which are persisting, unequal power relations between races in contemporary South Africa.


Despite the black African population gaining political power since 1994, this group remains economically marginalised. This is shown and reinforced by the group's poorer education prospects and employment outcomes, as detailed earlier in this chapter. This is in contrast with the white population group's retention of economic power and related benefits in post-apartheid South Africa (Thomas, 2019: 65), and the advancement of the Indian population group, which is also in sharp contrast with prospects for the black African and coloured groups. These dynamics reinforce unequal power relations between race groups. Critical race theorists have noted the flawed belief that 'racism is no longer a salient social problem' (Zamudio et al., 2011: 3) in a historically racialised society such as the United States, simply because it had been rendered illegal for more than 50 years. Rather, according to critical race theory, racism remains embedded in all aspects of social life in historically racialised societies, including in legal, economic and education systems. Persisting racial inequalities and unequal power relations between race groups across institutions and the broader society, 28 years after the dismantling of apartheid, illustrate that racism remains embedded in the fabric of post-apartheid South African society. The persistence of interpersonal and structural racism, as detailed above, reflects and fosters a sense of interracial mistrust and racial resentment, and broadly, holds negative implications for social cohesion across South Africa.

In the past few years, there have been highly publicised instances of racial prejudice on media platforms, which set a welcome precedent for the treatment of those who express racial intolerance. In a South African first, Vicky Momberg was criminally charged after insulting black African police officers in 2018 (Shange, 2018); she was sentenced to an effective two years in prison, and one year suspended. Momberg was later released after qualifying for a special remission of sentence. Nicholas Catzavelos was charged with *crimen injuria* and received a suspended sentence after making racially intolerant remarks against black African people in a widely disseminated video in 2018 (Nyathi, 2018). Similarly, Penny Sparrow was charged with

crimen injuria and convicted after making racially intolerant remarks on social media in 2016; she was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and was required to pay a R5,000 fine by the Scottburgh Magistrate's Court (Stolley, 2016). Until these cases, no legal action had previously been taken against individuals who incite and express racial intolerance in South Africa. This turn towards legal action against perpetrators of racial intolerance seemingly coincides with racial prejudice being increasingly expressed in subtle ways in interpersonal and institutional settings in contemporary South Africa (Thomas, 2019: 296). This suggests that legislated prohibition of hate speech could be an effective deterrent to expressions of racial intolerance.

With regard to public opinion surveys, the 2016 Afrobarometer survey of 2,400 adult South Africans showed that 52 per cent of survey respondents believed that race relations had changed for the better since 1994 in South Africa (Afrobarometer, 2016: 5–6). This is somewhat similar to the 51 per cent of more than 3,000 South African respondents to the 2011 SASAS, who reported feeling that race relations in South Africa had improved in that year (Gordon et al., 2012: 5). Similarly, 52 and 54 per cent of respondents to the SASAS believed that race relations had improved in 2008 and 2009, respectively. With the exception of the 2010 findings with 64 per cent of respondents perceiving race relations to have improved in that year, trends in both the SASAS and Afrobarometer surveys demonstrate a consistent pattern regarding South Africans' public opinion on race relations. Gordon et al. (2012: 6) attribute the 2010 results to the 'euphoric effect of the FIFA World Cup'. Despite the relative consistency of public opinion as shown by the Afrobarometer survey and the SASAS, a national annual survey conducted by Ipsos has shown that positive public opinion on race relations has been gradually declining since 2008 (see Figure 3.9). Public opinion on positive race relations based on the Ipsos survey ranged from 36 per cent to 46 per cent in the period between 2011 and 2017, and was at its lowest in 2013, at 36 per cent (DPME, 2017: 76). Public opinion on positive race relations based on this survey ranged from 49 per cent to 60 per cent between 2003 and 2010, then gradually declined from 2010.


Figure 3.9: Public opinion on positive race relations from 2003 to 2017



Source: DPME, 2017

In addition to the above, a 2019 report from the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation on the South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey (2019: 24) shows that 77 per cent of respondents indicated that ‘South Africa still needs reconciliation’ (see Figure 3.10). Just over half of the participants reported having experienced or known someone who had experienced reconciliation. Fifty-seven per cent of respondents believed that the country has made considerable progress in terms of reconciliation since the end of apartheid. While 66 per cent considered the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to have laid a foundation for reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa, this has not translated into actual racial reconciliation. This is further demonstrated by reports of racial intolerance, violent racial crimes and racial conflict detailed earlier in this section. Racial reconciliation, or broadly, social cohesion, could not be realised in a post-apartheid South Africa characterised by persisting, strained race relations and differential power dynamics on the basis of race and racial inequalities.

Figure 3.10: Perceptions regarding reconciliation progress




Source: South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2019

Respondents in the Reconciliation Barometer Survey further attributed lack of reconciliation to, among others, political parties’ exploitation of social divisions for political gain (74 per cent), continuing poverty among historically marginalised groups (73.3 per cent) and the continued use of race categories to measure transformation (72.2 per cent) (South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2019: 25). The 2006 MSR (2006: 31) noted that perceptions of whether race relations had improved in 2003 somewhat reflected discontent among those who had lost political power post-1994. This observation raises questions about characteristics of the large number of respondents who attributed lack of reconciliation to the continued use of race categories to measure transformation. This is important because the measurement of progress regarding transformation would be beneficial to members of historically marginalised groups, as would the notion of social justice as a necessary condition for social cohesion.

The majority of survey participants (55.8 per cent) indicated that both those who were previously oppressed and those who were not were responsible for facilitating reconciliation (see Figure 3.11). A total of 32.6 per cent believed that those previously oppressed were

responsible for ensuring reconciliation. Only 11.6 per cent believed that those who were not oppressed previously were responsible for ensuring reconciliation.

Figure 3.11: Perceived responsibility for facilitating reconciliation



Source: South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2019

Forgiveness, peace, truth, respect and moving-on are cited as key factors in facilitating reconciliation. To a lesser extent, finding ways to talk about the past, racial reconciliation, justice and retribution were considered important for reconciliation. Once again, the importance assigned to concepts such as moving on, coupled with the significantly less importance assigned to justice and retribution, raises questions about the characteristics of respondents and the extent to which they stand to benefit from a socially just South Africa. This is especially important in view of the notion of social justice being a necessary condition for reconciliation and ‘moving-on’. In line with this, Forde et al. (2021: 328–330) argue against peace-building approaches that emphasise symbolic notions of reconciliation, while failing to address sources of conflict. These authors refer to colonialism and apartheid-era racial segregation and dispossession as economic violence which, if not addressed through transformative measures such as reparations and distributive justice, will continue to disadvantage marginalised groups.

Failure to address the root causes of racial conflict precludes the possibility of structural transformation, and could therefore lead to ‘perpetual peacebuilding’, characterised by a perpetual cycle of introducing new institutions, laws and resources to counter the effects of persisting structural violence. Forde et al. (2021: 330) critique conventional peace-building efforts’ ‘strong focus on reconciliation over social justice’.

The previous sections highlighted structural socio-economic inequalities and the varied ways in which reconciliation efforts are impeded by race, class and gender disparities. In the next sections, we explore a cultural aspect of the reconciliation and justice debate: language.


Demographics of language

In the 2006 MSR (2006: 33), the most commonly spoken languages were, in descending order, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, Sesotho sa Leboa and English. Gauteng was the most linguistically diverse province, followed by Mpumalanga and Limpopo. It is important to note that this

finding relates to the use of language only, and the authors do not attempt to draw cultural inferences from the statement.

In the 2011 census, isiZulu was the most widely spoken first language in South Africa, followed by isiXhosa and Afrikaans. English, Sepedi, Setswana and Sesotho were spoken by only 9.6, 9.1, 8 and 7.6 per cent of the population, respectively (see Figure 3.12). Xitsonga, Siswati, Tshivenda and Sign Language were spoken by less than 5 per cent of the population each, at 4.5, 2.5, 2.4, 2.1 and 0.5 per cent, respectively. Languages other than those specified were spoken by 1.6 per cent of the population.

Figure 3.12: Percentages of first languages in South Africa



Source: Stats SA, 2011

The percentage of speakers of languages designated as 'Other' increased from 0.6 per cent in 1996 to 1.6 per cent in 2011 (Stats SA, 2011: 24; Stats SA, 1998a: 11). This presumed increase might be due to the possible inclusion of Sign Language in the category, 'Other', in 1996. This category might have also included languages spoken by Griqua communities, who were classified as 'Other/Unspecified' in the 1996 census when their numbers were too small to warrant separate analysis (Stats SA, 1998b). Approximately 8,000 people self-classified as Griqua in the 1996 census.

Similar to 2011, the most widely spoken languages in 1996 were isiZulu (22.9 per cent) and isiXhosa (17.9 per cent), followed by Afrikaans at 14.4 per cent. In 2011, the proportions of speakers of most languages had decreased since 1996. However, the proportions of home language speakers of Xitsonga (4.4 per cent in 1996), Tshivenda (2.2 per cent), isiNdebele (1.5 per cent in 1996) and English (8.6 per cent in 1996) showed an increase between 1996 and 2011. English showed the largest increase (+1 per cent). This increase might be due to the continuing association of the English language with social mobility in post-1994 society

(Bangeni & Kapp, 2007: 259, 266; Bekker & Hill, 2016: 2273), along with the cultural capital afforded to this language in many sections of society.

The prevailing trend regarding language use by province in 2011 was each province having one predominant first language; several provinces had more than one predominantly spoken first language (Stats SA, 2011: 26; see Table 3.5). The proportion of first languages spoken in Gauteng showed this province to be the most linguistically diverse province. IsiZulu was the most predominant first language, at 19.8 per cent; this is the lowest proportion obtained for a predominant language in any given province. This was followed by English at 13.3 per cent; Afrikaans at 12.4; per cent Sesotho at 11.6 per cent; and Setswana at 9.1 per cent. The percentage of Gauteng's most predominant first languages ranges from 9 per cent to 20 per cent. A similar type of linguistic diversity was observed in Mpumalanga, with 27.7 per cent of the population having Siswati as a first language, followed by 24.1 per cent of isiZulu, 10.4 per cent of Xitsonga and 10.1 per cent of isiNdebele first-language speakers.

Several of the languages were the least represented across all provinces, namely, isiNdebele, Siswati, Tshivenda and Xitsonga. This reflected the speakers of these languages as numerical, linguistic or ethnic minorities across South Africa.

Table 3.5: First language by province

Language (first)	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	SA
Afrikaans	49.7	10.6	53.8	12.7	1.6	9.0	12.4	7.2	2.6	13.5
English	20.2	5.6	3.4	2.9	13.2	3.5	13.3	3.1	1.5	9.6
isiNdebele	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.4	1.1	1.3	3.2	10.1	2.0	2.1
isiXhosa	24.1	78.8	5.3	7.5	3.4	5.5	6.6	1.2	0.4	16.0
isiZulu	0.4	0.5	0.8	4.4	77.8	2.5	19.8	24.1	1.2	22.7
Sepedi	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	2.4	10.6	9.3	52.9	9.1
Sesotho	1.1	2.5	1.3	64.2	0.8	5.8	11.6	3.5	1.5	7.6
Setswana	0.4	0.2	33.1	5.2	0.5	63.4	9.1	1.8	2.0	8.0
Sign language	0.4	0.7	0.3	1.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.5
Siswati	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.1	27.7	0.5	2.5
Tshivenda	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.5	2.3	0.3	16.7	2.4
Xitsonga	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	3.7	6.6	10.4	17.0	4.5
Other	2.2	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.8	1.8	3.1	1.0	1.6	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Stats SA, 2011

In terms of languages spoken by race, the Indian/Asian population was the most monolingual of race groups, speaking mainly English inside (92.1 per cent) and outside (95.3 per cent) the household (see Table 3.6). The coloured population predominantly speaks Afrikaans inside

(77.4 per cent) and outside (68.8 per cent) the household. This group speaks English to a much lesser extent, with 28.3 per cent speaking English outside the home, and 20.1 per cent speaking English inside the home.

Among the white population group, Afrikaans was the most commonly spoken language inside the home (61.2 per cent), though it was spoken to a much lesser extent outside the household (37.2 per cent). Instead, the white population mainly spoke English outside the household (61 per cent), while only 36.3 per cent spoke it inside the household.

The black African population was the most linguistically diverse race group, speaking all languages in and outside the household in varying degrees. IsiZulu was the most commonly spoken language inside and outside the household to an almost equal degree. Among this group, English shows the largest disparity in terms of the extent to which it is spoken inside and outside the home, at 1.6 per cent and 8.6 per cent, respectively. This is in line with the predominant use of English in occupational and educational settings in South Africa. In addition, being in linguistically diverse environments outside the home also likely necessitates use of English for this group.

The use of Xitsonga inside the household far exceeded that outside, at 2.1 and 0.5 per cent respectively. This implies that Xitsonga speakers mainly speak other languages when outside the home and might be attributable to their multilingualism (Mulondo & Thomas, 2021: 155), coupled with their status as one of the numerical ethnic minorities in South Africa. Khoi, Nama and San languages are spoken to a marginal, but similar degree inside and outside the household, at 0.1 per cent in either domain.

Table 3.6: Languages spoken inside and outside the household by race

	Black African		Coloured		Indian/Asian		White		South Africa	
	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside
Afrikaans	0.9	1.0	77.4	68.8	1.3	1.5	61.2	37.2	12.2	9.7
English	1.6	8.6	20.1	28.3	92.1	95.8	36.6	61.0	8.1	16.6
IsiNdebele	1.9	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	1.6	1.3
IsiXhosa	18.2	15.6	1.1	1.3	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.1	14.8	12.8
IsiZulu	31.1	30.8	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.0	0.5	0.5	25.3	25.1
Khoi, Nama and San languages	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Sepedi	12.4	12.0	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.3	10.1	9.7
Sesotho	9.7	9.6	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.1	7.9	7.8
Setswana	11.1	11.5	0.7	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	9.1	9.4
Sign language	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

	Black African		Coloured		Indian/Asian		White		South Africa	
	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside
Siswati	3.5	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	2.6
Tshivenda	3.1	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	2.2
Xitsonga	4.4	2.9	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	3.6	2.4
Other	2.1	0.5	0.1	0.0	4.0	0.7	1.1	0.5	1.9	0.5
Total Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (Thousands)	46307	46135	4961	4930	1430	1426	4442	4420	57143	56917

Source: Stats SA, 2018

Language usage, social status and identity

In the 2006 MSR not much research had been conducted on language in relation to issues of identity, multilingualism and the perceived utility of languages in relation to economic and social opportunities. Moreover, appraisal of aspects of any given language could logically be tied to its speakers' racial grouping, rather than to language itself. Language use in South Africa largely reflects the socio-historical positioning of different languages and their speakers in the pre-democratic era. English and Afrikaans continue to be privileged for use in various settings outside the household, including in business, the workplace and educational settings. This is despite the fact that South Africa has nine other official languages, and that Afrikaans and English are the third and fourth most spoken languages in South Africa, respectively, after isiZulu and isiXhosa (see Figure 3.12).

The privileging of English and Afrikaans over indigenous African languages, particularly, has varying implications for non-mother tongue speakers of these languages in multiple contexts. Language has socio-cultural, cognitive and economic value (DoHET, 2015). Socio-cultural value refers to 'the worth of [a] language as an expression of identity, culture and heritage of its speakers' (DoHET, 2015: 15). Cognitive value refers to a language's ability to enable its speakers to produce, access and consume knowledge, particularly in a learning environment (DoHET, 2015: 15). Economic value refers to the extent to which a language enables its speakers to easily get a job and, subsequently, to participate meaningfully in the labour market (Alexander, 2013: 102–105; DoHET, 2015: 16). In post-apartheid South Africa, these three values continue to be disproportionately assigned to English and Afrikaans, to the detriment of indigenous languages and their speakers, and to some indigenous languages over others.

Most South African languages can be said to have socio-cultural value, as their speakers are able to express their cultural heritages and identities using these languages. However, the disproportionate use of English outside the household for black African populations suggests

that English is afforded more socio-cultural value outside the household, compared to indigenous languages. The lack of cultural capital for indigenous languages is also demonstrated by their non-use inside or outside the household by non-African population groups, indicating the lack of economic value afforded to indigenous languages. English is widely accepted as a language of business in South Africa, to the exclusion of other South African languages, particularly indigenous languages. With regard to cognitive value, English continues to be the only language of learning and teaching (LOLT) for non-Afrikaans-speaking learners from the intermediate phase of basic education. Alongside Afrikaans, English is also a medium of instruction across South Africa's higher education institutions. Therefore, despite not being a first language in many black African households, English becomes a preferred LOLT and medium of instruction within this population group (Bangeni & Kapp, 2007: 259; Thomas & Maree, 2021: 8–11). This is also true for speakers of Afrikaans, to some extent. These trends demonstrate that speakers of languages other than English and, especially, of indigenous languages, are aware of the lack of cognitive or economic value afforded to their languages, relative to English in South African society. Globalisation and the prospects of international migration have also led to black African students and black and white first-language speakers of Afrikaans preferring English as a medium of instruction (Thomas & Maree, 2021: 11).

Among indigenous languages, Khoi and San languages have remained marginalised across contexts throughout post-apartheid South African history, and are in danger of extinction (Sehume, 2019: 74–76). Moreover, although they form part of the 11 official languages, speakers of numerical linguistic minorities such as Xitsonga and Tshivenda are routinely subjected to ethnic prejudice from members of majority ethnic groups within the black African population group (Mulondo, 2018: 54–55, 61; Mulondo & Thomas, 2021: 154). Speakers of linguistic minority languages tend to be multilingual, as a result of ethnic prejudice, coupled with the minority status of their language. For example, Xitsonga speakers use Xitsonga in the household to a much larger degree than they do outside the household (Stats SA, 2018: 9). This would suggest that outside the household, Xitsonga speakers use languages spoken by majority groups.

Despite the above, relative to other sources of social division (i.e. political affiliation, inequality and race), language is considered one of the least predominant sources of social division in South Africa (South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2017: 16–17). In the South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey of 2019 (2019: 45), language was ranked fourth as a source of division behind inequality, race and political parties. Moreover, self-description among South Africans tends to be according to nationality, followed by self-description as African, by race group and, lastly, by language group (DPME, 2017: 78). These trends suggest that self-identification by nationality in South Africa supersedes self-identification through language group. In turn, this might mean that, for the majority of South Africans, linguistic diversity does not pose a significant threat to social cohesion.

Conclusion and recommendations

A recurring theme of racial inequality emerged in this chapter. Despite the significant advances made since the advent of democracy, persisting racial disparities show that the make-up of post-apartheid South African society largely reflects that of the apartheid era. Twenty-eight years into democratic rule, white and Indian population groups have living conditions, education attainment patterns and employment outcomes far surpassing those of the coloured and black African populations. These trends are attributed to structural racism, which primarily functions to bestow privilege on some race groups, while disadvantaging others on a broad scale. With regard to gender, white and Indian women have benefitted disproportionately from redress policies, relative to coloured and black African women. Moreover, black African women simultaneously contend with racism and patriarchy, as reflected by their gross underrepresentation across senior and intermediate occupational categories, as well as the negative attitudes held by their counterparts in other designated groups towards their assumption of leadership roles.

The inherently racial structure of post-apartheid South African society further influences race dynamics and unequal power relations across society. These are at the root of racial mistrust, resentment and conflict. Unequal power relations, along with the denial of social justice in post-apartheid South Africa, hold negative implications for social cohesion. While differential power relations are evident in language use in South Africa, public opinion on this does not suggest any implications for social cohesion, given South Africans' tendency to self-identify using nationality and race, rather than language. However, linguistic inclusivity should be fostered, to counter the marginalisation of linguistic minorities and related ills such as ethnocentrism and ethnic prejudice. The predominance of themes such as racism and of social inequalities based on race, gender, ethnic or linguistic exclusion in post-apartheid South Africa suggests that much still needs to be done in the creation of a just, equitable and inclusive society. The following interventions are proposed to address the key issues identified in this chapter.

