



SOUTH AFRICA'S Secret Police

Gareth van Onselen

Inside the Multi-Billion Rand, Clandestine VIP Protection Services



South African Institute of Race Relations
The power of ideas



South African Institute of Race Relations

The power of ideas

MARCH 2018

Published by the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR)
2 Clamart Road, Richmond
Johannesburg, 2092 South Africa

P O Box 291722, Melville,
Johannesburg, 2109 South Africa

Tel: 011 482 7221
E-mail: info@irr.org.za
www.irr.org.za

© South African Institute of Race Relations

Members of the Media are free to reprint or report information, either in whole or in part, contained in this publication on the strict understanding that the South African Institute of Race Relations is acknowledged. Otherwise no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

While the IRR makes all reasonable efforts to publish accurate information and bona fide expression of opinion, it does not give any warranties as to the accuracy and completeness of the information provided. The use of such information by any party shall be entirely at such party's own risk and the IRR accepts no liability arising out of such use.

Author: Gareth van Onselen
Head of Politics and Governance
South African Institute of Race Relations
Tel: 011 482 7221
Cell: 073 179 5957
Email: gareth@irr.org.za

Design and layout by Ink Design Publishing Solutions, www.inkdesign.co.za

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA'S SECRET POLICE.....	3
2	HOW VIP PROTECTION IS STRUCTURED.....	5
3	HOW VIP PROTECTION WORKS.....	7
4	THE SIZE OF VIP PROTECTION AND ITS MEASURABLE OUTCOMES.....	12
5	FUNDING AN INSATIABLE MONSTER.....	19
6	EVERYTHING WE DON'T KNOW.....	30
7	APPENDIX.....	34
	Appendix 1: Estimates of National Expenditure: 2004/2005 to 2020/2021.....	34
	Appendix 2: Factsheet – VIP Spend 2000 to 2021.....	35

List of Tables

TABLE 1:	Number of assessments undertaken by the SSA: 2010/2011 to 2016/2017	8	TABLE 11:	Annual Budget for Static and Mobile Security: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021	21
TABLE 2:	All VIP flights for 21 Squadron, Reserve Squadrons, Chartered Planes and Helicopters: 2009/2010 to 2011/2012 ...	10	TABLE 12:	Combined Budget for VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021	22
TABLE 3:	Breakdown of all VIP Protection Services Personnel by province: February 2013	13	TABLE 13:	Combined Expenditure on VIP Protection and Static and Mobile Security by Five-Year Presidential Term: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021	23
TABLE 4:	Total number of VIPs Protected by VIP and Presidential Protection Services: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017	13	TABLE 14:	Breakdown of VIP Expenditure by Provincial Division: 2004/2005 to 2008/2009	24
TABLE 5:	All Presidential VIPs Protected by the Presidential Protection Services: June 2017	14	TABLE 15:	Annual Budget for the 21 (VIP) Squadron: 2009/2010 to 2020/2021	25
TABLE 6:	Total number of Foreign Dignitaries and Heads of State protected by VIP Protection: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017	15	TABLE 16:	Combined Total of all Publicly Budgeted Expenditure for VIP Flights	26
TABLE 7:	Total number of VIP Residences protected by Static and Mobile Security: 2008/2009 to 2016/2017	16	TABLE 17:	Cost of VIP Vehicles: 2004/2005 to January 2009.....	27
TABLE 8:	VIP and Presidential Protection Outcomes: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017	17	TABLE 18:	Measuring VIP Outcomes Against Expenditure Increase: 2012/2013 to 2016/17	28
TABLE 9:	Cost of the Presidential Protection Unit: 1997/1998 to 2005/2006	19	TABLE 19:	Four Universities versus VIP Protection Expenditure: Comparative Cost for 2018/2019	29
TABLE 10:	Annual Budget for VIP Protection Services: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021	20	TABLE 20:	National Archive Services versus Increases in VIP Protection Expenditure: Comparative Cost 2007/2008 to 2020/2021	29

1 INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA'S SECRET POLICE

Newly elected President Cyril Ramaphosa was recently pictured walking on the Cape Town Promenade with former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel. The picture was widely promoted on social media as evidence of Ramaphosa as being “a man of the people”. Less commented upon were the three VIP Protection officers flanking him.

They represent the tip of a very large and ever-expanding iceberg, the vast majority of which is hidden from the public eye.

There are few things so blatant and visible in South Africa, yet so secretive and shielded from accountability, as the VIP Protection Services. Quite who these people are, what they do, how they do it and who they report to is next to impossible to determine with any certainty from the public record. And yet they have grown exponentially, year-in and year-out, both in terms of budget and personnel. Today they constitute a veritable army of people. A private army, seemingly accountable to no one.

At the end of the current financial year, according to the 2018/2019 national budget, expenditure on VIP Protection (VIP Protection Services, Presidential Protection Services, Static and Mobile Security and the 21 (VIP) Squadron) will amount to R2.6bn. In 2000/2001, it stood at just R234m. And yet, for all that, we know next to nothing about the VIP Protection Services.

Its budget is shrouded in bureaucratic obfuscation. The Presidential Protection Services budget, for example, was last reported on in the Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE) in 2005/2006. We don't know how or on what basis flights are chartered, at huge expense, for VIP travel. The Protection Services outcomes, as reported in SAPS annual reports, suggest a decline in work, yet, year-on-year, the budget for VIP Protection grows, more often than not at a rate far greater than inflation. A mysterious document called the Risk Management Support System for Very Important Persons Policy (RIMAS) dictates who qualifies for VIP protection and on what basis – it has never been made public and, thus, does not exist on the public record. A hundred other key performance indicators are hidden away from the public and access to them refused to public representatives in Parliament.

It was under President Zuma that expenditure on VIP Protection exploded. Under President Mbeki, in nine years – from 2000/2001 to 2008/2009 – total expenditure on VIP Protection cost R4.3bn. Over the next ten years – from 2009/2010 to 2018/2019 – chiefly under President Zuma, a total of R18.2bn is set to be spent. And still it is growing at an exponential rate. If Cyril Ramaphosa is elected President in 2019, just the first two years of his new administration – 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 – will cost R5.8bn in VIP Protection.


EXPENDITURE ON VIP PROTECTION



R2.6
BILLION
2018/2019




R23
MILLION
2000/2001



AND YET,
FOR ALL THAT,
WE KNOW NEXT TO
NOTHING ABOUT THE VIP
PROTECTION SERVICES.



IT IS, IN THE END, AN ATTEMPT NOT JUST TO DOCUMENT THE LITTLE WE DO KNOW, BUT TO MAP THE VAST CHASM IN THE PUBLIC RECORD IN THE PUBLIC RECORD THAT CONSTITUTES THOSE THINGS WE DO NOT KNOW.



The reasons for this growth are not known. And we have no idea as to how well the Protection Services are actually performing. The relevant indicators, although they are reported on to the portfolio committee, are presented in such generic and vague fashion as to be practically meaningless. There are simply no comprehensive details, just scattered odd and ends, dotted across various formal reports. The public is entirely unaware of, and provided with no justification for, this growth. This, despite the fact that the Constitution states all security services are subject to the authority of Parliament.

This document is designed to serve as a general guide to the VIP Protection Services. By piecing together all the disparate information on the public record, from such sources as annual reports, Treasury documents, Parliamentary questions and replies, it attempts to do three things:

- describe how the VIP Protection Services work, are structured, the outcomes it is responsible for and its performance;
- to track the enormous rise in expenditure on VIP Protection over the past two decades;
- demonstrate the degree to which this exceedingly well-funded police force operates in secret and, generally, without accountability.

To this end, there are a number of tables throughout the document, which aim to track the core performance indicators for the VIP Protection Services. They are supplemented at the end by two Appendices, which are designed to act as 'Master Tables' for all the public costs related to VIP Protection.

At the end of the document, the many things we do not know are set out and summarised.

In this way, the purpose of the document is to expose as much of the iceberg as possible, to inform the public as to how VIP Protection – a complex and contradictory machine – operates and to highlight the key gaps in public knowledge about its performance and operations. **It is, in the end, an attempt not just to document the little we do know, but to map the vast chasm in the public record that constitutes those things we do not know.**

2 HOW VIP PROTECTION IS STRUCTURED

In 2000, the South African Police Service (SAPS) was restructured and all nine provincial VIP Protection Units were consolidated into one national organisation, comprising three sub-programmes.¹ In 2001, for the first time, Protection Services appeared as a line item and stand-alone programme under Safety and Security, in the ENE. The item has, since then, with one or two exceptions, stood alone as Programme 5: Protection Services.

Prior to 2001, there is no public budgetary record for VIP Protection.

Initially, Programme 5 comprised two sub-programmes: the Presidential Protection Unit and Static and In-Transit Protection. Over time, as Programme 5 grew, so more subdivisions emerged. Today, as of the 2018 ENE, there are four sub-programmes under Protection and Security Services (PSS), which the ENE describes as follows:

- **VIP Protection Services:** “Provides for the protection of the president, deputy president, former presidents, their spouses, and other identified dignitaries while in transit.”
- **Static and Mobile Security:** “Provides for the protection of other local and foreign dignitaries and the places in which all dignitaries, including persons related to the president and the deputy president, are present.”
- **Government Security Regulator:** “Provides for security regulations and evaluations, the administration of national key points, and strategic installations.”

- **Operational Support:** “Provides administrative support to the programme, including personnel development.”

2003 was the last time the Presidential Protection Unit would be reported on as a stand-alone line item in the ENE. In the 2004 ENE, following another restructuring, the generic sub-programme that is today called VIP Protection Services would subsume it. As a result, since 2004, it has impossible to tell what the budget is for the Presidential Protection Unit, although one can track total expenditure for VIP Protection Services since 2001.

The latter two sub-programmes – Government Security Regulator and Operational Support – are not relevant to this analysis. It is the former two sub-programmes – VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security – that are responsible for the security personnel who guard VIPs at their residences, and as they work and travel. Thus, this analysis focuses exclusively on them.

According to the latest official organogram for the SAPS, gazetted on 28 September 2017², the top senior management of the organisation, below the Minister and the National Police Commissioner, comprise nine national departmental heads. One of these, separate from Programme 5, is the Head: Presidential Protection Services. Below the senior management and under the Deputy National Police Commissioner, you can find Programme 5, with its own Divisional Commissioner.

2018 ENE PROJECTS
TOTAL EXPENDITURE
ON VIP PROTECTION
SERVICES AND
STATIC AND MOBILE
SECURITY

R3
BILLION


ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT
OF THE ENTIRE
ANNUAL BUDGET
FOR AN INSTITUTION
LIKE THE COUNCIL
FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH

R3.2
BILLION

AND DWARFS THE
LIKES OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES RESEARCH
COUNCIL

R572
MILLION

Thus, although in terms of budget Presidential Protection Services falls under Programme 5, organisationally it stands alone and its National Head reports directly to the National Police Commissioner. On 12 October 2017, in response to a Parliamentary question³, the Minister of Police would confirm this, saying: “The Presidential Protection Service is not under the sub-programme of Protection and Security Services.” Somewhat confusingly, no doubt with reference to the budgetary structure, he added: “In terms of the organisational structure, both are under Programme Five.”



Of the four current sub-programmes that form the Protection and Security Services, the first two – VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security – are the two that people are generally familiar with. It is these two sub-programmes with which this analysis is primarily concerned. The other two – the Government Security Regulator and Operational Support – are essentially administrative and comprise only a small amount (4.7% and 9.6% respectively) of the total Protection and Security Services budget and personnel.

The total Protection and Security Services budget is, it is true, a small fraction itself of the total SAPS budget, constituting around 3.2%. But because the SAPS budget is itself so enormous, that fact can be misleading. **The 2018 ENE projects total expenditure on VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security to come in at just under R3bn. That is roughly the equivalent of the entire annual budget (R3.2bn) for an institution like the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and dwarfs the likes of the Human Sciences Research Council (R572m).** Even the National Research Foundation, the budget for which was slashed in 2018, is now not much bigger (R4.1bn).⁴

But it wasn't always like this. There was a time when very little money at all was allocated to VIP Protection.

3 HOW VIP PROTECTION WORKS

According to the Minister of Police:

“The South African Police Service is tasked in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa to provide a VIP Protection Service to the Executive of South Africa both at National and Provincial levels as set out in Cabinet Memorandum 1A of 2004 dated 10 November 2004, which includes Ministers, Deputy Ministers, National Speaker, Deputy National Speaker, Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Deputy Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Members of the Executive Councils, the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Speakers of various Provincial Legislatures, Deputy President of Supreme Court of Appeal and Judge Presidents.”⁵

It is unclear, on a reading of the Constitution, which clause the SAPS relies upon for the mandate the Police Minister referred to. Section 205 (3) states that, “The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.” But there is nothing in that clause, or Section 205, which suggests members of the executive are entitled to special protection. Indeed, it would be profoundly problematic if the Constitution did single out any one group of people for special protection.⁶

Section 198 (d), which deals with the national security services more generally, however, states that all national security services are “subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive”. That might be

the case on paper, but in practical terms the various protection services would appear to display the very antithesis of accountability.

