SA Reconciliation Barometer 2014

SARB
2003–2013
OVER A DECADE OF DATA

REFLECTING ON RECONCILIATION

Lessons from the past, prospects for the future

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Reflecting on Reconciliation
Lessons from the past, prospects for the future

Kim Wale

IJR
THE INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC   African National Congress

EA   enumerator area

IJR   Institute for Justice and Reconciliation

LSM   living standards measure

SARB   South African Reconciliation Barometer/Reconciliation Barometer

TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year's South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB or Reconciliation Barometer) reflects on over a decade of SARB data in order to assess the changes in perceptions and experiences of reconciliation since the inception of the survey in 2003.

The introductory chapter locates this reflective aim within a process of reviewing and refining the SARB survey, as well as a broader historical moment in which the meaning and relevance of reconciliation are changing for South Africans. This year's report therefore contributes to taking stock of how far South Africans have come on the reconciliation journey, and also where we might need to focus attention on the road ahead. However, progress in reconciliation is not linear. Instead, we progress in some reconciliation-related areas, while remaining static or even regressing in other areas. Furthermore, results require interpretation. At first glance, some results appear regressive for reconciliation, but, when interpreted in relation to other findings, they indicate an acknowledgement of the need for deeper transformation within South African society. In many instances, results indicate that, as South Africans make progress towards certain areas of reconciliation, the transformation of material and symbolic inequalities becomes increasingly imperative to the further progression of reconciliation. Chapter two outlines the conceptual background and methodology of the survey.

Findings on the key area of political culture as it relates to reconciliation are discussed in chapter three. Improvements in interracial trust, a key indicator of the development of an inclusive political culture, are demonstrated. Findings indicate that interracial mistrust has steadily decreased by 12.5% over the past 11 years from 40.6% in 2003 to 28.1% in 2013. Furthermore, the difference in levels of trust in leaders and Parliament by race is also converging to more similar levels of trust over time. The gap between the group with the highest trust in leaders (black South Africans) and the lowest trust in leaders (white South Africans) decreased by a total of 15.4% from a difference of 42% in 2003, to a difference of 26.6% in 2013. At the same time as we witness these improvements in political culture, especially in relation to race relations, results also show a decline in South Africans' desire for a united South African identity and a strengthening of racial identity over time. On the surface, these findings do not look so good for reconciliation. However, alternative interpretations are offered which demonstrate that these results may also point to the development of a more critical and honest engagement with racial identity politics within South Africa.

Chapter four demonstrates that, while levels of interracial contact and socialisation have improved over the past 11 years, the poor remain largely excluded from this positive social integration. The percentage of South Africans who report often or always talking to someone from another race in a social setting increased from 10.4% in 2003 to 23.5% in 2013. However, when we disaggregate this figure by class,

we see that South Africans in the higher living standards measure (LSM) groups are much more likely to socialise across race than the middle LSMs, and the lowest LSMs are the least likely to socialise across race. Furthermore, between 2003 and 2013, the gap between the percentage of citizens socialising across race in the lowest and highest LSM groups increased from a 17.6% difference to a 27.2% difference. In 2003, 0.6 in every 10 South Africans (6.1%) within the lower LSM group, 2 in every 10 (19.5%) in the middle LSMs and 2.4 in every 10 (23.7%) in the highest LSMs reported socialising across race. Compared with 2013, 1.3 in every 10 (13%) in the lowest LSMs, 2.9 in every 10 (29.3%) in the middle LSMs and 4.7 in every 10 (40.7%) in the highest LSMs reported socialising across race. Not only are the poorest South Africans excluded from interracial socialisation relative to the middle and wealthier South Africans, but the degree of this exclusion also seems to have increased between 2003 and 2013, as the percentage of South Africans socialising across race has increased by a greater amount than those socialising in the lowest LSMs.

Chapter five addresses the issue of race and memory politics. It is concerning that South Africans' memory of apartheid is decreasing, even though its legacy remains with us and continues to impact on our material and social relations. Across all race groups, the percentage of South Africans who agree with the historical truth that apartheid was a crime against humanity decreased by 10% from 86.5% agreement in 2003 to 76.4% agreement in 2013. Across different historical truths about the oppressive and violent nature of apartheid, it is concerning that South Africans seem to be decreasing in their levels of agreement with these truths over time. Furthermore, when we disaggregate questions about apartheid and its legacy in terms of race, it seems that white South Africans are significantly less likely than the rest of South Africa to agree that apartheid was an unjust, oppressive and criminal system which resulted in the poverty of black South Africans today. For example, about 7 in every 10 South Africans agree that the apartheid government wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans. However, just over 5 in every 10 white South Africans agree, which is significantly less than other race groups (7 in every 10 coloured, 7 in every 10 Asian/Indian, 8 in every 10 black South Africans). Agreement levels are even lower for the statement that apartheid resulted in the poverty of black South Africans (3 in every 10 white South Africans, compared with 6 in every 10 coloured, 7 in every 10 Asian/Indian and 8 in every 10 black South Africans who agree with this statement). These results are interpreted through a reflection on the relationship between racial identity, privilege and memory politics.

The final chapter summarises and discusses the results of this year's SARB. It further reflects across the chapters to pull out key insights, similarities and contradictions across chapter findings. Key findings are interpreted and discussed, drawing on results of qualitative research processes undertaken by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) about the meaning and relevance of reconciliation over the past four years. In sum, results show positive progress towards reconciliation, as well as areas of tension which expose continued symbolic and material inequality in South Africa. Drawing on the results of the SARB, the conclusion argues that the idea of a unified nation is not necessarily conducive to reconciliation, as it may presuppose a politics of assimilation. Instead, results indicate the potential to shape a shared South African identity which, based on the principles of transformation, engages with racial-identity politics and continued forms of inequality towards deepening reconciliation in South Africa.

I.
INTRODUCTION

Progress in reconciliation cannot be assessed in a simple linear fashion. Instead, it seems that the light cast in the spaces where we improve in reconciliation pushes us yet further to engage with (and transform) the shadows cast by our shared histories of oppression and violence. This introduction locates the reflective task of this report within a broader process of reviewing the survey undertaken by the SARB in 2014.

This year's South African Reconciliation Barometer reflects on over a decade of SARB data to evaluate how South Africans' perceptions and experiences of reconciliation have changed between 2003 and 2013. Progress in reconciliation cannot be assessed in a simple linear fashion. Instead, it seems that the light cast in the spaces where we improve in reconciliation pushes us yet further to engage with (and transform) the shadows cast by our shared histories of oppression and violence. This introduction locates the reflective task of this report within a broader process of reviewing the survey undertaken by the SARB in 2014, as well as a historical moment in which the meaning and relevance of reconciliation are changing in South Africa. Within this context, this year's SARB aims to contribute to the process of taking stock of the past 11 years of the SARB and 20 years of reconciliation, in order to glean insights and lessons for our journey into the next decade of reconciliation.

There is another reason why this year's Reconciliation Barometer is devoted to the analysis of trends over the past 11 years. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, which houses the Reconciliation Barometer, has devoted 2014 to an in-depth process of rethinking the survey's content. Through a series of qualitative research processes, including focus groups with ordinary South Africans in 2011 and workshops with experts and key stakeholders held this year, the IJR is re-evaluating the meaning and relevance of reconciliation 20 years into our democratic dispensation. On the basis of findings from this research, as well as a psychometric evaluation of current questions, a refined survey instrument has been developed which aims to speak more directly to the issues of reconciliation faced in the present context. The year 2014 has therefore been a year of reflection and innovation for the SARB. Instead of collecting data this year, we have created an updated survey instrument for the years to come. It seems fitting, therefore, to devote the 2014 SARB Report to a reflection on and summary of the past 11 years, before we take a step into a new era of the SARB.

This process of reflecting on the past before we embark on the future of the new SARB is in some ways representative of a broader historical moment in South Africa. This moment is marked by the passing on of one of our country's most powerful symbols of reconciliation. One year ago, on 5 December 2013, the nation bid farewell to Nelson Mandela, the country's first president, architect and symbol of South Africa's post-1994 reconciliation process. We should not underestimate the effect this has on our national psyche and on our relationship to reconciliation. South Africans came together in those moments to mourn and remember the man and his legacy. While the

moment was filled with heightened emotions, it has taken time to work its way into the national psyche; to feel what indeed this means for us and our reconciliation story.

The Reconciliation Barometer is a project that reflects on what reconciliation has meant for us, and what it will mean for us going forward. In a workshop held by the SARB this year on rethinking reconciliation, one possible interpretation of the meaning of Mandela's passing for reconciliation in the national psyche was provided. In the quote below, Kenneth Lukuko, who leads the community healing project at the IJR, reflects that it is time for South Africans to move from idealising the saints of reconciliation to the more challenging and rewarding task of making reconciliation (with all its contradictions and tensions) part of everyday life. In Lukuko's words:

> At the beginning of our transition naturally there was a lot of uncertainty and insecurity as to what ought/could/should and would happen in order to move forward. Reconciliation became that process where we found symbolic acts by our leaders that got us to develop confidence [in] reconciliation as a process, especially the gestures of forgiveness by Nelson Mandela, who symbolised the suffering of many. In that way he actually got us to believe that despite all these challenges, we could walk on water. But now that he is gone, we realise that the contradictions were always there and that we had better now begin to address them more earnestly and honestly in order to fully reconcile. We have to actually learn to swim, which is obviously the tough part. Certainly he left us with the goodwill we might need to give us strength and enthusiasm to do so.

Mr Kenneth Lukuko
Senior Project Leader Community Healing, IJR

The quote captures the miraculous quality that many have attributed to our transition, but also alludes to the difficulties of sustaining the miracle. Reconciliation as articulated by Mandela holds something of the transcendent in it, but this transcendence cannot be taken for granted. It requires action, in the absence of which the term becomes a smokescreen for the perpetuation of old patterns and habits.

Bringing reconciliation down from its transcendent heights into the realms of everyday lived realities faced by South Africans also requires us to face the contradictions of the transition and their impact on the

present. These contradictions may be imagined as reconciliations shadow side. This shadow of reconciliation is seen, for example, in the inequality and poverty we continue to witness in South African society, or in the misunderstanding, fear and anxiety generated around racial issues.

Last year, the 2013 Reconciliation Barometer proposed the concept of radical reconciliation in order to encourage engagement with this shadow and also to ground the concept in everyday practice (Wale, 2013). The word 'radical' comes from the Latin word 'radicalis' which means 'root', as in 'going to the root of the issue'. In proposing the concept of radical reconciliation, the 'radical' forces us on the one hand to address the root issues which prevent reconciliation – to focus not only on the light but also to address the shadows of the contradictions that still exist. On the other hand, the word 'root' aims to signify the need to ground/root reconciliation at the level of everyday practice. In essence, radical reconciliation aims to humanise the concept by bringing it down from the transcendent heights of its history to ground it in everyday realities. In this process, the aim is not to lose the transcendent call of reconciliation to transform suffering, disconnection and violence into understanding, connection and healing at a national level, but it asks us to confront the searing contradictions which remain with us. It aims to ground the transcendent in the everyday, so that reconciliation becomes a daily practice.

The SARB 2014 Report continues this process of taking stock of where we have come from in order to prepare for the reconciliation road that lies ahead. Globally, South Africa has been revered and followed for its reconciliation process. We chart the path that post-conflict countries follow, which also means we have to be particularly willing to learn from our mistakes and to shift the path where necessary so that others can continue to learn from our process. The current moment is particularly important as we shift from one era of reconciliation to the next, take stock of the past 20 years, and focus attention on where we need to improve, what we need to confront and how we need to shift along this path.