Incentives should be created for the appointment of underrepresented demographic groups across occupational categories, especially considering their EAPs. This should be accompanied by stricter enforcement of redress in the workplace, considering that the gross majority of employers report no barriers to employing individuals from designated groups. There is a need for more concerted efforts towards the creation of a labour environment that is representative in terms of race and gender, particularly focusing on demographic groups that have benefitted the least from redress policies over the past 28 years. These include the coloured and black African populations (particularly black African women). Access to quality basic education and free higher education should be broadened for black African and coloured populations. Improving the educational outcomes and prospects of any population group would help improve these populations' living conditions and facilitate intergenerational social mobility.

As per the provisions of the proposed Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, legislation should be strengthened to deter potential perpetrators of racial

intolerance and hate speech, and to penalise perpetrators. This would help to neutralise the unequal power relations on the basis of race which continue to define post-apartheid South African society, especially considering the slow pace of transformation and persisting structural racism.

Indigenous languages must be made a compulsory addition to the basic education curriculum as first additional languages. In relation to this, African languages should be allocated the resources required to be used as mediums of instruction in basic education and higher education. True linguistic diversity in South Africa can be achieved by placing Indigenous languages on par with English and Afrikaans as languages of learning and teaching, and for official use. Measures must be put in place to invigorate the endangered Khoi and San languages and, along with them, the values and cultures of their speakers. Chief among these measures should be removing these languages from the margins and incorporating them into mainstream society.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DIVERSITY: DEMOGRAPHICS OF AGE, GENDER AND DISABILITY

Introduction


Age dynamics, gender relations and the experiences of citizens with disabilities remain important factors in South Africa's policy discourse on social transformation. While these issues are addressed in various ways in the Constitution of the country (from the premise of no discrimination on the basis of age, gender equality and the rights of persons with disabilities), more work still needs to be done. The 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR) explored these issues in some detail, noting changes since 1994, but highlighting the lack of progress regarding inclusion of disability in education and the economy. In this chapter, we examine dynamics from 1994 until the present era using the most recent available data. A significant challenge affecting South Africa and the world at this time is the COVID-19 pandemic and its unfolding aftermath. There is minimal published information on COVID-19 and its impact on broader social trends in South Africa. We return to the issue of COVID-19 and its possible effects at the end of this chapter.

Age dynamics

The 2006 MSR noted the implications of an ageing society for South Africa, coupled with features more typical of societies with higher birth rates than in wealthier countries. This trend has been maintained. The ageing of South Africa's population is a key marker of the country's unique demography and potential. South Africa – relatively the oldest population in sub-Saharan Africa – is situated within demographically the youngest of all world regions. The African continent's large population share of children and youth represents a key promise for the region's future. In South Africa, however, while the proportion of older adults (60+) will remain below 10 per cent in coming decades, their absolute number will grow extraordinarily rapidly: faster than in any other major world region (He et al., 2020).

South Africa has experienced a substantial increase in the absolute number of older persons since the early 1990s. With 2.8 million older persons in 1996 (around 7 per cent of the total population), the absolute number almost doubled to 5.4 million older persons aged 60 years and above in 2020 (9.1 per cent of the total population). This absolute number is expected to more than double to 11.6 million by 2050 (Stats SA 2020c; UNDESA, 2017). At the same time, fertility rates in South Africa have decreased substantially, from a previous rate of 6.04 new-borns per woman in 1960 down to 2.32 new-borns per woman in 2019 (Stats SA, 2019b). This major trend of a lower fertility and decreasing mortality dynamic – two main drivers for population ageing – is clear in the series of graphs below: an upward moving bulge of older cohorts and a decrease in younger cohorts. Trends are clearly seen in comparison across Figures 4.1 to 4.3.


Figure 4.1: Population pyramid for 2004



Source: Stats SA, 2019b


A further clear indication of the population-ageing dynamic in South Africa is indicated in Table 4.1. In the five years from 1996 to 2001, the total population increased by 4.2 million (10 per cent growth) while the older population (60+) increased by 477,071 (17 per cent growth). In the subsequent four years – between 2016 and 2020 – the total South African population increased by 3.9 million (7 per cent growth), while the older population grew with 901,144 (20 per cent growth). Another indication of the acceleration is in the comparison of the changes in the total population: in 2001 the 60+ population represented only 11 per cent of the total change in population size, while in 2020 that same cohort represents 23 per cent of the total population change.

Figure 4.2: Population pyramid for 2014



Source: Stats SA, 2019b

Figure 4.3: Population pyramid for 2021



Source: Stats SA, 2021b

Table 4.1: 1996 to 2020 change in population totals

Change per time period (numbers, e.g., 2001 minus 1996)			
1996	Male	Female	Total
Total Pop	19,520,887	21,062,685	40,583,573
Total 60+	1, 104, 331	1, 726, 869	2, 831, 200
2001	Male	Female	Total
Total Pop	1,913,153	2,323,052	4,236,205
Total 60+	164, 685	312,386	477,071
2011	Male	Female	Total
Total Pop	3,754,752	3,196,033	6,950,785
Total 60+	384,403	467,263	851,666
2016	Male	Female	Total
Total Pop	2,058,434	1,824,658	3,883,092
Total 60+	175,830	217,346	393,176
2020*	Male	Female	Total
Total Pop	1,881,649	2,087,047	3,968,696
Total Pop	322,293	578,851	901,144

Source: Stats SA, 1996, 2001a, 2011a, 2016a, 2020c

* Mid-year population estimates were used

The rise in the absolute number of older persons intersects with a rise in the burden of disease discussed in chapter five. The epidemiological transition is identified by a change in the primary causal factors leading to diseases and death, from communicable diseases and poor nutrition on the one hand to a predominance of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) on the other (Aboderin & Beard, 2014; Bloom et al., 2015). As the number of older persons increases, so also will the demand for long-term care (LTC), given the overlapping epidemiological transition (Solanki et al., 2019; WHO, 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic is, of course, superimposed on these pre-existing trends. In addition to population ageing and the epidemiological transitions, South Africa is experiencing a set of other major demographic, social and environmental trends. These include significant developments such as migration, urbanisation, the growth of urban informal settlements, climate change-related natural disasters and their subsequent impacts on rural development. Older people are affected by these critical concerns and equally engage in agentic practices when adapting to changes in the context. The link between climate change and South Africa's overall health burden is an important factor. Climatic changes and shocks have direct impacts on communicable and non-communicable diseases in society. Thus, primary health care policy interventions should be implemented alongside other measures aimed at lessening ecological degradation in South Africa. This connection between climate

conditions and the population's health profile illustrates the importance of employing a wide conception of sustainable development in policy planning. COVID-19 has highlighted that public health cannot be separated from socio-economic trends in society.

It is important to recognise the huge diversity and marked disparities in status, opportunities, capacities, wellbeing and life expectancy that exist within South Africa's older population in relation to a still relatively young population. Investments to enhance older people's health, knowledge and intergenerational engagement within their unique contexts can help maximise their positive social contribution and minimise their negative intergenerational impacts – thus enhancing the future prospects of the young, while strengthening social cohesion. This has the potential to serve South Africa's effort to nurture a demographic dividend and people-driven development.

For reasons of space and the importance of population ageing as a commonly neglected issue, the analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the ageing population, but other issues regarding age dynamics are of course also important. For example, youth unemployment, which was noted as a key issue in the previous MSR, remains an enormous challenge. A recent evidence-based report (De Lannoy et al., 2020), which draws on 2019 Statistics SA data, notes that half of South Africa's population aged 15 to 34 is unemployed. The same author group (De Lannoy et al., 2018) note the difficulties of relationships between different government departments and the need for coordinated policy-making and implementation regarding this issue.

Youth identity in South Africa is diverse and shaped both by local factors and by the increasing influence of social media and the internet (Lundgren & Scheckle, 2019). Youth identities, including gender identities (Sibanda & Batisai, 2021), have also been linked to the use of illicit substances. The concept of 'waithood', describing youth who have little chance of achieving the usual social markers of transition to adulthood, has been used to explain not just livelihood strategies but also early fertility, which has been seen as a way of communicating adult status (Honwana, 2014; Mbatha & Koskimaki, 2021; Swartz et al., 2018). All of these issues need to be considered in the context of the care economy, as discussed below, while using methodologies appropriate to context (Motha et al., 2019).

Gender dynamics

By mid-2021 the South African population was estimated to be around 60,000,000 (of whom 49 per cent are male and 51 per cent female). This is a significant, but not particularly reliable, reflection of the change of population in South Africa, when comparing 1994 and 2021, and not dissimilar to what was reported in the MSR of 2006. Statistics SA recognised the obvious limitations of pre-1996 census data, stating that prior to the first properly administered census in 1996, 'there was no reliable information available about the country as a whole' (Stats SA, 2021b).

This review of gender dynamics starts with the presentation of socio-economic indicators. Data provided by Stats SA (2014) present an unemployment rate of 35 per cent in 1994 without gender disaggregation. The Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), for the first quarter of 2021, shows a total unemployment rate of 32.6 per cent, with the female unemployment rates at 34 per cent and male at 31.4 per cent (Stats SA, 2021c). It is worth noting that the 1994 data shows that unemployment impacted on black Africans more severely than it affected members of other population groups: half (50 per cent) of all economically active black African females and one in every three (34 per cent) economically active black African males were unemployed, compared with one in 10 (9 per cent) economically active white females and one in 20 (5 per cent) economically active white males (Stats SA, 2001b).

Household income has seen improvements for women over time, but this is largely due to complex and mutually reinforcing economic growth factors, as noted in the 2006 report. Actual improvements in economic equality for women are difficult to gauge. Findings from Stats SA (2001b; 2011b) and Hirschowitz and Orkin (1997) showed over a third (up to 36 per cent) of South Africans living in households with an average monthly disposable income of R410 or less (lowest quintile), while only 8 per cent lived in households with an average monthly income of R2,573 or more (highest quintile). Stats SA (2001b) primary tables of '1996 and 2001 compared' break down the monthly income of individuals aged 15 to 65 years into R500 income increments, and by gender up to R30,001 or more: there remain stark inequalities between women and men in relation to income. Men consistently outnumbered women in every income range, and the gap between female and male earners became wider as the income became greater.

According to the Stats SA (2001b: 48) Gender Statistics Report, 'women were more likely than men to be found in the first two quintiles (household with the lowest income) and the opposite pattern was found in the highest income quintiles'. According to Stats SA (2020b), the 'bottom', socio-economically speaking, 60 per cent of South Africans depend more on social grants and less on the income they receive in their respective labour markets. In 2021, about one-third of South Africans relied on grants (pension, social protection, disability or family and child grants). Stats SA (2021a) further reported that social benefits accounted for 11 per cent of national government expenses, with a 17 per cent increase from 2018/19.

A report on 'Inequality Trends in South Africa: A multidimensional diagnostic of inequality' (Stats SA, 2019a; herein referred to as the 'Inequality Trends' report), found that the average asset scores for individuals living in male-headed households remained higher than those in female-headed households over the period of analysis. The Inequality Trends report also presented data on housing subsidies. It found that a notably higher percentage of female-headed households (23.1 per cent) than male-headed households (15.5 per cent) received subsidies, and this is in line with government policies that give preference to households headed by individuals from vulnerable groups, including females and individuals with disabilities.

In terms of basic services, Stats SA (2019a) reported that the portion of households with access to water – delineated by sex of the household head – in 2017 was 77 per cent (male) and 70 per cent (female). In 2002 these figures were lower, with 73.6 per cent of male-headed households and 60 per cent of female-headed households having access to water. The same report by Stats SA reported on the portion of households with access to electricity from the mains electricity supply by sex of the household head: in 2017 it was 82.4 per cent for male-headed households and 87.2 per cent for female-headed households. This represents a slight improvement from 2002, with male-headed households at 79.3 per cent and 72.9 per cent of female-headed households having access to electricity supply. In terms of access to sanitation facilities, Stats SA (2019a: 113) reported that ‘households headed by males had a greater proportion of access to improved sanitation at 67 per cent in 2002, rising to 83.3 per cent in 2017’ while for ‘female-headed households the proportion was 51.5% in 2002, increasing to 81.2% in 2017’. They conclude that, overall, household access to sanitation is showing ‘a general upward trend’, with the gap between male- and female-headed households narrowing.

Investing in women’s education contributes to poverty reduction; income growth; economic productivity; improvements in child health and nutrition; increases in school enrolment; protection against HIV infection; higher maternal and child life expectancy; reduced fertility rate and delayed marriage (UNESCO & UNICEF, 2010: 129). There have been improvements over the past two decades in the rate of enrolment and education of women at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Hirschowitz and Orkin’s (1997) study, ‘Inequality in South Africa’, based on the 1994 October Household Survey, examined education levels among the population. Hirschowitz and Orkin (1997) found that of those aged 20 years or more (13 per cent of the population) had received no primary education, 19 per cent had received some primary school education, and a further 8 per cent had received a complete primary school education. The General Household Survey found that percentage distribution for individuals between 6 and 18 years not attending an educational institution was 4 per cent in 2017. This compares with 2002 when it was 8 per cent (Stats SA, 2019a). The percentage of individuals aged 20 years and older attaining at least Grade 12 has increased consistently since 2002, expanding from 30.7 per cent in 2002 to 46.7 per cent in 2019, and the percentage of individuals with some post-school education increased from 9.2 per cent to 15.4 per cent (Stats SA, 2020a).

The Global Gender Gap Report (2021), published by the World Economic Forum, reports on enrolment rates, and provides gender disaggregated data on educational attainment (see Table 4.2). The Report shows that 86.7 per cent of South African women were enrolled in primary education, 78.5 per cent in secondary education and 26.4 per cent in tertiary education.

Overall, South Africa rates 18th out of 156 in this Global Gender Gap Index ranking (WEF, 2021). Table 4.2 shows South Africa’s scorecard: the country is ranked on gender equality in terms of economic participation and opportunity; educational attainment; health and survival, and political empowerment – indicators which show varying degrees of success in closing the gender gap.

Table 4.2: South African country score card – Global Gender Gap Report (South Africa)

INDICATOR	Females	Males	World Rank
Economic participation and opportunity			92
Labour force participation rate (%)	54.1%	66.3%	80
Wage equality for similar work, 1–7 (best)	–	–	131
Estimated earned income, int’l \$1,000	10.3%	14.7%	45
Legislators, senior officials and managers (%)	30.2%	69.8%	89
Professional and technical workers (%)	53.2%	46.9%	1
Educational attainment			69
Literacy rate (%)	86.5%	87.7%	79
Enrolment in primary education (%)	86.7%	87.3%	107
Enrolment in secondary education (%)	78.5%	65.4%	1
Enrolment in tertiary education (%)	26.4%	18.4%	1
Health and survival			37
Sex ratio at birth (%)	–	–	1
Healthy life expectancy, in years	57.7	54.6	48
Political empowerment			14
Women in parliament (%)	45.8%	54.2%	10
Women in ministerial positions (%)	48.3%	51.7%	
Years with female/male head of state (last 50)	–	–	12

Source: WEF, 2021

The government has taken significant steps towards achieving women’s equality through the ratification of international conventions, the passing of national legislation and the establishment of oversight mechanisms, all of which are aimed at the legal, economic and social advancement of women. These substantive reforms in the law promote equality, access to services and protection of women in a wide range of areas, including the promotion of equality, the prevention of unfair discrimination, employment equity, sexual and reproductive health, the prevention and management of domestic violence and sexual offences, the provision of (child) maintenance, the recognition of customary marriages, among others. In addition to changes in legislation, and the establishment of oversight mechanisms, South Africa has seen the representation of women within key governance structures doubling since 1994, with over 50 per cent of women holding ministerial positions. Mechanisms created to provide oversight regarding the implementation of laws include the establishment of commissions and oversight committees. Much legislation, however, still suffers from severe implementation challenges, which range from the inadequate training of duty bearers to the absence of dedicated budgets and skilled personnel to support

the implementation of these laws, and the positive legal obligations to South African women, within them. For example, despite progressive legislation on domestic violence and sexual offences, the prevalence of gender-based violence remains high.

South Africa's government has prioritised fighting gender-based violence, drawing on support from a number of civil society organisations. Two prominent interventions exemplify the state's attempts to address gender-based violence in South Africa: The National Strategic Plan on Gender Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF) (DWYPD, 2020) and a ring-fenced Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF) Response Fund. The country's national strategic GBVF plan is anchored around six principles, which cover areas such as institutionalised policy coordination, criminal justice system reforms, support and care, economic empowerment and enhanced information-sharing systems (DWYPD, 2020). There are additional policy implementation and oversight mechanisms discussed in the document. The R128 million GBVF fund launched in February 2021 is aimed at supporting the interventions outlined in the overarching strategic plan. It is important to note that this fund was drawn from contributions from the private sector. This illustrates how social compacting can be used in supporting government's gender-based policy goals.

The interventions cited above represent positive steps taken towards addressing gender-based violence at a national level. Yet, gender-based violence and sexual assaults cases continue to rise in society. There are several underlying causes informing this trend that deserve attention. Some of the factors are related to the persistent socio-economic disparities between men and women cited in preceding sections. The institutional weaknesses in policy implementation, highlighted throughout this chapter, equally contribute to fighting gender-based violence. Additionally, civil society groups have raised concerns about the government's inability to carry out essential actions identified in the national strategic plan on gender-based violence, such as setting up a coordinating council and addressing the slow pace of criminal justice system reforms. Several legislative amendments, which are aimed at ameliorating shortcomings in the criminal justice system, still need to be finalised (Shoba, 2021). These challenges require improvements in the government's implementation systems across different departments. Another crucial factor is disseminating the national strategic framework at provincial and local levels, so that it results in behaviour change in local communities. This is important because violence normally takes place within households and social institutions, i.e. schools, churches, social clubs. The Commission for Gender Equality (2021) report raises an additional concern regarding the National Strategic Plan's (NSP) status in government. It amplifies this observation in the following statement (Commission for Gender Equality, 2021: 25):

There appears to be a great deal of confusion regarding the current status of the NSP since it was approved by cabinet in March 2020. The Minister indicated at that time that government departments were being instructed to reprioritise their 2020/21 financial year annual plans and five strategic plans (SPs) to integrate NSP targets. Yet, no significant evidence exists to show that this was done.

Overall, several issues have curtailed the successful actioning of South Africa's National Strategic Plan. These barriers are concerning in light of escalating gender-based violence in the country. Government officials and other stakeholders involved should take note of the concerns raised by citizens and the Commission for Gender Equality.

LGBTQIA+ issues

The 2006 MSR did not have a dedicated section on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual (LGBTQIA+) issues. Given the importance of these for a changing South Africa, they are briefly discussed in this section. Going back to the Constitution, South Africa has progressive legislation on LGBTQIA+ rights, and is recognised as being the most progressive country on the continent on these issues. Indeed, South Africa is recognised as a destination for refugees and migrants who have been persecuted on the basis of LGBTQIA+ status in other African countries (Marnell, 2021; Marnell et al., 2021). Despite this, South Africa has some way to go in terms of achieving lived universal rights for sexual minorities, according to Human Rights Watch 2022 South Africa country page.

It is notoriously difficult to gain an accurate estimate of how many people in South Africa identify as LGBTQIA+, but The Other Foundation (2016) estimated the number being at around 530,000, which translates to a similar rate by population to other countries. De Villiers et al. (2020), Hassan et al. (2018) and Rabie and Lesch (2009) all note the complexity and variety of names given to LGBTQIA+ people in different communities in South Africa and to same-sex practices. Matters are further complicated when trying to tease out separate categories – for example, there may be some men who engage in same-sex sexual behaviour who refer to themselves as women but do not identify as transgender; some of their male sexual partners identify as heterosexual and have sex with women.

A large-scale study by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and The Other Foundation (The Other Foundation, 2016) found that 72 per cent of South Africans believe same-sex sexual activity to be morally wrong, though just over half the people surveyed believe that gay and lesbian people should enjoy the same human rights as other South Africans and should be included into existing cultures and traditions. Hate crimes against people identifying as LGBTQIA+ are a feature of South African society and are affected by location and other social factors (Ngidi et al., 2020). These include general societal markers of social exclusion, which were exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic (Reid & Ritholtz, 2020).