SAPS offers a standard “protection package” to all those people listed above. Automatically, MECs are graded as “low risk”, MPs as “medium risk” and Presidents and Deputy Presidents as “high risk”.⁷ However, should SAPS feel anyone else qualifies, or a predetermined individual qualifies for extra protection, it relies on a risk assessment to determine the relevant practicalities.

To do this, SAPS uses a policy called the Risk Management Support System for Very Important Persons Policy (RIMAS). **Very little is known about RIMAS. It appears never to have been made public.** But a general description can be found in a 2005 report from the Public Protector.⁸ Drawing on that document and other pieces of information (Parliamentary replies and portfolio committee briefings), it can be described as follows:

RIMAS was presented to Cabinet in October 1996 and approved the following year. It was then amended in 2004 (Cabinet Memorandum 1A of 2004 dated 10 November 2004). The policy defines “Very Important Persons” as follows:

“Individuals or groups of individuals who act in the interest of the country or whose safety is of significant importance to the country, and whose safety and security is either manifestly threatened or the likelihood of their safety and security being threatened is high.”⁹



IT IS UNCLEAR, ON A READING OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH CLAUSE THE SAPS RELIES UPON FOR THE MANDATE THE POLICE MINISTER REFERRED TO

VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT RIMAS. IT APPEARS NEVER TO HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

In order to ascertain whether a person qualifies for VIP Protection, it uses the following five key criteria¹⁰:

- **The personal profile of the VIP:** An assessment of the individual's personal background; their involvement or connection to controversial projects or issues;
- **The political sensitivity of the portfolio of the VIP;**
- **Manifest and potential threats against the security of the VIP:** In order to determine this, the SAPS rely on information provided by intelligence agencies;
- **The residential and office location of the VIP;** and
- **International threat analyses in respect of manifest or potential threats to the security of VIPs, either from domestic or international origin.**

These risk assessments of those individuals deemed to be VIPs are carried out quarterly, and the relevant protection package adjusted accordingly.

The Minister for State Security has said: "The State Security Agency (SSA) performs threat and risk assessments (TRAs) as per request from the South African Police – Directorate for Protective Services (DPSS), which includes the VIP services and the Presidential Protection Services (PPS). Threat assessments are also provided in support of the security deployment detail of the NATJOINTS. These assessments are provided to support the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division, and on the whole, the SSA provides the assessments on a routine basis as part of its Counter Intelligence mandate."¹¹

SSA derives its mandate from the National Strategic Act of 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), and as amended by the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act of 2013 (Act No. 11 of 2013), to conduct and coordinate Counter Intelligence (CI). It states the SSA is required to "put in place or institute measures and conduct activities to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence operations, to protect intelligence and any classified information, to conduct vetting investigations and to counter any threat or potential threat to national security".¹²

This is a breakdown of the number of risk assessments conducted by the SSA on behalf of SAPS and with regard to VIPs since 2010:

TABLE 1: Number of assessments undertaken by the SSA: 2010/2011 to 2016/2017¹³

YEAR	NUMBER OF ASSESSMENTS
2010/2011	5
2011/2012	5
2012/2013	39
2013/2014	42
2014/2015	86
2015/2016	109
2016/2017	60

Once the SSA has been determined that someone qualifies for VIP Protection, they are provided with a standard package (possibly adjusted to accommodate their risk profile). National and provincial dignitaries (Ministers, deputy Ministers, premiers and MECs) are provided with a standard number of protectors, who accompany them at all times.

In 2005, then SAPS Protection Services Divisional Commissioner LM Tshabalala put it like this: **“The individual protected remains an office bearer irrespective of the activity which may be engaged in and the interests of the country will still be negatively impacted upon should harm befall such individual thus requiring seamless protection.”**¹⁴

Along with a standard cohort of accompanying protectors, Static and Mobile Security also provides personnel to guard the official residence and offices of national dignitaries.


But it is with regard to the President and Deputy President that special measures apply, particularly when it comes to travel.

RIMAS states: “In the national interest, the President and the Deputy President receive high profile VIP protection and are obliged to accept it.”¹⁵

According to the Public Protector: “The responsibility of managing their travel by air remains that of the SAPS, but the aircraft is provided by the South African Air Force (SAAF). The SAAF is responsible for the flying and managing of the aircraft assigned to the Presidency on a 24-hour basis, regardless of the nature of the journey and irrespective of the existence or absence of any threat.”¹⁶

To this end, the SAAF, under the Defence Force, maintains 21 Squadron (more commonly referred to as the VIP Squadron), but SAPS can and often does make use of charter flights. It also has one plane of its own, which services VIP Protection Services. In 2009, it was revealed that the SAPS purchased a Cessna Citation Sovereign private business jet at a cost of R150 million to, among other things, “transport VIP protection service advance teams to countries in Africa”.¹⁷

The 21 Squadron comprises the following aircraft: two C550 Citation II light business jets, two Falcon 50 medium size business jets, one Falcon 900 medium size business jet and one Boeing BBJ, large business jet¹⁸. The Boeing – christened Inkwazi – was purchased in 2002 at a cost of around R400m (R100m of which was spent on the interior).¹⁹



It is notoriously difficult to get any information on how often the 21 Squadron is used or at what cost. The last reliable piece of information came in 2012 in response to a Parliamentary question²⁰. For the three-year period 2009/2010 to 2011/2012, there were a total of 551 flights to transport the President and Deputy President, as well as the Defence Minister, whom 21 Squadron also serves:

“
THE INDIVIDUAL
PROTECTED REMAINS
AN OFFICE BEARER
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE
ACTIVITY WHICH MAY
BE ENGAGED IN AND
THE INTERESTS OF
THE COUNTRY WILL
STILL BE NEGATIVELY
IMPACTED UPON
SHOULD HARM BEFALL
SUCH INDIVIDUAL THUS
REQUIRING SEAMLESS
PROTECTION.

TABLE 2: All VIP flights for 21 Squadron, Reserve Squadrons, Chartered Planes and Helicopters: 2009/2010 to 2011/2012

YEAR	21 SQUADRON	SAAF RESERVE SQUADRONS	CHARTERED	SAAF HELICOPTER	SAAF HELICOPTER ("FERRY FLIGHTS")	TOTAL
President Jacob Zuma						
2009/2010	72	16	3	63	84	238
2010/2011	84	7	1	131	63	286
2011/2012	72	2	23	137	74	308
Total	228	25	27	331	221	832
Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe						
2009/2010	52	14	0	–	–	66
2010/2011	48	16	8	–	–	72
2011/2012	47	7	16	–	–	70
Total	147	37	24	–	–	208
Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu						
2009/2010	52	17	0	–	–	69
2010/2011	68	37	1	–	–	106
2011/2012	56	25	0	–	–	81
Total	176	79	1	–	–	256
Grand Total	551	141	52	331	221	1 296

These flights are supplemented by a range of helicopter flights, also primarily managed by the SAAF (but not part of 21 Squadron) and comprising charter flights too. Significantly, the category "Ferry Flights", of which there were 221 during the three years in question, constitute those flights without any VIP passengers, as a helicopter simply flies to meet or returns from dropping a VIP off at a given location.

Although there was every indication that the use of 21 Squadron, and VIP flights in general, was increasing in the early 2010s, evidence now suggests the preference is for chartered flights. In November 2017, Defence Web reported that "earlier this month SAAF Chief, Lieutenant General Zakes Msimang, indicated plans were underway to improve aircraft availability at 21 Squadron, the unit tasked with VVIP and VIP transport. A lack of qualified maintenance and service personnel has seen low availability of aircraft, including Inkwazi, a Falcon 900B and

a Falcon 50. The situation was reportedly heading towards a complete grounding of all aircraft on the squadron's inventory."²¹

Charter flights are governed by a transversal contract (that is, a universal contract that cross cuts multiple departments), managed and maintained by the Treasury²². A copy of the relevant contract is available on the Treasury website. The relevant User Agreement states: "The transportation of IP's / VIP's/ VVIP's must be done by Midsize, Supersize or Wide-bodied jets."

Of VIP transportation, it states: "The South African Air Force is responsible to provide worldwide air transport to the South African President, Deputy President, Minister of Defence and other senior members of Cabinet. To meet this obligation a fleet of SA Air Force and Air Force Reserve Squadron VVIP aircraft are utilised." To this end, it determines: "Choice of aircraft will be subject to approval of the office of the particular principal"; "The aircraft must be available for possible inspection and approval by SAAF officials prior to the flight" and "the aircraft should be capable of transporting 10 passengers without any refuelling stops."

On the particulars, it states that the relevant plane must fit a "maximum of 14 passengers", provide "sleeping and bathroom facilities" for the relevant principal and their partner, a private facility for the principal, to be used as an office – as well as for two others, a "minimum of 6 seats in VIP configuration (ex First class) capable of reclining into a flat sleeping position" and the "Remaining seats in Business Class configuration (Preferably separated from rest of VVIP passengers)". Among other things, it also specifies "(a)n entertainment system (Audio + Video) that is accessible to both the VVIP and VIP passengers."

It is currently unknown how many flights are chartered on an annual basis for VIP Protection, but, given the decline in the use of 21 Squadron, it is no doubt significant and comes at great cost.

The relevant legislation governing VIP travel extends to the Presidential Handbook, which states: "For official purposes, private aircraft may be utilised by the President only in special circumstances, and after consultation with NSS."²³ Likewise and with regard to the Deputy President, the Handbook states: "For official purposes, private or commercial aircraft may be utilised by the Deputy President only in special circumstances, and after consultation with NSS. For private travel, private or commercial aircraft may be used after consultation with NSS."²⁴

The other core component of VIP travel is ground transport, comprising those cars which transport and accompany (as part of a convoy) VIP members and which constitute the relevant fleet. These fall under the SAPS. The public record carries no current information on the size or nature of the current VIP Protection Services fleet. In May 2010, in response to a Parliamentary question, the Minister of Police revealed that the size of the VIP Protection fleet stood at 614 vehicles.²⁵



IT IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN HOW MANY FLIGHTS ARE CHARTERED ON AN ANNUAL BASIS FOR VIP PROTECTION, BUT, GIVEN THE DECLINE IN THE USE OF 21 SQUADRON, IT IS NO DOUBT SIGNIFICANT AND COMES AT GREAT COST.

VIP PROTECTION FLEET




4 THE SIZE OF VIP PROTECTION AND ITS MEASURABLE OUTCOMES

“
FOR THE 2012/2013 FINANCIAL YEAR, THE TREASURY REPORTED THAT THE VIP PROTECTION UNIT PROVIDED PROTECTION “TO 450 SOUTH AFRICAN AND FOREIGN DIGNITARIES” — THAT WORKS OUT TO AN AVERAGE OF 4.4 VIP PROTECTION PERSONNEL TO EACH VIP (4.4:1).

The Treasury does not always provide information on the staff complement for each sub-programme (sometimes it does, sometimes it does not). The last time it did so for each sub-programme was in 2012/13²⁶. Those figures were as follows:

- **VIP Protection Services:** 1 998 personnel;
- **Static and Mobile Security:** 3 376 personnel;
- **Government Security Regulator:** 273 personnel; and
- **Operational Support:** 716 personnel.



That means a total of 5 374 VIP Protectors between VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security, and a total of 6 363 funded posts across Programme 5. Although a breakdown by sub-programme was not made available, the 2018/2019 ENE puts the total staff complement for Programme 5 at 6 585. Taking into account a marginal increase, those 2012/2013 numbers remain generally accurate today.

According to a Parliamentary reply from the police Minister, in 2014 the ratio of police to the South African population was one officer to 346 citizens (1:346), based on the 153 116 personnel employed in terms of the SAPS Act (visible policing, detectives and crime intelligence). The SAPS excludes administrative personnel when generating its ratio²⁷.

For the 2012/2013 financial year, the Treasury reported that the VIP Protection Unit provided protection “to 450 South African and foreign dignitaries” — that works out to an average of 4.4 VIP Protection personnel to each VIP (4.4:1). It also reported that, “137 residences and installations were protected” by the Static and Mobile Security Unit — or 24.6 VIP Protection personnel to each location (24.6:1).²⁸

No information is available on the precise breakdown of those particular ratios, whether those for the President, members of the executive or dignitaries.

Thus, as a general rule, while 346 South Africans are forced to share one police officer, VIPs have at least 4.4 security personnel guarding them at any one time.

It is difficult definitively to know how those personnel currently break down by sub-programme or province. In July 2013, however, the Minister of Police revealed that 1 151 personnel were assigned to the VIP Protection Services alone, as of 28 February 2013²⁹. This means, if one uses the total personnel figures provided in the ENE in that year, 847 personnel were assigned to the Presidential Protection Unit, which falls within VIP Protection Services.