In general, the findings of 11 years of data are mixed and push us to engage the transformation imperative within the reconciliation process. In terms of developing an inclusive political identity, results which at surface level seem cause for concern, on deeper reflection may in fact indicate a more honest engagement with identity politics. While a positive finding for race relations is the increase in interracial integration especially in social spaces, the shadow of this finding is demonstrated in the reality that the poor remain excluded from increasing racial integration. In the area of memory politics, South Africans – and especially white South Africans – appear to be forgetting the brutal realities of apartheid. However, as much as we would like to forget this difficult history, reconciliation requires that we engage with the past in order to transform its effects on our present and future. The temptation to deny what is difficult is understandable but not conducive to reconciliation. These results indicate that the reconciliation road ahead requires South Africans to acknowledge and transform relations of continued material and symbolic inequality, at the same time as we celebrate our increasing capacity for connection across previous boundaries.

II.
METHODOLOGY

The Reconciliation Barometer is a nationally representative public opinion poll that has been conducted by the IJR since 2003.[1] It is the only survey in South Africa at present that provides a longitudinal measure of progress in reconciliation since the transition to democracy in 1994.

In addition to tracking and reporting trends and year-on-year change, it is among the project's founding goals to collect reliable and accurate data that can meaningfully inform public and policy debates, particularly where these risk overreliance on assumptions, rhetoric and stereotypes as is sometimes the case in discourse around reconciliation, social relations and nation-building. Two qualitative studies on reconciliation have also been conducted by the survey, in 2001 and again ten years later in 2011.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey recognises that, like many other facets of social change, reconciliation is difficult to define and inherently challenging to measure. IJR founding director Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio has described reconciliation as involving multiple processes and parameters, but necessarily interruption patterns of events. It entails understanding, social dialogue, grieving and healing, acknowledgement of the truth, the pursuit of justice, reparations, and sometimes forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio, 2004: 6–8). Daniel Philpott (2009) refers to the importance of restoring 'right relationships within a community' through processes that 'address the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlist the wide range of persons affected by these crimes (2009: 392). Louis Kriesberg also usefully defines reconciliation as

> the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups. It often refers to the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship. (Kriesberg, 2007: 2)

IJR executive director Fanie du Toit has also proposed that reconciliation should be 'framed as a call [for] recognition of the basic and radical interdependence of comprehensive (moral, political, social and environmental) wellbeing across conflict lines', and as a process should allow for both participation and creativity but also 'concrete agendas, fostering shared memories and more effective institutions (Du Toit, 2012: 10, 15, 25–57).

A wide range of thought and theory on conflict, social and political transition and reconciliation was taken into account in the development of the Reconciliation Barometer survey. Initial and important contributions were made by Professor James Gibson, who worked closely with the IJR in the early stages of the survey's development. Gibson proposed that the measurement of reconciliation in South Africa required testing of the following concepts:

- 'Interracial reconciliation – defined as the willingness of people of different races to trust each other, to reject stereotypes about those of other races, and generally to get along with each other;
- Political tolerance – the commitment of people to put up with each other, even those whose ideas they thoroughly detest;
- Support for the principles (abstract and applied) of human rights – including the strict application of the rule of law and commitment to legal universalism;
- Legitimacy – in particular, the predisposition to recognise and accept the authority [of] the major political institutions of the New South Africa.' (Gibson, 2004: 4)

From these concepts, as well as the results of an initial exploratory study conducted in 2002 that aimed to identify the 'meanings and associations South Africans attribute to the concept of reconciliation' (Lombard, 2003: 3), seven initial indicators and hypotheses were used to develop the measures included in the Reconciliation Barometer research instrument. These were later reduced to six hypotheses, as shown in the table on page 12.

This year is the first year since 2003 that the SARB has not conducted an annual survey. Instead, research energies were channelled into a systematic process of testing and refining the original conceptualisation of reconciliation. While the original conceptualisation has successfully assessed the concept of reconciliation over the past 11 years, findings from both quantitative and qualitative research point towards shifts in the meaning and relevance of reconciliation 20 years into democracy. Conceptually, therefore, the framework has been re-evaluated to incorporate findings from an expert survey conducted in 2010, the qualitative survey interviews conducted in 2011, as well as two workshops held in 2014 with experts and key stakeholders in the field of reconciliation. A first workshop was held in July with 20 colleagues from the IJR on creatively reconceptualising reconciliation, and a second was held in August with 15 key stakeholders from media, government, academia and civil society on rethinking the South African Reconciliation Barometer.

In addition to the qualitative research, the SARB has undergone a rigorous psychometric evaluation process to test the validity and reliability of current scales and items. On the basis of this qualitative

Summary of conceptualisation: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2004–2013	
Hypotheses	Indicators
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with one another and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security
Political culture: If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multiracial political parties
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of one another, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; interracial preconceptions; interracial tolerance
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue

and psychometric research, a refined survey instrument has been designed to reflect the issues faced by reconciliation in the current context and will form the basis of the SARB survey from 2015.

SAMPLING AND FIELDWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with South Africans in all nine provinces of the country, using a quantitative questionnaire developed by the IJR that includes approximately 100 survey items. All questions are closed-ended, and the majority are in the form of five-point Likert scales. Sampling, piloting and interviews are conducted by Ipsos and form part of the bi-annual KhayaBus, which focuses on measuring social and political trends. A national sample is drawn that is representative of the South African adult population aged 15 and above and in 2013 included approximately 1 989 metro and 1 601 non-metro inhabitants, with an equal gender split. The sample frame is based on the 2001 census enumerator areas (EAs). Following random selection of EAs, secondary sampling is conducted at the household level, before a final stage of selecting respondents aged 15 and above. Random sampling 'ensures that each person in the South African adult population has an equal probability of being chosen to do the interview'. As a

representative sample, the 'results of the survey can be projected onto the South African population as a mirror image of trends in attitudes and perceptions amongst adult South Africans in general'. In 2013, a sampling error of 1.7% on a sample of 3 590 respondents was achieved, with a confidence interval of 95% (Ipsos, 2013). Participation is voluntary, and no incentives were offered to respondents.

For all the survey rounds analysed in this report, fieldwork was carried out in the first half of the year, between March and May. Interviews were conducted in six languages, according to the preferences of respondents: English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and Tswana. Ipsos ensures a minimum back-check of 20% of interviews conducted by each fieldworker to ensure accuracy and consistency. The metro sample is then weighted according to race, metro, gender and age, while the non-metro sample is weighted by community size, age, gender and province.

ADDITIONAL REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS

The results of the Reconciliation Barometer survey are released annually by the IJR to coincide with the commemoration of the Day of Reconciliation on 16 December. Each year, the report provides a snapshot overview of national public opinion in relation to the social, economic and political indicators shown in the summary of conceptualisation table. This year's report is unique in that it provides an analysis over time, rather than a snapshot, in order to assess South Africa's progress towards reconciliation over the 2003–2013 period. All reported data is weighted, unless otherwise stated, to allow for conclusions to be drawn about the entire South African population over time.

Data is generally analysed and presented using several key demographic variables that include gender, age, living standards measure (LSM) and historically defined race categories. A variable has been created that distinguishes between 'youth' respondents, ages 15–29, and 'adult' respondents aged 30 years and older. The LSM is a composite that includes a range of survey items that assess dwelling type, telecommunications, domestic workers employed in the household, water and sanitation services on site, ownership of household consumer items (refrigerator, microwave oven, television, etc.), and residence in a rural or metropolitan area. Further, it is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid racial categories in South Africa, but survey responses are presented according to race where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion. While race is a socially constructed category, material, social and psychological divisions were created on the basis of this social construction. Therefore, apartheid-era racial categories continue to impact on the lives of South Africans and analysis on the basis of these categories aims to assess this impact in order to shift it towards deeper racial reconciliation and equality.

Most of the survey items are measured on a five-point Likert scale. For example, respondents are asked to indicate how much they agree with an item: *strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and strongly agree*. Analysis and presentation of data over the 11-year period focused on ascertaining the percentage of the sample who agree with an item (combining *agree* and *strongly agree* responses)

and then displaying the change in the percentage of those who agree over time. When interpreting the results presented, it is important to bear in mind that disagreement levels cannot be gleaned simply from agreement levels, as the total percentage includes *neutral* and *don't know* responses. Further analysis disaggregated agreement by demographic variables. A key finding from demographic analysis is that race is the only demographic variable that consistently accounts for differences in perceptions and experiences of reconciliation. Age and gender did not account for substantial difference in perception. As a result, this report focuses on race as a key demographic variable used in the analysis of change in perception over time. Findings are presented in graphs to demonstrate trends over time. The tables used to generate these graphs can be found in Appendix B.

Finally, the IJR grants external access to the Reconciliation Barometer survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis on an application basis. Interested researchers, academics, students, civil society organisations and others are encouraged to contact the Institute with access requests (see www.ijr.org.za).

NOTES

1. During 2003 and 2004, the survey was conducted twice a year, but, as from 2005, has been undertaken annually. For purpose of longitudinal comparison, this report only includes data from rounds 1 and 3 from 2003 and 2004, conducted in March/April during the first term Khayabus, and excludes rounds 2 and 4, which were conducted mid-year in 2003 and 2004.

III.
POLITICAL CULTURE

The concept of political community speaks to whether South Africans feel they belong to an inclusive political identity. While an inclusive political identity is conducive to reconciliation, an exclusionary political identity is not.

Political theorists identify trust as a crucial element and indicator of democratic political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). According to Putnam, trust is a measure of social capital. 'Social capital' refers to the collective values of social networks as well as to the desire to support one another that emerges from these networks (Putnam, 2000). Democracy requires that citizens trust one another as well as the institutions and leaders of the democratic order. However, not all forms of trust indicate the kinds of social capital which are ideal for healthy democracy. For example, it is not good for democracy if citizens blindly trust leaders, as this inhibits their capacity to critique and challenge undemocratic behaviour of leaders. As democracies mature, this is usually accompanied by decreasing levels of trust in leaders. Bridging social capital is indicated by trust between individuals of different social groups and therefore indicates inclusive social identities which encourage connection across identity groups.

The SARB measures trust in other race groups, which is an indication of bridging social capital and a political culture of reconciliation in South Africa. In addition, it measures trust in leaders and institutions. While a certain degree of trust in leaders is required for a political culture of reconciliation, this should be tempered by healthy scepticism. This chapter discusses changes in both interracial and political trust. It further assesses whether South Africans across race groups trust/ mistrust political leaders and institutions (the political system) similarly or whether they express very different perceptions of the political system. The degree to which citizens feel connected to or separate from the political system relative to one another tells us something about their feelings of inclusion or exclusion from this sphere and also from one another relative to the system.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND IDENTITY

The concept of political community speaks to whether South Africans feel they belong to an inclusive political identity. While an inclusive political identity is conducive to reconciliation, an exclusionary political identity is not. In the Reconciliation Barometer, the concept is measured through questions about group identity and intergroup trust. In the section below, the concept of political community is evaluated through an analysis of the degree to which South Africans express desire for a united South Africa, which primary social groups they identify most strongly with and levels of interracial mistrust.

Social identity is a concept which speaks to group belonging, as well as the way in which we associate and connect to others on the basis

of this belonging. Individuals hold many identities at one time on the basis of the different social groups they belong to, for example, gender, race, nationality, language. However, some of these associations are more salient (stronger) than others. Identity associations can be inclusive or exclusive. An inclusive identity is one which is open and accepting to many different identity groups. In the Reconciliation Barometer, political identity is tested through a number of questions, two of which are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Together, these figures speak to whether South Africans desire a united identity and which identities are most salient.

Figure 1 reviews the percentage of South Africans who agree with the statements: *It is desirable to create one united South Africa out of all the groups who live in this country* and *It is possible to create one united South Africa out of all the groups who live in this country*. Over time, the desire for a united South Africa has decreased by 17.9% from 72.9% in 2003 to 55% in 2013. Agreement with whether a united South Africa is possible has decreased by 7%, and the gap between what South Africans desire and what they think is possible has reduced from 12.3% in 2003 to 1.4% in 2013. In other words, the difference between the percentage of South Africans who agree that a united nation is desirable and that it is possible has decreased over time. The period between 2010 and 2013 witnessed the steepest decline in citizen's desire for a united South Africa. In this time, the percentage of South Africans who agreed with this statement declined by 17.2% from 72.2% to 55%. In 2013, just over half of South Africa's citizens agreed that they desired a united South Africa, compared with almost three quarters in 2010 and 2003.