Access to justice for LGBTQIA+ South Africans is a major concern. A report by the Gender Health and Justice Research Unit (Müller & Meer, 2018) states that many cases of violence against LGBTQ people do not reach the courts, for a range of reasons. These include: fears for the safety of complainants, homophobia within the family and community, past experiences of prejudicial treatment within the legal system and a perception that the system is inefficient. Where cases do reach the courts, they are often not viewed as LGBTQ-related. There is a strong need for

more support for complainants and improved access to justice, a view which is echoed by the report of the Ministerial Advisory Task Team on the Adjudication of Sexual Offence Matters (MATTSO, 2013: 10). That report identifies the following groups as being at increased risk for sexual violence: women, children, elderly, sex workers, persons with disabilities, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and intersex persons, foreign women and people trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

In schools, a pattern of micro-aggression against LGBT youth has been reported, again with intersections with race and other factors (Francis, 2017; 2021). The legacy of colonial exclusionary practices and religious intolerance is felt in this area, as in others (Loubser & Kotzé, 2018). There is a vibrant and active set of civil society and activist groups in South Africa promoting inclusion for LGBTQIA+ people, including access to full social participation and services such as health services (Nyoni, 2020). It remains the case, however, that certain groups, such as trans people, are more likely to experience discrimination in society (Essack et al., 2018).

Disability dynamics

The issue of disability and social inclusion was dealt with briefly in the 2006 MSR, and it noted that much more needs to be done in South Africa in terms of improving life conditions for people with disabilities. Given this recommendation, this report provides broader data on disability inclusion issues. The growth of the disability rights movement since the 1980s culminated in a series of national and international policies and charters. These have galvanised the visibility of disability as a key issue in human rights and development. This has resulted in a range of policy and legislative initiatives, and improved measures of disability, as well as the disaggregation of data by disability status. These measures allow for ongoing monitoring of trends in the inclusion of persons with disabilities in mainstream society.

Disability prevalence is complex to determine as criteria for assessment of disability change. The current gold standard for assessing disability in national statistics is the Washington Group Short Set (WG SS), which is the method of assessment currently used by Stats SA. Table 4.3 shows disability prevalence over time.

Table 4.3: Overall disability prevalence in South Africa for moderate and severe disabilities (UN disability index for WG SS)

Data source	
CASE Survey 1998	5.9%
Census 2001	5.0%
Census 2011	7.4%
Community Survey 2016	7.7%

Prevalence of general disability increases with age, with similar trends across all population groups. This trend has remained constant across all data sources. Differences in prevalence rates between Census 2001 and the CASE Survey 1998 and the other datasets are primarily due to differences in terminology used in the questions (asking about ‘disability’ in 2001 and ‘difficulties’ – see Schneider (2009); Schneider et al. (2009)) in the other datasets. The tables below show trends by age and gender.

Table 4.4: Total prevalence of disability by age (UN disability index for WG SS)

Age category	CASE 1998	Census 2001	Census 2011	Community Survey 2016
15–19	4.1	3.0	2.6	2.6
20–24	4.6	3.5	2.4	2.4
25–29	5.1		2.5	2.7
30–34	5.1	4.9	3.0	3.5
35–39	6.0		3.8	3.9
40–44	7.5	7.1	5.4	5.7
45–49	9.3		8.7	9.0
50–54	11.9	10.5	12.1	13.7
55–59	13.7		15.6	18.3
60–64	14.3	13.0	18.7	24.2
65–69	12.2		22.8	31.5
70–74	13.4	17.4	29.3	40.9
75–79	20.9		36.3	49.9
80+	24.1	27.2	-	-
80–84	-	-	44.3	61.1
80+	-	-	53.1	73.1

Table 4.5: Total prevalence by sex (UN disability index for WG SS)

Sex	CASE 1998	Census 2001	Census 2011	Community Survey 2016
Male	6.4	5.05	6.4	6.5
Female	5.5	5.0	8.3	8.9

The only difference in prevalence trends by gender is that in earlier data sources women tended to report less disability than men compared to the later data sources. Again, this could be differences relating to the wording of the question combined with an age factor – there are more older women and higher rates of disability in older people. Disability is also associated with poverty and social circumstances. The differing rates by population group appear in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Prevalence by population group (UN disability index for WG SS)

Population group	CASE 1998	Census 2001	Census 2011	Community Survey 2016
Black African	6.1	5.2	7.7	7.6
Coloured	4.5	4.2	6.2	7.5
Indian/Asian	4.7	3.7	6.2	8.4
White	5.7	4.3	6.5	9.2
Other	-	-	5.6	-

It is not clear why there are differences in the prevalence rates for Indian/Asian and white groups between Census 2011 and the 2016 Community Survey. Except for the Community Survey, the pattern of prevalence is that more black African people report difficulties than do other population groups, and Indian/Asians and coloured people report the least. Part of the problem in comparing across population groups is that there is insufficient information about the language and terminology used in the research questionnaires, which impacts participants' responses significantly. Differing age distributions also need to be considered.

Trends in key markers of disability inclusion: Socio-demographic trends

There are different trends that need to be reviewed to understand the progress made in addressing the interests and needs of persons with disabilities. Key ones include:

- (i) inclusion of disability in all policy documents, legislation and rules arising from these frameworks
- (ii) generic inclusion measures such as accessibility of public buildings and spaces, transport, health, education and other services; and
- (iii) individual level of inclusion.

The focus of this section is the last trend – individual levels of inclusion, as this is the trend with the most accessible information and data.

While there are many markers of inclusion that could be measured, this section focuses on some key ones, including educational achievement, employment status and access to healthcare and other services – markers measured on routine data collection platforms. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide information on educational participation and achievement for people with disabilities.

Table 4.7: Proportion of people with disabilities with no schooling by sex and population group (%)
(N=people with disabilities 20 years and older at the time of interview)

Date	Black African men	Black African women	Coloured men	Coloured women	Indian/ Asian men	Indian/ Asian women	White men	White women
1998*	23		19		14		14	
2001	35.3	41.8	19.1	21.5	10.0	22.5	6.3	7.0
2011**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2016**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Not fully comparable to 2001 measures of education

**No measures reflecting no education

Source: Commission for Gender Equality 2001, 2021; Stats SA 2001c, 2011c, 2016b; CASE 2000

Table 4.8: Proportion of children and young adults with disabilities who do not attend school (%)

Date	Preschool	Primary school	High school	Vocational training
1998	48	5	47	88
2001*	61.1 (5 yr olds)	14.8 (10 yr olds)	18.5 (15 yr olds)	-
5–24-year-olds not attending school – level of schooling unspecified				
2011	20.2	27.3	29.0	27.4
2016	23.5	33.3	31.0	27.5

* Figures were given for individual age years. The middle age for each level of basic schooling was used as a proxy for primary and high school and five-year-olds for preschool

The 1998 data suggest that many children access primary school (only 5 per cent do not attend school) but that they do not progress to high school. Given the different age groups merged into the 2011 and 2016 statistical analysis, it is difficult to note any trends in ‘not attending school’. For the 2001 Census a similar pattern was found to the one for the 1998 data, although with a better level of attendance in high school (only 18.5 per cent out of school compared to 47 per cent identified in the 1998 data).

The report for the Community Survey 2016 report on disability (Stats SA, 2016a: 30) summarised the trend from Census 2011:

Looking at persons with disabilities, the proportion completing NTCIII has remained very low at less than 1 per cent and figures remained stagnant over the years. By the year 2016, the proportion of persons with disabilities who completed NTCIII was less than 0.5 per cent, a figure that is much lower than for persons without disabilities. On a positive note, it is noticed that there is an upward trend for persons with disabilities who completed primary school (grade 7) and matric (grade 12).

The trajectory from primary through to high school provides some indication of the quality of education. It allows children to pass primary school and remain in school by progressing to high school.

Despite commitments to increasing employment for people with disabilities, Table 4.9 demonstrates that employment barriers persist.

Table 4.9: Proportion of persons with disabilities, employed and unemployed (15–65 years) (percentage by sex)

Date	Employed		Unemployed		Not economically active		Not applicable	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1998	14	11	11	9	74	80	-	-
2001	15.7	10.0	13.6	14.2	42.1	41.4	28.6	56.7
2011*	-		-		-		-	
2016*	-		-		-		-	

**The 2011 Census and 2016 Community Survey did not analyse the data by employment status but rather by household wealth status, which does not indicate individual level employment status*

Of note is the high number of persons with disabilities who are economically inactive. This attests to the difficulties experienced by persons with disabilities in finding and retaining employment, especially in a context of high unemployment. An analysis of the trends in proportions of employees who are disabled, as illustrated in the table by the Commission on Employment Equity (CEE), could provide some useful indications. While absolute numbers have changed, the major trends have not changed significantly when comparing different groups by age, sex and population group.

The conclusion previously reached by the national survey, conducted for the Department of Health in 1998, is that divisions in society seem to happen between people with and without disabilities followed by differences by sex. Men with disabilities tend to be better off than women with disabilities. Population group is also a major factor determining inclusion and advantage or disadvantage, with all white people with disabilities being more likely to be included than black people. This means that if a person is disabled, a woman and black African, the chances are higher that she would be less educated (because of being black African) and less likely to be employed (because of being a woman) than a white man who is disabled. Both of these people would, however, be less educated and less likely to be employed than their non-disabled counterparts.

The efforts in place to overcome sex and race discrimination should also impact on disabled people. However, ongoing efforts to overcome discrimination on the basis of disability should remain a major priority. Other aspects not discussed that should be looked at in more detail – by making comparisons between people with and without disabilities – include:

- Quality of life and satisfaction with various facets of life
- Deprivation levels, including comparisons of people with and without disabilities within households (intra-household disparities)
- Mortality statistics by disability status (it would require significant effort to ensure death certificates record this information).

The COVID-19 context

Though it is still early to report, with data, on the impact of COVID-19 on all aspects of South African life, and its relationship to dynamics of age, gender and disability, it is important to raise some issues here, sometimes from current data not yet fully peer reviewed. COVID-19 mortality is associated with increasing age, and is higher in men than women (Guilmoto, 2020), though the age mortality differentials may be flatter in low- and middle-income countries, like South Africa, than elsewhere (Demombynes, 2020). There may be changes in mortality patterns; for example, it appears that mortality from COVID-19 may have been relatively greater in adults between 40 and 65 in the second wave in South Africa than in the first wave (Jassat, 2021).

As yet, there is relatively little disaggregated information on COVID-19 and disability. The information available suggests that the social exclusion associated with disability may have been exacerbated under COVID-19, and that healthcare access, already a problem, may be further compromised (McKinney et al., 2020; McKinney et al., 2021; Ned et al., 2020).

A key feature of the COVID pandemic is that it has refocused attention on the care economy, much of which is informal. In a recent policy paper, Casale and Posel (2020) note, for example, that while childcare burdens increased for all South Africans under COVID-19 lockdown, the impact of increased childcare burden differentially affected women. Similarly, the impact on work differentially appears to affect South African women more than men (Parry & Gordon, 2021; Ranchhod & Daniels, 2021), and gender appears to play a role in lower access to healthcare for other conditions under COVID (Burger et al., 2020).

There are further intersectionality trends which come into focus during COVID-19 that need to be considered in the future. For example, COVID-related lockdown seems to have had a profound, and possibly gendered, effect on HIV services (Davey et al., 2020). Concerns have been raised as to whether the pandemic poses particular threats to the mental health and safety of women living with HIV (Joska et al., 2020), and LGBTQIA+ people may also be differentially excluded (Reid & Ritholtz, 2020). It is still too early to prognosticate on the impact of COVID-19 on age, gender and disability dynamics in the long term, but clearly any prognostication must take these issues into account.

Conclusion

In the space provided it has been possible to present only a portion of the data available on the dynamics of age, gender and disability. There has been some progress in South Africa regarding gender rights and participation, but what is striking is the relative lack of change regarding disability inclusion and rights. The backlog concerning disability rights and inclusion is serious, and has been recognised elsewhere (see, for example, Mapungubwe Institute for Social Reflection [MISTRA], 2014). The 2019 Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios 2030 models and indicators barely mention disability, apart from referencing the Disability Grant – as is common, disability inclusion is not prioritised as a feature of social inclusion. In most of the areas considered, the key challenges are not for new policies but rather for engagement with questions of implementation – the realisation of lived rights in the actual social contexts of a diverse and divided society. In this regard, the importance of intersectoral collaboration on key issues, including, for example, youth unemployment, cannot be stressed sufficiently.

One central key area to consider for the future from a policy perspective, however, is a clearer focus on the care economy; this is an economy, which is largely invisible but links issues of gender, age and disability very clearly. This issue is of growing focus for international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2018) and the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2021). In terms of conceptualising the challenges ahead, the COVID-19 pandemic is clearly a crucial contextual factor, and it is too early to understand fully the implications of this. An intersectional lens is required to explore the dynamic interplay between a range of social factors and wellbeing in South Africa, and there are also emerging analytic frameworks which may be fruitful to explore. For example, epigenetics, which provides methods of linking vulnerabilities to social factors in the fields of health and social behaviour, may provide a useful analytic lens (Samodien et al., 2021). Similarly, the long-term intergenerational impact of past experiences (including pre-democracy experiences) must also be considered. For example, a recent review indicates that current adolescent wellbeing in South Africa remains profoundly affected by an ongoing historical legacy of structural exclusion and power relationships (Jacobs & George, 2021).

Two key issues facing South Africa as it changes are those of the digital economy and climate change. Digital access is an issue which has come to the fore very strongly during COVID-19, and it is clear that in South Africa, as elsewhere, access is affected by the intersections of gender, age and disability, in interaction with a range of other factors (Mariscal et al., 2019; Satar, 2019). It is essential that all digital policy interventions be age, gender and disability-inclusive, with a clear focus on particular access and use challenges. In this regard, a Universal Design approach to innovation is especially important (Satar, 2019).

Climate change is an existential threat globally but is experienced differentially. Once again, it is clear that gender, age and disability issues, along with their intersection with poverty and related precarity, profoundly impact climate vulnerability, and vulnerability to national

disasters. All climate and disaster planning must consider particular vulnerabilities based on gender, age and disability (Otto et al., 2017).

A complete understanding of where we have come from and where we should be going requires that we look both back and into the future, a recognition of the complexities of the current moment, and of reliance on a range of methods and lenses. The COVID-19 pandemic, deleterious though it clearly is in a range of ways, may assist our thinking about disability inclusion in particular, as it has demonstrated in a host of ways how vulnerable all South Africans and, indeed, all humans are.

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CHAPTER FIVE

MIGRATION, CAUSES OF MORTALITY AND CRIME

This chapter addresses three divergent themes. However, these themes – migration, causes of mortality and crime – have a bearing on each other. Human mobility on the one hand, for example, poses challenges to the planning of social and health systems, while causes of mortality can often be explained by an inadequate health system or are due to unnatural causes such as murder. Three main aspects are highlighted in each theme, namely: changes that have occurred since 2006 in terms of a growth or decrease in numbers, explanations for and implications of the changes and, lastly, the government interventions required for existing challenges. The chapter begins with a discussion on migration trends and then proceeds to discuss different causes of mortality in the country. It ends with a discussion on crime and its relation to policing in South Africa. Policy lessons are highlighted throughout the chapter in order to provide stakeholders with a basis for considering policy changes in the three core research themes.

Internal migration

Human geographic mobility is high in South Africa, as people engage in both permanent and temporary relocation, inter- and intra-provincially. Migration is predominantly from rural to urban areas. Estimates of provincial population numbers as a percentage of the country's total population since 2006 puts internal migration in South Africa into perspective, particularly in those provinces that attract the most migrants. More than half of South Africa's population live in three provinces – Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape.

Table 5.1 shows the estimated percentage of the total population living in each of the provinces in 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2020. Inter-provincial (as well as international) migration patterns significantly influence the provincial population numbers. Gauteng remains South Africa's most populated province, with 26 per cent of the total population living in this province. It has also had the largest increase of 3.9 per cent of its population since 2006 (from 22.1 per cent in 2006

to 26 per cent in 2020). Although the share of the total population of the Western Cape (11.8 per cent) is smaller than that of KwaZulu-Natal (19.3 per cent), the population of the Western Cape is the only other province that has shown a significant increase since 2006 (from 10.8 per cent in 2006 to 11.8 per cent in 2020). North West and Mpumalanga also showed small, estimated increases of 2 per cent (from 6.7 per cent in 2006 to 6.9 per cent in 2020) and 1 per cent (from 7.7 per cent in 2002 to 7.8 per cent in 2020) respectively. The Eastern Cape has recorded the largest estimated drop in its share of the total population, from 13.6 per cent in 2006 to 11.3 per cent in 2020, followed by a 1.1 per cent drop in KwaZulu-Natal (20.4 per cent to 19.3 per cent), a 0.9 percentage point drop in Limpopo (10.7 per cent to 9.8 per cent) and a 0.8 per cent drop in the Free State (5.7 per cent to 4.9 per cent) in the same period. The Northern Cape is the only province whose estimated share of the country's total population remained unchanged (2.2 per cent) in the 14-year period since 2006.

Table 5.1: Distribution of the provincial share of the total population

Province	2006 %	2011 %	2016 %	2020 %
Eastern Cape	13.6	12.7	11.9	11.3
Free State	5.7	5.4	5.1	4.9
Gauteng	22.1	23.6	25.0	26.0
KwaZulu-Natal	20.4	19.8	19.5	19.3
Limpopo	10.7	10.4	10.1	9.8
Mpumalanga	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.8
Northern Cape	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
North West	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.9
Western Cape	10.8	11.3	11.6	11.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Stats SA, 2020a

The age distribution of the population in a province (also because of migration) is an important factor for development planning, income generation, education and health facilities, among other things. Limpopo and the Eastern Cape (39.2 per cent and 36.2 per cent respectively) have the highest proportions of persons younger than 15 years, while Gauteng and the Western Cape (24.5 per cent and 27.7 per cent respectively) have the lowest proportions. The Eastern Cape has the highest proportion of the elderly (persons above 60 years) (11.5 per cent), followed by the Western Cape (10.3 per cent) and Northern Cape (10.2 per cent) (Stats SA, 2020a: 20). The population profile therefore differs significantly by province. Gauteng has a higher proportion of adults aged 25–39, when compared to the Eastern Cape, which has a higher proportion of children aged 0–14 and elderly within the province.

Demographics of migration

The following sections discuss the provincial migration trends in South Africa and the socio-economic factors that shape migration choices.

Provincial migration patterns

Table 5.2 shows that Gauteng and the Western Cape received the highest positive net migrants for all periods. Gauteng gained around a million inter-provincial migrants over a five-year period, while the Western Cape gained close to 300,000 inter-provincial migrants over the same period. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Free State experienced net outflows of migrants for all the periods. The highest outflow for all periods was from the Eastern Cape, with over 300,000 migrants over a five-year period, followed by Limpopo, with a net outflow of 189,112 migrants in the period 2016–2021, compared to an outflow of 206,374 people in the 2006–2011 period. The outflow decreased in the Free State from 41,302 in 2006–2011 to 29,929 in 2016–2021, while the outflow increased in KwaZulu-Natal in the same period from 76,296 to 88,163.

Table 5.2: Estimated provincial migration streams

Province	2006-2011 Net migration	2011-2016 Net migration	2016-2021 Net migration
Eastern Cape	-342,000	-326,841	-322 957
Free State	-41,302	-31,295	-29,929
Gauteng	974,765	1,026,451	980,398
KwaZulu-Natal	-76,296	-70,880	-88,163
Limpopo	-206,374	-174,868	-189,112
Mpumalanga	56,049	67,737	61,034
Northern Cape	8,163	10,628	11,554
North West	102,778	117,813	112,881
Western Cape	276,434	297,601	290,555

Source: Stats SA, 2020a: 15–16 (Provincial estimates are developed based on a five-year cohort component method)

Gauteng and the Western Cape stand out as the most attractive destinations for labour migrants, since they contribute most to the economic growth of the country, accounting for 49 per cent of the GDP in 2018 (35 per cent Gauteng and 14 per cent in the Western Cape) (Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 26). The economic strength of Gauteng increases its attractiveness to migrants, while opportunities for employment, study and the quality of life play an important role among the push and pull factors between the Eastern and Western Cape. Being closer to loved ones and gaining access to better municipal services were also common reasons for inter-provincial movement since 2011 (Stats SA, 2016: 30).