The Minister broke down the deployment of those 1 151 personnel in VIP Protection as follows:

TABLE 3: Breakdown of all VIP Protection Services Personnel by Province: February 2013

PROVINCE/UNIT	DEDICATED PERSONNEL
Eastern Cape	117
Free State	64
Gauteng	119
KwaZulu-Natal	118
Limpopo	55
Mpumalanga	63
North West	92
Northern Cape	53
Western Cape	61
National VIP Pretoria	217
National VIP Cape Town	192
Total	1 151

According to SAPS annual reports³⁰, the number of VIPs protected by VIP Protection Services and Mobile and Static Security over the past ten years is as follows:

TABLE 4: Total number of VIPs Protected by VIP and Presidential Protection Services: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017

YEAR	VIP PROTECTION SERVICES		PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICE	TOTAL
	National Dignitaries	Provincial Dignitaries	Presidential (PPS)	
2007/2008	N/A	N/A	N/A	191
2008/2009	N/A	N/A	N/A	206
2009/2010	N/A	N/A	N/A	216
2010/2011	N/A	N/A	N/A	229
2011/2012	78	119	17	214
2012/2013	77	123	18	218
2013/2014	74	126	18	218
2014/2015	96	163	16	275
2015/2016	84	135	16	235
2016/2017	75	128	16	219

These comprise the core VIPs for which the Protection Services are responsible. With a few exceptions, those national dignitaries generally reflect the members of the national executive, provincial dignitaries – MECs and premiers – and Presidential Dignitaries; the president, former presidents and their spouses.³¹

VIP PROTECTION SERVICES

1 151
PERSONNEL
RATIO OF 5.7 TO 1

PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES

847
PERSONNEL
RATIO OF 47 TO 1



IT IS UNCLEAR ON WHAT GROUNDS THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL IN THE PRESIDENCY QUALIFIED FOR PROTECTION FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION UNIT, AS OPPOSED TO FROM VIP PROTECTION SERVICES, AS IS THE CASE WITH REGARDS TO DR NKOSAZANA DLAMINI-ZUMA,

Using only the personnel numbers provided by the Minister of Police for 2013, and the respective personnel number in the ENE for 2012/2013, the following general ratios hold for that year:

- VIP Protection Services: 200 national and provincial dignitaries, assigned 1 151 personnel, equates to a general ratio of 5.7 to 1
- Presidential Protection Services: 18 dignitaries, assigned 847 personnel, equates to a general ratio of 47 to 1

Regards VIP Protection, the numbers of national and provincial dignitaries assigned protection jumped significantly for the recent round of national elections (up from 74 national dignitaries in 2013/2014 to 96 in 2014/2015 and from 126 provincial dignitaries to 163). This could be explained by the change in many national and provincial executive positions as the respective cabinets were changed, in response to the election results. Thus, if a minister or MEC was “reshuffled” both they and their replacement would have received protection during the course of that financial year.

It is unclear on what grounds the Director-General in the Presidency qualified for protection from the Presidential Protection Unit, as opposed to from VIP Protection Services, as is the case with regards to Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, although she would possibly qualify as a former spouse of President Jacob Zuma. That said, similar protection is not afforded to the former wives of other former presidents. For example, former first lady Mapula Mopate, divorced from Kgalema Motlanthe in 2010, is not listed as a beneficiary of Presidential Protection.

The Minister of Police, in a June 2017 Parliamentary reply³², provided the names of all 16 VIPs protected by the Presidential Protection Services at the time³³. They were as follows:

TABLE 5: All Presidential VIPs Protected by the Presidential Protection Services: June 2017

	Current President of South Africa
1.	President JG Zuma
	Current Deputy President of South Africa
2.	Deputy President MC Ramaphosa
	Former Presidents of South Africa
3.	Former President FW De Klerk
4.	Former President TM Mbeki
5.	Former President KP Motlanthe
	Former Deputy Presidents of South Africa
6.	Former Deputy President P Mlambo-Ngcuka
7.	Former Deputy President BM Mbete
	Current First Ladies of South Africa
8.	Spouse of President JG Zuma, GA Khumalo (Ma-Khumalo)
9.	Spouse of President JG Zuma, N Ntuli (MaNtuli)
10.	Spouse of President JG Zuma, TS Madiba
11.	Spouse of President JG Zuma, GB Ngema (MaNgema)
12.	Spouse of Deputy President MC Ramaphosa, Ms Motsepe
	Former First Ladies of South Africa
13.	Spouse of Former President TM Mbeki, Mrs Z Mbeki
14.	Spouse of Former President KP Motlanthe, Ms Mtshali
15.	Spouse of Former President Mandela, Mrs G Machel
	Other persons afforded this service
16.	Director General from Presidency, CL Lubisi
17.	African Union Chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

The Police Minister has stated that he is not prepared to release any information with regards to the number of VIP personnel assigned to Presidential Dignitaries, stating: "The total number of members allocated to these VIPs will not be disclosed, as the disclosure of this information in itself can pose a serious risk to the effective protection of the President and Deputy President."³⁴

However, with regard to President Jacob Zuma, there is a degree of evidence on this front to be gleaned from the media. In November 2016, Business Day reported that 88 VIP Protectors had been exclusively assigned to the President³⁵. The previous month, City Press reported that the Presidential motorcade consisted of 20 vehicles, including a separate medical van and vehicle for the President's military medic and that four

additional armed-guards from the SAPS Special Task Force were to now accompany Zuma on all flights, in addition to his pre-existing VIP security contingent³⁶.

Both the VIP Protection Services and the Presidential Protection Services provide security beyond senior government executives. Foreign dignitaries and Heads of State are likewise afforded protection, depending on their status, by both. Reporting on how this works is sketchy, going by the SAPS annual reports³⁷. The various categories are reported on haphazardly and sometimes not at all. Sometimes criteria are merged and sometimes the information provided is confusing. But it is possible to discern the following information for the past ten years:



TABLE 6: Total number of Foreign Dignitaries and Heads of State protected by VIP Protection: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017

YEAR	VIP PROTECTION SERVICES	PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES	Total	VIP PROTECTION SERVICES	VIP MOVEMENTS	PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES	Total	PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES
	FOREIGN DIGNITARIES	HEADS OF STATE		MAJOR, NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL EVENTS		PRESIDENTIAL MOVEMENTS		PRESIDENTIAL VISITS
2007/2008	154	N/A	154	62	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2008/2009	492	11	492	321	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2009/2010	237	N/A	237	363	136 419	N/A	136 419	61
2010/2011	204	N/A	204	257	167 774	N/A	167 774	246
2011/2012	143	N/A	143	298	144 584	N/A	144 584	N/A
2012/2013	160	72	232	294	99 802	N/A	99 802	177
2013/2014	81	208	289	44	93 101	1 525	94 626	178
2014/2015	56	108	164	41	N/A	N/A	N/A	180
2015/2016	62	178	240	362	N/A	N/A	N/A	187
2016/2017	73	65	138	362	90 111	N/A	90 111	150

NUMBER OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TRIPS



The first thing to notice is how consistent the numbers are, even decreasing in certain criteria. The number of foreign dignitaries protected by both VIP Protection Services and the Presidential Protection Services has only once breached 300 (492 in 2008/2009) and for the most part stays steady at between 150 and 250 foreign VIPs per year. Likewise, the number of major, national or provincial events for which VIP Protection is responsible for some element of security has generally fluctuated around the 300 mark. The number of “VIP Movements” (or shifts – a shift

being a trip) has decreased from 167 774 in 2010/2011 (the year of the World Cup), to just 90 111 in 2016/2017. And the number of domestic and international trips by those 16 odd people who enjoy Presidential Protection has generally remained around the 180 mark.

The reporting on Static and Mobile Security is better and, over the past five years, has been almost comprehensive. Nevertheless, that unit also demonstrates a remarkable consistency:

TABLE 7: Total number of VIP Residences protected by Static and Mobile Security: 2008/2009 to 2016/2017

YEAR	STATIC AND MOBILE SECURITY			PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES		
	14 “STATIC UNITS” AS OF 2017			4 “STATIC UNITS” AS OF 2017		
	INSTALLATIONS	VIP RESIDENCE	TOTAL “PROTECTION ACTIONS”	OFFICES	VIP RESIDENCE	TOTAL “PROTECTION ACTIONS”
2008/2009	25	90	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2009/2010	25	76	73 730	N/A	N/A	N/A
2010/2011	28	93	88 330	N/A	N/A	N/A
2011/2012	28	109	95 344	N/A	N/A	N/A
2012/2013	40	97	98 728	3	15	8 748
2013/2014	40	90	97 090	3	15	13 140
2014/2015	40	92	94 352	4	19	16 790
2015/2016	40	102	97 380	4	17	15 372
2016/2017	28	96	94 780	4	17	15 330

PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION SERVICES

- 20 residences
- four offices
- 15 000 annual shift

Again, security is split between Static and Mobile Security (which has 14 dedicated “Static Units” for the protection of VIP Residences and VIP Installations) and Presidential Protection Services (which has four dedicated units to similar ends). The number of buildings protected has remained consistent at around 40, the number of residences at around

100 and the number of shifts to this end, steady at around 95 000 per year. With regard to the Presidential Protection Services, again, a similar pattern: Just under 20 residences, four offices and an annual shift number on or around 15 000.

With regards to the final and ultimate measurable outcome for VIP Protection Services – security breaches – according to SAPS Annual Reports³⁸, save for one incident in 2010, both the VIP Protection Services and the Presidential Protection Services claim to have a spotless record:

TABLE 8: VIP and Presidential Protection Outcomes: 2007/2008 to 2016/2017

YEAR	UNIT	SAPS ANNUAL REPORT
2007/2008	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"There were no security breaches."
2008/2009	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred."
2009/2010	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred in South Africa or abroad."
2010/2011	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"During the reporting period, one security breach occurred during the 2nd quarter while protecting a South African VIP at the Tshwane University of Technology. No security breaches occurred during special and provincial events and visits by foreign VIPs to the country or South African VIP visits abroad."
2011/2012	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"During the reporting period, one security breach occurred. The security breach occurred at Danielskuil in the Northern Cape in respect of the protection of a Member of the Executive Council (MEC). No security breaches occurred during major/special and provincial events as well as visits by foreign VIPs to the country and South African VIP visits abroad."
2012/2013	Single Line Item: VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the in-transit protection of Presidential VIPs, South African VIPs, foreign VIPs visiting the country, presidential visits abroad or major events."
2013/2014	VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the protection of South African VIPs within South Africa, during major/special, national or provincial events, or during visits by foreign VIPs to the country and South African VIP visits abroad."
	Presidential Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the protection of Presidential VIPs within South Africa, abroad, at major events or during visits to the country by foreign Heads of States."
2014/2015	VIP Protection Services	N/A
	Presidential Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the protection of Presidential VIPs in South Africa and abroad, during major events or during visits of foreign Heads of State to the country."
2015/2016	VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred."
	Presidential Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the protection of Presidential VIPs in South Africa and abroad, during major events or during visits of foreign Heads of State to the country."
2016/2017	VIP Protection Services	"No security breaches have occurred during the protection of South African VIPs within South Africa and abroad, during major/special, national or provincial events, during visits by foreign VIPs to the country or visits by South African VIPs abroad."
	Presidential Protection Services	"No security breaches occurred during the protection of Presidential VIPs in South Africa and abroad, during major events or during visits of foreign Heads of State to the country."



BY THE PRESIDENT'S OWN ADMISSION, HOWEVER, SECURITY BY THIS DEFINITION WAS CLEARLY VIOLATED. THERE WAS, IN JUNE 2014, AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION ON THE PRESIDENT BY POISON, WHICH WAS SUCCESSFULLY ADMINISTERED TO THE PRESIDENT AND WHICH, BY HIS OWN ACCOUNT, RESULTED IN SEVERE PHYSICAL HARM, A MEDICAL EMERGENCY AND ULTIMATELY IN HIS NEAR DEATH

This, however, is difficult to reconcile with the public record. In August 2017, for example, President Jacob Zuma confirmed a long-standing suspicion that he had been poisoned in June 2014. He said: "I was poisoned and almost died just because South Africa joined Brics [the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa business communities] under my leadership. They said I was going to destroy the country."³⁹ He went into some detail, stating that "I nearly died because they did poison me. They managed to find someone close to me and I know it. I was dead. They don't believe how I survived. Not one dose, because the person who was poisoning me was so innocent, so close. Three doses. Even scientists can't believe why I did not die (sic)..."