To further assess political identity in South Africa, Figure 2 summarises the results to the question of which social group South Africans associate most strongly with. A list of 13 different possibilities is given: language; ethnicity; race; class; neighbourhood; religion; South African identity; social; savings or sports club; work or school colleagues; age; African identity; gender. The top four identity associations chosen by South Africans between 2003 and 2013 are language, race, ethnicity and South African identity. Language and race have been more frequently selected over time. In 2003, language was selected by 20.4% of citizens and by 23.2% in 2013, and race was the third-most selected identity in 2003 by 11.8% of South Africans, but swopped with ethnicity to come in at second place in 2013 with 13.4% of South Africans selecting race as the strongest group association. Ethnicity dropped in strength from 15.1% in 2003 to 11.1% in 2013 and South African identity dropped from 11.2% in 2003 to 7.1% in 2013.

In sum, language has remained the most important identity category chosen by South Africans over time with almost a quarter of South Africans selecting this identity as their primary group association in 2013. Between 2003 and 2013, race increased in popularity as a primary South African identity, and increased from the third most popular identity in 2003 (with 11.8% of South Africans selecting this choice) to the second most popular primary identity in 2013 selected by 13.4% of South Africans. While the inclusive identity of South African nationality remains in the top four categories, it has decreased in popularity by 4.1% between 2003 and 2013. The high points for this inclusive identity are seen in 2009 and 2010 when almost a quarter of South Africans chose this identity (14.2% and 13.7% respectively). In 2009, South African identity was stronger for South Africans than racial identity, but the 2009 figure for identification with South African identity decreased to half the figure it was in 2009 by 2013. Looking at Figures 1 and 2 together, South Africans appear to be steadily moving away from an inclusive South African identity, and this is most visible in the post-2010 period.

INTERRACIAL TRUST

If trust across identity groups is present, inclusive forms of association are more likely to prevail. It is a primary source of social capital, which enables cooperation between citizens towards common ends, regardless of the social group that they belong to. Racial identity is an important and historically divisive feature that continues to characterise interactions between South African citizens. Although racial oppression was already the primary feature of social relations before the adoption of the apartheid ideology, this system formalised constructed racial identity and the commensurate privileges that it ascribed to its racial hierarchy. South Africans were legally and psychologically taught to fear and mistrust groups other than their own, interracial relationships were prohibited, and public space was segregated along race lines.

The importance of fostering interracial trust for reconciliation in South Africa cannot be understated. As a country, we are working to remedy the effects of decades of racial oppression and segregation, based first in colonialism and then in apartheid. Because intergroup trust is a cultural concept, it takes time to shift levels of trust. The process of increasing trust is a psychological, spatial and embodied process which shifts over time. Interracial trust is measured in the Reconciliation Barometer in terms of the degree of mistrust in race groups different from one's own race, through responses to the statement: = '[GROUP] people are untrustworthy'. The word '[GROUP]' is replaced with the race group that the respondent is not, for example if the respondent is Asian/Indian, then it is replaced with '[black, white and coloured] people are untrustworthy'.

The changing percentage of South Africans who agree with this statement is captured in Figure 3. It is positive to note that interracial mistrust has steadily decreased by 12.5% over the past 11 years from 40.6% in 2003 to 28.1% in 2013. In other words, interracial trust is steadily increasing for South Africans over time. Furthermore, turning to Figure 4, which disaggregates interracial trust by age, it is interesting to note that decreases in trust are occurring similarly for youths and adults. It is not the case that the younger generation is more likely to trust than the older generation. Instead, youths and adults demonstrate

Figure 1: Desirability and possibility of creating one united South Africa, 2003–2013 (% agreement)



Figure 2: Primary identity associations, 2007–2013 (%)

Figure 3: Interracial mistrust, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

The figures for points plotted on all graphs can be found in corresponding tables in Appendix B.

similar levels of agreement with mistrust, with youths indicating only marginally lower levels of mistrust than adults (youth mistrust was 2.6% lower than adults in 2003 and 2.4% lower than adults in 2013).

Figure 5 presents the trend for interracial mistrust disaggregated by race over the 2003–2013 period. Findings indicate that levels of trust have increased for the period measured. As a group, black South Africans continue to be most distrustful of other racial groups but, at the same time, also recorded the biggest decline in levels of mistrust over the past 11 years. In 2003, 47% agreed with the statement that other race groups are untrustworthy. In the same year, the least mistrusting group was coloured South Africans at 18.8% agreement. This figure dropped by 14.7% to 32.3% agreement for black South Africans in 2013 and by 8.8 % for coloured South Africans to 10% in 2013. The gap between the least and most trusting race groups therefore narrowed by 5.9% from a 28.2% difference in 2003 to a 22.3% difference in 2013. In sum, the differences in mistrust levels between different race groups is decreasing as South Africans across race are indicating more similar levels of trust in one another over time. We are also witnessing a general decline in mistrust for all South Africans.

TRUST IN LEADERS AND INSTITUTIONS

Another important measure of political culture for reconciliation is the degree of trust that ordinary citizens have in the country's leaders and the institutions over which they preside. While trust levels between citizens may be thought of as horizontal trust, confidence in leaders and institutions represents a vertical form of trust towards the system that regulates all conduct, including social interaction, within a country's borders. The dynamics of this second kind of trust are significant for reconciliation, but in different ways from horizontal trust. The Reconciliation Barometer hypothesises that, in order for reconciliation to take root, it is important for citizens to view political leaders, public institutions and government as legitimate, accountable and responsive. Without such legitimacy, citizens are less likely to abide by the founding values of the state. This section focuses on whether or not South Africans demonstrate trust and confidence in leaders and institutions. It is, however, difficult to assess how much trust is ideal for a healthy democratic political culture. On the one hand, it is important for citizens to feel that leaders and institutions are legitimate. On the other hand, blind trust is not conducive to a critical citizenship required for a healthy democracy.

Over the years, the Reconciliation Barometer has measured the levels of confidence and trust citizens have in national leaders and governance institutions. Figure 6 summarises shifting levels of confidence in executive and legislative institutions between 2006 and 2013. Figure 7 summarises trust in national leaders and institutions between 2003 and 2013. Both figures show a long-term trend in growing distrust towards the institutions commonly associated with a democratic dispensation and the leadership that presides over them.

To ascertain citizen's levels of confidence in institutions, respondents are asked: *Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions*. Results for the entire list of institutions are summarised in Table 6 in the appendix. Figure 6 demonstrates

Figure 4:   Interracial mistrust by age, 2003–2013 (% agreement)


Figure 5:   Interracial mistrust by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

confidence in executive and legislative institutions in terms of the percentage of South Africans who report that they have 'quite a lot' or 'a great deal' of confidence in South African executive and legislative institutions. Overall confidence in all four institutions decreased since our first measurement in 2006. Amongst those listed, confidence in the presidency has consistently remained highest, but at the same time also recorded the greatest decrease in trust from 77% in 2006 to 55.1% in 2013. Support for the national government, the institution that drew the second highest level of support, also decreased precipitously from 73.1% in 2006 to 54.5% in 2013. Confidence levels in Parliament declined from 69.4% in 2006 to 54.5% in 3013. Out of these institutions, the second lowest confidence was expressed in provincial government, which decreased from 64.5% in 2003 to 51.8% in 2013. Consistently, the lowest confidence has been in local government, the site at which citizens interact most directly with government. However, this is also the only institution whose levels of confidence have improved between 2006 (50.3%) and 2013 (54.5%).

Across a list of different public institutions, in 2013 South Africans indicated the highest confidence levels in religious institutions (67%) and the public protector (64%) and the lowest confidence levels in political parties (46.2%) and the police (47.9%). Further analysis of the difference in confidence levels across race groups indicated that the three institutions which demonstrate the greatest difference in confidence levels across race are: the presidency, national government and Parliament. In contrast, the four institutions which demonstrate the greatest similarity across race groups are print media, broadcast media, religious institutions (high confidence across all race groups) and local government (low confidence across all race groups).

Trust in national leaders and institutions is further gleaned by asking whether South Africans agree with the statements: *Most of the time I can trust the country's national leaders to do what is right* and *The South African parliament can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole*. The levels of agreement are demonstrated from 2003 to 2013 in Figure 7, which shows that trust in leaders and Parliament has been decreasing over time. In 2003, 61.6% of South Africans agreed with the statement that Parliament can be trusted, while 54.5% agreed that national leaders can be trusted. Ten years later in 2013, trust levels for Parliament has decreased by 12.7% to 48.9%, and by 6.2% to 48.3% for national leaders. Over this time, declines in trust levels for both Parliament and leaders occurred over the 2006–2009 period, with a relatively sharp incline in the 2010 period, only to decline again to record lows in the following years.

There are interesting shared patterns for citizens' shifting levels of confidence and trust in leaders and institutions, as demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7. These levels have varied over time in relation to key social and political events. The highest levels of trust and confidence were witnessed over the 2004–2006 period (when South Africa experienced high economic growth), and then in 2010 (during the FIFA World Cup held in South Africa). They have been at their lowest in 2008 and 2009 (when South Africa witnessed an economic decline and far-reaching power shifts within the ANC) and then again in the most recent 2013 survey (in the run-up to the 2014 elections). It is interesting to note a possible pattern in results over the course of the SARB. In the lead-up to national elections in 2009 and 2014,

Figure 6: Confidence in executive institutions and legislative institutions, 2006–2013 (% quite a lot and a great deal)


- Presidency
- National government
- Provincial government
- Local government
- Parliament

Figure 7: Trust in national leaders and Parliament, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

- Trust in national leaders
- Trust in government

the ANC ruling party held its national conference to elect its executive committee in Polokwane in December 2007 and in Manguang in 2012. Post Polokwane witnessed a dip in confidence figures in 2008 and 2009, which then rose again post national elections in 2010, 2011, and 2012, only to drop again post Manguang in the lead-up to the 2014 elections. We have yet to see whether this pattern continues, but it may demonstrate the effect which divisive politicking within the ANC has on the confidence and trust of the citizenry in the political sphere. As individuals vie for positions within the organisations in the lead-up to the national conference, this may have a counterproductive effect on the nation's perception of government institutions, leaders and the ruling party.

POLITICAL TRUST ACROSS RACE

Trust in national leaders and Parliament is analysed across race groups and demonstrated in Figures 8 and 9. Both graphs show a similar trend, with trust levels for different race groups diverging fairly dramatically in 2003 and then converging to more similar levels in 2013. Black South Africans demonstrate the highest levels of trust in leaders and Parliament, while their white compatriots recorded the lowest aggregate positive responses to these statements. Figure 8 shows that, in 2003, 62.5% of black South Africans compared with 20.5% of white South Africans agreed that national leaders are trust-worthy. Over the past 11 years, these figures decreased by 8.7% for black South Africans to 53.8%, and increased by 6.7% for white South Africans to 27.2% in 2013. Therefore, the difference between the group with the highest trust in leaders (black South Africans) and the group with the lowest trust levels (white South Africans) decreased by a total of 15.4% from a difference of 42% in 2003 to a difference of 26.6% in 2013. In other words, white and black South African opinions seem to be converging over time in the degree to which they trust national leaders.

A similar trend occurred for levels of agreement with the statement that Parliament can be trusted (Figure 9). For the most trusting group (black South Africans), agreement on this statement decreased by 17.5% from 70.4% in 2003 to 52.9% in 2013, and for white South Africans it increased by 13.1% from 21.4% in 2003 to 34.5% in 2013. Again, the difference between the trust levels of black and white South Africans has decreased by 30.6% from a 49% difference in 2003 to an 18.4% difference in 2013. In sum, white and black South Africans demonstrate notably different levels of trust in leaders and Parliament, but this difference is steadily decreasing over time with black South Africans becoming less trusting, while their white compatriots have recorded an increase in trust from a low base.