The majority (53.64 per cent) of the migrants into the Western Cape came from the Eastern Cape, followed by 20.95 per cent from Gauteng. Migrants into Gauteng are more evenly spread, and the majority are from Limpopo (30.92 per cent), KwaZulu-Natal (19.30 per cent), the Eastern Cape (14.22 per cent) and Mpumalanga (11.15 per cent). Yu (2021) also established that over 70 per cent of the migrants into the Western Cape settled in Cape Town, while nearly 90 per cent of migrants into Gauteng settled in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Furthermore, intra-provincial migrants accounted for the highest proportion of total migrants in all provinces. This applies also to the Western Cape and Gauteng (64.84 per cent and 59.11 per cent shares, respectively) (Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 34).

Table 5.3: Inter-provincial migrants' previous province of residence and current province of residence

Previous Province	Current province of residence								
	Percentage								
	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GAU	MPU	LIM
WC	N/A	29.47	16.17	5.82	5.64	2.91	5.17	2.85	3.49
EC	53.64	N/A	12.98	20.63	47.53	17.17	14.22	9.12	9.67
NC	5.36	2.81	N/A	7.97	2.41	5.59	1.63	1.95	1.71
FS	3.60	6.55	12.87	N/A	4.24	11.80	7.76	5.86	4.52
KZN	8.25	18.28	4.54	12.15	N/A	5.30	19.30	17.20	6.28
NW	2.34	3.94	29.75	10.18	3.18	N/A	9.84	5.23	11.46
GAU	20.95	30.22	15.97	32.45	25.99	37.86	N/A	34.98	45.82
MPU	2.47	4.25	3.47	4.45	6.68	5.81	11.15	N/A	17.05
LIM	3.39	4.48	4.24	6.35	4.34	13.57	30.92	22.80	N/A
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Intra-provincial migrants and international migrants are excluded

Source: Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 35. This study is based on the 2011 Census Data (most recent census at the time of writing), which is the primary source of data for measuring internal migration.


According to Kleinhans and Yu's (2020) study, both long-term (migrated during 2001–2006) and short-term migrants (migrated during 2007–2011) into the Western Cape and Gauteng were likely to be young, aged 15–34 years and were mostly black African urban residents with 11 to 12 years of education on average. Better living conditions and labour market prospects seem to be the pull factors of the popular destination areas. However, not all the inter-provincial migrants eventually found work in Gauteng and the Western Cape. In the cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg, for example, the unemployment rate of inter-provincial migrants is over 20 per cent. Nevertheless, given that Gauteng and the Western Cape are associated with better economic conditions and work opportunities, job-seeking migration to these provinces will continue (Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 40–49).

An important trend since 2001 is the fact that inter-provincial migrants into Gauteng and the Western Cape enjoyed lower unemployment rates than permanent residents but were still outperformed by intra-provincial migrants within these two provinces. Inter-provincial migrants into Gauteng and the Western Cape were 3 per cent more likely to find work than permanent residents (Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 39; Oosthuizen & Naidoo, 2004: 15).

The above results pose challenges to the Gauteng and Western Cape provincial governments. First, inter-provincial migration will result in a steadily increasing burden on basic service delivery, housing, health, education and social services. Backlogs will most likely occur. Second, it is likely that those who do not find work will not return to their home provinces. Thus the two receiving provinces need to deal with an increase in the unemployed population through, for example, job creation and entrepreneurship development strategies. On the other hand, the migration of younger and more educated individuals to the cities has resulted in an ageing and less educated population in the home provinces, imposing an additional fiscal burden on the remaining residents (especially Limpopo and the Eastern Cape).

Therefore, inter-provincial migration needs to be taken into consideration by the national government when allocating the national budget to provinces, districts and municipalities. However, equal consideration should be given to the less developed provinces (especially the Eastern Cape and Limpopo) by firstly establishing the push factors for migration, and then better addressing the socio-economic conditions in these provinces (Kleinhans & Yu, 2020: 50).

Figure 5.1: Urbanisation 2009–2019



Source: Stats SA, 2020d

Migration and urbanisation

South Africa has experienced steady rates of rural–urban migration over the last two decades. In 2001 South Africa had an overall urbanisation level of 56.26 per cent (Stats SA, 2006: 19), which increased to 61.69 per cent in 2009 and 66.86 per cent in 2019.

Based on a projection by the United Nations (2018), 70 per cent of South Africa’s population will be living in urban areas by 2025 and 80 per cent by 2050.

On the positive side, an analysis based on the National Income Dynamics Study (2008 and 2014) has highlighted that migration to cities has helped many South Africans. Between 2008 and 2014 around 385,000 citizens were lifted above the poverty line by moving from rural to urban areas. Most of those who moved to the cities succeeded in getting some form of employment. Although some of the jobs were casual and low paid, they were still better off than being unemployed in a rural area (Turok & Visagie, 2017). Migration also benefits rural communities through the flow of income from family remittances (Turok & Visagie, 2017).

However, rural–urban migration in South Africa has also been a challenge to both rural and urban areas and has had negative implications for both. Some of the negative implications for rural areas are the reduced availability of labour and resource underutilisation, while pressure on services and settlements in urban areas has increased. Although urban living holds the promise of improved conditions, people relocating to metropolitan areas must contend with numerous problems such as crowded living conditions, informal housing and inadequate sanitation. The study by Turok and Visagie (2017: 15) found that more than a third of rural–urban migrants between 2008 and 2014 migrated into informal settlements or shacks, although it should be considered that nearly two-thirds of migrants were living in more durable structures.

However, strong population growth in the large cities risks outpacing the ability of municipalities to deliver basic infrastructure and household services. Informal urban settlements are particularly vulnerable because of the high population densities and lack of public facilities. Furthermore, citizens in metropolitan areas are in general not satisfied with the levels of service delivery. The South African Citizen Satisfaction Index of 2020 reflects low levels of satisfaction regarding service delivery in metropolitan municipalities. Cape Town remains the best-performing city, recording the highest score of 66.0 (out of a possible 100) for the seventh consecutive year, followed by eThekweni (57.2), Tshwane (53.6) and Johannesburg (51.4). Nelson Mandela Bay (49.8), Buffalo City (46.5) and Mangaung (38.9) reflect satisfaction scores below 50 (SA CSI, 2020).

The largest proportion of internal movement in South Africa involves a net distribution towards urban areas. However, strong, continuing inter-connections between rural and urban areas of the country remain. Many invest whatever spare resources they have in rural homes and livestock and therefore remain attached to their rural origins and identities. Rural areas are therefore of continued importance as a place of security and family and are the preferred retirement place for many people (Vibert, 2020).

Public sector planning needs to understand migration dynamics and trends and consider the high number of South Africans who regularly move between urban and rural areas. Migration to urban areas puts stress on planning processes in health and social systems. The temporary and circulatory nature of these internal movements exacerbates the problem. For example, access to health care is required not only at the destination, but also at the area of origin. However, the planning of health and social systems is often premised on a stable catchment population (Ginsberg et al., 2021: 2). The details of spatial development planning are explored further below.

Future planning

Urbanisation is regarded as an additional challenge to South Africa, along with low economic growth and high unemployment and inequality. Although it is argued that poverty is more pronounced in rural areas, there are nevertheless increasing concerns about the ‘urbanisation of poverty’ (Arndt et al., 2019 1).

In addition, the rate of expansion between the different cities in South Africa has been very uneven, which translates into different challenges and opportunities. It also requires different planning and budgeting. The fastest population increase over the past years occurred in two of the Gauteng metros (Johannesburg and Tshwane), followed by Cape Town and the third Gauteng metro (Ekurhuleni). Over half of the country’s population growth between 2001 and 2011 occurred in Gauteng and Cape Town. In the other four metros the rate of increase was much closer to that of the rest of the country (Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014: 680).

Several strategies have been put forward for national development and urban planning. These are: greater investment in major cities to accommodate migrants and prevent urban poverty from worsening; the provision of job and income opportunities through investment in rural areas; and, lastly, given their stronger linkages to the rural poor, investment in smaller urban centres. Such small-town development could strengthen the linkages between rural agriculture and other economic sectors by providing markets for products. Small town initiatives may also provide a more gradual employment transition for people looking to leave agriculture and rural areas. Thus, small town development could provide a ‘middle-path’ towards the development of rural areas and ‘more inclusive urbanisation’ (Arndt et al., 2019: 2).

Arndt et al. (2019) have examined these three strategies using a dynamic economy-wide model. Their simulations confirm that urbanisation requires additional public investments in infrastructure and services, but not at the cost of reducing investment in rural areas. Reducing investment in rural areas leads to faster out-migration, which can worsen rather than improve the welfare of the urban poor. It is argued that one of South Africa’s most difficult development problems is reaching the growing number of people living in larger cities/towns without neglecting the already large and poor rural population.

Scholars further emphasise that rural development should not only focus on agriculture/ farming but should increase employment opportunities and access to market activities. In other words, there should be a rural development strategy that incorporates non-farm activities, as growth and development are most noticeable in the manufacturing and service sectors. Wider concerns such as health, education, participation and social protection should also be addressed (Madzivhandila, 2014).

Given the spatial legacy of apartheid in South Africa and a belief by many politicians that rural–urban migration should be discouraged because of social dislocation, the government until 2012 did not have a strong desire for an explicit National Urban Policy (NUP) (Turok, 2015: 363). Nevertheless, municipal funding has tended to follow the population distribution. An attempt was made in 2009 to introduce an NUP, although rural development was the declared priority at that stage and the cabinet was not sympathetic to the idea. Increasing community protests in the townships and informal settlements, among other reasons, forced the government to take urbanisation pressures more seriously (Turok, 2015: 363). In 2012, in its first comprehensive National Development Plan (NDP), the government acknowledged the importance of urban development. Consequently, in 2013 it launched, for public discussion, the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), which was approved by Cabinet in 2016.

In 2017, the Cities Support Programme of the Intergovernmental Relations Division of National Treasury requested a South African Urbanisation Review from a team led by South African experts, to inform national policy and specifically the IUDF on options for enhancing spatial integration. According to the report, the management of the urbanisation process is inadequate, which can be attributed to both the country’s spatial legacy and the shortcomings in the government’s programmes and policies. A range of extensive recommendations are made on issues relating to housing, transport, special economic zones and municipal finances. It suggests approaches that are likely to increase the impact of urban development programmes while remaining fiscally sustainable (National Treasury, 2018).


The future of South Africa’s urban development, and the wellbeing of the expected 80 per cent of the South African population living in urban areas by 2050, will be determined by how well the government manages the urbanisation process and whether it indeed implements expert recommendations. The following sections examine the chapter’s second main research theme: mortality rates in South Africa within the context of macro-social trends. This discussion connects mortality rates with socio-economic developments and salient policy developments in the health system.

Mortality trends and social conditions

The wellbeing and health status of a population is reflected in its level of mortality. Policy formulation and health interventions aimed at increasing life expectancy are dependent on mortality statistics. Over a period, it becomes evident whether there has been an improvement or a deterioration in the health status of the population.

In the period 1997 to 2006, an increase in registered deaths was recorded, peaking at 614,412 in 2006. However, as shown in Figure 5.2, since 2007 the number of deaths has decreased to 446,544 in 2017. For example, between 2015 and 2016 the figures show a decline of 3.0 per cent, while the deaths between 2016 and 2017 show a 5.1 per cent drop. The decline since 2006 has been driven by the impact of the antiretroviral therapy rollout (ART) since 2004, while, as discussed below, mortality from tuberculosis and non-communicable diseases also dropped slightly.

Figure 5.2: Registered deaths, 2005–2017




Source: Stats SA, 2020c

A distinction can, however, be drawn between male and female deaths over the 11-year period between 2006 and 2017, with the proportion of male and female deaths widening between these years. In 2005 female deaths reached a peak of 49.6 per cent (from 44.1 per cent in 1997) and then took a downward turn to 49.2 per cent in 2006 and to 47.2 per cent in 2017. Male deaths on the other hand, decreased from 55.9 per cent in 1997 to 50.5 per cent in 2006, although the proportion of male deaths then started increasing to 52.3 per cent in 2017 again. From age groups zero to 65–69 years, male deaths exceeded those of female deaths. However, above 70 years female deaths surpassed male deaths. The gap between male and female deaths is the highest, at 4 per cent, in age groups 85–89 and 90 years and above, and 3.5 per cent in age group 80–84 (Stats SA, 2020c: 12).

The age pattern of mortality in 2007, 2013 and 2017 was uniform over these selected years, although there were declines in the proportion of deaths at the younger ages. The largest decline (3.3 per cent) over the 10-year period was in the age group 30–34, and the second largest in the age group 35–39 (2.8 per cent). Table 5.4 also shows that the percentage of infant deaths (age 0) was 7.7 per cent in 2007, after which it consistently declined to 5.7 per cent in 2013 and 4.4 per cent in 2017. From 2013 to 2017 the percentage of deaths in the over-70 age groups increased.

Figure 5.3: Sex distribution of deaths, 2005–2017



Source: Stats SA, 2020c

Table 5.4: Distribution of death by age (2007, 2013, 2017)

Age	Percentage death by age		
	2007	2013	2017
0	7.7	5.7	4.4
1–4	2.5	2.0	1.4
5–9	0.9	0.8	0.6
10–14	0.7	0.7	0.6
15–19	1.5	1.6	1.5
20–24	4.1	3.3	2.9
25–29	7.1	5.5	4.7
30–34	9.5	6.8	6.2
35–39	9.0	7.0	6.2
40–44	8.0	6.9	6.3
45–49	7.1	6.6	6.3
50–54	6.4	6.9	6.8
55–59	6.0	7.0	7.5
60–64	5.1	7.4	8.1
65–69	5.6	7.8	8.1
70+	18.6	25.5	28.2

Excluding deaths with unspecified age

Source: Stats SA, 2009, 2014, 2020c

The decreasing death rate among the youth can be attributed to the anti-retroviral treatment (ART) rollout after 2004 and particularly after 2008 as political will towards the HIV ART programme improved. Access to ART has not only changed the historical patterns of mortality but has extended the lifespan of many South Africans who would have died at an earlier age. In the period 2009–2012 alone, there has been a marked increase in life expectancy, from 56 to 61 years, while child and infant mortality rates decreased by 25 per cent in the same period. This can be attributed to the aggressive expansion of the prevention of mother-to-child transmission programme among HIV-positive pregnant women, accompanied by a dramatic decrease in HIV transmission to infants (Simelela et al., 2015; Stats SA, 2020c). By 2020, life expectancy at birth was estimated at 62.5 years for males and 68.5 years for females (Stats SA, 2020c: 5–6).

Causes of deaths

Considering the high levels of violence experienced in the country, information on both the natural and non-natural causes of death is important in South Africa. Table 5.5 shows the percentage distribution of deaths due to natural and non-natural causes for selected years between 2006 and 2017. To show the trend, the statistics of every second year are selected between 2006 and 2017. Most deaths were due to natural causes throughout this period, However, as the table shows, there has been a consistent rise in non-natural deaths. The proportion of deaths attributed to non-natural causes has been increasing from 8.7 per cent of the total number of deaths in 2006 to a high of 11.5 per cent in 2017.

Table 5.5: Percentage distribution of deaths – natural vs unnatural

Causes	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017
Unnatural	8.7	9	9	9.9	10.7	11.4	11.5
Natural	91.3	91	91	90.1	89.3	88.6	88.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


Source: Stats SA, 2020c

In 2007 the age group that was most affected by non-natural causes was the 15–19 one, in which 44 per cent of the deaths were due to non-natural causes, followed by the 20–24 (31 per cent) age group. Ten years later (2017), the 20–24 age group was the most affected by non-natural deaths (47.9 per cent), followed by 43.1 per cent deaths in the 15–19 age group. For older ages (over 60) the non-natural causes of deaths were less than 5 per cent in 2007 as well as in 2017 (Stats SA, 2009; 2020c).

Non-natural deaths can result from, for example, substance misuse, accidents, suicide and homicide. Most non-natural causes of death in 2017, for example, resulted from other external causes of accidental injury (67.1 per cent). The second most common non-natural cause of

deaths was assault (15 per cent, up from 10.2 per cent in 2007) followed by transport accidents (11.5 per cent). Less than 1 per cent of natural deaths were due to intentional self-harm (0.7 per cent) and sequelae of external causes of morbidity and mortality (0.2 per cent) (indicated as 'other' in the chart). It should, however, be noted that nearly three quarters of non-natural causes of deaths were not adequately classified. Differentials by sex also showed higher proportions of non-natural deaths for males (16.7 per cent) compared to 5.4 per cent of female non-natural deaths (Stats SA, 2020c: 48).

Figure 5.4: Non-natural causes of death 2017



Source: Stats SA, 2020c

Table 5.6 shows the ten leading causes of death in 2007, 2012 and 2017. Apart from intestinal infectious diseases, which were no longer among the ten leading causes of death in 2017, and immune mechanism disorders, which had also dropped from the list by 2012, eight causes remained on the list over the 10-year period. They differed only in the ranking and in the extent of the contribution of each cause to the overall number of deaths per year.

Tuberculosis has consistently been the leading underlying cause of death. However, despite maintaining the same rank, the proportion of deaths due to tuberculosis decreased from 12.7 per cent in 2007 to 6.4 per cent in 2017 due to a comprehensive response to the HIV pandemic and tuberculosis (see Table 5.6). Diabetes mellitus has since 2015 been the second leading underlying cause of death – its proportion increasing from 3.4 per cent in 2007 to 5.7 per cent a decade later, while cerebrovascular diseases moved to the third leading cause of death since 2012. Its proportion increased from 4.2 per cent in 2007 to 5 per cent in 2017. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is in the fifth position, accounting for 5 per cent of deaths in 2017, which shows a rise from 2007 (2.2 per cent).

Table 5.6: Ten leading underlying natural causes of death

Causes of death	2007			2012			2017		
	Rank	Number	%	Rank	Number	%	Rank	Number	%
Tuberculosis	1	76,761	12.7	1	47,472	9.9	1	28,678	6.4
Influenza & pneumonia	2	49,722	8.3	2	26,385	5.5	7	18,837	4.2
Intestinal infectious diseases	3	337,398	6.2	9	14,948	3.1	Not among the first 10		
Heart diseases (other forms)	4	426,030	4.3	4	21,612	4.5	4	22,098	4.9
Cerebrovascular diseases	5	525,321	4.2	3	23,944	5.0	3	22,259	5.0
Diabetes mellitus	6	620,139	3.4	5	21,230	4.4	2	25,336	5.7
Lower respiratory diseases	7	715,313	2.5	10	12,228	2.5	8	13,167	2.9
Disorders – immune mechanism /2012 & 2017 – Other viral diseases	8	815,253	2.5	Not among first 10 8 15,057 3.1			10	12,622	2.8
HIV	9	913,521	2.2	6	18,663	3.9	5	21,439	4.8
Ischaemic heart disease	10	13,381	2.2	Not among first 10			9	12,766	2.9
Hypertensive diseases	11	12,506	2.1	7	6,195	3.4	6	19,900	4.5
Other natural causes		241,572	40.2		215,472	44.8		198,278	44.4
Non-natural causes		54,216	9		47,220	9.8		51,164	11.5
All causes		601,133	100		480,476	100		446,544	100

Sources: Stats SA, 2009, 2014, 2020a


The graphs in Figures 5.5–5.8 show the four leading natural causes of death for the broad age groups 1–14, 15–44, 45–64 and 65 and over.⁴ Intestinal infectious diseases were the leading cause of death in the age group 1–14 years in 2013 (14.1 per cent) but were replaced by influenza and pneumonia in 2017 (7.1), which was the second leading cause in 2013 (9 per cent). Although tuberculosis is the third leading cause of death in this age group (5.5 per cent in 2013 down to 3.9 per cent in 2017), the proportion of deaths are lower than in the subsequent age groups.⁵ The high incidence of poverty in South Africa is reflected in the fact

4 The WHO recommended the classifying ages for international comparison (Stats SA, 2020c: 39). These broad age categories were different in the years before 2013. A comparison with earlier years is therefore not possible.