In November 2017, he repeated this confirmation, telling ANN7: "I was poisoned, some people wanted me dead, indeed it was quite a strong poison and I did go through a challenging time... Those who call me their enemies it is their choice."⁴⁰

First Lady Nompumelelo Ntuli-Zuma is currently being investigated by the Hawks for allegedly poisoning the president, although no charge has been laid. She denies guilt. Her lawyer has stated: "She is adamant that she has nothing to do with a so-called plot to try and assassinate or kill the president." In January 2015 she was instructed by State Security Minister David Mahlobo to vacate the President's Nkandla residence pending the investigation.⁴¹

In 2014, the relevant outcome for the Presidential Protection Services in the SAPS annual report read: "No security breaches occurred during

the protection of Presidential VIPs in South Africa and abroad". The SAPS 2013/2014 Annual Report defines a "security breach" as "Any act that bypassed or contravened security policies, practices or procedures, resulting in physical harm, medical emergencies or embarrassment⁴² to a VIP."⁴³

By the President's own admission, however, security by this definition was clearly violated. There was, in June 2014, an attempted assassination on the President by poison, which was successfully administered to the President and which, by his own account, resulted in severe physical harm, a medical emergency and ultimately in his near death.

If there is any truth to the suspicion that the First Lady was involved, that would constitute a double breach – for she, just like the President, is protected by the Presidential Protection Services. Likewise, if there is any truth to the President's assertion that the attempt followed his policy on BRICS, it constitutes an intensely political attack and, simultaneously, a failure of the intelligence services.⁴⁴

Despite this, the Presidential Protection Services or the intelligence services have never been called before the Police Portfolio Committee or Parliament to account for the breach, its claim in the 2014/2015 Annual Report has never been challenged and it appears from the public record that no member of the Presidential Protection Services has ever been made to account for the failure.

5 FUNDING AN INSATIABLE MONSTER

If one tracks the annual expenditure on VIP protection over the years, as set out in the ENE, a number of patterns emerge. Of these, the first and most significant is that expenditure has increased, almost without exception, every year since it was first established as a line item in 2000. The second is that the amount of information the Treasury is willing to make available about Programme 5 has simultaneously decreased every year, to the extent that, in the 2018 ENE, there was almost no detail at all.

The 2001 ENE stated:

“The work of the Presidential Protection Unit has increased since President Mbeki’s inauguration, as former President Mandela and his spouse continue to receive protection. This has necessitated an increase in the budget of the Unit, and accounts for the 50,5 per cent average increase in the budget for this sub-programme between 1997/98 and 2000/01. The bulk of programme expenditure is devoted to the protection of other prominent people; this accounts for 88 per cent of expenditure.”

The Presidential Protection Unit was a temporary feature, as a stand-alone item, in the ENE⁴⁵. It appears nine times, from 1997/1998 (R10.8m) to 2005/2006 (R92.8m), before it disappears, to be subsumed by the generic line item, VIP Protection Services.

Over that period, the amount spent on the Presidential Protection Unit was as follows:

TABLE 9: Cost of the Presidential Protection Unit: 1997/1998 to 2005/2006:

ADMINISTRATION	FINANCIAL YEAR	PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION UNIT
Nelson Mandela	1997/1998	R10.8m (A)
	1998/1999	R16.4m (A)
2 Year Total:		R27.2m
Thabo Mbeki	1999/2000	R30.0m (A)
	2000/2001	R34.4m (A)
	2001/2002	R67.4m (P)
	2002/2003	R63.7m (P)
	2003/2004	R79.9m (P)
5 Year Total:		R275.4m
Thabo Mbeki [Kgalema Motlanthe]	2004/2005	R86.7m (P)
	2005/2006	R92.8m (P)
	2006/2007	N/A
	2007/2008	N/A
	2008/2009	N/A
5 Year Total:		R179.5m
<p>(A): Audited amount (i.e. definitive expenditure) (P): Proposed allocated (subject to adjustment in Mid Term Review and/or, finally, auditing)</p>		

With regard to the generic VIP Protection Services (Table 10), although the leap in expenditure in 2001 was significant at the time, up from R138m in 2000 to R237m in 2001, the ENE states that “(t)he small decline in expected spending in 2001/2002 relative to budget estimates in 2000 reflects a commitment to contain spending on this programme”.



2005/2006 – THE LAST YEAR THE PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION UNIT APPEARED IN THE BUDGET.

SLOWLY AT FIRST, THROUGHOUT MBEKI’S PRESIDENCY, AND THEN EXPONENTIALLY THROUGH ZUMA’S, SPENDING ON VIP PROTECTION WOULD EXPLODE.

Elsewhere, it states: “Although it is the intention of the Department of Safety and Security to report on the performance of the Protection services, it is not possible at this stage to provide data on the number of people receiving protection every year.”

Both these commitments, however, came to nought. **Slowly at first, throughout Mbeki’s presidency, and then exponentially through Zuma’s, spending on VIP Protection would explode.** Simultaneously, the amount of information reported on Programme 5 would slowly evaporate to the point of non-existence.

TABLE 10: Annual Budget for VIP Protection Services: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021⁴⁶

COST	THABO MBEKI				THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE				JACOB ZUMA				JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				
R2.0bn																					
R1.9bn																					
R1.8bn																					
R1.7bn																				R1.72bn	
R.16bn																			R1.61bn		
R.15bn																	R1.50bn				
R1.4bn																	R1.40bn				
R1.3bn																					
R1.2bn																	R1.22bn				
R1.1bn																R1.15bn					
R1.0bn																					
R900m																R977m					
R800m																					
R700m																					
R600m																					
R500m																					
R400m																					
R300m																					
R200m																					
R100m																					
R0.0m																					
YEAR	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	THABO MBEKI				THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE				JACOB ZUMA				JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				

TABLE 11: Annual Budget for Static and Mobile Security: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021⁴⁷

COST	THABO MBEKI			THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE					JACOB ZUMA					JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA			
R1.5bn																					
R1.4bn																					
R1.3bn																					
R1.2bn																					
R1.1bn																					
R1.0bn																					
R900m																					
R800m																					
R700m																					
R600m																					
R500m																					
R400m																					
R300m																					
R200m																					
R100m																					
R0.0m	R95.9m	R62.0m	R64.8m	R108m	R153m	R264m	R335m	R408m	R473m	R642m	R733m	R760m	R784m	R863m	R909m	R913m	R969m	R997m	R1.06bn	R1.13bn	R1.21bn
YEAR	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	THABO MBEKI			THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE					JACOB ZUMA					JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA			

(For both tables, the last three years 2018/2019, 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 are projected estimates in line with the medium-term budget policy)

Spending remained relatively stable through President Mbeki's two terms in office (2000/2001 to 2008/09). Although it did increase, it did not significantly outstrip inflation, rising by just R215m (VIP Protection Services) and R378m (Static and Mobile Security) over nine years. But it was with the election of President Jacob Zuma in 2009 that the budget would skyrocket. Over the following ten years (2009/2010 to 2018/2019)

the VIP Protection Services budget grows by R1.148bn (up to R1.5bn) and Static and Mobile Security by R589m (up to R1bn).

The latest ENE (2018) projects a combined total spend of R5.7bn on the two sub-programmes for the 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 financial years. By way of comparison, in President Mbeki's last two years in office (one of which saw Kgalema Motlanthe take over the Presidency) a combined total of R1.5bn was spent.

TABLE 12: Combined Budget for VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021⁴⁸

COST	THABO MBEKI				THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE				JACOB ZUMA					JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA			
R3.2bn																					
R3.1bn																					
R3.0bn																					
R2.9bn																					R2.94bn
R2.8bn																					
R2.7bn																				R2.74bn	
R2.6bn																					
R2.5bn																			R2.56bn		
R2.4bn																	R2.40bn				
R2.3bn																					
R2.2bn																					
R2.1bn																R2.19bn					
R2.0bn															R2.01bn						
R1.9bn																					
R1.8bn														R1.88bn							
R1.7bn													R1.73bn								
R1.6bn																					
R1.5bn													R1.53bn								
R1.4bn												R1.42bn									
R1.3bn																					
R1.2bn										R1.26bn											
R1.1bn																					
R1.0bn									R1.08bn												
R900m																					
R800m								R826m													
R700m							R730m														
R600m						R629m															
R500m					R516m																
R400m																					
R300m			R331m	R366m	R376m																
R200m	R233m	R299m																			
R100m																					
R0.0m																					
YEAR	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	THABO MBEKI				THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE				JACOB ZUMA					JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA				CYRIL RAMAPHOSA			

Finally, it is by comparing the total costs for each administration (five-year terms) that the full extent of the explosion in spending over Jacob Zuma's tenure becomes evident, as well as an indication of the size of the

budget now allocated to VIP Protection that President Cyril Ramaphosa will inherit over the next five years:

TABLE 13: Combined Expenditure on VIP Protection and Static and Mobile Security by Five-Year Presidential Term: 2000/2001 to 2020/2021⁴⁹

COST	THABO MBEKI	THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE	JACOB ZUMA	JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA	CYRIL RAMAPHOSA
R12.0bn					
R11.5bn					
R11.0bn				R11 118.7bn	
R10.5bn					
R10.0bn					
R9.5bn					
R9.0bn					
R8.5bn					
R8.0bn					
R7.5bn					
R7.0bn			R7 045.9bn		
R6.5bn					
R6.0bn					
R5.5bn					R5 668.4bn
R5.0bn					
R4.5bn					
R4.0bn					
R3.5bn					
R3.0bn		R3 078.6bn			
R2.5bn					
R2.0bn					
R1.5bn					
R1.0bn	R1 230.9bn				
R500m					
R0.0m					
TERM	2000/2001 – 2003-2004	2004/2005 – 2008/2009	2009/2010 – 2013/2014	2014/2015 – 2018/2019	2019/2020 – 2020/2021
	THABO MBEKI	THABO MBEKI/KGALEMA MOTLANTHE	JACOB ZUMA	JACOB ZUMA/CYRIL RAMAPHOSA	CYRIL RAMAPHOSA



JUST THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF CYRIL RAMAPHOSA'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION, 2019/2020 TO 2020/2021, IS SET TO COST R5.7BN FOR VIP PROTECTION. AT A CONSERVATIVE AVERAGE OF R3BN PER YEAR, A FULL RAMAPHOSA PRESIDENTIAL FIVE-YEAR TERM CAN BE FAIRLY ESTIMATED TO COST AT LEAST R15BN, AND AT LEAST R30BN OVER 10 YEARS IN VIP PROTECTION.

In brief, in the nine years between 2000/2001 and 2008/2009, VIP Protection under President Mbeki cost R4.3bn. Over the course of the following ten years, from 2009/2010 to 2018/2019, it is set to cost R18.2bn.

Just the first two years of Cyril Ramaphosa's first administration, 2019/2020 to 2020/2021, is set to cost R5.7bn for VIP Protection. At a conservative average of R3bn per year, a full Ramaphosa presidential five-year term can be fairly estimated to cost at least R15bn, and at least R30bn over 10 years in VIP Protection.

TABLE 14: Breakdown of VIP Expenditure by Provincial Division: 2004/2005 to 2008/2009

PROVINCE	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007	2007/2008	2008/2009
Head Office	R24 329 027.00	R19 556 620.00	R8 932 986.00	R6 054 097.00	R18 946 981.00
Western Cape	R418 156.00	R308 568.00	R42 837.00	R143 673.00	R186 604.00
Gauteng	R521 887.00	R703 119.00	R229 121.00	R365 223.00	R439 468.00
KwaZulu-Natal	R451 312.00	R406 799.00	R597 126.00	R581 123.00	R540 265.00
Limpopo	R196 465.00	R187 775.00	R290 465.00	R429 530.00	R516 945.00
Mpumalanga	R380 585.00	R242 720.00	R457 531.00	R576 656.00	R610 849.00
Northern Cape	R146 503.00	R205 824.00	R191 945.00	R346 028.00	R443 325.00
North West	R162 815.00	R341 757.00	R376 408.00	R437 230.00	R511 423.00
Eastern Cape	R687 280.00	R325 838.00	R556 458.00	R676 427.00	R782 513.00
Free State	R102 409.00	R165 556.00	R284 124.00	R462 002.00	R318 188.00
Total	R27 396 439.00	R22 444 576.00	R11 959 001.00	R10 071 989.00	R23 296 561.00

The greatest expenditure is on the Head Office, which comprises, according to the Minister, VIP Protection Services and the Presidential Protection Services.

For a full breakdown of all the relevant facts and figures related to these increases, see Appendix 1 and 2 at the end of the document.

For any given year, it was, in the past, possible to break down the expenditure on VIP Protection Services into their various provincial units. The Minister of Police, for example, provided such a breakdown for the years 2004/2005 to 2008/2009, in reply to a Parliamentary question⁵⁰. That, however, was just before expenditure exploded under President Zuma, and, since then, no similar breakdown has been made available by the SAPS.

These numbers are all that is available on the public record so far as direct budgeted expenditure for VIP Protection is concerned. However, they are by no means comprehensive. **There are a great many "sunken" costs involved in VIP Protection, hidden away in the budgets for**

other departments. Of them all, the greatest by some considerable distance is the cost of air travel.