Another apparent trend demonstrated in Figure 8 and Figure 9 is the decrease in trust levels for coloured South Africans and the increase in positive responses from Asian/Indian South Africans. While coloured South Africans were the second most likely group to agree that they trust national leaders in 2003, this figure has sunk by 13.9%, making them the second least trusting of national leaders in 2013. For trust in Parliament, this figure has decreased even more dramatically by 22.7%, making it the racial group least trusting of Parliament in South Africa. For Asian/Indians, trust agreement levels increased by 12.8% and 12.6% for national leaders and Parliament respectively.

Figure 8:   Trust in national leaders by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Figure 9:   Trust in Parliament by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

The notable decrease in trust for coloured South Africans over the 11-year period fits within a broader trend occurring for coloured South Africans across SARB data. In a number of different areas related to reconciliation, coloured South Africans' perceptions appear to have shifted from high levels of support and positivity to be replaced by an increasing sense of frustration and disillusionment. This cross-cutting finding will be further discussed throughout the report.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the objective of a more inclusive political identity, the results over time display high, but decreasing, levels of approval for the desirability of a united South African nation. This could mean either that South Africans are indeed becoming less keen about the idea of a unified nation, but it may also suggest disillusionment with the interpretation of the concepts of unity and of nationhood as used in our political discourse. They have, arguably, in recent years been used in ways that may have been counterproductive to addressing the most problematic divisions and inequalities. When making claims to a united South African identity, this should not be at the expense of addressing the inequalities that may exist within a constructed unity. A decreasing desire for a unified South African identity may not indicate a desire for exclusive identities, but rather a more critical evaluation about what is meant by a 'unified identity'.

At the level of race relations, there seems to be an important improvement, as trust levels increase and perceptions about leaders become less different across race. At the same time, racial identities are becoming stronger and a united South African identity is becoming weaker. Overall, race continues to be a social identity marker for South Africans (in fact, it has grown in importance over the 11-year period). This seeming contradiction in results which show increasing interracial trust alongside stronger associations with racial identity will require further research and analysis. A possible interpretation of these results is that, perhaps, as some aspects of race relations improve in South Africa, the areas in which we still need to work also become more visible. As we trust each other more across race, we are possibly also more able to honestly confront continued racial inequalities. The continued work of repairing race relations and shifting racial inequality requires that we bring awareness to the dynamics of racial identity rather than deny its impact. In this light, it makes sense that increasing trust across race could lead to a stronger rather than weaker connection to racial identity. A stronger sense of racial identity is not necessarily counterproductive to reconciliation. If it is constructed around developing an understanding of the way in which race impacts our lives in order to shift these dynamics towards deeper connection across race, then this kind of racial identity supports rather than thwarts reconciliation.

IV.
RACIAL RECONCILIATION

Apartheid regulated and enforced not only the geographical and material, but also the psychological segregation of South Africa's constitutive population groups. Apart from the economic dispossession that coincided with forced removals and the enforcement of pass laws to police geographic segregation, the imposition of these laws also had a profound impact on the psyche of all South Africans, instilling a toxic understanding of intergroup relations.

Reconciliation is an attempt to undo years of spatial, social and psychological damage caused by apartheid in order to repair race relations. To assess our progress in this area, the SARB measures the degree of, and the desire for, greater interracial integration.

CONTACT AND SOCIALISATION

Since its inception, the SARB has measured the frequency of contact and socialisation between race groups. This measure has been informed by social psychological theory related to the contact hypothesis, which is attributed to Gordon W. Allport (1954), who posits that the most effective way to reduce prejudice between groups is through interpersonal contact under the correct conditions. These conditions include equality between groups, sharing common goals, and interpersonal interactions at the level of friendship formation.

The Reconciliation Barometer tests the degree of interracial contact in two different environments. The first kind of contact is referred to as everyday interracial talk and is tested through the question: *On a typical day during the week, whether at work or otherwise, how often do you talk to [OTHER RACE GROUP] people?* The second kind of contact is referred to as interracial socialisation and is tested through the question: *When socialising in your home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to [OTHER RACE GROUP] people?* Following the contact hypothesis, it is the second kind of contact which is more likely to reduce prejudice and negative stereotypes, as social environments are more likely to create a sense of equality and personal interaction. Through social interracial contact, it is also more likely that individuals will reciprocally recognise their shared humanity and come to learn about, and be concerned with, the lived experience of different people.

In terms of overall trends for the two variables 'interracial talk' and 'interracial socialisation', the percentage of South Africans who respond that they often or always talk to a person of another race is always higher than the percentage of those who say they often or always socialise with people from another race. Overall, this percentage for both variables has increased over time by 7.6% for the talk variable (25.5% in 2003 to 33.1% in 2013) and by 13.1% for the socialisation variable (10.4% in 2003 to 23.5% in 2013). In other words, the size of the gap between people who engage in interracial talk and interracial socialisation is decreasing, as those who report interracial socialisation is increasing at a steeper rate than those who report engaging in interracial talk. Over the 11-year period, 2008, 2010 and 2013

witnessed the highest levels of reported interracial talk and socialisation. Conversely, declines in reported amounts of talk and socialisation were witnessed in 2009 and over the 2011–2012 periods. Further research is needed to understand why levels of interracial contact peaked in 2008 and 2010, and why it dropped to its third, lowest level again in 2012 only to be nudged up again in 2013. Overall, reported instances of interracial talk and socialisation have improved over the last ten years. Following the contact hypothesis, this increase in interracial contact may also account for the increasing levels of interracial trust discussed in the previous chapter.

Figure 10: Interracial talk and socialisation across race lines, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)

RACIAL INTEGRATION AND CLASS INEQUALITY

One of the major insights of the Reconciliation Barometer over the years has been the extent to which class inequality has become a key mediating factor as far as racial integration is concerned. This finding has implications both for the contact hypothesis theory and our understandings of reconciliation. The 2013 SARB proposed the concept of radical reconciliation on the basis of these findings to argue that reconciliation needs to respond to the realities of sustained socio-economic exclusion by those who were also marginalised under apartheid. The system was calibrated so that racial segregation and class inequality became intimately intertwined with each other (Wolpe, 1972). The Reconciliation Barometer gleans class position from the living standard measure (LSM). The LSM is a composite measure of the standards of living of the household that the respondent belongs to. It includes a range of items such as dwelling type, tele-communications, domestic workers employed at household, water and sanitation services on site, ownership of household consumer

items, and residence in rural or metropolitan area. The responses to these items are combined to create a single score for respondents, with category 1 representing the lowest LSM scores and category 10 representing the highest LSM scores. By way of using LSM categories to create broad class categories, LSM 1–5 contain the poorest of South African citizens, followed by a middle-income group within category 6–8, and then the wealthiest of South African citizens within LSM 9–10. Disaggregating LSM scores by race for 2013 data, we continue to see the legacy of this intersecting relationship between race and class as represented in Figure 11. While the middle and upper LSM groups are becoming more integrated, the poorer LSM groups remain almost exclusively black. The overwhelming majority of the poor continue to be black.

The first thing to notice is that, in the lowest four LSM categories (on the horizontal axis), there is a much higher percentage (on the vertical axis) of black South Africans (represented by the blue bar) relative to the total population of black South Africans found in the lowest LSM groups than any other race group: 35.4% of black South Africans are in the lowest four LSM categories, 48.2% are in the middle categories and 16.3% are in the highest four categories. The opposite trend is demonstrated for white and Asian/Indian South Africans (red and green bars respectively), as they are entirely absent from the lower LSM categories and the majority of individuals within these race groups are found in the higher LSM groups.

For white South Africans, 0% are in the lowest four LSM groups (in fact, there are no white South Africans in our sample in the first five LSM categories), 5% are in the middle categories, and 95% are in the top four categories (with 73.3% of white South Africans in the highest two LSM categories 9 and 10). Within Asian/Indian South Africans, 0% are in the lowest LSM categories, 15.5% are in the middle LSM categories and 84.3% are in the highest LSM categories. For coloured South Africans, the majority are found in the middle LSM groups, with 3.6% in the lowest four LSM categories, 38.7% in the middle categories and 57.8% in the highest four LSM categories.

These figures indicate a prominent relationship between race and class, especially in term of material exclusion. Black South Africans comprise the vast majority of the materially excluded in South Africa, a dire reality which is not experienced by most white South Africans. This is part of the legacy passed down from centuries of colonialism that culminated in the apartheid system, which fostered a mutually reinforcing relationship between racial discrimination and class inequality. From the statistic discussed above, we see that this inheritance continues to be alive to this day. In their 2006 book *Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa*, Jeremy Seekings and Nicolli Nattrass demonstrate that, although policies of economic empowerment have allowed a few black South Africans to climb the social ladder to build a more multiracial middle class, they have been less successful in uplifting the marginalised masses and undoing the apartheid legacy of disenfranchisement (Seekings & Nattrass, 2006). As a result, intraracial class inequality has widened amongst black South Africans and, as such, did not result in the dismantling of the race/class system that underpinned apartheid. If race and class inequality continue to be intertwined 20 years into democracy, the question emerges: how does this impact on racial integration and relations of contact and socialisation? Figures 11 and 12 assist

Figure 11: LSM category by race, 2013 (%)

Figure 12: Interracial talk by LSM, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)*

Figure 13: Interracial socialisation by LSM, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)*

*Data was not collected for this question in 2009

in answering this question by disaggregating frequency of contact and socialisation by lower, middle and upper LSM groups.

Figure 12 demonstrates that, over the past 11 years, the frequency of interracial talk reported by the lowest LSM group (LSM1–5) has only increased by 1.1%, from 14.1% in 2003 to 15.2%. For the middle LSM group (LSM 6–8), the frequency of interracial talk has decreased from 46.3% in 2003 to 39.9% in 2013, and for the highest LSM group (LSM 9–10) there has been a 5.2% increase, from 64.9% in 2003 to 70.1% in 2013. In other words, in 2003, for every 1 person engaging in interracial talk in lowest LSM groups, there were 3.3 in middle and 4.6 in the highest LSM groups. In 2013, for every 1 person engaging in interracial talk in the lowest LSM groups, there were 2.6 people in the middle LSM groups and 4.6 in the highest LSM groups. While there has been little contact for the poor, and this has not improved over the past 11 years, there is more contact for the middle LSM groups and the most contact for the upper LSM groups. The greatest increase in interracial talk figures has been for the wealthiest LSM groups, and not for the middle groups as might be expected. Racial integration is higher for the middle LSMs than the lower LSMs, but has decreased rather than increased over the past 11 years.

Figure 13 shows a similar trend for socialisation frequency as for contact frequency, where the lower LSM groups demonstrate noticeably less interracial socialisation than the middle and upper LSM groups. In 2003, 6.1% of South Africans in the lowest LSM groups reported that they socialise across race, followed by the middle LSMs at 19.5% and then the highest LSMs at 23.7%. Across lower, middle and upper LSM groups, these figures have improved over the years. In 2013, the percentage of South Africans in the lowest LSMs who report socialising across race has doubled to 13%, the percentage in the middle LSMs has increased by 9.8% to 29.3%, and in the highest LSMs it has almost doubled to 40.7%. In other words, in 2003, for every 1 person socialising across race in the lowest LSMs, there were about 3.2 in the middle LSMs and 3.8 in the higher LSMs. In 2013, for every 1 person socialising across race in the lower LSMs, there were 2.2 in the middle LSMs and 3.1 in the highest LSMs.

For both everyday interracial talk and interracial socialisation, the poorest of South Africans report the lowest levels of contact and socialisation, followed by middle LSMs and then the wealthiest LSMs. Furthermore, the gap between LSM groups in terms of the percentage of reported interracial talk and socialisation is increasing rather than decreasing. The difference between the percentage of people who socialise across race for the lowest LSMs and the highest LSMs was 17.6% in 2003 and increased to 27.7% in 2013. Similarly, for percentage of reported interracial talk, the difference between the lowest and highest LSM groups increased from 17.6% in 2003 to 27.7%.