5 This decline may be attributed to the BCG vaccine for babies (against tuberculosis).


that malnutrition is the fourth leading cause of death in the 1–14 age group (4.6 per cent in 2013 and 3.5 per cent in 2017).

Figure 5.5: Four leading underlying causes of death, 1–14 years: 2013 and 2017




Source: Stats SA, 2020c

Figure 5.6: Four leading underlying causes of death, 15–44 years: 2013 and 2017




Source: Stats SA 2020c

Figure 5.7: Four leading underlying causes of death, 45–64 years: 2013 and 2017



Source: Stats SA, 2020c

Figure 5.8: Four leading underlying causes of death, 65+ years: 2013 and 2017



Source: Stats SA, 2020c

Tuberculosis was the leading cause of death in both 2013 and 2017 for age groups 15–44 and 45–64. However, the proportion of deaths because of tuberculosis decreased from 15.3 per cent (2013) to 11.3 per cent (2017) in the age groups 15–44 years, and from 10.5 per cent to 7.9 per cent in the age group 45–64 years. HIV, the second leading cause of death in the age group 15–44, also saw a slight decrease from 10.8 per cent to 10.6 per cent, while diabetes, the second largest cause in the age group 45–64, showed an increase from 6.5 per cent in 2013 to 7.2 per cent in 2017. Diabetes was also the second largest cause of death in the above-65 age group in both 2013 (8.5 per cent) and 2017 (9 per cent), following cerebrovascular diseases, which was the leading cause of death (9.4 per cent in 2013 and 8.5 per cent in 2017) in this age group. HIV was still the fourth leading cause of death in the 44–64 age group and showed a slight increase from 2013 (5 per cent) to 2017 (5.4 per cent).

Leading underlying natural causes of death by population group (2007/2017)⁶

In the 10-year period between 2007 and 2017 tuberculosis remained the leading cause of death among black Africans, accounting for 14.8 per cent in 2007 and 7.9 per cent in 2017. This was followed by influenza and pneumonia (9.6 per cent) in the second place in 2007, but HIV (6.1 per cent) in the second place in 2017. For the white population group, ischaemic heart diseases were the leading cause of death in both 2007 (12.3 per cent) and 2017 (10.7 per cent), followed by other heart diseases in second place in both 2007 (6.9 per cent) and 2017 (7.1 per cent). However, for Indians and coloureds the leading causes of death changed between 2007 and 2017. For Indians, ischaemic heart diseases accounted for the most deaths in 2007 (13.6 per cent), while diabetes was the leading cause in 2017 (14 per cent), with ischaemic heart diseases a close second in 2017 (13.4 per cent). For coloureds, tuberculosis was the leading cause in 2007 (9.8 per cent) and diabetes in 2017 (8.3 per cent), followed by both chronic lower respiratory diseases (6.8 per cent) and tuberculosis (6.4 per cent) in 2017.

South Africa has the largest HIV epidemic in the world, with 7.7 million people living with HIV in 2018 (up from 4.6 million in 2008). The HIV prevalence among the general population is 20.4 per cent, which is the fourth highest in the world (up from 9.3 per cent in 2008 and 10.0 per cent in 2013). In addition, 20 per cent of all new infections in the world occur in South Africa. Women are also disproportionately affected by HIV in the country. In 2018, 4.7 million (62.67 per cent) women were living with HIV compared to 2.8 million men (37.33 per cent) and in the same year 140,000 women and 86,000 men became HIV positive. Moreover, HIV prevalence among young women is nearly four times greater than that of young men. The difference is particularly acute in the age group 10 to 19 years, with 33,000 girls as opposed to 4,200 boys becoming HIV positive (Avert, 2020). Prevalence varies markedly between regions, ranging from 12.6 per cent in the Western Cape to 27 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal (Avert, 2020).

⁶ As noted by Statistics SA, a large proportion of death notifications (25.9 per cent in 2007 and 12.3 per cent in 2017) did not specify population group. Statistics should therefore be treated with caution.

After years of ambivalence, in 2004 the government started rolling out an anti-retroviral programme. In 2006 it signed off the then new National Strategic Plan (NSP) for HIV and AIDS and STIs, 2007–2011. By December 2008, an estimated 424,009 patients were receiving ARVs, which increased to 678,550 at the end of 2008 (Simelane & Venter, 2014: 250). Since 2009 new administrations rapidly normalised the response to the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Between 2009 and 2012 there was a fourfold increase in the number of people receiving ART, with 2.4 million people receiving treatment in 2013. The national anti-retroviral (ARV) programme is now the largest globally, providing ART to around 4.5 million people. In his 2018 State of the Nation Address, President Ramaphosa committed to placing an additional two million people on anti-retroviral treatment by the end of 2020.

As noted above, the success of South Africa's ART programme is evident in the increase in national life expectancy. While life expectancy at birth declined between 2002 and 2006, largely due to the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, access to ART increased life expectancy from 61.2 years for females and 56.5 years for males in 2010, to 67.3 for females and 60.46 for males in 2018 (Stats SA, 2020c: 6). Furthermore, as a result of the HIV ART programme in pregnancy and beyond, South Africa has reported a decline in the number of maternal deaths and Institutional Maternal Mortality Ratio (iMMR) since 2009. A peak of 189 deaths per 100,000 live births was reported in 2009, which gradually decreased to 105.9 in 2018/2019 and 88 in 2019/2020 (Bomela, 2020; CRA, 2021: 45).

The National Strategic Plan Mid-Term Review report in 2019 showed that the country was on track with only one of the UNAIDS 90-90-90 targets (to ensure that by 2030, AIDS and TB are no longer public health threats in South Africa). By the end of 2020, 90.5 per cent of people infected with HIV knew their status, 68.4 per cent of those tested positive were on sustained treatment and 88.4 per cent of those on treatment were virally repressed (SANAC, 2021). This equates to 62 per cent of people living with AIDS in South Africa being on treatment and 55 per cent virally suppressed. However, the total viral suppression rates are under 50 per cent for those 15–24 years old (approximately 45 per cent of the population is under 25 years) (Allinder & Fleischman, 2019). HIV was the second-most prevalent underlying cause of death in this age group in 2017 (5.5 per cent) (down from 5.9 per cent in 2013), while tuberculosis was the leading cause (7.3 per cent) in 2017 (also down from 10.1 per cent in 2013) (Stats SA, 2020c 43; Stats SA, 2014a: 35).

The high burden of tuberculosis (the third highest globally after India and China), including a multi-drug resistant TB, amplifies the HIV pandemic in the country. Levels of HIV and TB co-infection are very high, with as many as 60 per cent of patients having HIV-associated TB. In 2016, nearly 60 per cent of the 237,000 new cases of TB were HIV positive (Sinai et al., 2018). It is argued that the war against TB will not be won unless the war against HIV is won (Mabuza, 2020). ART coverage of HIV-positive TB patients was 88 per cent in 2016, increasing from 54 per cent in 2012 and 62 per cent at the end of 2013 (Sinai et al., 2018).

COVID-19

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 is bound to change the general trend of the past few years of the mortality statistics and causes of death in South Africa. As indicated by the South African Medical Research Council (SAMRC), it is important to keep track of not only the deaths related to COVID-19, but also the number of excess deaths (in other words, deaths that occur above what would normally be expected). The official COVID-19 death rate by 12 July 2021 stood at 64,509 (NICD, 2021). According to SAMRC, a significant number of excess deaths in South Africa can be attributed to COVID-19. This observation is strongly supported by the fact that when the COVID-19 deaths in the period started to decrease, the excessive deaths also begun to decrease. The remaining 5–15 per cent of the excess natural deaths are attributable to collateral causes, mainly due to the health services being overwhelmed during surges in the pandemic.

Table 5.7 shows that the excess deaths for the period 3 May 2020 to 19 June 2021 stood at 173,132, with the Eastern Cape recording the highest rate (526 per 100,000 of the population), followed by the Northern Cape (471 per 100,000), the Free State (350 per 100,000) and KwaZulu-Natal (347 per 100,000). Below the South African average of 291 excess deaths per 100,000 people are North West (194), Gauteng (195) and the Western Cape (239).

Table 5.7: Excess deaths, 3 May 2020–3 July 2021

Region	Excess deaths	Excess deaths per 100,000 population
South Africa	182,369	306
Province		
Eastern Cape	34,400	523
Free State	10,644	366
Gauteng	36,520	234
KwaZulu-Natal	39,852	348
Limpopo	16,241	275
Mpumalanga	13,077	272
Northern Cape	5,739	490
North West	8,578	213
Western Cape	17,318	245

Source: SAMRC, 2021

Concerns about the health care system

Major successes in the health system have been achieved, particularly the response to HIV, which has been instrumental in improving key health indicators relating to death rates, life expectancy and maternal, child and infant mortality. Nevertheless, there are serious challenges facing the South African health system.

The country's health system has seen relatively poor performance since 1995 compared with other countries of similar, and in certain instances lower, national income and health expenditure per capita. This can mainly be attributed to, firstly, gross inequality, where 5 per cent of the GDP (60 per cent of the 8.5 per cent GDP healthcare expenditure) is spent on 16 per cent of the population who have private health insurance, while 3.5 per cent of GDP is spent on 84 per cent of the population who depend on the under-resourced public sector (Rispel, 2016: 8).

A study on mortality trends from 1997 to 2012 (The Lancet, 2016) raises concerns about the quality of health services in the country as well as emphasising the importance of social determinants of healthcare. Concerns about the quality of health services have also been noted in The Presidency's (2014: 61) Twenty Year Review (1994–2014). In June 2018, the South African health ombud (Prof. Malegapuru Makgoba) expressed concern that the country's health care system was on the verge of collapse. Similarly, the then Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, acknowledged that the health care system was 'very distressed', which can be attributed to poor management skills in most of the hospitals as well as the exponential growth of the burden of disease. Overcrowding, long waiting lists for treatment, irregular buying of goods, poor financial management and a chronic shortage of human resources are just some of the other problems experienced (Dhai & Mahomed, 2018: 8; Maphumulo & Bhengu, 2019). In addition, many public health care facilities have unacceptable physical environments (such as lack of cleanliness) for the delivery of quality health care. Medical litigation has increased both in size and in frequency. In 2015 alone an amount of nearly R500 million (R498,964,916) was paid out for litigation claims because of negligence or malpractice (Maphumulo & Bhengu, 2019).

A major problem is a disconnect between progressive policies and resource allocation on the one hand and implementation on the other. Implementation has failed, in that of tolerance of ineptitude is evident, as well as management and governance failures. South Africa also lacks a fully functional district health care system, which is the vehicle for the delivery of primary health care (Barron & Padarath, 2017: 3).

Many key policy documents have aimed to remedy challenges facing the health system (e.g. the National Health Act 2004 and the White Paper on National Health Insurance (2015). However, the challenge has been in implementing these successfully. In this regard, the South African Health Review notes that when policies are not complemented by adequate resources, committed leadership and stewardship, and regular engagement with key stake holders, they

will remain mere aspirations. The development of an empowered cadre of health managers, as well as accurate data on health status and health services (to inform policy decisions) are important (Barron & Padarath, 2017: 7), in addition to effective implementation and fair financing arrangements.

While medical services are important, broader complementary interventions are necessary to address the social determinants underlying the major burden of disease in the country. These social determinants of health, common to the main causes of premature mortality in South Africa, are poor housing, inadequate water and sanitation, a suboptimal food environment, high levels of substance and alcohol abuse and an inadequate health-system response. However, although addressing social determinants is a cornerstone in the Department of Health's Primary Health Care Strategy (embedded in the NDP), the policy commitments should be translated into programmatic action at different levels in the health system and with other sectors (Scott et al., 2017).


Lastly, it is argued that there is a poor understanding of internal migration (and of cross-border migration) and its impact on the public health care system in South Africa. Very little effort has been put into providing evidence-based recommendations and guidelines for migration-aware health-policy solutions and programmes. Health-system responses should engage with the movement of South Africans within and between provinces and districts, and should cater for circular migratory patterns between rural and urban areas. Such a system should also focus on the smaller population of cross-border migrants (Veary et al., 2017).

The sections that follow investigate the last theme of this chapter, namely crime trends and the criminal justice system.

Crime trends and the criminal justice system

Crime persistently features as a pressing priority among South Africans. Combatting crime is one of the strategic priorities mentioned in the National Development Plan (NDP). A total of 2.12 million acts of serious crime were committed in 2011. This number steadily increased to 2.19 million in 2015, after which it showed a decline to 1.91 million in 2020. With these high crime statistics over the years, Gallup's 2019 Global Law and Order Index scored South Africa fifth lowest out of 142 countries (only Liberia, Gabon, Venezuela and Afghanistan fared worse). Of importance, however, are the trends of the different types of crime described in this section.

Figure 5.9: Total crimes in South Africa (2011-2020)




Source: Crime Stats SA, 2020 (numbers are rounded off to the second decimal)

Murder

The murder rate in the country is exceptionally high. In the first three months of 2021 alone, 4,976 people were murdered, translating into over 55 per day. This is 387 more than in the previous corresponding period (SA Police, 2020). The figures for murder declined from 19,202 in 2007 to 15,554 in 2012. From 16,213 murders in 2013 the figure increased to 21,325 in 2020, which translates into an overall increase of 34 per cent from 2007 to 2020. Between 2011/12 and 2019/2020 the murder rate increased by over 20 per cent. Gauteng has the highest murder rate of 174,894 deaths in 2019 and 177,737 deaths in 2020, followed by the Western Cape, with 113,987 (2019) and 113,508 (2020) murders, and KwaZulu-Natal with 97,505 in 2019 and 101,154 in 2020 (SA Police Service, 2020: 13).

Since 2012, police performance has also deteriorated significantly. Between 2011/12 and 2019/20, the police's ability to solve murders and armed robberies dropped by 34 per cent and 24 per cent respectively (Burger, 2021a). Although everyone is affected by crime in South Africa, evidence from studies conducted in 2007/2008 (although these acknowledged that the data was incomplete) indicate that the burden of serious crime (murder) is disproportionately suffered by black and poor South Africans (Silber & Geffen, 2009: 39).

Figure 5.10: Annual murder rate, 2007–2020

Source: SA Police Service, 2009: 5; 2020: 5

Other common crimes

Residential burglary has consistently been the most common crime experienced by South Africans. However, the lowest number of reported burglaries since 2006/2007 was in 2019/2020 (before the COVID lockdown), with 205,959 recorded. Another crime experienced by South Africans is common robberies (street robberies). The lowest number of common robberies took place in 2017/2018 (50,730), down from 71,157 in 2006/2007, while robbery cases in 2019/2020 stood at 51,825. While car and motorcycle theft consistently decreased from 86,298 in 2006/2007 to 46,921 in 2019/2020, carjacking, on the other hand, increased from 9,417 in 2011/2012 to 18,162 in 2019/2020.

Table 5.8: Rate of other common crimes (selected years)

Crime	2006/2007 Numbers	2011/2012 Numbers	2015/2016 Numbers	2019/2020 Numbers
Residential burglary	249,665	246,612	250,606	205,959
Common robbery	71,156	54,442	54,110	51,825
Car/motorcycle theft	86,298	58,800	53,809	46,921
Rape	Not available	47,069	41,503	42,289
Carjacking	Not available	9,417	14,602	18,162

Source: SA Police Service, 2020

Reporting of crimes

A major concern in the country is that over the years crime victims in South Africa have increasingly refrained from reporting crimes to the police. It is important to understand the extent of crime and how it manifests in order to formulate, implement and monitor the strategies for crime prevention. The rates for reporting crimes to the police were significantly higher in the metro (54 per cent) and urban areas (50 per cent) compared to the rural areas (32 per cent). This may be due to better accessibility of police stations in the metro and urban areas (Stats SA, 2018).

Crime categories that were more likely to be reported to the police were murder, car theft and carjacking. In general, property-related crimes such as house breaking and burglary, and theft of personal property, as well as theft of livestock, are less likely to be reported. Most property crimes, particularly car thefts and carjacking, were reported to the police mainly for insurance purposes. Although the reporting of crimes fluctuated over the past decade (2010–2020), as reflected in Table 5.9, reporting on murder in 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 stood at 100 per cent, while 80.2 per cent and 78.7 per cent of victims reported vehicle theft in 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 respectively. On the other hand, only 51.8 per cent (2018/2019) and 48.3 per cent (2019/2020) of those that experienced housebreaking reported it to the police. Incidences of rape reported to the police decreased from 47,069 in 2011/2012 to 42,289 in 2019/2020. Reporting of livestock theft, which mainly occurs in rural areas, has been very low, with a reporting rate of only 29 per cent in 2017/2018. The predominant reason for not reporting housebreaking and theft since 2013/2014 (52 per cent) is the perception that ‘police could do nothing’ (Stats SA, 2018: 28).

Table 5.9: Reporting of crimes

Crimes	2010 %	2013/4 %	2016/7 %	2017/8 %	2018/9 %	2019/20 %
Burglary	60.0	58.5	51.2	51	51.8	48.3
Murder	93.2	82.6	66.0	89	100.0	100.0
Robbery	39.0	31.0	33.0	36	31.8	39.6
Motor vehicle theft	98.3	91.7	86.0	78	80.2	78.7
Carjacking	Not available	Not available	88.0	70	85.0	78.0
Livestock theft	36.3	40.1	26.0	29	Not available	Not available

Stats SA, 2018; Stats SA, 2014b; Stats SA, 2020b


Public approval of and trust in the criminal justice system

Statistics South Africa's annual nationwide Victim of Crimes Surveys reveal that public approval of the police dropped by 10 per cent from 64.2 per cent in 2011 to 54.2 per cent in 2018 (Stats SA, 2018). The majority of households are also not satisfied with the performance of the courts in dealing with perpetrators. In 2017/18 only 41 per cent of households were satisfied with the performance of the courts. The majority of respondents who were dissatisfied indicated that the courts were too lenient on criminals when passing judgment (45.6 per cent), that perpetrators were released unconditionally (17.1 per cent) and that matters dragged on for too long (14.3 per cent).

Several national longitudinal studies have been conducted over the years on the trust of South Africans in the police and the courts. Trust in the police has been at a steady low level, with some fluctuation since 2006. Less than 50 per cent of citizens trusted the police between 2006 and 2015 – 48 per cent in 2006 and 49 per cent in 2015 (Chingwete, 2016). A second national study also found that trust in the police varied between 45 per cent in 2017 to 48 per cent in 2018 and reached a low of 40 per cent in 2020 (Patel & Sadie, 2021). Trust in the courts over the years has also shown a large decline, from 69 per cent of citizens trusting the courts in 2006 down to 56 per cent in 2015 (Chingwete, 2016). The majority of citizens still trusted the courts in 2017 (53 per cent), but the proportion of citizens trusting the courts dropped to 45 per cent in 2020 (Patel & Sadie, 2021).

It is therefore evident that public trust in the SA Police Service has been low for some time. In his State of the Nation Address in 2020, President Ramaphosa attributed the public's low level of trust in the police to high levels of police misconduct and the deteriorating performance of the police as a whole.

Figure 5.11: Trust in the police and the courts, 2006–2020



Source: SA Police Service, 2020

Police misconduct and leadership crises

The incidence of police brutality is high despite the denials of the Minister of Police. South Africans lodged 42,365 criminal complaints against the police between April 2012 and March 2019 (Knoetze, 2019). Towards the end of this period, over R2.8 billion was paid by the SA Police (because of court orders) to the victims of unlawful police conduct (Burger, 2021b). In 2018/2019, for example, more than 5,000 formal complaints were opened against the police and R535 million was paid out to victims of police misconduct. However, just under 10 per cent of the almost 193,000 SAPS personnel were subjected to formal disciplinary proceedings (Ivkovic et al., 2020).