It is possible to determine the amount spent on 21 Squadron by going through the various ENE Votes for the Department of Defence. Although only reported on sporadically, between them all one can patch together the total amount budgeted for 21 Squadron over the past ten years:

TABLE 15: Annual Budget for the 21 (VIP) Squadron: 2009/2010 to 2020/2021

PRESIDENT	YEAR	ALLOCATION
Jacob Zuma	2009/2010	R17.3m (A)
	2010/2011	R19.5m (A)
	2011/2012	R24.8m (A)
	2012/2013	R28.3m (A)
	2013/2014	R41.7m (A)
5 Year Total:		R131.6m
Jacob Zuma [Cyril Ramaphosa]	2014/2015	R48.3m (A)
	2015/2016	R61.3m (A)
	2016/2017	R41.9m (A)
	2017/2018	R73.7m (P)
	2018/2019	R75.7m (P)
5 Year Total:		R300.9m
Cyril Ramaphosa	2019/2020	R78.9m (P)
	2020/2021	R82.6m (P)
2 Year Total:		R161.5m (P)
<p>(A): Audited amount (i.e. definitive expenditure) (P): Proposed allocated (subject to adjustment in Mid Term Review and/or, finally, auditing)</p>		

These amounts appear relatively small. It is not possible to know from the ENE or the Department of Defence Annual Reports what those costs cover, but they are not comprehensive. In reply to a Parliamentary question, the Minister of Police revealed that the total cost of all President Jacob Zuma’s flights between 2009/2010 and 2011/2012 was R140 515 430.15, and the cost of flights undertaken by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe over the same period was R69 746 680.47⁵¹. Both are significantly above the audited budget allocation as set out in the Department of Defence’s financial statements (a total of R61m, compared to the total of R210m identified in the relevant Parliamentary reply).

But these pale in comparison to the amount being spent on chartered aircraft, the total amount for which is unknown. One can glean some indication as to the scale of the amount from anecdotes reported in the media:

- In September 2011, while the Presidential Jet was being serviced, the Department of Defence hired a Boeing 727 to fly Zuma to America. In reply to a Parliamentary question, the full cost of that flight was revealed to be R6 331 174.67⁵². However, it was later revealed that two further planes had ‘shadowed’ Zuma’s flight, in case his plane suffered some shortcoming – a South African Airways Airbus A340 and a Bombardier Global Express XRS, requiring around 35 crewmembers⁵³. The cost of these additional flights is not known,⁵⁴ but, together with Zuma’s Boeing, the exercise is conservatively estimated to have cost R10m.
- In September 2017, a plane was hired for Zuma visit to China for the 9th BRICS summit in Xiamen. It is estimated to have cost in the region of R20m⁵⁵. It was reported that this was done despite the fact that the financial year budget for VIP flights had been used up.



THERE ARE A GREAT MANY “SUNKEN” COSTS INVOLVED IN VIP PROTECTION, HIDDEN AWAY IN THE BUDGETS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS. OF THEM ALL, THE GREATEST BY SOME CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE IS THE COST OF AIR TRAVEL.



VIP EXPENDITURE ON FLIGHTS OF THIS KIND HAS BECOME SO LARGE THAT IT IS EATING INTO THE BUDGETS OF OTHER AIR FORCE SQUADRONS DEDICATED TO SUCH THINGS AS SEARCH AND RESCUE.

IT IS FAR MORE LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE TRUE, TOTAL FIGURE IS IN EXCESS OF R250M ANNUALLY. AND EVEN THAT IS PROBABLY CONSERVATIVE.

According to the reply to a 2016 Parliamentary question from the Minister of Defence, R100 million had been allocated “for the leasing of the VIP-configured jet for the 2016/2017 financial year.”⁵⁶ Which translates to R273 972 per day or “more than double the price of a first class round-trip to London.”⁵⁷

Then there are also Helicopter Flights and “ferry flights”, which constitute a separate budget. Again, it is impossible to determine the full amount spent, and one relies on information gleaned from replies to Parliamentary questions for an indication as to the size.

According to the Minister of Defence, the total cost of the 590 VIP helicopter flights over the three-year period 2009/2010 to 2011/2012 came to R50 981 806.70 and broken down as 362 helicopter flights at a cost of R44 822 319.60 and 228 VIP helicopter “ferry flights” at the cost of R6 159 487.10.⁵⁸

President Jacob Zuma would have been responsible for a great deal of those trips. Beeld has reported that “Zuma uses his presidential jet to fly to King Shaka International Airport in Durban and then uses two Oryx helicopters to fly 100km from there to Nkandla.”⁵⁹

The paper reported that **VIP expenditure on flights of this kind has become so large that it is eating into the budgets of other Air Force Squadrons dedicated to such things as search and rescue:** “15 Squadron based in Durban received a small amount of flight hours for training, but 300 flight hours for VIP flights. This is apparently used to transport President Jacob Zuma to his Nkandla home over weekends. As a result, there are no funds budgeted for the helicopters to respond to a disaster along the coast.”⁶⁰

Further, that, “22 Squadron in Cape Town is facing a similar predicament, with most of its budget allotted to VIP flights and a small provision for training time. Pilots are no longer applying their search and rescue skills. It was reported last week that the air force has no operating budget this year for its 30 Augusta helicopters.”⁶¹

Making sense of this loose affiliation of numbers and statistics is difficult, but for the three-year period 2009/2010 to 2011/2012, it is possible to discern the following:

TABLE 16: Combined Total of all Publicly Budgeted Expenditure for VIP Flights

LINE ITEM	BUDGET
Total 21 Squadron Budget	R61.6m
Total Cost of Flights: President	R140.5m
Total Cost of Flights: Deputy President	R69.7m
Total Cost of Helicopter Flights	R44.8m
Total Cost of Helicopter “Ferry Flights”	R6.2m
Three-Year Total	R322.2m
Annual Average	R107.6m

That annual average of R107m is deeply conservative in several key respects. First, it does not account for year-on-year increases, which, if the general budget is any indication, have been extraordinary since 2012. Second, it does not include the costs of flights for the Defence Minister, which are currently unknown. Third, and most importantly, it does not include the costs of chartered flights, estimated in 2016 to be at least R100m annually for the President alone. **It is far more likely, therefore, that the true, total figure is in excess of R250m annually. And even that is probably conservative.**

According to the ENE, the cost of vehicles is borne by the general VIP Protection budget. What information there is on the public record again comes from the reply to a Parliamentary question⁶². It is fairly outdated, but nevertheless provides an indication as to the kinds of costs involved. In 2009, the Minister of Police provided the following breakdown:

TABLE 17: Cost of VIP Vehicles: 2004/2005 to January 2009⁶³

YEAR	COST
2004/2005	R27 396 439.00
2005/2006	R22 444 576.00
2006/2007	R11 959 001.00
2007/2008	R10 071 989.00
April 2008 – January 2009	R23 296 561.00
Total	R95 168 566.00

Tracking the particular cost of VIP Protection for the President alone is almost impossible, given the sparsity of information on the public record. However, there have been a few indications.

In 2005/2006 the Public Protector revealed that, for the respective financial year, VIP Protection for former presidents and deputy presidents was as follows⁶⁴:

- Former President P W Botha: R2 038 714
- Former President F W De Klerk: R3 034 515
- Former President N Mandela: R5 100 310
- Former Deputy President J Zuma: R6 834 192

Zuma, who at that stage had recently been removed from his position as Deputy President, dominated the stakes, dwarfing even former President Nelson Mandela.

In March 2009, the Minister of Police revealed that it was costing the state R998 815.89 a month to protect Zuma, by which time he was the presumptive president⁶⁵.

In May 2016, the Minister of Police stated that R125.1m had been set aside for the protection of President Zuma and the First Ladies, although it is not possible to ascertain the time period or specific costs he was alluding to⁶⁶.

Given the consistency in the outcomes for the protection services, as listed in the various SAPS annual reports over the past five years, it is difficult to understand the dramatic increase in expenditure. The following table compares those outcomes against the total budget for Protection Services for each relevant year:



TABLE 18: Measuring VIP Outcomes Against Expenditure Increase: 2012/2013 to 2016/17

YEAR	RESIDENCES/ OFFICES PROTECTED	PROTECTION ACTIONS	PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCES/ OFFICES PROTECTED	PROTECTION ACTIONS	FOREIGN DIGNITARIES/ HEADS OF STATE PROTECTED	MAJOR, NATIONAL OR PROVINCIAL EVENTS	PROTECTION MOVEMENTS	TOTAL DIGNITARIES PROTECTED	PRESIDENTIAL VISITS	TOTAL BUDGET
2012/2013	137	98 728	18	8 748	232	294	99 802	218	177	R1 561.4bn
2013/2014	130	97 090	18	13 140	289	44	93 101	218	178	R1 781.1bn
2014/2015	132	94 352	23	16 790	164	41	N/A	275	180	R1 935.9bn
2015/2016	142	97 380	21	15 372	240	362	N/A	235	187	R2 132.4bn
2016/2017	124	94 780	21	15 330	138	362	90 111	219	150	R2 234.1bn



THE FACT THAT THE PROTECTION SERVICES NEEDED, AT LEAST, R672M MORE IN FUNDING TO DO, AT THE MOST, THE SAME AMOUNT OF WORK IT WAS DOING FIVE YEARS EARLIER, HAS NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED IN ANY PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON ITS EXPENDITURE.

In 2012/2013, fewer VIP residencies were protected than in 2016/2017 (124 versus 137), thus there were fewer “protection actions” or shifts (98 728 versus 94 780). The number of Presidential residences protected increased fractionally (from 18 to 21), although the “protection actions” almost doubled (8 748 versus 15 330). Significantly fewer foreign dignitaries and Heads of State were protected (232 versus 138) but the number of events protected is marginally higher (294 versus 362), and yet there were far fewer “protective movements” (99 802 versus 90 111) and the total number of national and provincial dignitaries remains effectively the same (218 versus 219). And, finally, fewer presidential visits were undertaken (150 versus 177).

Despite this, every year without fail, the budget allocated to VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security increased. Over the relevant five-year period, it grew by R672m, far above inflation. And that is before one caters for such things as the cost of chartered flights. **The fact that the protection services needed, at least, R672m more in funding to do, at the most, the same amount of work it was doing five years earlier, has not been justified in any public documents on its expenditure.**

There are a few budgets not included in this analysis for the simple reason that they cannot be tracked in any form at all. They include the number of personnel and budget assigned to those members of the State Security Agency responsible for risk assessments. Likewise, the capital cost of new VIP planes. Inkwazi, for example, cost R400m – not included in the totals for the year it was bought – but there is persistent talk in the media of a desire on the part of the Defence Force to purchase for the President a new Presidential Jet. The speculated numbers have been enormous and, it would appear, only public political pressure has prevented the purchase. Nevertheless, exceedingly large “once-off” capital purchases such as these are important to bear in mind in order to appreciate how conservative the budgetary totals are.

It is difficult to contextualise the amount spent on VIP Protection but, by way of comparison, there are other budget allocations that provide a sense of perspective.

Given that VIP Protection concerns essentially an investment in muscle and force, one comparative mechanism is the amount invested in ideas, innovation and education – a “brawn versus brains” comparison, for argument’s sake.

The combined total state allocation for four universities in 2018/2019 – Zululand, Walter Sisulu, Fort Hare and Venda – was R2.5bn. That is almost R100m less than was spent on VIP Protection (and even that excludes the cost of chartered flights).

TABLE 19: Four Universities versus VIP Protection Expenditure: Comparative Cost for 2018/2019⁶⁷

BUDGET ALLOCATION	2018/2019
University of Zululand	R531.683 m
Walter Sisulu University	R837.599 m
University of Fort Hare	R595.901 m
University of Venda	R586.439 m
Four-University Total	R2 551.6bn
Total VIP Expenditure	R2 638.6bn

Between them, those four universities serve approximately 55 000 students, and each is required to report in some detail as to how the state allocation afforded them is spent. But one can take the comparison further still. Institutions like the State Archives, neglected and in an advanced state of disrepair⁶⁸, have been systematically cut year-on-year, when it comes to their share of the national budget.

TABLE 20: National Archive Services versus Increases in VIP Protection Expenditure: Comparative Cost 2007/2008 to 2020/2021⁶⁹

YEAR	NATIONAL ARCHIVE SERVICES ALLOCATION	INCREASE / DECREASE	INCREASE IN TOTAL VIP EXPENDITURE
2007/2008	R42.1m (A)		+ R100.6m
2008/2009	R45.4m (A)	+ 3.3m	+ R96.4m
2009/2010	R51.6m (A)	+ R6.2m	+ R276.4m
2010/2011	R44.7m (A)	–R6.9m	+ R180.4m
2011/2012	R41.5m (A)	–R3.2m	+ R165.5m
2012/2013	R36.9m (A)	–R4.6m	+ R112.6m
2013/2014	R45.4m (A)	+ R8.5m	+ R219.7m
2014/2015	R40.4m (A)	–R5.0m	+ R154.0m
2015/2016	R39.4m (A)	–R1.0m	+ R196.5m
2016/2017	R37.3m (A)	–R2.1m	+ R101.7m
2017/2018	R47.1m (P)	+ R9.8m	+ R244.5m
2018/2019	R48.4m (P)	+ R1.3m	+ R160.0m
2019/2020	R48.4m (P)	–	+ R184.8m
2020/2021	R52.0m (P)	+ R3.6m	+ R203.1m

(A): Audited amount (i.e. definitive expenditure)
(P): Proposed allocated (subject to adjustment in Mid Term Review and/or, finally, auditing)

From the beginning of 2009/2010 – the year that spending on VIP Protection started to explode – and onwards, the National Archive Service allocation started to be cut, supplemented only by the occasional increase in budget. The end result is that, by 2020/2021 (R52m), the Treasury projects that its allocation will only just get to where it was 12 years earlier, in 2009/2010 (R51.6m).