These findings have profound implications for racial reconciliation in South Africa and point to one of the most serious obstacles for reconciliation policy and practice in years to come. Social interventions may help, but, without a significant change in the material prospects of ordinary citizens, their impact may be limited. These figures for the relationship between race and class in South Africa paint a picture of class segregation with racial inflections. The majority of the poor continue to be black and segregated from the multiracial, urban

How many South Africans report often or always socialising with someone from another race?

2003 1 in 10 vs **2013** 2.4 in 10

Socialising across race within South African LSM groups

LSM 1–5 = poorest
LSM 6–8 = middle income
LSM 9–10 = wealthiest

2003

LSM 1–5 0.6 in 10

LSM 6–8 2 in 10

LSM 9–10 2.4 in 10

2013

LSM 1–5 1.3 in 10

LSM 6–8 2.9 in 10

LSM 9–10 4.7 in 10

middle class. This pattern is witnessed on the geographical landscape of South Africa, where our cities may demonstrate increasing racial integration, but townships and rural settlements continue to be poor, black and segregated as was intended by apartheid planners. This finding is important for racial reconciliation in South Africa and points to the need to address the relationship between material and social exclusion that results in the segregation of many poor black South Africans from interracial middle-class city spaces.

DESIRE FOR INTERRACIAL INTERACTION

While the section above focused on the frequency of two different kinds of interracial interaction, this section measures the degree to which South Africans express a desire for interracial interaction. Respondents were asked their desire for more interracial conversation through the question: *If you had a choice, would you want to talk to [OTHER RACE GROUP] people?... more often, about the same, less often, or never?* In addition, they were also asked about their desire to learn more about the customs of groups other than their own through the statement: *I want to learn more about the customs and ways of [OTHER RACE GROUP] people. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, are uncertain, disagree, strongly disagree.* The summary of positive responses to these questions appears in Figure 14. The desire for interracial talk is measured by the percentage of South Africans who say they would want more of it, and the desire for interracial learning about the customs of different groups is measured by the percentage that agree and strongly agree that they want to learn more.

Looking at Figure 14, both the desire for interracial talk and learning about the customs of others have decreased over time. In terms of the former, there has been a 12.9% decrease from 32.3% in 2003 to 19.4% in 2013. Similarly, the desire for learning about customs has decreased by 14.1% from 53% in 2003 to 38.9% in 2013. Overall, the desire for interracial talk has decreased over the past 11 years and the desire to learn more about other races customs has decreased over the past six years. While contact and socialisation figures have increased, they are still low, especially in the lower classes. It is concerning that the desire for more interracial interaction is decreasing despite the continued need to address segregation in South Africa. Future editions of the survey will have to probe this finding in more depth.

Figure 15 further disaggregates the findings regarding the desire for more interracial talk by the different racial groups. Overall, white South Africans consistently demonstrate the least desire to engage in more interracial talk, followed by black South Africans. This figure has decreased from 2003 to 2013 for both white and black South Africans, from 15.9% to 11.7% for white South Africans and from 31.2% to 20.1% for black South Africans. The most significant decrease over the 11-year period has been for coloured South Africans. In 2003, they demonstrated the highest levels of intent to engage in more conversation across historical racial barriers at 66.1%. This figure has dropped by 46.6% to 19.5% in 2013. Overall, the graph also points to a convergence in the responses of the different groups. In 2003, the difference between the lowest (15.9% for white South Africans) and highest (66.1% for coloured South Africans) levels

Figure 14: Desire for more interracial interaction, 2003–2013 (%)

Figure 15: Desire for more interracial talk by race, 2003–2013 (% more often)*

*Data was not collected for this question in 2008

of desire was 50.2%. In 2013, the difference between the lowest (11.7% for white South Africans) and highest (34.3% for coloured South Africans) was 22.6%, which is less than half the size of the difference in 2003.

APPROVAL FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION

Another important gauge of racial reconciliation is the degree to which South Africans approve of various levels of engagement between the country's historically defined groups over time. Approval is measured by asking South Africans how much they approve of the following scenarios. Respondents are first asked which race group they find the most difficult to associate with and then the response is inserted into the [GROUP] slot:

1) Living in a neighbourhood where half my neighbours are [GROUP] people.

2) Having a [GROUP] person sitting next to my child, or the child of a family member, at school.

3) Having to work for and take instructions from a [GROUP] person.

4) Having a close relative marry a [GROUP] person.

The percentage of South Africans who approve or strongly approve of these statements over the past 11 years is represented in Figure 16. Questions 1, 2 and 4 were asked from 2003 to 2013, and question 3 was introduced in 2008. Overall, interracial marriage received the lowest approval from South Africans and approval levels were the same as when they were first measured 11 years ago (47.4% in 2003 and 47.5% in 2013). School integration received the highest approval levels, but such approval levels are nevertheless down from their first measurement (66.7% in 2003 to 59.3% in 2013). Living in an interracial neighbourhood and having to work for someone of another race share similar levels of approval of 56.5% and 53.2% respectively. Approval of interracial neighbourhoods has remained similar to the 2003 levels, showing a slight increase of 3.9% from 52.6% in 2003 to 56.5% in 2013. In 2010, there was a spike in the response pattern for all four types of racial integration, which returned to their original levels in 2011. We can only speculate why this may be the case. One possible explanation can be the impact that the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which strongly profiled the 'rainbow nation narrative' with its emphasis on racial unity, has had on the sentiments of citizens. This period was uniquely characterised by a shared national euphoria which brought South Africans together across different race groups in a spirit of shared celebration, unity and connection. However, whatever caused the spike in 2010 approval levels did not sustain a more robust shift, as perceptions dropped again the following year.

Figure 17 focuses on interracial marriage, the most intimate of the four forms of integration that received the lowest level of approval from South Africans, and disaggregates its findings by race. A notable improvement is seen over the past 11 years for white South Africans. In 2003, only 13.1% of this group approved of interracial marriage; by 2013 this figure almost tripled to 35.1%. For black and Asian/Indian

Figure 16: Approval of racial integration, 2003–2013 (% approval)

Figure 17: Approval of relatives' interracial marriage by race, 2003–2013 (% approval)

South Africans, approval levels decreased slightly over the 11-year period from 51.4% to 48.9% (2.5% decrease) for black South Africans and from 55% to 50.8% (4.2% decrease) for Asian/Indian South Africans. The most notable change in approval levels, however, occurred for coloured South Africans. Their approval ratings for interracial marriage dropped by almost 20% from 65.1% in 2003 to the second lowest approval rating of 45.5% in 2013. As in other figures discussed in this report, we see a convergence of racial opinion over time. While the difference between the most and least approving was 52% in 2003, in 2013 it had reduced to 15.7%.

A similar trend is also visible for the three remaining forms of engagement. Across all forms of racial integration, white South Africans are the least likely to approve. However, with the exception of 'having to work for someone of another race', white South Africans show the highest rate of improvement on approval scores over 11 years. On this question, all races demonstrate a decrease in levels of approval between 2006 and 2013. With the exception of school integration, coloured South Africans demonstrate the steepest decrease in approval levels. Across questions of racial integration in the marriage, neighbourhood, and work spheres, coloured South Africans have dropped from the highest to the second lowest approval of racial integration, over the past 11 years. Across all levels of racial integration Asian/Indian South Africans demonstrate the highest approval levels in 2013. For school integration, both coloured and Indian South Africans have decreased in their approval rate by similar amounts, being 13.4% and 15.5% respectively.

CONCLUSION

In general, the percentage of people who report engaging in interracial talk and socialisation has increased over the 11-year period. However, when both forms of interracial interactions are analysed in relation to class, findings demonstrate that interracial integration is consistently lower for the poorer LSM categories and higher for the more well-off LSM categories. Class inequality, which is mapped into the racial geographies of South Africa, results in exclusion of the poor from racially integrated middle- and upper-class spaces. These results indicate a need to address issues of material inequality in order to forge racial integration across class boundaries. Furthermore, while increased interracial socialisation has resulted in lower levels of mistrust, it has not resulted in higher desire for more interracial interaction or more approval for racial integration. In terms of approval of racial integration, results do not indicate overall change in the 2003–2013 period. However, a substantial improvement is seen for white South Africans in their approval of interracial marriage, interracial neighbourhoods and interracial schools. By contrast, across different spheres, coloured South Africans have decreased in levels of approval for different forms of integration. In sum, while improvements are demonstrated in perceptions of white South Africans towards integration, it is notable that coloured South Africans' perceptions towards racial integration are demonstrating decreasing levels of approval.

V.
MEMORY POLITICS

'The struggle of man against power, is the struggle
of memory against forgetting.'

(Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*)

How we remember the violent and divisive nature of apartheid matters for reconciliation. We continue to bear the legacy of this past materially and psychologically, and, if we forget what we have come through, we are in danger of repeating past mistakes in the future. This is especially pertinent since we continue to be affected by the legacy of apartheid in the present. At another level, memory also speaks to the question of whose history is remembered and whose history is forgotten. If reconciliation and nation-building serve to fix the meaning of history and to close down spaces for alternative narratives, then this is not conducive to reconciliation. In a recent opinion article in the *Mail and Guardian* entitled 'Twist memory and you distort identity', Liepollo Lebohang Pheko criticises the fetishisation of 'traditional' cultural symbols once a year on Heritage Day. Instead, she argues that Africa's cultural symbols should form part of the living 'tapestry', including 'the languages, names, poetry, literature and human ethics that contribute to the people we are' (Pheko, 2014). Memory, like culture, is a living source on which to create and recreate our nation. If we relegate certain memories and cultural forms to 'heritage', we also remove them from the realms of everyday existence.

Pheko's critique has implications for questions of consciousness and culture in the everyday lived experiences of South Africa. If constructions of African culture are relegated to Heritage Day and heritage sites, what then is the dominant culture of the everyday? The issue of the dominant culture of the everyday is central to the current reconciliation debate, as it points towards the elusive concept of white privilege often discussed as an obstacle to reconciliation. In a recent workshop held this year with a group of expert stakeholders on the topic of reconciliation, the dynamics and implications of white cultural privilege were unpacked. Public intellectual and writer, T.O. Molefe, elucidated the concept of code-switching. He described how, for black South Africans to succeed in organisations, they have to alter their ways of speaking and behaving to fit the dominant (white) culture. Similarly, political commentator, Aubrey Matshiqi, referred to the 'cultural majority' to argue that ways of seeing and being in South African are framed by the numerical minority who have become the cultural majority. This point, he argues, is missing from the reconciliation discourse.

In the previous section on race relations, the intersection between race and class was highlighted as a key obstacle for reconciliation. This section moves the focus from the material inequality of class relations to the symbolic inequality of cultural dominance as it plays out in the field of memory politics in South Africa. This distinction is important. As Molefe explained in the same workshop, 'we should not conflate white privilege with economic inequality; the issue of white privilege is also about living in a society that is made in your image and the cultural dominance you enjoy as a result'.

MEMORY POLITICS AND RACIAL IDENTITY

Memory politics is not just a question of what we remember, but also of what we forget. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) managed to bring victims and perpetrators of human rights violations into a shared space of confession, forgiveness, truth and amnesty. However, most ordinary citizens, and especially white South Africans, did not participate in a process of coming to terms with the traumatic realities of a history they share and benefitted from at the expense of the majority of citizens. A 1996 survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation found that many white South Africans romanticise the memory of apartheid, and that the majority did not feel responsible for apartheid abuses and did not support redress processes (Theissen & Hamber, 1998).

More recently, Melissa Steyn analysed recollections of everyday experiences of apartheid held by the Apartheid Archives Project (Steyn, 2012). She found high levels of ignorance or forgetting about the injustices of apartheid which, among white South Africans, served not only to psychologically shield them from awareness of the injustices that undergird their privilege, but also to ensure that racial privilege continues without internal questioning. In other words, remembering the injustices of the past would require confronting their legacy in the present, which could have difficult psychological and material consequences for white South Africans. She argues that ignorance and forgetting therefore become a tacitly agreed-upon strategy of protection of white privilege.