In the COVID-19 lockdown period between 26 March and 5 May 2020, a total of 828 cases against the police were received by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), a spike of 200 when compared to the same period in 2019. These include 32 alleged killings by the police, 18 reports of death in custody, 25 torture cases, eight allegations of rapes by police officers and 589 assault cases (Knoetze, 2020).

Long-standing abuses in the appointment of leaders are at the heart of the country's failing police service (Burger, 2021a). Since 2000, eight different people have occupied the post of national commissioner of police, seven of them since 2009. In 2010 Jackie Selebi, the longest-serving post-apartheid SAPS national commissioner, was convicted and imprisoned for corruption. One commissioner currently (2021) faces criminal charges, and separate inquiries recommended the removal of another two (Burger, 2021a). Many functions of the SAPS have deteriorated since the 'serial crises of top management' were first identified by the National Planning Commission in 2012 (Burger, 2021b).

The way forward

It is evident that serious reform of the police service is required to restore its credibility in the eyes of South Africans and to lower levels of crime in the country. A serious path to reform should include the selection of reputable leaders for the SAPS. These leaders need to be able to break the code of silence within the police force and be committed to building a culture of police integrity. They should be beyond reproach and be willing to hold transgressors accountable (Ivkovic et al., 2020). Burger and Mbanye (2020) also emphasise the need for far-reaching interventions such as reviewing the current systems of recruiting, training, promoting, disciplining and equipping police officers. In their view, the situation can be turned around in a short period of time 'if there is a strong, ethical and highly skilled top management team in place' (Burger & Mbanye, 2020).

The government's National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 (approved in 2012) identified possible reasons for the lack of professionalism in the national police, including a 'serial management crisis', a lack of capacity and skills, and the disbanding of specialised units. The

NDP also recommended ways to address these challenges. However, after nearly a decade, implementation seems to be lacking.

According to experts, the leadership crisis could be solved by implementing two key NDP recommendations: firstly, the establishment of an independent panel to conduct a transparent, merit-based process for identifying and recommending to the president the best possible person to be National Commissioner; and secondly, a multi-sectoral National Police Board should be appointed to undertake performance and integrity assessments of the senior management echelon, starting with the 199 generals (Burger, 2021b).

Several official reports over the past decade have highlighted key challenges and practical options to improve policing. However, no clarity exists on whether these recommendations have been implemented. These include the National Development Plan (2012), Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry Report (2014), Marikana Commission of Enquiry Report (2015), White Paper on Policing (2016), State of Democratic Policing Report (2017), and the Panel of Experts Report on Policing and Crowd Management (2018) (Burger, 2021a). It is therefore evident that there is no shortage of policy recommendations on various aspects of policing. Absent is the implementation of the numerous recommendations and policy guidelines.

The drivers of crime can be linked to varied and complex factors. The increase in crime is thus likely to be the result of a combination of factors such as socio-economic deterioration, increased inequality, declining police performance and high levels of police corruption.⁷

Besides strategies to reduce inequality and socio-economic deterioration, a clear national strategy to tackle violent crimes is also necessary. The key is to understand what drives violence and murder in particular areas. Reducing these factors would bring violence down more generally. Violence in hotspots can be reduced by targeted policing and a ‘whole of society’ approach (strengthening partnerships between the police and communities/civil society) as advocated in the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security (Lancaster, 2021). It has also been found that violent crimes are often organised crime, yet local police stations lack the expertise and resources to deal with organised crime. Specialised knowledge, skills and understanding of organised crime are required to successfully neutralise criminal gangs. At police station level, the policing of organised crime therefore needs to be professionalised. Distinct professional practices are required to tackle organised crime, since it is an activity sufficiently set apart from general detective work (Govender, 2015).

Concluding remarks

Since 2006 much has changed in terms of the prevalence of migration, mortality rates and crime rates in South Africa. These changes, particularly in the case of migration, have resulted in either the intensification of existing socio-economic challenges or the creation of new

⁷ Constraints of space prevent an in-depth discussion of these multi-faceted factors.

threats to social stability. The discussion highlighted two main characteristics of migration. The first is that inter-provincial migration has significantly influenced provincial population numbers. Over the past 16 years Gauteng and the Western Cape have received the highest numbers of net migrants, while the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State all recorded a continuous net population outflow. Secondly, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of urbanisation in the population, with 67 per cent living in urban areas in 2020 (up from 56 per cent in 2001).

Despite the benefits of rural–urban migration to both rural and urban areas, this migration also has negative implications for both. For example, rural areas face a reduced availability of labour and resource underutilisation, while urban areas are under pressure to develop new settlements and services. Temporary and circulatory movements exacerbate the problem, since, for example, health care is required not only at the destination, but also at the area of origin. Experts have proposed three main strategies to address these issues: the development of rural areas (not only focusing on agriculture), greater investment in major cities and investment also in small towns and secondary cities. The government has taken urbanisation seriously. For example, it accepted the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) in 2016 and received a South African Urbanisation Review (requested by National Treasury) to inform national policy on options for spatial integration. The future of urban development will be determined by the government’s implementation of the above.

Since 2006 there has been a decline in the death rate in South Africa. This can mainly be attributed to the government’s ART rollout, particularly since 2008. Access to ART has not only significantly reduced child and infant mortality rates and deaths among the youth but has also extended the general lifespan of South Africans. In addition, although tuberculosis is still the main underlying natural cause of death in South Africa, the numbers have declined significantly since 2006 due to the government’s comprehensive response to the HIV pandemic and TB. However, serious concerns exist about the quality of health services in the country, which is ascribed to the gross inequality in health expenditure between the private and public sector (on which 84 per cent of the population depends), management and governance failure in most hospitals and the lack of a fully functional district health system, which is the main vehicle for the delivery of primary health care. In moving forward, a more equitable health system should be put in place, the quality of services in the public health sector should be improved and the social determinants of health should be addressed.

Finally, crime is still a persistent feature in South Africa. Acts of serious crime steadily increased until 2015, after which they declined by 11 per cent between 2015 and 2020. However, although the murder rate decreased from 2006/2007 to 2011/12, it has increased by over 20 per cent between 2011/12 and 2019/20. Citizens’ trust in the police has been consistently low, which may be attributed to the significant deterioration of police performance over the years. Since 2006 a further major concern is that crime victims have increasingly refrained from reporting crimes to the police, except for murder, car theft and carjacking (mainly for insurance purposes).

Serious reform of the police is required to restore its credibility in the eyes of South Africans and to lower the levels of crime. Such reforms should include the selection of reputable leaders for the SAPS, interventions in the recruiting, training and disciplining of police officers, and the implementation of the recommendations contained in official reports produced over the past decade.

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CHAPTER SIX

SOCIAL COHESION AND THE ORGANISATION OF SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Introduction

A critical conclusion in the previous 2006 Macro-Social Report (MSR) was that social networks, even among the poor, do influence an individual's access to resources and socio-economic opportunities such as employment. The degree of social cohesion in society is determined by how people organise themselves in society, their social networks and social capital. This chapter will briefly discuss social cohesion and the organisation of social life and social networks in South Africa. Since 1994 and the birth of a democratic dispensation, a central goal of the South African government has been to unite its people in their diversity and to attain social cohesion in society.

With the advent of democracy, deep-seated division fed by years of colonialism and apartheid had to be addressed. Social cohesion has become a national priority, evident in significant policy documents such as the Presidency's Twenty-Year Review, Towards a 25 Year Review report, and the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030. Outcome 14 of The Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014–2019 expressly refers to social cohesion and nation building (DPME, 2014). Priority six of The Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2019–2024 refers to social cohesion and safe communities (DPME, 2019a). As stated under this priority: 'Without a high degree of social cohesion and unity of purpose, it is difficult to envisage South Africa overcoming the significant obstacles that stand in the way of prosperity and equity' (DPME, 2019a: 192).

Social cohesion is about the extent to which people, across and within groups, cooperate with each other. It may be a characteristic of society more broadly, or of more specific elements within society, including individual experiences. According to the MISTRA (2014: 95) report on nation formation and social cohesion, it is defined as the 'degree of social integration and

inclusion in changing communities in a diverse society with a history of division and inequality'. Therefore, in this context, a 'community or society is cohesive to the extent that the inequalities, exclusions and disparities based on ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age and disability, or any other distinctions which engender divisions, distrust and conflict, are reduced or eliminated in a planned and sustained manner' (MISTRA, 2014: 95). Most importantly, community members and citizens should underpin this as 'active participants working together for the attainment of shared goals, designed and agreed upon to improve the living conditions for all' (MISTRA, 2014: 95).

An important characteristic of social cohesion is healthy social relations which emerge through interpersonal trust and social networks (IJR, 2018). A study conducted by Lefko-Everett et al. (2018: 3) and the Poverty and Inequality Initiative (PII) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) created 11 qualitative focus group discussions in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape in 2016 and 2017, 'for the purpose of eliciting new and inclusive inputs and contributing to a better understanding of the meaning and extent of social cohesion in the country' (Lefko-Everett et al., 2018: 3). Participants listed the qualities of unity, diversity and working together in connection with social cohesion. They found that unifying values of respect and love, religion and sport bring South Africans together, although the country remains divided due to the economic situation, politics, racial discrimination and cultural differences. Additionally, research participants shared experiences of cooperating with others in a variety of circumstances, and expressed willingness to do so again in future.

In a policy brief, the IJR (2018) highlights that strong social cohesion is linked to higher levels of per capita income and employment, as well as effective policy implementation and governance at municipal level, whereas poverty, unemployment and service delivery protests are negatively correlated with social cohesion. This point is equally articulated in chapters one and two of this report, which explore the relationship between socio-economic trends, governance and social cohesion. This relationship is noted further in the DPME's Towards a 25 Year Review report (2019b: 151), which concludes that 'lack of social connectedness and social cohesion (i.e., "bonding" social capital) among South Africa's young people negatively impacts on work readiness'. According to a World Bank Development Report 2013, 'jobs can shape social interactions and the ways societies manage collective decision making. They connect people with others and can provide access to voice' (World Bank, 2012: 126–127). The report adds that 'people's trust in government and their confidence in institutions may increase if they believe that job opportunities are available to them either now or in the future. Jobs can influence social cohesion through their effects on social identity, networks, and fairness' (World Bank, 2012: 126–127). These findings are important points to consider – see chapter two in this report on social structure and social mobility, and a discussion on employment in South Africa.

Social cohesion is complex: many factors contribute to its attainment, including how people physically live and share their domestic spaces with others in their neighbourhoods or communities. People may share similar experiences and goals and this feeds into their beliefs

and actions about the world in which they live, as well as policy interventions required to improve their living conditions. The next section explores how households and families are comprised within the context of social cohesion. Most people reflect on families and households as their most important social reference groups and social institutions. Individuals rely on their families and households for their physical, social and economic wellbeing and survival (Stats SA, 2019: 6).

Trends in household and family make-up

The characteristics of living arrangements in South Africa are usually influenced by individuals' marital status and the composition of households. A household is defined as an arrangement of co-residence with shared consumption and production (Hall & Mokomane, 2018). Households can be organised in various ways. Table 6.1 reveals that nuclear households, which are typically characterised as couples, or one or more parent(s) with children, constitute 39.9 per cent of households nationally. Extended households are more broadly classified as a nuclear core combined with other family members such as parents or siblings. A very small percentage in 2019 (2.4 per cent) were classified as complex, that is, they contained non-related persons. In terms of provinces, nuclear households were most prevalent in Western Cape (51.3 per cent) and Gauteng (45.7 per cent), whereas extended households featured predominantly in Eastern Cape (43.7 per cent), Limpopo (42.0 per cent) and KwaZulu-Natal (39.6 per cent).

Table 6.1: Household types in percentages

	1996	2001	2019
Complex	-	-	2.4
Extended	20.9	27.0	34.2
Nuclear	46.3	41.1	39.9
Single	16.2	18.5	23.4
Other	12.0	13.4	-
Unspecified	4.6	-	-

Source: Stats SA, 2012; Stats SA, 2019

It is important to note that around 41.8 per cent of the households in South Africa are headed by women and the average household size is 3.31 persons per household nationally (ranging from 3.11 in urban areas to 3.73 in rural areas). The previous MSR (2006) indicated a trend of a decline in household size between 1996 and 2001, with household size reducing from an average of 4.5 to 3.8 persons per household. This, among other factors, reflects both migration and a decline in fertility rates. In 2019 nearly a quarter (23.4 per cent) of South African households consisted of a single person. According to Statista, in 2020, the total fertility

rate, which is the average number of children a woman would have by the age of 49 years, for South Africa was estimated to be just 2.41 children per woman. This demonstrates a steady decrease from 2.9 in 1998 and is also much lower than most other Sub-Saharan countries (O'Neill, 2020). Additionally, in a 2016 South Africa Demographic and Health Survey (SADHS), there is an increase in the percentage of unwanted births from 17.3 per cent in 1998 to 20.4 per cent in 2016.

Table 6.2 refers to household membership per province, based on an inter-generational configuration. Nationally, households classified as double generation households, which are comprised of parents and children, make up the largest percentage of living arrangements. Partners or siblings living together (classified as single generation households) account for 13.9 per cent of households. Only 4.5 per cent of households constitute so-called 'skip generation' households, where grandparents live with grandchildren. Triple generation households account for 18.4 per cent in both KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape. Over two-thirds (67.6 per cent) of the population in South Africa live in urban centres and 32.4 per cent live in rural areas (Kemp, 2021).

Table 6.2: Percentage distribution of inter-generational households by province, 2019

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	RSA
Unclear	2.5	4.3	3.5	2.2	3.8	3.0	3.5	4.2	2.4	3.4
Skip generation	1.8	8.5	5.7	6.6	5.4	4.7	2.3	4.8	6.8	4.5
Triple generation	10.6	18.4	17.7	15.2	18.4	15.0	10.6	17.5	19.0	14.7
Double generation	48.1	34.5	41.0	42.4	35.2	36.9	42.3	40.0	39.3	40.1
Single generation	18.1	12.3	12.0	11.9	13.1	12.0	16.4	12.0	9.4	13.9
Single person	19.0	22.1	20.1	21.6	24.2	28.3	25.1	21.6	23.1	23.4

Source: Stats SA, 2019

In terms of the data in Table 6.3, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of households living in a formal dwelling from 65.1 per cent in 1996 to 81.9 per cent in 2019, whereas households living in traditional dwellings have decreased steadily over a 23-year period and households living in informal dwellings have decreased in percentage from 16.2 per cent in 1996 to 12.7 per cent in 2019. Split by province, traditional dwellings were more common in the Eastern Cape (23.0 per cent) and KwaZulu-Natal (13.1 per cent). Households in Limpopo and Mpumalanga have a majority of formal dwellings, of 95.2 per cent and 89.6 per cent respectively.

Table 6.3: Percentage households across dwelling types

	Formal dwelling	Traditional dwelling	Informal dwelling	Other
Census 1996	65.1	18.3	16.2	0.4
Census 2001	68.7	14.8	16.4	0.3
Community Survey 2007	70.6	11.7	14.4	3.3
Census 2011	77.6	7.9	13.6	0.9
GHS 2019	81.9	5.1	12.7	0.3

Source: Stats SA, 2012; Stats SA, 2019

Table 6.4: Households by race and type of dwelling (proportions), 1996 and 2017 (%)

Housing type	Black		Other races*		Total	
	1996	2017	1996	2017	1996	2017
Formal housing	52.5	76.3	93.6	95.5	64	80.1
Informal housing	21.2	16.2	2.6	2.9	16.0	13.6
Traditional dwelling/ hut/structure made of traditional materials	24.7	6.8	1.3	0.4	18.2	5.5
Other types of housing	1.6	0.7	2.6	1.1	1.8	0.8

* Other races include coloured, Asian/Indian and white

Source: Stats SA in Makombo, 2019

In terms of marital status, the data in Table 6.5 indicates that slightly more male youth (aged 18–34) than female youth (aged 18–34) are single. An estimated 59 per cent of people over 18 in South Africa are legally married. Twenty-eight per cent of individuals between the ages of 35–59 years are likely to live together, whereas 12 per cent of individuals between the ages of 60 and 74 years are divorced or separated.

Table 6.5: Marital or relationship status for individuals aged 18 years and older, 2019 (%)

	18–34 years		35–59 years		60–74 years		>75 years		Total	
Status	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Single	96.2	87.9	49.2	43.9	9.1	15.0	5.8	7.0	53.2	46.8
Widowed	0.1	0.0	1.2	5.0	13.6	39.8	28.1	73.5	2.6	10.5
Divorced or separated	0.1	0.1	2.2	3.7	5.2	6.9	1.7	3.0	2.0	3.4
Living together	2.8	7.6	14.9	13.6	5.2	2.3	2.7	0.8	11.7	10.9
Legally Married	1.0	4.4	32.6	33.8	66.9	36.1	61.7	15.7	30.5	28.5

Source: Stats SA, 2019

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which took hold globally in early 2020, Parker and De Kadt (2020) argue that in the South African context ‘household composition and structure, in particular, female-headed households and multigenerational households, are likely to be at risk’. Amongst these risks are job security, the cost of living, food costs and accessing affordable retail outlets. Women-headed households are also among the poorest, with a high number of residents and low levels of income. Consequently, the effects of the pandemic on income, childcare, sanitisation and the wellbeing of women are evident (Moore, 2020). The gendered socio-economic impact of COVID-19 is connected to the historic long-standing gender disparities discussed in chapters two, three and four. These inequalities are well documented in previous chapters, highlighting the intersection between race, class and gendered socio-economic exclusion. In the following sections, we shift the discussion towards an examination of social networks and capital.

Social networks and social capital

Social networks are important avenues for individuals to integrate into society and to benefit from the opportunities that can be wrought from their economic, social, political and cultural connections. Social connections, whether they involve contact with colleagues and neighbours or ordinary friendships, are valuable (Matenda et al., 2020). South African studies have shown that social support groups, especially friendship-based ties, can alleviate some of the poverty experiences of elderly people in society (Sidloyi & Bomela, 2015). In another study, ‘social-networks-of-care’ as well as kin-ship support systems were found to be useful coping strategies for employed mothers in South Africa (Maqubela, 2016). Matenda et al. (2020: 6) found that social groups and individuals are making use of social media to gain social capital, and civic life is the ‘vehicle through which social capital is acquired’.

Social media has become an increasingly popular platform for individuals to widen their social networks and relationships, define themselves, organise and share their values and beliefs. This has had positive and negative results for South African society. Citizens have made use of social media platforms to challenge racism, for example, but also to create social division through fake news. This trend has meant that social networking has evolved from a communication platform for family and friends to a more substantive influencer of society, shaping politics, education, employment, innovation, business and politics. Social media technologies have therefore become an important source of social capital which is necessary for a society's development (Matenda et al., 2020). This reinforces the report's overall analysis of how digital technologies shape economic restructuring, governance, activism and social cohesion (see chapters two, three and seven). The uptake and integration of digital technologies into different areas of human development is a central feature of contemporary South African society. Macro-social trends are unfolding within a context of innovation and structural change which shape political, social and economic dynamics.

Social capital can be linked to personal aspects such as beliefs, values, norms and attitudes, as well as cultural norms like religion, tradition and shared histories (Johnston et al., 2013). Structurally, social capital refers to 'the outwardly visible features of social organisations such as patterns of social engagement or density of social networks' (Johnston et al., 2013: 25). Social capital, according to a majority of scholars, 'involves an individual's use of social networks to gain access to and use resources, either for personal or community benefit' (Matenda et al., 2020: 2). Table 6.6 suggests that South Africa is an increasingly digital society with 38.10 million internet users (64 per cent internet penetration). In early 2021 the number of social media users in South Africa was equivalent to 41.9 per cent of the population.

Table 6.6: Digital users in South Africa (in millions)

	2020	January 2021
Internet	36.49	38.19
Social media	22	25
Mobile internet	-	34.93
Mobile social media	-	21.56

Source: Datareportal, 2021

Table 6.7 shows that nearly two-thirds (63.3 per cent) of South African households had at least one member who had access to or used the Internet either 'at home, work, place of study, internet cafés, or at public hot spots' (Stats SA, 2019: 51). Use of the internet at home is highest among households in the Western Cape (21.7 per cent) and lowest in Limpopo (1.6 per cent). Youth between the ages of 25 and 35 make up nearly 50 per cent of social media users and they spend on average of 3 hours and 10 minutes per day on social media via any device (Davis, 2021).