Over this period, there is not a single year in which the increase in VIP Spending alone (regardless of the size of the total budget) is not at least double, at most five times, the size of the total allocation for the National Archive Services.

6 EVERYTHING WE DON'T KNOW



WERE IT NOT FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES – WHICH ROUTINELY ASK PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS ABOUT KEY ASPECTS OF VIP PROTECTION, OFTEN ONLY TO BE DECLINED – THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE WOULD BE NEXT TO NOTHING.

Over the approximately twenty years during which VIP Protection Services has grown from a minor blip on the SAPS budgetary radar into an ever-expanding Programme that now constitutes, at the very least, some R3bn a year, it has been marked by secrecy and a lack of accountability. Disturbingly, this tendency towards unaccountability has grown at almost the same rate.

Were it not for the persistence of opposition parties – which routinely ask Parliamentary questions about key aspects of VIP Protection, often only to be declined – the amount of information available would be next to nothing. The basis on which so much information is refused is also vague or ambiguous. For example, when, in April 2016, the Minister of Police was asked with regards to which statute or policy information regarding the number trips undertaken by the President was deemed classified, the Minister responded with a single line: “The required information has direct security implications, which cannot be disclosed.”⁷⁰

Frequently, there is not even an attempt to explain under what legislative mandate such information should be classified.

Even the national intelligence services are required to report to a portfolio committee. It is true, those meetings are held behind closed doors; nevertheless, they are at least a chance for the public, via its selected representatives, to conduct civilian oversight.

No doubt such information is sensitive and must be distributed with care, but, as the intelligence services demonstrate, there is a way to do that without compromising security. The Constitution states that all security services are “subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive”. That means that civilian oversight, directly or via the public’s representatives in Parliament, must define police conduct. It doesn’t play out like that in practice.

Thus, there is a great deal of important information we do not know about the VIP Protection Services, and the public record suggests this information has not been made available to Parliament either. Here follows a list of information and documents concerning the VIP Protection Services, alluded to on the public record but either never made public or shielded from the public in the name of security.

Policy

- **2000 Cabinet Memorandum:** In 2000, a decision was taken to reconstitute the VIP Protection Services, amalgamating all nine provincial VIP units into a single national programme. It was formalised in a Cabinet Memorandum. It has never been made public or been presented to Parliament.
- **Cabinet Memorandum 1A of 10 November 2004:** Again, the VIP Protection Services were reorganised in 2004, via a Cabinet decision. Among other things, according to the police Minister, it defined who was entitled to VIP Protection and why. It has never been made public or been presented to Parliament.

- **Risk Management Support System for Very Important Persons Policy (RIMAS):** Sometimes referred to as the Risk Information Management Administration System, RIMAS is a constant presence in SAPS annual reports, always alluded to but never expounded upon. Outside of the Public Protector’s 2005/2006 report, its contents are unknown. Key to determining how risk assessments are carried out and the mechanics of VIP Protection, it has never been made public⁷¹. After Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was afforded Presidential Protection in 2017, the Police portfolio committee did request that the RIMAS policy be made available to it. It is unclear whether SAPS ever acceded to that request.⁷²
- **Risk Assessments:** Done quarterly by the State Security Service, it is possible these are presented to the joint standing committee on intelligence. However, from the public record, it appears they are conducted without oversight.
- **Presidential Protection Services Budget:** As of 2006/2007, the Treasury stopped reporting on the budget for the Presidential Protection Services, which was subsumed by the VIP Protection Services budget. This was in spite of the fact that Presidential Protection Services cuts across or provides the same service as both VIP Protection and Static and Mobile Security. For the past 12 years, its particular budget has not been reported on.
- **Reporting on Outcomes:** As evidenced by the SAPS annual reports – in particular, President Jacob Zuma’s poisoning – there is a profound problem with the manner in which oversight is conducted. The line item in annual reports, which often reads now more like a declaration – “there were no security breaches” – is not extrapolated upon (number of attempted breaches, breaches intercepted, arrests, prosecutions) but also, going by the public record, is sometimes palpably false, as was the case in 2014.

Operations

- **Presidential Protection Services:** The budget, personnel, vehicles, any breakdown of cost, number of protectors assigned per dignitary, training qualification, salaries and rank, vetting, reporting lines, equipment, flights, provincial divisional budgets, number and cost of flights – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions.
- **VIP Protection Services:** Personnel, vehicles, any breakdown of cost, equipment, salaries and rank, number of protectors assigned per dignitary, training qualification, vetting, reporting lines, flights, provincial divisional budgets – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions.
- **Static and Mobile Security:** With regards to the Presidential Protection Services and general Static and Mobile Security, personnel, vehicles, residences protected, unit costs, provincial divisional budgets, reporting lines, equipment, qualifications, vetting, salaries and rank, number of protectors assigned per residence – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions.
- **21 Squadron:** Breakdown of costs, number of flights, number of flights for the defence Minister, cost of flights (fuelling, refuelling), salaries and rank, qualifications, vetting, cost of fleet maintenance and upkeep, “ferry flights”, even catering – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions. The same applies to Helicopter Flights.

- **Chartered Flights:** A deeply significant and costly component of VIP protection, the relationship between 21 Squadron and chartered flights remains unarticulated and vague. When and on what basis are flights chartered, why does 21 Squadron appear to be obsolete, how many flights have been chartered, at what cost – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions.
- **The State Security Agency:** How many personnel are assigned to risk assessment, how much does risk assessment cost, what do the various assessments say, how is quality control maintained, reporting lines, how are threats verified, how long and on what basis is VIP Protection assigned, qualifications, vetting, budget – all of these core operational matters are currently unknown and, more often than not, refused in replies to Parliamentary questions.

Classified Information (as per the Ministers of Police and Defence)

- **Cost of VIP Flights:** In October 2013, defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula declared any information on VIP flights “confidential for security reasons”⁷³. For years prior, although reluctantly, the Department of Defence had provided information on request about the cost of flights related expenditure. Thus, Mapisa-Nqakula’s declaration provoked the following response: “We must be the only Constitutional democracy in the world where the costs of VIP flights, and the guidelines regulating the use of VIP flights, by a serving president are classified.”⁷⁴
- **Cost of Chartered VIP Flights for the President:** “The information required relates to the movements of the VVIP and for security reasons the response to this question can only be presented to a closed session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.”⁷⁵

- **The Security Clearance of Key Personnel:** “The information required relates to the movements of the VVIP and for security reasons the response to this question can only be presented to a closed session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.”⁷⁶
- **In-Flight Catering:** “The information required relates to the movements of the VVIP and for security reasons the response to this question can only be presented to a closed session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.”⁷⁷
- **Amount Spent on Fuel for VIP Flights:** “The information required relates to the movements of the VVIP and for security reasons the response to this question can only be presented to a closed session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.”⁷⁸
- **Qualifications and Training of Air Force Pilots:** “The information required relates to the movements of the VVIP and for security reasons the response to this question can only be presented to a closed session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.”⁷⁹
- **A Breakdown of Expenditure on VIPs:** “Information relating to expenditure incurred in the deployment of personnel in the protection of the President, former Presidents, the Deputy President, Ministers and members of Provincial Executive Councils at their residences and workplaces, is confidential and may not be disclosed, to prevent their safety from being compromised.”⁸⁰
- **Number of VIP Trips to President Zuma’s Private Residence:** “The information in question is confidential and cannot be provided.”⁸¹
- **Number of VIP Personnel Assigned to Presidential Protection:** “The total number of members allocated to these VIPs will not be disclosed, as the disclosure of this information in itself can pose a serious risk to the effective protection of the President and Deputy President.”

The secrecy that marks the Protection Services should not be underestimated. It is a profound and serious problem. **There are few component parts of any constitutional order for which transparency, oversight and accountability are more important. The national security forces wield great power, are funded by significant amounts of public money and, by their very nature, generate an insular and self-contained organisational culture. To ensure they operate always in the public interest a constant vigilance is required. Failure to do so can, very quickly, result in a culture of secrecy and unaccountability taking hold.** There is much evidence to suggest this tendency towards concealment is already well-developed, when it comes to Programme 5 and the VIP Protection Services.

The SAPS will no doubt argue that it meets all its obligations in terms of accountability, at least so far as “security concerns” would reasonably allow for. The public record, however, suggests that is not true. While the SAPS leadership does, on an ad hoc rather than annual basis, report on Programme 5 to the portfolio committee, the relevant minutes suggest these meetings are superficial and, ultimately, no different to what appears in the SAPS annual reports: random, disconnected snippets of information, often entirely unrelated to questions around core performance.⁸² The portfolio committee itself, has some questions to answer on this front.

The relevant chain of command is not called to account, budget increases are not interrogated against performance, accountability for security breaches are not cross-examined, outcomes are not probed, and meaningful details of equipment and personnel not demanded or provided. Vetting remains mysterious and unexamined in any considered detail. The relationship between the intelligence services and the SAPS is unexplored. VIP travel, primarily the ambit of the Department of Defence, is not seen as part of VIP Protection, left to the occasional parliamentary question to determine. Certainly, none of these critical elements are explored over time. Rather, when they are occasionally explored, that is done in a bubble, comprising no more than the relevant financial year.

The greatest of all these mysteries is the Presidential Protection Services, hidden away in other budgets, without any stand-alone reporting lines, it remains an operational enigma. Ultimately, perhaps most importantly, the executive is never made to account for the rise in cost and personnel. The president, for example, is never called on to explain his attitude or the attitude of the executive towards VIP Protection and its necessity.

In every practical way, VIP Protection really is a secret police force. Unchecked, the risks are great.



THERE ARE FEW COMPONENT PARTS OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER FOR WHICH TRANSPARENCY, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE MORE IMPORTANT. THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES WIELD GREAT POWER, ARE FUNDED BY SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC MONEY AND, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, GENERATE AN INSULAR AND SELF-CONTAINED ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE. TO ENSURE THEY OPERATE ALWAYS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST A CONSTANT VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED. FAILURE TO DO SO CAN, VERY QUICKLY, RESULT IN A CULTURE OF SECRECY AND UNACCOUNTABILITY TAKING HOLD.

7 APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Estimates of National Expenditure: 2004/2005 to 2020/2021

Department: Police: 'VIP Protection Services' and 'Static and Mobile Support' Unit Budgets / Defence: '21 (VIP) Squadron' Budget