The figures and quotes discussed below indicate similar findings to the studies cited above. In comparison with other race groups, white South Africans indicate high levels of denial of past injustice, low levels of responsibility for past injustice, and low levels of support for redress.

MEMORIES AND MEANINGS OF APARTHEID

To assess South African memories of apartheid, four commonly recognised historical truths about the nature of apartheid are proposed and respondents are asked whether they agree with these statements:

1) Apartheid was a crime against humanity.

2) In the past, the state committed terrible crimes against those struggling against apartheid.

3) The apartheid government wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans.

4) Many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid.

Statements 1 and 2 were asked from 2003, and statements 3 and 4 were included in 2012. Figure 18 summarises the results of the percentage of South Africans who agreed with these statements between 2003 and 2013.

Figure 18 demonstrates that, over the 11-year period, levels of agreement have declined by 10.1% from 86.5% of South Africans who agreed that apartheid was a crime against humanity to 76.4% who agreed with the statement in 2013. Similarly, the percentage of those who believe that the apartheid government committed terrible crimes against anti-apartheid activists decreased slightly by 5.2% from 77.3% in 2003 to 72.1% in 2013. In 2013, almost 8 in every 10 South Africans agreed with statement 1 and about 7 in every 10 South Africans agreed with statements 2, 3 and 4.

RACE AND MEMORY

Figures 19, 20, 21 and 22 disaggregate the results on apartheid memory by race and, in each case, noticeable differences in racial memory are obvious. Figure 19 focuses on the statement that apartheid was a crime against humanity. In general, white South Africans are the least likely to agree with this statement. Their levels of agreement have also decreased by 17.5% from 70.3% in 2003 to 52.8% in 2013. Throughout this 11-year period, their perception was fairly erratic in comparison with the trend of other races. For instance, in 2008, levels of agreement among white South Africans dipped to their second-lowest point of 58.3%, then, over the next two years, rose again to reach the highest point of 81.9% in 2010, almost matching black responses, only to decline again over the next 3 years to reach the lowest point of 52.8% in 2013. Asian/Indian South Africans' levels of agreement decreased by 11.6% from 88.6% in 2003 to 77% in 2013, and coloured South Africans' levels of agreement decreased by 21.8% from 92.2% in 2003 to 70.4% in 2013. Black South Africans' levels of agreement decreased by 8% from 88.9% to 80.9%. Overall, all race groups have declined in their level of agreement that apartheid was a crime against humanity over the past 11 years by at least 8% (black South Africans) and at most 21.8% for coloured South Africans. In 2013, white South Africans were the least likely to agree with this historical truth, with about 5 in every 10 (52%) agreeing that apartheid was a crime against humanity, compared with the average of 8 in every 10 South Africans.

Figure 20 summarises the findings for the statement that apartheid committed terrible crimes against anti-apartheid activists dis-aggregated by race. As in Figure 18, we see that white South Africans are the least likely to agree with the statement over time, but that

How many South Africans agree that apartheid was a crime against humanity?

…against humanity

2003
86.5%
AGREE

VS

2013
76.4%
AGREE

…against humanity by race: **2013**

WHITE
52.8%
AGREE

ASIAN/
INDIAN
77.0%
AGREE

COLOURED
70.4%
AGREE

BLACK
80.9%
AGREE

their perceptions seem to vary more than those of any other race group. They drop to the second-lowest point of 52.8% agreement in 2008 and then rise to the highest point of 72.7% in 2010, and then drop to their lowest point of 50.2% in 2013. Agreement on this historical truth declined the least for black South Africans at 3.7% (from 79.8% to 76.1%) and the most for coloured South Africans at 20.4% (from 87.9% to 67.5%). White South Africans demonstrate the lowest agreement with this statement – about 5 in every 10, compared with the average of 7 in every 10.

Figure 21 and Figure 22 capture the results for 2012 and 2013 on the two historical statements that apartheid oppressed the majority

and that apartheid resulted in black poverty today. Across all the questions on historical truths, we see a dip in agreement over the 2012–2013 period, and a similar dip is witnessed in these two figures. The decline is particularly stark for white South Africans, who, in 2013, demonstrated noticeably lower levels of agreement than any other race groups.

Focusing on Figure 21, in terms of the historical truth that apartheid oppressed the majority, in 2012 the gap between the lowest agreement (white South Africans at 68.9%) and the highest agreement (black South Africans at 83.8%) was 14.9%. All race groups showed declines in their agreement with this statement in 2013, but white South Africans dropped most notably by 18.7% to 50.2%. The gap between the lowest (white South Africans') and the highest (black South Africans') level of agreement also increased to 26.2% compared with 14.9% in 2012. In 2013, about 5 in every 10 white South Africans, 7 in every 10 coloured South Africans, 7 in every 10 Asian/Indian South Africans and 8 in every 10 black South Africans agreed with the statement that apartheid was a system that oppressed the majority of South Africans.

Figure 22 reports on responses to the statement that apartheid has resulted in the continuing poverty of many black South Africans today. In a similar pattern to that of Figure 21, agreement levels decline for all race groups between 2012 and 2013. Black South Africans are the most likely to agree (82% in 2012 and 76.6% in 2013), and white South Africans the least likely to agree (50.6% in 2012 and 33.4% in 2013). The difference between the agreement of black and white South Africans is 31.4% in 2012 and 43.2% in 2013. In 2013, about 3 in every 10 white South Africans, 6 in every 10 coloured South Africans, 7 in every 10 Asian/Indian South Africans and 8 in every 10 black South Africans agreed with the statement.

PERCEPTIONS ON REDRESS

Most South Africans share a history of apartheid, racial oppression and state violence. Together, the country has moved through a transition to democracy, but how we remember our past is important for our present and our future. This memory also impacts on how we deal with the legacy of our past. This section focuses on the connection between reconciliation and economic justice through the memory concept of redress. Redress speaks to the need to address and right the wrongs of the past that continue to impact on the present. When we engage with the historical connection between the oppression of black South Africans during apartheid and the poverty faced by black citizens today, redress aims to dismantle this historical legacy of inequality in order to move forward from the past.

In order to assess whether South Africans think that socio-economic redress is important for reconciliation in South Africa, respondents were asked to respond to the following two statements:

1) Reconciliation is impossible as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor.

2) It is still important for the government to provide support to people who were victims of human rights abuses under apartheid.

Figure 18: Memories and meanings of apartheid, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

- A crime against humanity
- Terrible crimes were committed against anti-apartheid activists
- Wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans
- Resulted in the poverty of many black South Africans today

Figure 19: Apartheid was a crime against humanity by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

- White
- Asian/Indian
- Coloured
- Black

Figure 20: Apartheid committed terrible crimes against anti-apartheid activists by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

- White
- Asian/Indian
- Coloured
- Black

The first statement has been asked by the SARB since 2011, when 47.9% of South Africans agreed with it. This figure increased slightly by 4.3% in 2013 to 52.2% of South Africans agreeing that reconciliation is an impossibility in the context of continued poverty for those disadvantaged by apartheid. Statement 2 was included in the SARB in 2012. Overall, 64.5% of South Africans agreed with the statement in 2012, while agreement levels dropped to 57.6% in 2013.

Figure 23 shows the shifts in opinion on questions of the relationship between reconciliation and the economic conditions of those disadvantaged by apartheid. Over the period 2001–2013, opinion on the question became more divergent across racial categories. While 40.5% of white South Africans agreed in 2011, this figure declined by 12% to 28.5% in 2013. By contrast, black South Africans were the most likely to agree with the statement over the three-year period. Their levels of agreement increased during this period by 8.5% from 49.2% in 2003 to 57.7% in 2013. The gap between the lowest (white South Africans') and highest (black South Africans') levels of agreement has widened from 8.7% in 2003 to 29.2%. In 2013, white South Africans (about 3 in every 10) were the least likely to agree that reconciliation is impossible when those disadvantaged by apartheid continue to be poor, followed by coloured (about 4 in every 10), Asian/Indian (about 5 in every 10) and black South Africans (about 6 in every 10).

Figure 24 reports the results for the percentage of South Africans who agree with the statement that the South African government should support victims of human rights abuse under apartheid. It demonstrates a similar trend as in Figure 23, with perceptions about the desirability of redress diverging along racial lines. Amongst all groups, agreement levels declined between 2012 and 2013, but this drop was more notable for white South Africans (17.6% decline) than for black South Africans (5.1%). In 2013, white South Africans were the least likely to agree with the statement (about 3 in every 10 agreed), followed by coloured South Africans (about 5 in every 10 agreed), and about 6 in every 10 black and Asian/Indian South Africans agreed with the statement.

CONCLUSION

Looking at results related to the way in which we remember apartheid over the 11-year period, there are some interesting trends emerging. For example, as pointed out in the previous section, perceptions are changing dramatically for coloured South Africans. The percentage of coloured South Africans who agree that apartheid was a crime against humanity and that it committed terrible crimes against those who struggled against it declined by about 20% in each case over time.

Key findings on racial memory politics show that, in terms of acknowledging the injustice of the past and supporting redress measures, white South Africans are much less likely to agree with these tenets. In 2013, only half of white South Africans agreed that apartheid was an unjust, inhumane, criminal system and only a third agreed that it has resulted in the continued poverty of black South Africans today. The vast majority of South Africans in other race groups agreed with these statements. As noted earlier, our interpretation, or memory, of the past has a profound impact on how we deal with the

Figure 21: Apartheid wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans by race, 2012–2013 (% agreement)

Figure 22: Apartheid resulted in the poverty of many black South Africans today by race, 2012–2013 (% agreement)

present. When we look at questions of redress, it appears that white South Africans are not only less likely to agree about the extent of historic injustices, but are also less likely to agree with the measure of redress, support and compensation that is required by those who suffered from the system's implementation. In terms of the statements that reconciliation is impossible when those disadvantaged by apartheid are poor, and that government should support victims of apartheid, only about 3 in every 10 white South Africans agree, which is half of every 6 in 10 black South Africans.

These findings can be interpreted through an understanding of the relationship between memory politics and white privilege in South Africa. The emerging field of privilege studies demonstrates that a lack of awareness about the nature of privilege is a key characteristic of dominant identity groups (Pratto & Stewart, 2012). Therefore, privileged racial identity often goes hand in hand with low race consciousness (awareness of the way in which race impacts on one's life). This obliviousness around race and privilege is recognised in this literature as a privilege in and of itself, as it allows an individual to remain oblivious to their own privileged status. In other words, denial of injustice is a characteristic of meaning-making within dominant identity groups. Furthermore, it is painful and potentially risky to acknowledge the historical suffering of the other in relation to the historical privilege of the self. These findings show that, in the area of memory politics and reconciliation, more work is required to challenge, support and encourage white South Africans in a process of acknowledging historical injustice and its relation to racial privilege. In essence, a deeper conversation is required that engages white South Africans on the relationship between memory and identity politics in order to interrogate what it means to be white in the South African past, present and future in relation to the lived experiences of other race groups.

Figure 23: Reconciliation is impossible if those disadvantaged by apartheid are still poor by race, 2011–2013 (% agreement)

Figure 24: Government should support victims of human rights abuses under apartheid, 2012–2013 by race (% agreement)

VI.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

It is only by creating a collective awareness
around the inequalities which continue to exist
that we can shape a shared identity based on
the principles of justice and transformation.

This final chapter aims to summarise, interpret and discuss key findings from the analysis of 11 years of SARB data, as well as to offer some suggestions for reconciliation moving forward on the basis of these findings. In addition, the chapter will draw on various qualitative research initiatives undertaken by the project over the past four years to assist with the interpretation of key findings. These include the expert survey conducted in 2010, the focus group research completed in 2011, and the expert stakeholder workshop held in 2014. On the one hand, there are key insights emerging from each specific chapter around political culture, race relations and memory politics. On the other, there are cross-cutting insights that emerge across different SARB questions, and especially in relation to the patterns occurring over time.