This is an important point to note since Stats SA (2019) estimates that youth (aged 18–34) constitute almost a third of the population (17.84 million) in South Africa (with 9.04 million males and 8.80 million females). This is a sizeable percentage to influence society and drive positive change. Young people need to feel included; this helps to alleviate feelings of apathy and promote active citizenship. The National Youth Development Agency developed the Integrated Youth Development Strategy which contends that the youth must be integrated into society if South African society is to become cohesive, sustainable and democratic. Through inclusiveness, young people are empowered to contribute meaningfully to the advancement of society (Ahmad & Sheikh, 2013). Furthermore, the youth use social media to grow their networks in order to gain social capital. This social capital is vital for empowering communities, providing personal development opportunities, addressing personal and social needs and civic engagement. The youth cooperate with each other ‘to assist one another to achieve their own “community” aims’ (Matenda et al., 2020: 6).

Table 6.7: Percentage of households with access to the internet at home, or for which at least one member has access to or used the internet by province, 2019

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	RSA
Anywhere	74.3	52.5	54.8	60.3	55.7	58.6	74.8	67.4	43.2	63.3
At home	21.7	3.2	5.9	5.4	5.8	2.3	14.9	3.2	1.6	9.1

Source: Stats SA, 2019

In the previous Macro-Social Report (2006), there was an emphasis on the critical importance and impact of TV as a medium for political education and awareness in South Africa. Traditional media, however, have faced growing competition as social media usage is on the increase. Table 6.8 shows that almost two-thirds of South Africans believe that social media is a vehicle for voicing their political beliefs and most agree (48 per cent) that government should not be allowed to close down social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) when they feel that it undermines political stability. Almost equal percentages of individuals agree (38 per cent) and disagree (37 per cent) that they sometimes interact with people on social media whose political views and beliefs are different from their own. A striking majority (59 per cent) feel that social media give ordinary people a voice and that this platform effectively holds those in power to account (48 per cent). Most individuals disagree that social media is dividing the South African nation. This last finding on social media’s impact on community divisions is salient for examining social cohesion. The following sections explore social cohesion at community level, drawing on data documenting racial and religious trends.

Table 6.8: Perceptions regarding social media and society, SARB 2019 (%)

Statements	Agree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Don't know
People should be allowed to express any political view that they have on social media	64	12	20	4
Government should be allowed to close down social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc) when they feel that it undermines political stability	30	48	17	5
The government should be allowed to monitor my activities on social media	28	49	18	6
I do sometimes interact with people on social media whose political views and beliefs are different from mine	38	37	22	8
Social media is dividing our nation	31	37	24	8
Social media is effective in keeping those in power accountable	48	18	25	
Social media gives ordinary people a voice	59	14	19	8

Source: IJR, 2019

Community, religion and social organisation

In a 2017 South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey (IJR, 2017: 16) respondents were asked to indicate what divides South Africans today; for example, was it inequality, that is, the division between rich and poor? Inequality featured prominently at 58 per cent, followed by race (53.3 per cent), political parties (37.7 per cent), disease (18.7 per cent) and language (15.5 per cent). Despite the historical and contemporary challenges linked with race, class and language, a 'South African identity, however, remains important to most South Africans, coupled with a desire and optimism for a united South Africa' (IJR, 2017: 17).

Table 6.9 shows responses to a survey question: ‘In general, what may prevent you from talking to people of different race groups?’ and findings suggest that ‘most South Africans ... remain open to interracial interaction in all spaces – private and public – with the main limitations in this regard (other than none) being language and confidence barriers’ (IJR, 2017: 8).

Table 6.9: Order of barriers to interracial interaction

	First barrier (%)	Second barrier (%)
Nothing	34.3	13.7
Language	18.1	14.2
Your confidence	10.9	13.4
No common ground	8.5	9.1
Negative prior experiences	7.2	11.5
Your willingness to talk/engage	6.2	11.8
Fear/anxiety	4.4	10.7

Source: IJR, 2019

The benefits of social cohesion can only be truly felt if there is meaningful connection between race groups in South Africa. The data in Table 6.10 indicates that the largest percentage (39.5 per cent) of individuals never interact with different race groups in their home. There is a common percentage of people who sometimes mix with different races at work or in their place of study (29.6 per cent) as well as at social gatherings and events (29.9 per cent).

Table 6.10: Percentage frequency of interracial interaction

	Commercial or retail spaces	Public recreational spaces	Work/place of study	Social gatherings and events	Public transport spaces	Home
Never	16.9	25.3	25.5	29.6	35.3	39.5
Rarely	24.5	26.3	21.0	25.1	24.4	21.4
Sometimes	36.0	31.3	29.6	29.9	24.9	24.7
Often	15.9	12.8	15.3	10.9	10.3	10.2
Always	6.6	4.4	8.7	4.5	5.1	4.2

Source: IJR, 2019

Meaningful social cohesion in South Africa requires religious tolerance and freedom because the country has a diverse religious population. The previous MSR (2006) indicated that religious organisation is an important element of social capital in many respects: as a repository of social values, a crucial element of social networking, a formal system of social organisation and, in some instances, an instrument of socio-economic opportunity and status. This statement remains true 16 years later. Cloete (2014) contends that although religion can divide people along racial and economic lines (which is an example of how religious social capital can hamper social cohesion), it can also be ‘an important partner in social issues and public life and therefore also in the formation of social capital and social cohesion’. Religion can answer personal needs, enhance community building and sustain social cohesion. It would be incorrect to assume that the social networks created through religious connections have no role to play in social cohesion. Between 1996 and 2015, the majority of South Africa’s population (74.1 per cent in 1996 and 86.0 per cent in 2015) associated themselves with the ‘Christian’ religion.

As Table 6.11 shows, in 2015, 5.2 per cent of the population characterised themselves as not affiliated to any particular religion. KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are home to the largest percentage of the population who associate with ancestral, tribal, animist or other traditional African religions, with 12.3 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively. The Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal cater for the religious needs of Muslims, who comprise 1.9 per cent of the total and 5.3 per cent, 2.4 per cent and 2 per cent per respective province. Although Hindus comprise about 0.9 per cent of the population of South Africa; 3.3 per cent of the population of KwaZulu-Natal were Hindus.

Table 6.11: Percentage distribution of religious affiliation by province, 2015

Religious Affiliation	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	RSA
Christian	87.8	83.5	98.4	97.7	78.5	93.3	87.1	93.2	79.9	86.0
Muslim	5.3	0.4	0.9	0.6	2.0	1.5	2.4	0.8	0.9	1.9
Ancestral, tribal, animist or other traditional African religions	2.8	8.6	0.0	1.4	12.3	3.0	2.3	4.0	4.5	5.4
Hindu	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.9
Jewish	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.2
Other religion	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4
Nothing in particular	2.8	7.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	6.3	1.5	14.4	5.2
Do not know	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Stats SA, 2015

A greater number of Muslims (75.6 per cent) attend religious services and ceremonies at least once a week compared to the 52.5 per cent of Christians and 36.6 per cent of Hindus. Those individuals who are exclusively affiliated with ancestral, animist or other traditional African religions were most likely (16.7 per cent) never to attend religious services. It is important to note that it could be that people may affiliate to more than one belief system. In a 2013 study, conducted via in-depth interviews with 55 black South African youth (age 18) living in the Johannesburg-Soweto metropolitan area, Brittian et al. (2013) found that for some issues, such as dealing with grief, participants relied on the complexity of both African traditional and Christian beliefs and the relation between both faith traditions in their healing. The diversity of religious practices and affiliations in South Africa are part of a wider civil society political culture discussed below.

Social organisation, social movements and the human rights regime

South Africa has a vibrant and active civil society including trade unions, special interest or pressure groups, issue-oriented groups, community-based organisations, social movements, civic movements, cultural groups, professional groups and the ideological marketplace, for example, the mass media. In 2020, there were an estimated 200,000 NGOs in South Africa compared to just over 140,000 registered NGOs in 2015 (Radebe & Nkonyeni, 2020). This vibrancy in civil society is often expressed in the form of protests against all types of social injustice and inequality. Political protest is fundamental to the history and character of a democratic South Africa. Gumede (2018) argues that South Africa has ‘a civil society culture that has not only promoted cultural diversity but that is itself diverse, with a hard-won heritage of tirelessly fighting for the rights of the people in this country’. He further argues that, in addition, South Africa’s Constitution ‘provides a special place for civil society to play an oversight role over democratic institutions, monitor human rights and to give citizens, especially the poor, vulnerable and excluded, the tools to know and assert their rights’.

This activism did not fall away with the attainment of democracy and is vital to the health and quality of a strong, consolidated democracy. According to Alexander et al. (2018: 40), an estimated 3,550 media-reported community protests took place in South Africa between 2005 and 2017. The estimated number of police-recorded community protests stands at 14,200 between 2005 and 2017. Moreover, media-reported community protests have increased in frequency, with double digit numbers in the 2,000s, reaching 71 in 2012 and then an average of 320 annually thereafter.

A human rights regime, namely one which entails the promotion and protection of human rights, forms the backbone of a democratic South Africa, with a Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. NGOs in South Africa have continued the clarion call for the maintenance of human rights protection with common areas of concern, including access to justice, freedom of speech, farm workers’ rights, refugee rights and gender equity socio-economic

rights, as well as the human rights of non-nationals exposed to violent attacks. Research on the factors driving these attacks identifies the following: competition for formal and informal local leadership positions, contestation over limited business opportunities, identity politics and a belief in suspicions and myths: ‘migrants tend to be blamed for crime, corruption and other socioeconomic ills’ (Misago, 2011). Table 6.12 shows the number of recorded attacks on foreign nationals per province between 1994 and 2018. Of the total number, 8 per cent (42) were recorded in 2018 alone.

Table 6.12: Xenophobic violence incidents by province, 1994–2018

Province	Number of incidents
WC	111 (21.0%)
EC	33 (6.2%)
NC	5 (1.0%)
FS	19 (3.7%)
KZN	67 (12.7%)
NW	20 (3.8%)
GP	212 (40.1%)
MP	22 (4.2%)
LP	40 (7.6%)
Total:	529 (100%)

Source: Mlilo and Misago, 2019: 3

Between 1994 and 2018 there were an estimated 529 recorded incidents of xenophobic violence and types of victimisation. Between 1994 and 2018, 309 deaths caused by xenophobic violence were recorded; 901 physical assaults; over 100,000 displaced people, 2,193 shops looted and 257 threats to safety or property. These are underestimations as ‘due to the nature of xenophobic violence, which frequently includes multiple incidents, underreporting, and a lack of detailed information, the true extent of victimisation’ is unknown (Mlilo & Misago, 2019: 203).

A variety of civic organisations exist in South Africa which advocate for wide-ranging causes including health, education and service delivery. As outlined in the DPME’s Towards a 25 Year Review (2019b: 34) report: ‘South Africa has seen the emergence of new issue based social movements such as Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, Abahlali baseMjondolo, #FeesMustFall movement, etc. which transcend traditional civil-society organisations such as students and civic movements.’ Ballard et al. (2006) argue that it is through the activities of social movements that people in poor urban and rural communities experience meaningful democracy. The TAC, for example, was founded in 1998 with a focus on

access to AIDS treatment; its reputation has grown over the years, with the *New York Times* calling it ‘the world’s most effective AIDS group’ in 2006. The founding director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Dr Peter Piot, has referred to the TAC as ‘the smartest activist group of all, worldwide’. In 2002 a significant victory for the TAC was the ‘Constitutional Court ruling in which the South African government was ordered to provide anti-retroviral drugs to prevent transmission of HIV from mothers to their babies during birth’. Also, thanks in large part to TAC pressure, the National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs and Tuberculosis 2007–2011 was adopted by the South African Parliament (TAC, 2021).

Active citizen participation and advocacy is essential to upholding a sustainable, socially cohesive society. As shown in Table 6.13 just over a quarter of the population (26.4 per cent) have contacted their local councillor or community leader about an issue and just under half of the population (41 per cent) have got together with others to raise an issue. Over half the population (53.6 per cent) have attended a community meeting or contacted (51.0 per cent) the radio, TV or a newspaper to complain about an issue. These figures would indicate that South Africans are politically active in diverse ways. Unconventionally, around 8 per cent of people participate in politics to advance a cause through the use of force or violence.

Table 6.13: Citizens’ political participation, SARB 2019 (%)

	<i>Have done it</i>	<i>No, but I would if I had the opportunity</i>	<i>No, and would never do this</i>
Used force or violence for a political cause	8.1	14.3	77.7
Refused to pay a tax or a fee to the government	5.9	23.3	70.8
Signed a petition (online or hardcopy)	12.7	32.2	55.1
Shared political content on social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter)	14.4	23.6	62.1
Contacted your local councillor or other community leaders about an issue	26.4	38.1	35.5
Contacted radio, TV or a newspaper to complain about an issue	13.3	36.6	50.1
Got together with others to raise an issue	41.0	28.9	30.1
Attended a community meeting	53.6	21.7	24.7

Source: IJR, 2019

In the previous MSR (2006), reference was made to over 37 political parties as well as independent groups contesting elections across South Africa's three spheres of government. In the 2019 national elections, 48 parties contested indicating an increasing interest in the exercise of choice in a democratic system. In relation to voter participation, however, a worrying trend has emerged of decreasing voter turnout at national elections. The Electoral Commission of South Africa defines voter turnout as the number of people who voted divided by the number of registered voters and so Table 6.14, although indicating a slight decrease in turnout, reflects the turnout as nevertheless remaining relatively stable and high.

Table 6.14: Voter turnout at successive national elections (1999-2019)

Year	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Voter turnout (%)	88	76.73	77.3	73.48	66.05

Source: IEC, 2021

However, it is more accurate to use a comparative research definition of voter turnout which calculates the number of people as a proportion of the eligible voting age population (the VAP – which is 18 years or older in South Africa). By comparative, we mean that across consolidated democracies globally, a more accurate standard measure for voter turnout interrogates the number of voters as a proportion of the eligible VAP. When referring to the turnout as a proportion of VAP, as demonstrated in Table 6.15, the turnout is far lower and 'confirms a growing gap between registered and unregistered voters and a subsequent decline in participation' (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 5). This reflects a 37 per cent drop in the first 25 years of South Africa's democratic history with less than half of eligible voters turning out in 2019.

There are implications if South Africans increasingly decide not to turn out at the polls, which could be seen as positive and/or negative. For example, disillusionment with formal avenues of political participation could mean disengagement, or it could mean possible grassroots dynamism and issue-based campaigns arising in the place of formal participation. This could mean more political activity but through alternate forms. Voting is the most direct form of a citizen's expression of approval or disapproval with its governing structures and in a democracy, the voice of the people is essential. If the people do not care to vote, then fundamental trust may have been broken in the independent electoral process and the use of the polls as a legal measure to organise the country's political system; or it could mean that South Africans do not believe that voting for any party will have a direct impact on their life.

Table 6.15: Voter turnout as a proportion of VAP

Year	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Turnout as VAP	72	58	60	57	49

Source: Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020

Another important trend to reflect upon is the youth vote in South Africa. With its bulging youth population, a large group of eligible voters have emerged. The youth need to register for and participate in voting if the democratic project is to continue. However, although in the 2019 elections, there were an estimated 11.7 million eligible voters in the 18–29 age group, only 5.6 million in this age group actually registered (48.6 per cent). This is a decline from the 2014 elections ‘when well over half (58 per cent) of all 18–29-year-olds were registered to vote’ (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2020: 7–8). This data suggest that young people in the country have become despondent, and they do not view voting or participating in politics as core catalysts for social transformation. Yet, sections of South Africa’s youth have found alternative ways to participate in public policy discussions and politics. The political demands and views articulated in these youth-led agentic practices are captured in the following sections, which provide some insight into youth perspectives on post-apartheid society.

Trends in social self-definition and the withering of the rainbow nation

This section discusses some of the main themes expressed by young South Africans when debating nation building and reconciliation in society.

Intergenerational trauma and social resentment

The National Party’s (NP) project of apartheid viewed South Africa as a multi-national state, going as far as creating so-called homelands for these nations (or ‘tribes’, as per colonial-apartheid parlance). The democratic government inaugurated in May 1994 was tasked with creating a unified national identity from this ethnic diversity. Coming off the back of the Presidency’s Ten-Year Review (TYR) (2003), the first iteration of the Macro-Social Report (MSR) was understandably optimistic about the government’s progress towards attaining social cohesion. This optimism can be attributed to the newness of the ‘constitutional order which guarantees equal rights and promotes equal access to opportunity’ (PCAS, 2006: 25). The new Constitution set the incoming democratic dispensation the task of ‘heal[ing] the divisions of the past and establish[ing] a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’ (South Africa, 1996). Towards this end, the government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a transitional body that eventually submitted its final report in 1998.

The TRC's aim of narrating the truth of what exactly happened during the apartheid era is indicative of 'the recourse to narrative' that Bhekizizwe Peterson (2009) identified as 'one of the striking features' of contemporary South African socio-political life. MISTRA's research for the Indlulamithi Scenarios 2030 found that after 25 years, a shared objective view of this hurtful history had still not emerged, with 'differences in the reading of history, not just between whites and blacks, but also in the ways in which the struggle against apartheid, the constitutional settlements and the TRC process is understood' being observed (Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios 2019: 27). Mabasa (2021) points to the importance of 'departing from the liberal social cohesion approach, which reduces nation building to a moral question without questioning existing structural power relations in society'. The rest of this sub-section draws on Mabasa's notion to discuss the crisis of narrating the post-apartheid South African nation (to borrow from Homi Bhabha) in relation to the socio-economic crisis wrought by racist and sexist inequality.

The year 2008 is quite an important year in South Africa's contemporary history, as it was also the year in which a political crisis converged with an economic one – that is, the dark cloud surrounding the resignation of former president Thabo Mbeki, which occurred around the same time as the Great Recession. To be fair, the 2006 MSR could not possibly have anticipated this dual-headed hydra, which resulted in 'economic stagnation and increasing threats to institutional integrity' during the 2010s (Levy et al., 2021: 1). Sluggish economic growth and political competition over access to diminishing state resources led to the development of a disillusioned discourse and 'mobilisation around a sense of woundedness and resentment', as well as around ethnicity and culture. MISTRA's research, as part of the Indlulamithi Scenarios, found these sentiments to be an indictment on the post-apartheid political settlement (Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019: 27). As important as ideology is to making sense of the South African crisis, there are discernible structural issues underpinning it. In fact, the two are linked.

The increased vulnerability of South Africa's political settlement is a function of the country's stubbornly high rate of wealth and income inequality – which, at a Gini Coefficient of 0.68, is regarded as the highest in the world. The DPME's Twenty-Five Year Review acknowledges that 'whilst inequality within race increased over the 25-year period, inequality between races and gender is still the worst legacy of apartheid' (DPME, 2019b: 25). Widening intra-racial inequality is largely attributable to the uneven and elitist nature of government's flagship vehicle of economic transformation, Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE). A commitment to B-BBEE, as well as the ANC government's promises of upward mobility and its commitment to channelling 'diversity toward a shared national purpose' are listed as some of the pillars of South Africa's political settlement in a paper by Levy et al. (2021). This gives credence to Friedman's argument about the 'continued division of the population into economic insiders who enjoy access to the benefits of the formal economy and outsiders who do not' (Friedman, 2021: 2).