ADMINISTRATION	FINANCIAL YEAR	TOTAL PERSONNEL IN PROGRAMME 5	VIP PROTECTION SERVICES BUDGET	PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION UNIT	VIP PROTECTION UNIT INCREASE / DECREASE	STATIC AND MOBILE SUPPORT BUDGET	STATIC AND MOBILE INCREASE / DECREASE	COMBINED PROTECTION BUDGETS TOTAL	SAAF 21 (VIP) SQUADRON	TOTAL COMBINED COST	AVERAGE INFLATION (DEC - DEC)	VIP BUDGET ADJUSTED FOR AVERAGE INFLATION
Nelson Mandela	1997/1998	3 238	N/A	R10.8m (A)		N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	8.62%	
	1998/1999	3 088	N/A	R16.4m (A)		N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	6.86%	
2 Year Total:				R27.2m								
Thabo Mbeki	1999/2000	2 974	N/A	R30.0m (A)		N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	5.27%	
	2000/2001	2 920	R138.0m (A)	R34.4m (A)		R95.9m (A)		R233.9m	N/A	N/A	5.33%	
	2001/2002	2 580	R237.2m (A)	R67.4m (P)	+ R99.2m [71.9%]	R62.0m (A)	-R33.9m [35.3%]	R299.2m	N/A	N/A	5.73%	R145.4m
	2002/2003	2 677	R266.6m (A)	R63.7m (P)	+ R29.4m [12.4%]	R64.8m (A)	+ R2.8m [4.5%]	R331.4m	N/A	N/A	9.47%	R153.7m
	2003/2004	3 359	R257.5m (A)	R79.9m (P)	-R9.1m [3.4%]	R108.9m (A)	+ R44.1m [68.1%]	R366.4m	N/A	N/A	5.84%	R168.3m
4/5 Year Total:			R899.3m	R275.4m		R331.6m		R1 230.9bn				
Thabo Mbeki [Kgalema Motlanthe]	2004/2005	4 819	R223.2m (A)	R86.7m (P)	-R34.3m [13.2%]	R153.2m (A)	+ R44.3m [40.7%]	R376.4m	N/A	N/A	- 0.68%	R178.1m
	2005/2006	6 519	R251.9m (A)	R92.8m (P)	+ R28.7m [12.9%]	R264.2m (A)	+ R111.0m [72.5%]	R516.1m	N/A	N/A	2.06%	R176.9m
	2006/2007	N/A	R294.2m (A)	N/A	+ R42.3m [16.8%]	R335.3m (A)	+ R71.1m [26.9%]	R629.5m	N/A	N/A	3.24%	R180.5m
	2007/2008	N/A	R321.5m (A)	N/A	+ R27.3m [9.3%]	R408.6m (A)	+ R73.3m [21.9%]	R730.1m	N/A	N/A	6.17%	R186.3m
	2008/2009	N/A	R353.3m (A)	N/A	+ R31.8m [9.9%]	R473.2m (A)	+ R64.6m [15.8%]	R826.5m	N/A	N/A	10.04%	R197.8m
5 Year Total:			R1 444.1bn			R1 634.5bn		R3 078.6bn				
Jacob Zuma	2009/2010	N/A	R442.8m (A)	N/A	+ R89.5m [25.3%]	R642.8m (A)	+ R169.6m [35.8%]	R1 085.6bn	R17.3m (A)	R1 102.9bn	7.26%	R217.7m
	2010/2011	N/A	R530.6m (A)	N/A	+ R87.8m [19.8%]	R733.2m (A)	+ R90.4m [14.1%]	R1 263.8bn	R19.5m (A)	R1 283.3bn	4.10%	R233.5m
	2011/2012	6 319	R663.4m (A)	N/A	+ R132.8m [25.0%]	R760.6m (A)	+ R27.4m [3.7%]	R1 424.0bn	R24.8m (A)	R1 448.8bn	5.01%	R243.1m
	2012/2013	6 363	R748.2m (A)	N/A	+ R84.8m [12.8%]	R784.9m (A)	+ R24.3m [3.2%]	R1 533.1bn	R28.3m (A)	R1 561.4bn	5.75%	R255.3m
	2013/2014	6 331	R876.4m (A)	N/A	+ 128.2m [17.1%]	R863.0m (A)	+ 78.1m [9.9%]	R1 739.4bn	R41.7m (A)	R1 781.1bn	5.77%	R269.9m
5 Year Total:			R3 261.4bn			R3 784.5bn		R7 045.9bn	R131.6m	R7 177.5bn		
Jacob Zuma [Cyril Ramaphosa]	2014/2015	6 398	R977.9m (A)	N/A	+ R101.5m [11.6%]	R909.7m (A)	+ R46.7m [5.4%]	R1 887.6bn	R48.3m (A)	R1 935.9bn	6.12%	R285.5m
	2015/2016	6 802	R1 158.1bn (A)	N/A	+ R180.2m [18.4%]	R913.0m (A)	+ R3.3m [0.4%]	R2 071.1bn	R61.3m (A)	R2 132.4bn	4.51%	R302.9m
	2016/2017	6 595	R1 222.5bn (A)	N/A	+ R64.4m [5.6%]	R969.7m (A)	+ R56.7m [6.2%]	R2 192.2bn	R41.9m (A)	R2 234.1bn	6.59%	R316.6m
	2017/2018	6 585	R1 407.0bn (P)	N/A	+ R184.5m [15.1%]	R997.9m (P)	+ R28.2m [2.9%]	R2 404.9bn	R73.7m (P)	R2 478.6bn	5.19%	R337.5m
	2018/2019	6 551	R1 500.8bn (P)	N/A	+ R93.8m [6.6%]	R1 062.1bn (P)	+ R64.2m [6.4%]	R2 562.9bn	R75.7m (P)	R2 638.6bn		R355.0m
5 Year Total:			R6 266.3bn			R4 852.4bn		R11 118.7bn	R300.9m	R11 419.6bn		
Cyril Ramaphosa	2019/2020	6 517	R1 611.9bn (P)	N/A	+ R111.1m [7.4%]	R1 132.6bn (P)	+ R70.5m [6.6%]	R2 744.5bn	R78.9m (P)	R2 823.4bn		
	2020/2021	6 517	R1 727.5bn (P)	N/A	+ R115.6m [7.2%]	R1 216.4bn (P)	+ R83.8m [7.4%]	R2 943.9bn	R82.6m (P)	R3 026.5bn		
Mbeki/Motlanthe 9 Year Total:			R2 343.4bn			R1 966.1bn		R4 309.5bn				
Zuma/Ramaphosa 10 Year Total:			R9 527.7bn			R8 636.9bn		R18 164.6bn	R432.5m	R18 597.1bn		
Ramaphosa 2 Year Projected Total:			R3 339.4bn			R2 349.0bn		R5 668.4bn	R161.5m	R5 829.9bn		
21 Year Projected Grand Total:			R15 210.5bn			R12 952.0bn		R28 162.5bn		R28 756.5bn		
(A): Audited amount (i.e. definitive expenditure) (P): Proposed allocated (subject to adjustment in Mid Term Review and/or, finally, auditing)						KEY: All numbers drawn from the National Estimates of Expenditure, as listed on www.treasury.gov.za ■ Increase, above Average Inflation for the relevant calendar year ■ Increase, below Average Inflation for the relevant calendar year ■ Decrease, below Average Inflation for the relevant calendar year						

Appendix 2: Factsheet – VIP Spend 2000 to 2021

VIP Protection Services

- The budget for VIP Protection Services, which contains within it the budget for the Presidential Protection Services Unit, has grown from R138m in 2000/2001 to a projected total of R1.728bn in 2020/2021.
- The current budget for the Programme, for the 2018/2019 financial year, stands at R1.5bn.
- That amount, R1.5bn, exceeds the total amount spent on VIP Protection Services for President Mbeki's entire second five-year term (2004/2005 to 2008/2009), during which time a total of R1.444bn was spent on VIP Protection Services.
- Expenditure exploded during the ten years that marked President Zuma's two administrations, increasing from R353m in 2008/2009 to R1.5bn in 2018/2019 (President Cyril Ramaphosa would see out the last year of President Zuma's second administration).
- Over the ten-year course of President Zuma's two administrations (2009/2010 to 2018/2019 inclusive), a total of R9.528bn would be spent on VIP Protection Services. By comparison, the nine-year total for President Mbeki's two administrations was R2.343bn (VIP Protection Services first appeared as a line item in the budget one year into Mbeki's first term).
- For 16 out of the 20 years for which a budget for VIP Protection Services has appeared in the ENE, the amount allocated has significantly outstripped the average inflation rate for that year. Only twice, in 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, did the allocation actually decrease.

- The projected total to be spent on VIP Protection Services for just the next two years (2019/2020 and 2020/2021), the first two years of the next administration, will be R3.339bn.

Static and Mobile Security

- The budget for Static and Mobile Security has grown from R95.9m in 2000/2001 to a projected total of R1.216bn in 2020/2021.
- The current budget for the Programme, for the 2018/2019 financial year, stands at R1.062bn, the first time it has crossed the billion Rand threshold.
- During the course of President Mbeki's entire second five-year term, a total of R1.635bn was spent on Static and Mobile Security.
- Spending on Static and Mobile Security has grown at a more consistent but still high rate compared to that on VIP Protection Services. Nevertheless, the amount spent over the course of President Zuma's two administrations (2009/2010 to 2018/2019 inclusive) still represents a significant increase. Over that period, a total of R8.637bn was spent on Static and Mobile Security.
- The projected total to be spent on Static and Mobile Security for just the next two years (2019/2020 and 2020/2021), the first two years of the next administration, will be R2.349bn.

21 Squadron

- The ENE only identify the budget for 21 Squadron randomly and, even then, the figures are only available from 2009/2010. Over the next ten years, during President Zuma's two administrations, a total of R432m was spent on the VIP Squadron.

- Expenditure increased significantly, but off a very small base, from R17.3m in 2009/2010 to R75.5m in 2018/19, the budget for the current financial year.
- The projected total to be spent on 21 Squadron for just the next two years (2019/2020 and 2020/2021), the first two years of the next administration, will be R162m.

Total Expenditure: VIP Protection Services, Static and Mobile Security and 21 Squadron

- Since 2000/2001, the total amount budgeted for and spent on VIP Protection, across VIP Protection Services (including Presidential Protection Services), Static and Mobile Security and 21 Squadron is R28.756bn.
- The total protection services budget (VIP Protection Services and Static and Mobile Security) has grown from R234m in 2000/2001 to a projected total of R3.027bn in 2020/2021, an increase of R2.710bn over 21 years.
- The bulk of that growth happened over the ten years that constituted President Jacob Zuma's two terms. Over the period, total expenditure rose from R826m (excluding 21 Squadron's budget, but it would have been negligible) in 2008/2009 to R2.638bn in 2018/2019, the total budget for the current financial year.
- Over the course of President Zuma's two administrations, R18.6bn was spent on protection services. By way of comparison, a total of just R4.3bn was spent during the nine years of President Mbeki's previous two administrations (2000/2001 to 2008/2009).
- The projected total budget for protection services, for just the next two years (2019/2020 and 2020/2021), the first two years of the next administration, will be R5.830bn.

Endnotes

1. See 2002 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 24: Safety and Security, Page 545. http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2002/ene/vote_24.pdf The Vote states, "SAPS restructured Protection Services following a Cabinet decision in 2000 to amalgamate the nine provincial units of the VIP Protection Service into three national units."
2. See Government Gazette, Vol 627, 28 September 2017, No 41143, Page 14. <https://archive.opengazettes.org.za/archive/ZA/2017/government-gazette-ZA-vol-627-no-41143-dated-2017-09-28.pdf>
3. See Parliamentary Reply NW2356, Question No 2356, 12 October 2017. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/6992/>
4. See 2018 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 30: Science and Technology, Page 638, <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/ene/Vote%2030%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf>
5. See Parliamentary Reply NW140E, Question No 1245, 18 May 2010. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8062:parliamentary-question-police-vip-protection&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115
6. This myth about there being a Constitutional mandate for the VIP Protection Services is everywhere. The 2015/2016 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 225, states: "The South African Constitution, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996), section 24(1) mandates the Protection and Security Services Division and the Component PPS to render an in-transit and static protection service to all individuals identified as VIPs in terms of the Risk Information Management Administration System (RIMAS) policy, as approved by Cabinet in 1997 and revised in 2004, by virtue of their public office or strategic importance to the country (including foreign dignitaries)." Section 24, however, is part of the Bill of Human Rights has to do with the Environment. https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2015_2016/saps_annual_report_2015_2016.pdf The 2016/2017 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 235, states: "Section 205 (3)" of the Constitution "mandates that the PSS Division and the PPS component renders an in-transit and static protection service to all individuals identified as VIPs". However, it does no such thing. Section 205 (3) of the Constitution reads: "The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law." <https://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/Constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1>
7. See DefenceWeb, "Police VIP protection costs soar", 13 March 2009 http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1312&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115
8. See Public Protector Report No 1/2006, "Report On An Investigation Into Allegations Of Unethical And Improper Conduct By Deputy President P Mlambo-Ngcuka Relating To Her Unofficial Visit To The United Arab Emirates In December 2005" http://www.pprotect.org/sites/default/files/legislation_report/Mlambo-Ngcuka%20Report.pdf
9. Ibid. Page 35
10. Ibid. Page 35
11. See Parliamentary Reply NW2184E, Question No 1972, 7 July 2017
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. See Public Protector Report No 1/2006, Page 37
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. Page 36
17. See Statement by Dianne Kohler Barnard, 11 November 2009, "On the Department of Police's private jet" <http://www.polity.org.za/article/da-statement-by-dianne-kohler-barnard-democratic-alliance-shadow-Minister-of-police-on-the-department-of-polices-private-jet-19112009-2009-11-19>