In terms of political culture, a positive finding for reconciliation is the decreasing levels of interracial mistrust, which declined by 12.5% over the 2003–2013 period. This shift has happened alongside increasing levels of interracial contact, and especially interracial socialisation. As proposed by the contact hypothesis, these results do seem to indicate that increased contact in a social setting is leading to an increase in trust in other races. Reconciliation-related improvements can further be traced in the findings on political trust disaggregated by race. In 2003, the gap between the least trusting (white South Africans) and the most trusting (black South Africans) was substantially wider than it was in 2013. While white South Africans' political trust scores are consistently lower than those of black South Africans, the fact that they are moving closer together indicates greater coherence in perception of the political system across racial categories.

In terms of race relations, there appears to be an overall positive trend towards integration, which is an encouraging finding for the prospects of reconciliation. However, when these results are further analysed in relation to class inequality, a shadow emerges in this otherwise positive picture. The frequency of racial interaction (both contact and socialisation) for the poorer South Africans in LSM 1–5 is much lower than for the middle income LSM 6–8 and the wealthiest LSM 9–10 groups. These results point to the broader exclusion of the poor from integration processes that occur within the formal economy. Many black South Africans remain trapped in segregated townships and rural areas with weak infrastructure and without opportunity to engage in talk or socialisation with other racial groups.

In terms of memory politics, the SARB has recorded decreases in the acknowledgement and awareness of the injustice of apartheid over time. South Africans are 10.1% less likely to agree that apartheid was

a crime against humanity in 2013 than they were in 2003. This result could indicate a shift in how we remember the past. While we continue to mark our history through heritage days, the question of whether South Africans are adequately engaging with what this history means is an altogether different matter. The lack of awareness around historical truths is particularly striking among white South Africans. Only half of white South Africans agree with this and other historical statements about the oppressive nature of apartheid. This finding speaks to the way in which, as a nation, we understand and engage our history, which has further implications for race relations and the creation of an inclusive South African identity.

An interesting contradiction emerges in the results. On the one hand, race relations are improving in terms of trust and interracial contact and socialisation. On the other hand, in terms of primary identity association, racial identity is becoming stronger as the desire for a unified South African identity decreases and agreement on the meaning of apartheid diverges across race. Considering why this may be the case urges us to think more deeply about the complex trajectory of improving race relations in South Africa, as well as the relationship between racial identity politics, national identity and memory. At the same time as race relations improve, the contradictions and inequalities remain with us. In a sense, as things improve at the basic level of race relations (increased trust and contact), the injustice of continued material inequality and the fact that the majority of the poor are black and excluded from interracial socialisation become more glaring. Furthermore, as we move closer to one another, we are more able to understand and identify the continuing subtle nuances of racial inequality which operate at the symbolic level of white privilege. It makes sense in this context that South Africans would increasingly select race as a primary identity category. This assertion may indicate a deeper willingness to address continued racial division by recognising that this requires acknowledging, rather than denying, the strength of the identity category. Perhaps it is only in the light of increasing interracial relations and trust that we can confront some of the more entrenched legacies of our histories of apartheid and colonialism.

Results on an inclusive political culture from the SARB and the stakeholder workshop (2014) provide further support for this interpretation that South Africans are calling for a more critical understanding of what it means to share a South African identity. There seems to be a level of necessary complexity that is not captured under the notion of a 'united' South African identity. Survey results indicate that South Africans are decreasing in their desire for a united South African

identity, and that racial identities are becoming stronger rather than weaker. This issue of a united South African identity was further discussed in the expert stakeholder workshop hosted by the IJR. The discussion highlighted the need to create space for conflict within unity. Participants identified the importance of creating an inclusive South African identity, but also the challenges faced in this area. Two important points, related to this theme, emerged. Firstly, that it is difficult for citizens to articulate and define what exactly it means to be South African, which, in turn, impacts on their sense of an inclusive nation. Furthermore, it was argued that it is important to find a balance between what is diverse and what is common so as to allow space for conflict within unity. The decreasing desire for a 'united' South Africa and the increasing identification with racial identity open up the space to move towards a shared identity of transformation (engaging difference, power and conflict) rather than assimilation (denying difference, power and conflict).

Identity politics (the way in which social identities are implicated within relations of power), especially as they relate to race, are rising to the surface of the SARB results and in the broader arena of South African politics. This indicates the importance of building an inclusive South African identity based on the principles of transformation and incorporating identity politics within the field of reconciliation. Within this space, memory plays a key role, as SARB results demonstrate the significance of engaging in a broader conversation about the meaning and relevance of South Africa's history. Memory and national identity are closely connected to each other. The divergence in historical memory across race may speak to the decreasing desire for a unified identity. Dialogue over the meaning of the past may also help to lay the foundation for the creation of a shared South African identity based in engaging, rather than denying, the history of apartheid and its impact on the present. If South Africans can build a shared version of the history and meaning of our past, present and future, then this could create some ground on which to understand one another's lived experiences and to build an inclusive identity based on principles of transformation.

Continuing with the theme of identity politics and reconciliation, across SARB results over time a significant shift in coloured perceptions on reconciliation indicates increased frustration and disillusionment within this racial identity. This shift is seen across many different areas such as political trust, approval of racial integration, and apartheid memory. While this group generally demonstrated high levels of trust, approval for racial integration, and agreement on the injustice of apartheid in 2003, their responses to the same issues looked far more pessimistic in 2013. These results make sense when understood in the context of increasing frustrations with racial identity politics expressed by coloured South Africans in the focus group research. These identity politics are often described as the zebra politics of South Africa, where the focus is either on black or white South Africans. In this context, coloured South Africans feel excluded, disregarded and marginalised. These sentiments were captured in focus group research conducted in 2011, where coloured respondents were particularly clear that they felt left out of the current arrangement; for example: 'the blacks are running the country and the whites own the country…' (Group 4: Worcester). Furthermore, in a focus group discussion with coloured South Africans in Cape Town, a sense that black South Africans possessed a sense of entitlement was further expressed. There were

strong sentiments that coloured people are excluded from sharing in a struggle identity, despite their participation in the liberation struggle alongside black South Africans (Group 2: Cape Town). In general, feelings of exclusion and marginalisation are expressed in these interviews and are demonstrated throughout the SARB in notable changes in coloured perception about reconciliation-related issues over the 11-year period.

In addition, across SARB questions, the views of white South Africans on reconciliation and related issues generally appear to be disconnected from those of their compatriots. The question of how to engage and attract white South Africans in dialogues around race and reconciliation is a constant struggle for those working in this field. This sense of the disconnection of white South Africans from the broader political and social realms of South African society can be gleaned across SARB results. White South Africans demonstrate lower levels of trust in the system, lower levels of support for racial integration, higher levels of denial about the injustice of the past, and lower levels of support for redress related to such injustice. In the areas of trust in the political system and support for racial integration, it is positive that these are improving for white South Africans over time. Nevertheless, they remain the lowest for this identity category. In the area of memory politics, results for white South Africans seem to be getting worse as levels of agreement with historical truths about injustice decrease over time.

The significance of engaging white South Africans was emphasised in the expert survey on reconciliation conducted in 2010, where experts in the field of reconciliation called for white South Africans to visibly contribute to the upliftment of victims of apartheid, to acknowledge the ways in which they benefitted from the past, and to participate in creating a shared sense of nationhood. The results from the SARB data indicate that this process may require some intervention, as white South Africans are moving further away from acknowledging the past. This is further demonstrated across white groups in the 2011 survey research where participants make statements demonstrating defensiveness around white identity, such as 'but I'm not going to apologise for being white' (Focus Group 9: Free State). In addition, quotes from a focus group interview with white South Africans in Cape Town emphasise a desire to disconnect from history, and also to be absolved from the responsibility implied in remembering the past; for example: 'I don't feel I need to reconcile with anyone because I didn't do anything'; 'leave apartheid out of the history books, ignorance is bliss hey' and 'apartheid has nothing to do with me' (Focus Group 1: Cape Town). These quotes read alongside SARB findings indicate a real need to engage white South Africans on the question of what their whiteness means for them and to educate young South Africans about the relevance of the past for the present.

These findings speak to the importance of developing a national conversation about what it means to be white in South Africa in order to facilitate a deeper understanding about the place and role of this racial identity within reconciliation dynamics. This kind of intervention could be situated within a broader process of forging a shared identity around a deeper understanding of the lived experience of one's fellow South Africans. For reconciliation to address some of the shortfalls identified in the SARB, the meaning of the past and the symbolic inequality represented in white denial should be interrogated in a

supported way. If done with sensitivity, this can lead to deeper understanding, acceptance and trust across race in South Africa. An example of this kind of work being done in the context of a South African university course on race is documented in a recent article published in the *Journal of Moral Education* (Swart, Arongudade & Davis, 2014). The authors argue that teaching a class which encourages students to interrogate the workings of racial privilege and memory politics encourages a move away from 'multiculturalism's political accommodation of difference to reflecting on and subverting the privileges of difference frequently experienced as domination and oppression'. Creating spaces which encourage a deeper under-standing of racial identity politics, especially amongst white South Africans, is an important part of incorporating white identity into a broader anti-racist South African identity, which honestly engages with the legacy of the past in order to build a different kind of future.

A final insight ends this reflection on over a decade of SARB data on a positive note. Across questions of trust and confidence in political leaders as well as the approval of racial integration and agreement on memory politics, 2010 was a good year for reconciliation. This was also the year of the FIFA World Cup, and it is interesting to note that this moment of connection across race and class boundaries in shared celebration and euphoria occurred in the same year that the SARB recorded particularly positive findings for reconciliation. The importance of this event for reconciliation is further emphasised across focus group interviews as playing a very positive role in reconciliation across race groups. As one white respondent puts it 'We need the World Cup every year'. This quote is striking because not only

does it recognise the importance of shared celebratory events for reconciliation, but it also highlights that they need to be sustained 'every year'. The injection of positivity which the FIFA World Cup brought may have created a moment of connection, but this did not shift perceptions in the long run. Nevertheless, the importance of events of celebration which incorporate different groups within South Africa is crucially important for building relationships of reconciliation.

In sum, the findings of 11 years of the SARB indicate both the light and shadow of our reconciliation process. Many improvements related to reconciliation have been discussed, as well as issues that require further attention if we want to move reconciliation to a deeper place of transformation. This conclusion has attempted to further show how the contradictions which emerge within these findings in fact open the space for a conversation between transformation and reconciliation in South Africa. For example, results point to the future possibility of creating a shared South African identity that is not based in blanket unity, but rather in acknowledging contradictions held within our reconciliation story such as class inequality, white denial, and a sense of marginalisation among coloured South Africans. It is only by creating a collective awareness of the tensions and inequalities which continue to exist that we can come to shape a shared identity based on the principles of justice and transformation rather than assimilation. Finally, as we acknowledge (to transform) the more difficult findings of the Reconciliation Barometer, we should also not forget to continually create and support events and activities which have the power to forge a new narrative of celebration and belonging across race and class for all South Africans.

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FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS

Focus Group 1, 2011. White English-speaking South Africans between the ages of 16–24 years old, Southern Suburbs, Cape Town.

Focus Group 2, 2011. Coloured English-speaking South Africans between the ages of 25–49 years old, Southern Suburbs, Cape Town.

Focus Group 3, 2011. Coloured Afrikaans-speaking South Africans between the ages of 16–24 years old, Southern Suburbs, Cape Town.

Focus Group 9, 2011. White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans between the ages of 25–49 years old, Heilbron, Free State.