In a country with a history of unjust and unequal access to economic opportunities like South Africa, the promise of upward social mobility is important because it ‘renew[s] a vision of hope and possibility across society as a whole’ (Levy et al., 2021: 4). This hopefulness is what fosters a sense of belonging. The disillusionment expressed through increasing patterns of voter apathy is indicative of poor citizens’ alienation from the political system. This has terrible consequences for the legitimacy of the democratic dispensation. The DPME Twenty-Five Year Review (2019b: 34) notes that South Africans ‘feel increasingly ambiguous towards the early reconciliation project’, which means that the country’s process of healing remains incomplete. This brings into sharp focus what scholars have termed ‘intergenerational trauma’, which refers to ‘memories [that] come to affect not only those who have personally experienced the conflict and resultant trauma, but also successive generations’ (Adonis, 2016: 2). Noting that education ‘remains an important instrument for social mobility’, the Twenty-Five Year Review also found that the social gains of the increase in numbers enrolled in higher education were offset by ‘high drop-out rates and a low throughput rate of African students’ (DPME, 2019b: 25). Keeping in mind Chikane’s (2018: 126) reminder that ‘both rates were exacerbated by students’ financial woes’, we can say that for many black families, poverty is generational. This has further ossified the country’s social structure, resulting in greater social distance between the country’s racialised classes.

The Marikana violence in 2012 and the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016 unleashed a discourse that seemed to suggest that the democratic government did not have a good story to tell. Both these moments of unrest were the response of workers and students, respectively, to macro-economic dynamics. South Africa’s rapid integration into the global and increasingly financialised economy during the early years of democracy made it subject to the dictates of neoliberalism. In the case of Marikana, this manifested in the ‘increased sub-contracting of mining operations, atypical employment, mechanisation and externalisation of labour costs’, which exacerbated worker precarity (Mabasa & Chinguno, 2018: 319). The #FeesMustFall protests, on the other hand, can be broadly attributed to the stubbornness of exclusionary, racist institutional cultures in the country’s formerly whites-only universities, as well as decreasing state subsidies, which inevitably led to the increase in student fees during 2008–2015 (Chikane, 2018: 126); As can be gleaned from the rest of the African continent’s prior experience, the universities (and their humanities departments in particular) are usually the first casualties of government’s fiscal prudence or what Leftist critics refer to as austerity (see Mamdani, 2007).

The ‘triumph of narrative’ that Ndebele (2007) saw in the truth-telling process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) turned into a crisis of narrative as soon as it became clear that the ‘feeling that “in the fullness of time” things would resolve themselves and life would get better’, observed by Peterson (2009: 19) during the late 1990s, was misplaced. This is because it was not strongly linked to the democratic government’s redistributive socio-economic policies. Approaches to social cohesion and nation formation should take account of the Indlulamithi Scenarios Research finding that ‘respondents feelings of reconciliation were dependent on

certain outcomes such as racial justice and genuine social and economic redress' (Indlulamithi South Africa Scenarios, 2019: 27).

While criticism of 'rainbowism' was not new, the Fallist Movement can be credited with breaking the silence about certain uncomfortable issues that had largely been ignored in elite spaces. The students sought to unmask the 'collective amnesia' (to borrow from the title of a contemporaneous poetry collection; Putuma, 2017) at the heart of the narrative of how South Africa came to be. The populist tendency of the Fallists notwithstanding, their attempt to voice centuries of black pain, which tends to not fit neatly within the time and conceptual frame of 'apartheid-era human rights violations', must be commended and supported where possible. For Peterson (2009), healing this black pain requires abolishing whiteness as a normative system of dominance and privilege that works against black people. The preceding critique of South Africa's nation-building efforts captures the youth's despondency and alienation from the political system. It suggests that deeper engagement with youth perspectives on social, political, cultural and economic exclusion is required in social cohesion programmes. This intervention must be implemented alongside the main recommendations summarised below.

Conclusion and chapter recommendations

The chapter's discussion highlights the importance of coordinating social cohesion programmes within government and broader society more efficiently. Evidence cited earlier in this report, relating to crucial areas, such as social networks, organisation of social life, household composition and political agency in civil society, amplifies this point. Efforts to increase coordination between social cohesion programmes and other government initiatives need to focus on decreasing socio-economic inequality as it is identified in this chapter as the main cause of social divisions. All the survey and interview data cited in this chapter draws attention to addressing material disparities in communities. Constitutional prescripts about social cohesion and policy frameworks require a conducive socio-economic context which will not foster social divisions or fuel exclusions.

Digitisation has diversified citizens' options for expressing political views, engaging in public policy discussions and sharing information. This trend has positive outcomes such as enhancing access to information, empowering citizens' direct oversight and providing new forms of political mobilisation. But there are also dangers to the growing influence of digitisation in social interactions and relations. Some prominent examples include hate speech and the dissemination of false information which exacerbates conflict in society. Thus, it is essential to create appropriate regulatory frameworks which protect citizens' use of digital platforms for political participation while ensuring that this political agency does not deepen social divisions or violate constitutional principles. The current legislative deliberations on this topic need to factor in the chapter's evidence on the links between digitisation and political participation.

This chapter alludes to varied types of political and social agency within South African communities. These findings are important because they point to different forms of political and civic participation. Voter turnout during elections has declined, yet South Africans still engage in diverse citizen-activism strategies. This raises an important question about why these varied forms of political activism do not lead to higher voter turnout in elections. Further research work and citizen engagement is required to answer this pertinent question. Additionally, non-political party participation in the political system needs to be explored within the context of social cohesion. Society is encouraged to explore how this form of participation can aid social cohesion in communities.

Youth development and political participation deserve additional attention in any analysis of macro-social trends. Most of the literature on youth policy has correctly focused on core human development areas such as education, health and employment. But the evidence presented throughout the report amplifies the significance of other dimensions of youth development in social cohesion interventions. Factors such as culture, socialisation and the varied forms of youth political agency are crucial determinants of social cohesion among young people. In addition, structural intergenerational trauma shapes the formation of individual and collective youth identity. The country's social cohesion programmes relating to youth must be sensitive to these historic class, race and gender identity markers.

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CONCLUSION

Main findings

In this second iteration of the MSR (2022), contemporary issues of concern have emerged as South Africa's democracy evolves. One limitation, however, was that this MSR report was developed in the earlier period of the Covid-19 pandemic globally and in South Africa; and so does not deal with its impact in a comprehensive manner. The following extract from a report prepared by MISTRA towards the end of 2020 on the multidimensional impact of a pandemic bears some relevance:

Social psychology of a pandemic

The fundamental lesson of social psychology – which has been highlighted in other parts of the world – is that success in managing a crisis of the magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic depends on two critical factors: firstly, the extent to which the leadership of society enjoys the confidence of the population and, secondly, the capacity of state and other institutions to implement the interventions intended to contain and ameliorate the crisis. The evolution of this dynamic in the six months of South Africa's experience (from March to September 2020) demonstrates this truism in very stark terms.

While it would be difficult to vouch for the reliability of various opinion surveys conducted in this period, there were common trends among most of them.

According to a survey conducted by the University of Johannesburg (UJ) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)⁸ government – particularly the President and the Minister of Health – enjoyed the unprecedented confidence of the population during the early days of interventions. Ipsos also found that South Africans were confident that the government was effectively addressing the threat posed by the spread of the coronavirus, even as the lockdown forced millions to isolate themselves⁹. However, increased polarization and waning willingness

8 HSRC and UJ survey: <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/11849/UJ-HSRC%20Covid-19%20Democracy%20Survey%20Summary%20Findings.pdf>, accessed 27 August 2020

9 Ipsos survey: <https://www.ipsos.com/en-za/online-south-africans-have-more-confidence-government-business-when-it-come-covid-19-0>

to follow strict regulations started to play out about two months into the lockdown.

Indeed, the trust in government started to fray as the socio-economic impact of the pandemic and the interventions took effect, as communities grew weary of the restrictions, as incidents of brutality by security forces were publicised, and as corruption in the awarding of some of the tenders was exposed. The sense of cohesion and mutual solidarity was negatively affected. Confidence in the performance of the President, which fell by 24 percentage points over this period, illustrates this trend. The response from all sections of the leadership – political, business, trade union and other civil society bodies, as well as traditional leaders and healers – has been critical as the situation has unfolded. At the same time, the situation lent itself to varying responses by political players, and the three major political parties started to locate themselves differently on the continuum between ‘saving lives’ and ‘preserving livelihoods’. The African National Congress (ANC) and the government sought to find the delicate balance in-between; the Democratic Alliance (DA) put greater emphasis on opening up economic activity while the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) ventured to posit economic collapse as a welcome prospect that would undermine white economic domination.

In other words, there was an initial sense of leadership, cohesion and progress in dealing with COVID-19, although the efforts were also seen as an exaggerated response and as a diversion from critical socio-economic challenges. The UJ and HSRC survey found that during the hard lockdown (level 5) a significant majority (78 per cent) of the adult public were willing to sacrifice some freedoms to play their part in curbing the spread of COVID-19. As the months went by, frustration and anger intensified.

According to the South African Depression and Anxiety Group (SADAG) calls to their helpline doubled less than two months into lockdown and continued to increase¹⁰. COVID-19 affected people’s livelihoods which has led to depression and anxiety. This includes people grappling with lack of food, housing and job security; difficult home dynamics; gender-based violence and many other aspects of their lives¹¹. Furthermore, people have also had to deal with testing positive for Covid-19 and having to isolate; a fear of infecting others as well as the stigma surrounding testing positive.

The gains made in the initial stages of the lockdown seemed to be slipping as the numbers shot up and issues of food security worsened, aggravated by the massive general disruption of economic and social life. The danger of negative socio-psychological dynamics playing out started to increase – social unrest, helplessness, irrational beliefs, political opportunism, defiance and so on. Though this seemed to be increasing, the state – working with social partners – seems to have managed the situation well enough to prevent a social conflagration

10 Palm, K. 2020. ‘46% of those seeking help are financially stressed during lockdown: SADAG’. Eyewitness News, <https://ewn.co.za/2020/05/08/46-of-those-seeking-help-arefinancially-stressed-during-lockdown-sadag>

11 Msomi, N. 2020. ‘Lockdown has worsened depression and could contribute to suicidal thoughts says mental health group’. *Health-e News*, <https://health-e.org.za/2020/09/04/lockdown-has-worsened-depression-and-could-contribute-to-suicidal-thoughts-saysmental-health-group/>

Communication, reassurance, acknowledgement of weaknesses and a strategy of gradual risk-adjustment seem to have contained the most negative social dynamics.

Other contemporary issues of concern include the low carbon transition in South Africa, and increased digitalisation, as well as concerns around institutional governance and poor socio-economic performance. The 2006 MSR found that ‘overall, the data points to increasing levels of social cohesion, in terms of unity, coherence, functionality and pride among South Africans. However, this is drawn back by the legacy of inequality, intense migratory trends, crime related to social conditions and vestiges of racism in terms of attitudes and practical actions’ (PCAS, 2006: 2). It is salient to highlight the broader socio-economic and political governance context, which informed the main finding cited above. South Africa had experienced one of its longest periods of sustained economic growth (from the late 1990s to 2008), culminating with GDP growth averaging 5 per cent between 2004 and 2007. This economic growth was accompanied by re-integration into global markets, expanded access to basic services for citizens, and the development of one of the world’s largest social transfer systems.

In addition, several legislative changes introduced policies aimed at transforming the demographic composition and the operations of economic, political, social and cultural institutions. In the first decade of democracy, democratic governance principles and constitutional imperatives drove macro-social policy interventions. The 2022 MSR findings must be assessed in relation to changes in the socio-economic and political context after 2006. One of the significant contextual changes is the 2007/08 global financial crisis and its impact on South Africa’s development trajectory. Equally significant are the power shifts in global economic balances, characterised by China’s exponential economic development and higher growth rates in emerging markets. South Africa has experienced additional shifts in the political governance context, with government and public institutional legitimacy eroded as a result of state capture. Both government and private sector organisations played a substantial role in state capture through patronage networks. Finally, the 2022 MSR had to grapple with the impacts of emerging technologies, which are increasingly transforming politics and human development.

The MSR 2022 surfaces important macro-social data that reflects South Africa’s performance in politics, economics and social and cultural dynamics, as well as governance. The major trends are discussed below.

The overall macro-social trends illuminate a decline in essential socio-economic indicators since the 2006 MSR publication. South Africa’s political economy has not performed well in measures such as economic growth, employment, inequality and competitiveness. Poverty rates have increased since 2011 after significant reduction in earlier periods, and the quality of basic public services in communities is poor. These trends have led to persistent social instability, which is exemplified in the social unrest taking place in the economy, local state and other social institutions such as households. A case for economic restructuring and for social

redistribution to address long-standing societal inequalities is developed from the report's findings. South Africa needs a negotiated social compact framework, which is anchored in altering the production, investment, labour market and resource allocation patterns in the economy.

The decline of good governance, which is not confined only to public institutions, has often lead to unethical leadership, corruption, institutional decay and low levels of trust. Governance failures have exacerbated the adverse socio-economic conditions cited in the previous section. The findings from this report highlight the centrality of transparent, accountable and responsive governance in reorienting South Africa's development path. Legitimacy for public and political institutions at national and local state levels is imperative, as it attracts economic investment, improves public services and fosters active citizenship. This report discussed and proposed measures to rebuild government legitimacy. It considered the complexity of patronage networks operations across state and market institutions. This includes factoring in analyses of class formation when drawing lessons for preventing future state capture. South Africa needs to implement public service reforms while simultaneously addressing the race and class socio-economic disparities which create conditions conducive for corrupt patronage networks in the first place. The evidence presented throughout this report shows that poor governance and unethical behaviour are intricately linked to systemic socio-economic inequality.

The race and class inequality themes were also explored in sections examining racial power relations, social mobility, social identity and national reconciliation. These findings reveal that racial inequalities persist in all essential human development areas such as education, household income, employment, skills development and wealth. In addition, institutional racism remains persistent in varied social institutions. It is exemplified in disputes over organisational culture, language and demographics in the make-up of institutions. Data cited in this reports illustrates that the country needs additional national reconciliation programmes, which are aimed at strengthening social cohesion and nation building. These programmes should focus on the following core drivers of social division cited in the report: language, structural inequality, political party discourse and personal experiences of racism. The intersectional analysis in the report goes beyond race and class dynamics. Gender, age and disability trends are examined to determine how they impact on social cohesion. Gender inequalities remain prevalent in labour markets, household income, access to basic services and assets. But some noticeable improvements in areas such as education (especially secondary and tertiary enrolment), and health have been recorded over the past 16 years. An additional finding from the report's gender analysis is the prevalence of gender-based violence in communities. This phenomenon takes place in different social institutions, and is linked to socio-economic factors, psychological disorders and gender socialisation in society. These underlying causes of gender-based violence require coordinated interventions from both state and non-state sections of society, as illustrated by the report's discussion of the National Strategic Plan on Gender Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF). The success of these interventions will be determined by the ability to

implement and strengthen gendered approaches in South Africa's criminal justice system.

The report's discussion on youth cuts across varied human development areas. It goes beyond the prominent policy challenge of youth unemployment, and draws in political, cultural and sociological insights from youth experiences in the past 16 years. Major policy lessons emerge from two central findings in the report: youths' critique of South Africa's national reconciliation efforts and youth-led activism in the education sector. These two phenomena are interlinked and amplify discontent with systemic inequality in society. In addition, youth experiences draw attention to intergenerational differences in society, especially in the areas of politics, culture and economic participation. Young South Africans have expressed their discontent with their overall marginalisation in society, yet they still find ways to engage politically and participate in survivalist economic activity. These actions often take place outside established political institutions and formal markets, but they are important for understanding youth-led citizenship and livelihood practices. The report encourages policy stakeholders to study this youth agency when reforming the nation's youth development policy. It provides a basis for introducing different approaches to youth-focused socio-economic, political and cultural development programmes.

Key insights for future action

Overall, this report has provided an analysis of macro-social trends in South Africa since the last MSR iteration was published in 2006. New data has been surfaced on macro-social trends in the following core areas: social mobility, social networks, social cohesion, identity formation and key human development indicators. The report's research updates and contextual analyses offer insights into the relationship between socio-economic conditions and macro-social trends in the country.

Government legitimacy and trust in public institutions emerged as core themes in this report. These areas have a significant impact on future policy decision-making options for South Africa, especially socio-economic development. The economy-wide restructuring and social redistribution required in the country will not succeed without strengthened government legitimacy or trust in public institutions. Several redistributive social policy propositions, such as the National Health Insurance (National Health Insurance) and Basic Income Grant (BIG), need effective government performance. The continued decline in legitimacy and trust undermines the prospects for successful implementation in these policy areas. This applies equally to crucial macro- and micro-economic interventions necessary for restructuring the economy. Government incentives and rents for business are essential components of economic restructuring processes, and they cannot be deployed successfully without effective state governance.

Declining legitimacy and trust levels also impact on the way citizens engage in political governance. The report highlighted continued social conflicts and protests, despite some of the gains made

in areas such as social policy, improved access to public services and the maintenance of a democratic political culture. Citizens have lost confidence in the formal government processes and institutions mandated to address their socio-economic and political grievances. They opt for alternative strategies that, in most cases, result in social conflict and violence. Government legitimacy and trust levels need to be strengthened to support economic restructuring and to rebuild citizens' confidence in formal state processes. While state institutional reforms and prosecuting corrupt officials feature prominently in most proposals, these efforts need to be supported by socio-economic transformation.

Another important theme for future action is social cohesion and its relation to nation building and reconciliation. South Africa has regressed on one of the Constitution's cardinal principles, namely the creation of a united nation. The report attributes this trend to several core factors causing social divisions; however, systemic inequality is a common trait in all these factors. Thus, addressing all types of inequality is imperative for social cohesion, especially disparities formed along race, class and gender lines. Additionally, the report points to social divisions experienced by citizens at micro and meso levels. Policy interventions aimed at nation building at a national level have produced limited impacts within communities. More efforts need to be directed towards strengthening social cohesion at provincial and local levels. The role of local civil society institutions is essential in this process as these organisations play a significant role in identity formation at a community level.

The impact of innovative technologies, especially within contexts of low carbon and digital economy deliberations, deserves equal attention in future policy decision-making. Trends identified in the report reveal how emerging technologies shape developments in politics, economics, social networks and citizen activism. These technologies provide opportunities for enhancing transparency, access to information, citizen oversight and creating new forms of political activism. The innovations accompanying the introduction of new technologies are also likely to determine the nature of economic restructuring in South Africa. However, the report encourages policymakers to consider introducing adaptive regulatory frameworks that minimise negative outcomes such as misinformation, dissemination of hate speech, privacy encroachments and using digital platforms for entrenching social divisions. The findings in the report equally raise the salience of ensuring that emerging technologies do not deepen existing socio-economic inequality.

The final theme for future consideration is the nature of political expression, participation and engagement by citizens. Chapter six in the report discussed the trend of low voter turnout in national government elections in the past 16 years. This is mainly highlighted in the sections exploring social networks, citizen participation, youth development and social cohesion. Yet, the report also alludes to diverse political expression and participation taking place outside political party institutions and electoral processes. This indicates that low voter turnout does not necessarily mean that South Africans are totally disengaged from politics or public policy debates. It is crucial to comprehend the varied strategies citizens use in political organising and

public policy advocacy. These myriad forms of political participation provide insights into South Africans' main social, economic and political interests, which determine the extent of social cohesion in society. The main challenge is developing measures that strengthen integration between the broader civil society participation described in the report with formal political processes that include, but are not limited to, elections and political party activities.

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This 2022 Macro-Social Report (MSR) aims to update and build on the MSR published by the Presidency of South Africa in 2006. That document discussed major macro-social trends in the country, with a specific focus on core nation-building pillars such as social identity, social cohesion and socio-economic transformation. This 2022 MSR captures the significant changes in South Africa's political, social and economic spheres since 2006. It primarily explores the impact of these structural changes on macro-social trends, which are comprised of social networks; demographic changes in society; socio-economic mobility; and the organisation of social life and identity. This report also draws attention to the major domestic and global contextual shifts that continue to shape macro-social trends in South Africa.

Findings in this MSR point to insights for strengthening democracy over the next years, especially in the areas of governance, social cohesion and socio-economic development. Above all, it is essential to recognise the disparities in material conditions across South Africa in order to understand the trajectory of the country's macro-social trends. Poor economic performance and weak governance threaten to undermine the gains of the first decades of South Africa's democracy. The importance of digital technologies in political and socio-economic developments in the country is also highlighted. It is one of the many macro-social trends discussed in the report which are crucial for determining the legitimacy and consolidation of South Africa's democracy in the years ahead.