18. See The South African Airforce, "21 Squadron" http://www.af.mil.za/bases/afb_waterkloof/21Sqn.htm
19. See News24 "New presidential jet will make Nkandla seem like child's play – Maimane", 15 September 2016 <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/new-presidential-jet-will-make-nkandla-seem-like-childs-play-maimane-20160915>
20. See Parliamentary Question No 1291 and No 1292, 18 May 2012 <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/president-zumas-flight-costs-amount-to-r1405m--min> and Statement by David Maynier "More than R50 million blown on 500 VIP helicopter flights, 200 of which were empty", 27 August 2012 <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/r50m-spent-on-helicopter-flights-for-vips--david-2>
21. See DefenceWeb, "21 Squadron VVIP transport budget 'blown' by millions", 28 November 2017 http://www.defencweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50016&catid=74&Itemid=30
22. See Transversal Contract RT61-2014, "Hiring of Aircrafts and Helicopters to the State, Including Escorting of Illegal Immigrants". <http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/ocpo/ostb/contracts/RT61-2014.zip>
23. See The Presidential Handbook: On support for the President, his or her spouse and dependent children, and the Deputy President and his or her spouse, November 2015, Page 12 <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/sites/default/files/Presidential%20Handbook.pdf>
24. Ibid.
25. See Parliamentary Reply NW1404E, Question No 1245, 18 May 2010. http://www.defencweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8062:parliamentary-question-police-vip-protection&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115
26. See 2012 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 25: Police, Page 16. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2012/enebooklets/Vote%2025%20Police.pdf>
27. See Parliamentary Reply NW717E, Question No 634, 18 July 2014. https://pmg.org.za/question_reply/490/
28. See 2012 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 25: Police, Page 16. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2012/enebooklets/Vote%2025%20Police.pdf>
29. See Parliamentary Question No 1385, Question Paper 7 June 2013 https://pmg.org.za/question_reply/461/
30. See South African Police Service Annual Reports for 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/14, 2014/2015, 2015/2016, 2016/2017, Programme 5: Protection and Security Services https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
31. The 2014/2015 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 249, states: "While the primary clients of the Head Office units, which are based in Pretoria and Cape Town, are Ministers and Deputy Ministers, the provincial offices focus on the protection of Premiers and Members of the Executive Council. Static Protection has the same clients as VIP Protection, however the 'static protection' function is only performed at provincial level." https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2014_2015/SAPS_AR_2014-15_for_viewing.pdf
32. See Parliamentary Reply NW1171E, Question No 1041, 5 May 2017 <http://pmg.org.za/files/RNW1041-170606.docx>
33. The 2015/2016 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 225, states of the Presidential Protection Services (PPS), "The PPS Component is a national competency with Provincial PPS offices located in Gauteng, the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The PPS Component provides in-transit and static protection to the President, the Deputy President, former Presidents, former Deputy Presidents, their spouses, identified VIPs, including foreign Heads of State/Government and former Heads of State/Government and their spouses and at strategic government installations. The in-transit protection function is performed in Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, including at national level. The static protection function is performed in the provinces indicated above as well as in the Eastern Cape and at National level." https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2015_2016/saps_annual_report_2015_2016.pdf
34. See Parliamentary Reply NW1484E, Question No 1342, 19 May 2017 <http://pmg.org.za/files/RNW1342-170627.docx>
35. See Business Day, 28 November 2016, "Paranoid' Zuma protected by 88 bodyguards". <https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2016-11-28-paranoid-zuma-protected-by-88-bodyguards/>

36. See City Press, 23 October 2016, "Zuma doubles security detail" <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-doubles-security-detail-20161022>
37. See South African Police Service Annual Reports for 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/14, 2014/2015, 2015/2016, 2016/2017, Programme 5: Protection and Security Services https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annualreports_arch.php
38. Ibid
39. See The Mercury, 14 August 2017, "I was poisoned and almost died when SA joined Brics, says Zuma" <https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zuma/i-was-poisoned-and-almost-died-when-sa-joined-brics-says-zuma-10782354>
40. See The Citizen, 13 November 2017, "I was poisoned – Zuma" <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1726854/i-was-poisoned-zuma/>
41. See News 24, 17 August 2017, "MaNtuli looks ahead as Hawks confirm Zuma poison plot probe is done" <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantuli-looks-ahead-as-hawks-confirm-zuma-poison-plot-probe-is-done-20170817>
42. This stipulation, that "embarrassment" constitutes a security breach, is another vague outcome worthy of more attention from the portfolio committee. In 2013, Jacob Zuma's VIP car was rammed by a "mentally disturbed man", before he was arrested. "Zuma was sitting in the back seat of his black BMW when the unidentified man sped towards the car, hitting its front right mirror and causing chaos as the president's bodyguards in the other seven cars rushed up and handcuffed him." (See, DispatchLive, 14 October 2013, "Bodyguards rush to protect Zuma". <http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2013/10/14/bodyguards-rush-to-protect-zuma/>). In August 2017, after receiving VIP Protection from the Presidential Protection Services, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was "chased away" from Marikana (see Huffington Poster, 22 August 2017, "'Go Away': Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma Chased Away From Marikana"
43. See 2013/2014 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 198 https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2013_2014/ar2014_02_partb.pdf
44. Zuma did, subsequent to his initial claim, state the exact opposite in a written Parliamentary reply in October 2017, stating: "I am not aware of a conspiracy to poison me because of the decision of South Africa to join BRICS or because of the radical economic transformation policy of government." See The Mail & Guardian, 9 October 2017, "Zuma does an about-turn on BRICS poison claims" <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-09-zuma-does-an-about-turn-on-brics-poison-claims>
45. See Estimates of National Expenditure for 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. Vote 25: Safety and Security/Police. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/default.aspx>
46. See Estimates of National Expenditure for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018. Vote 25: Safety and Security/Police. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/default.aspx>
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. See Parliamentary Reply NW62E, Question No. 50, 6 February 2009. https://pmg.org.za/question_reply/41/
51. See Parliamentary Replies NW1500E and NW1501E, Question Nos. 1291 and 1292 respectively, both of 18 May 2012, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/president-zumas-flight-costs-amount-to-r1405m--min>
52. See Parliamentary Reply NW5956E, Question No. 3304, 28 October 2011 <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/president-zumas-flight-to-usa-cost-r-63m--lindiwe->
53. See The Saturday Star, 21 January 2012, "Zuma's aircraft row" <https://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/zumas-aircraft-row-1217261#.UCoIlqDjrN4>
54. See DefenceWeb, 15 March 2012, "DA says Sisulu trying to obscure cost of Zuma's shadow planes" http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24395&catid=74&Itemid=30
55. See Business Report, 7 September 2017, "R20 million spent for President Zuma to fly to China for Brics" <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/r20-million-spent-for-president-zuma-to-fly-to-china-for-brics-11108803>
56. See Parliamentary Reply NW1955E, 12 September 2016 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B-slGu8-FTxRFdHQ0NQLTdHV1E>

57. See Statement by Kobus Marias, 12 September 2016, "R273,972 per day to be spent on presidential jet" <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/r273972-per-day-to-be-spent-on-presidential-jet--k>
58. See Statement by David Maynier, 27 August 2012, "More than R50 million blown on 500 VIP helicopter flights, 200 of which were empty". <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/r50m-spent-on-helicopter-flights-for-vips--david-2>
59. See "Flying Zuma home eats up rescue budget", 30 July 2013, <http://www.climbing.co.za/2013/07/flying-zuma-home-eats-up-rescue-budget/>
60. Ibid and see News24, 24 July 2013, "Financial woes ground defence choppers" <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Financial-woes-ground-defence-choppers-20130724>
61. Ibid.
62. See DefenceWeb, 13 March 2009, "Police VIP protection costs soar" http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1312&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115
63. The Minister did also provide a breakdown of the expenditure on vehicles by provincial VIP division, (Parliamentary Reply NW62E, Question No. 50, 6 February 2009. https://pmg.org.za/question_reply/41/) It is as follows:

PROVINCE	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007	2007/2008	2008/2009 – JAN 2009
Head Office	R98 285 734.00	R100 841 579.00	R142 400 009.00	R165 365 702.00	R169 691 341.00
Western Cape	R21 188 225.00	R24 378 710.00	R1 507 362.00	R5 333 754.00	R5 662 983.00
Gauteng	R35 286 552.00	R40 039 748.00	R12 190 050.00	R13 170 137.00	R13 969 253.00
KwaZulu-Natal	R41 328 668.00	R32 448 254.00	R25 407 921.00	R27 185 570.00	R26 282 173.00
Limpopo	R4 564 571.00	R6 956 043.00	R8 796 674.00	R8 813 543.00	R8 926 162.00
Mpumalanga	R3 882 660.00	R5 936 393.00	R7 817 474.00	R10 599 628.00	R11 418 300.00
Northern Cape	R4 336 689.00	R5 198 655.00	R6 249 487.00	R7 503 265.00	R6 830 585.00
North West	R4 814 628.00	R6 668 215.00	R9 046 546.00	R10 838 690.00	R11 818 500.00
Eastern Cape	R6 753 591.00	R11 451 049.00	R13 841 631.00	R15 695 088.00	R16 107 296.00
Free State	R2 706 609.00	R4 920 905.00	R7 174 348.00	R8 739 484.00	R8 722 891.00
Total	R223 147 927.00	R238 839 551.00	R234 431 502.00	R273 244 861.00	R279 429 484.00

64. See Public Protector Report No 1/2006, "Report On An Investigation Into Allegations Of Unethical And Improper Conduct By Deputy President P Mlambo-Ngcuka Relating To Her Unofficial Visit To The United Arab Emirates In December 2005" Page 38 http://www.pprotect.org/sites/default/files/legislation_report/Mlambo-Ngcuka%20Report.pdf
65. See DefenceWeb, 13 March 2009, "Police VIP protection costs soar" http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1312&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115
66. See BusinessTech, 24 May 2016, "R125 million VIP protection for Zuma and his wives" <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/124649/r125-million-vip-protection-for-zuma-and-his-wives/> Business Tech did provide a link to the original reply, but unfortunately it is broken and the reply no longer appears to be archived on Parliament's website: http://www.Parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20160524/615695_1.doc
67. See 2018 Estimates of National Expenditure, Vote 15: Higher Education and Training, Page 42. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/enebooklets/Vote%2015%20Higher%20Education%20and%20Training.pdf>

68. See, for example, State Of The Archives: An analysis of South Africa's national archival system, 2014, compiled by the Archival Platform (http://www.archivalplatform.org/images/resources/State_of_the_Archive_FOR_WEB.pdf). Elsewhere, the The Chief Director of the National Archives told Parliament in 2016 that "(t)he budget for archives was inadequate and this had severe implications on completing mandates, because in most cases new infrastructure was needed, as well as renovations, maintenance, equipment for archives and records services and compensation of employees". She stated the institution also suffered "severe" skills shortages and poor infrastructure. See, State of Archives & Challenges in South Africa: National Archivist briefing; Strategic Overview & Future plans, 1 March 2016. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22093/>
69. See Estimates of National Expenditure, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, Vote 37: Arts and Culture. <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/default.aspx>
70. See Parliamentary Reply NW944E, Question No. 825, 18 March 2016. <https://pmg.org.za/files/RNW825-160401.docx>
71. The 2014/2015 South African Police Service Annual Report, Page 249, describes RIMAS as follows: "The rendering of protection services is regulated through the Risk Information Management Administration System (RIMAS) policy, as approved by Cabinet in 1997 and revised in 2004. The RIMAS policy prescribes the categories of VIPs commensurate to the risk linked to each category that qualifies for protection services." https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2014_2015/SAPS_AR_2014-15_for_viewing.pdf
72. See Report of the Portfolio Committee on Police on the 2017/18 Budget Vote 23, Annual Performance Plan (APP) and 20114-2019 Strategic Plan of the Department of Police (SAPS), Dated 17 May 2017, Page 37. <http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/170517pcpolicereport3.pdf> The report states: "The Committee asked that the RIMAS document be made available to the Committee and that it be briefed once the assessment (of Dlamini-Zuma) is finalised".
73. See DefenceWeb, 15 October 2013, "Cost of Zuma VIP flights now classified – DA". http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32239:cost-of-zuma-vip-flights-now-classified--da&catid=35:Aerospace
74. Ibid.
75. See Parliamentary Reply NW1956E, 12 September 2016 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B-slGu8-FTxRFdHQ0NQLTdHV1E?usp=sharing>
76. Ibid. Parliamentary Reply NW1957E
77. Ibid. Parliamentary Reply NW1961E
78. Ibid. Parliamentary Reply NW1962E
79. Ibid. Parliamentary Reply NW1963E
80. See Parliamentary Reply NW56E, Question No. 54, 8 June 2009. https://pmg.org.za/question_reply/42/
81. See Parliamentary Reply NW3161E, Question No. 2730, 24 August 2015. <http://pmg.org.za/files/RNW2730-150824.docx>
82. See, for example, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group minutes for the 15 April 2013 presentation of the SAPS leadership (SAPS Strategic and Annual Performance Plan 2013: Administration & Protection Services). The final section of the meeting, fleeting and inconsequential but on the Protection Services, is almost redundant in its superficiality. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15665/> Alternatively, the 2014/15 briefing on the SAPS Annual Report, at which time it was evident President Zuma had been poisoned, which, when it came to the Protection Services, focused primarily on newspaper stories and unhappiness at some VIP offices (see SAPS on its 2014/15 Annual Report, 14 October 2015. <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/21613/>)



South African Institute of Race Relations

The power of ideas

2 Clamart Road, Richmond, Johannesburg, 2092 South Africa

P O Box 291722, Melville, 2109 South Africa

t. 011 482 7221

info@irr.org.za | www.irr.org.za