Appendix A

Location and composition of SA Reconciliation Barometer focus groups

Table A1: SA Reconciliation Barometer focus groups				
#	Province	Area	Age	Race	Language
1	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	16–24	White	English
2	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	25–49	Coloured	English
3	Western Cape	Worcester	16–24	Coloured	Afrikaans
4	Western Cape	Worcester	25–49	Coloured	Afrikaans
5	Gauteng	Johannesburg	25–49	White	English
6	Gauteng	Johannesburg	50 and above	Black	Sotho/Zulu
7	Gauteng	Pretoria	16–24	White	Afrikaans
8	Gauteng	Pretoria	25–49	Black	Sotho/Zulu
9	Free State	Heilbron	25–49	White	Afrikaans
10	Free State	Warden	16–24	Black	Sotho
11	Free State	Warden	25–49	Black	Sotho
12	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	16–24	Black	Zulu
13	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	25–49	Black	Zulu
14	KwaZulu-Natal	Phoenix DBN	25–49	Indian	English
15	KwaZulu-Natal	Chatsworth DBN	16–24	Indian	English
16	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	50 and above	Black	Xhosa
17	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	25–49	Black	Xhosa
18	Eastern Cape	Umtata	16–24	Black	Xhosa

Appendix B

POLITICAL CULTURE

Table 1: Desirability and possibility of creating one united SA, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	Desirable to create one united South African nation	Possible to create one united South African nation
2003	72.9	
2004	76.5	
2005	77.6	
2006	76.3	
2007	69.7	60.6
2008	67.8	56.1
2009	72.0	59.9
2010	72.2	63.8
2011	66.3	59.9
2012	61.8	59.0
2013	55.0	53.6

Table 2: Primary identity associations, 2007–2013

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Language	20.4	24.1	19.3	20.7	18.3	21.6	23.2
Ethnicity	15.1	18.4	19.3	18.5	18.6	15.8	11.1
Race	11.8	12.0	10.9	14.5	19.0	18.4	13.4
SA nationality	11.2	11.9	14.2	13.7	12.6	8.3	7.1

Table 3: Interracial mistrust, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	People of other races are untrustworthy
2003	40.6
2004	39.6
2005	41.5
2006	39.9
2007	43.5
2008	34.0
2009	32.9
2010	35.4
2011	34.1
2012	30.0
2013	28.1

Table 4: Interracial mistrust by age, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	Youth	Adult
2003	38.6	41.3
2004	38.8	39.9
2005	41.7	41.5
2006	40.6	39.7
2007	44.9	43.1
2008	31.7	34.8
2009	30.4	33.8
2010	34.6	35.7
2011	33.8	34.2
2012	29.0	30.4
2013	26.4	28.8

Table 5: Interracial mistrust by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	23.9	20.1	18.8	47.0
2004	27.9	17.4	9.9	45.7
2005	19.4	14.8	18.7	47.7
2006	21.6	14.0	15.4	45.3
2007	24.3	20.2	23.5	50.0
2008	29.8	18.3	16.3	37.2
2009	25.0	19.9	18.7	36.2
2010	33.6	15.7	17.9	38.4
2011	22.6	11.3	16.2	38.9
2012	12.7	25.5	18.8	33.9
2013	17.7	14.8	10.0	32.3

Table 6: Confidence in insitutions, 2006–2013 (quite a lot + a great deal) (%)

Year	Presidency	National government	Provincial government	Local government	Parliament
2006	77.0	73.1	65.5	50.3	69.4
2007	68.2	62.7	56.6	43.2	61.6
2008	57.4	57.9	49.8	40.0	56.0
2009	54.5	57.1	49.0	38.5	54.9
2010	66.9	65.8	57.9	43.1	64.5
2011	64.5	65.0	56.4	42.7	61.1
2012	63.7	65.4	61.2	49.8	62.9
2013	55.1	54.5	51.8	48.6	54.5

Table 7:	Trust in national leaders and Parliament, 2003–2013 (% agreement)	
Year	Trust in national leaders	Trust in Parliament
2003	54.5	61.6
2004	64.4	72.7
2005	61.4	70.2
2006	64.5	71.1
2007	57.0	64.8
2008	48.7	62.9
2009	49.6	60.0
2010	58.2	69.0
2011	51.2	60.9
2012	50.3	51.0
2013	48.3	48.9

Table 9:	Trust in Parliament by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)			
Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	21.4	36.1	57.0	70.4
2004	32.3	62.3	64.7	81.3
2005	33.7	62.8	57.7	76.8
2006	42.2	59.3	59.0	76.4
2007	40.6	47.7	62.9	69.8
2008	34.3	44.4	48.1	70.0
2009	26.7	36.3	39.6	68.6
2010	35.0	52.8	49.2	78.0
2011	43.2	57.8	39.7	66.4
2012	35.7	49.3	26.7	56.1
2013	34.5	48.7	34.3	52.9

Table 8:	Trust in national leaders by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)			
Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	20.5	26.9	46.8	62.5
2004	24.9	48.3	57.0	77.6
2005	29.5	44.3	46.4	68.0
2006	36.3	44.0	47.0	70.4
2007	33.1	38.3	54.9	62.1
2008	23.1	30.6	35.0	55.2
2009	20.9	24.1	29.9	57.4
2010	31.7	49.1	36.1	65.9
2011	29.7	35.4	28.0	58.1
2012	31.2	40.7	33.5	55.3
2013	27.2	39.7	32.9	53.8

Appendix B

RACIAL RECONCILIATION

Table 10: Talk and socialisation across race lines, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)

Year	Talk to people of other races	Socialise with people of other races
2003	25.5	10.4
2004	24.3	9.9
2005	30.5	11.4
2006	28.7	13.2
2007	35.7	17.1
2008	38.4	23.3
2009	33.8	17.6
2010	37.9	20.9
2011	31.7	18.7
2012	27.4	17.8
2013	33.1	23.5

Table 12: Interracial talk by LSM, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)

Year	LSM 1–5	LSM 6–8	LSM 9–10
2003	14.1	46.5	64.9
2004	11.2	43.3	65.5
2005	19.9	49.9	59.1
2006	16.8	46.6	65.0
2007	23.1	54.6	75.2
2008	25.8	47.6	75.3
2010	23.8	46.8	71.9
2011	19.2	41.0	60.4
2012	15.3	31.6	55.1
2013	15.2	39.9	70.1

Table 11: LSM category by race, 2013 (%)

LSM	Black	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Total
1	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
2	5.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	4.2
3	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.7	7.3
4	19.2	0.0	0.0	2.4	14.8
5	23.2	0.0	0.6	10.5	18.6
6	25.0	5.0	14.9	28.2	22.6
7	8.6	7.8	28.5	20.7	10.1
8	3.7	14.0	12.2	17.7	6.5
9	3.0	34.2	21.9	14.1	8.3
10	1.0	39.1	21.7	5.3	6.6

Table 13: Interracial socialisation by LSM, 2003–2013 (always + often) (%)

Year	LSM 1–5	LSM 6–8	LSM 9–10
2003	6.1	19.5	23.7
2004	4.8	16.7	27.3
2005	7.5	19.0	24.6
2006	8.0	22.0	27.5
2007	11.1	27.9	31.7
2008	14.1	31.4	47.8
2010	12.5	26.4	41.0
2011	13.0	23.4	30.1
2012	10.3	19.8	36.8
2013	13.0	29.3	40.7

Table 14: Desire for more interracial interaction, 2003–2013 (%)		
Year	Desire for more interracial talk	Desire to learn more about the customs of other races
2003	32.3	
2004	32.3	
2005	33.9	
2006	32.7	
2007	31.3	
2008		53.0
2009	28.4	55.1
2010	29.6	56.2
2011	24.7	49.8
2012	23.2	38.8
2013	19.4	38.9

Table 15: Desire for more interracial talk (% more often)				
Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	15.9	43.5	66.1	31.2
2004	16.5	41.4	66.2	31.3
2005	15.8	38.9	56.0	34.0
2006	19.9	33.0	42.9	33.5
2007	18.7	32.6	35.1	33.0
2009	27.6	25.9	38.8	27.5
2010	22.2	38.7	35.0	30.0
2011	24.3	38.7	35.5	23.1
2012	17.2	30.4	30.1	22.9
2013	11.7	34.3	19.5	20.1

Table 16: Approval of racial integration, 2003–2013 (% approval)				
Total	Neighbour	Marry	School	Workforce
2003	52.6	47.4	66.7	
2004	52.5	48.7	67.4	
2005	60.2	53.4	70.1	
2006	49.8	43.1	65.8	
2007	52.2	41.7	66.9	
2008	61.4	47.2	69.1	60.6
2009	56.3	46.4	68.1	60.1
2010	67.3	53.0	76.3	67.9
2011	55.3	46.2	65.5	56.2
2012	57.0	47.1	60.6	54.6
2013	56.5	47.5	59.3	53.2

Table 17: Approval of relatives' interracial marriage by race, 2003–2013 (% approval)				
Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	13.1	55.0	65.1	51.4
2004	15.8	52.6	76.6	51.6
2005	24.6	62.7	69.2	55.5
2006	27.0	50.7	55.1	44.1
2007	22.2	49.5	43.8	44.4
2008	25.4	61.6	55.3	49.6
2009	29.2	46.3	51.0	48.7
2010	40.7	68.4	65.4	53.2
2011	38.0	60.6	55.8	46.0
2012	32.5	48.1	37.6	49.2
2013	35.1	50.8	45.5	48.9

Appendix B

MEMORY POLITICS

Table 18: Memories and meanings of apartheid, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	A crime against humanity	Terrible crimes were committed against anti-apartheid activists	Wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans	Resulted in the poverty of many black South Africans today
2003	86.5	77.3		
2004	84.9	74.9		
2005	85.9	77.2		
2006	87.8	80.4		
2007	86.4	78.3		
2008	83.0	76.0		
2009	83.9	78.7		
2010	87.4	79.6		
2011	80.1	72.5		
2012	83.8	82.5	81.1	76.5
2013	76.4	72.1	72.1	69.5

Table 19: Apartheid was a crime against humanity by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	70.3	88.6	92.2	88.9
2004	67.1	82.0	93.7	87.3
2005	68.1	87.1	89.4	88.0
2006	74.8	87.6	95.0	88.9
2007	67.1	88.8	92.2	89.1
2008	58.3	90.8	89.1	86.3
2009	76.1	89.7	89.6	84.3
2010	81.9	88.1	93.3	87.6
2011	79.8	86.5	77.4	80.2
2012	73.5	89.3	78.3	85.7
2013	52.8	77.0	70.4	80.9

Table 20: Terrible crimes were committed against anti-apartheid activists by race, 2003–2013 (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2003	56.4	82.1	87.9	79.8
2004	56.4	75.8	92.6	76.4
2005	62.8	76.5	87.4	78.2
2006	66.4	85.1	91.5	81.2
2007	55.0	84.9	88.9	81.0
2008	52.8	87.8	83.1	78.8
2009	70.5	89.3	83.1	79.2
2010	72.7	88.9	83.3	80.0
2011	65.7	78.0	70.1	73.7
2012	67.7	83.4	75.8	85.3
2013	50.2	71.4	67.5	76.1

Table 21: Apartheid wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans by race, 2012–2013

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2012	68.9	76.2	73.1	83.8
2013	50.2	68.7	66.2	76.4

Table 22: Apartheid resulted in the poverty of many black South Africans today by race, 2012–2013 (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2012	50.6	73.4	61.4	82
2013	33.4	67.3	58.7	76.6

Table 23: Reconciliation is impossible if those disadvantaged by apartheid are still poor by race, 2011–2013 (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2011	42.2	54.8	58.0	54.2
2012	32.3	41.0	33.0	49.7
2013	27.5	60.0	40.4	60.3

Table 24: Government should support victims of human rights abuses under apartheid, 2012–2013 by race (% agreement)

Year	White	Asian/Indian	Coloured	Black
2012	48.8	63.3	57.8	69.3
2013	34.3	65.8	54.8	64.9

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, which was established in 2000 in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the aim of ensuring that the lessons of South Africa's successful transition to democracy remain fundamental principles central to government and society as the country moves forward. Today, the IJR works to build fair, democratic and inclusive societies across Africa after conflict.

Since 2003, the IJR's Policy and Analysis programme has conducted the South African Reconciliation Barometer survey: an annual national public opinion poll that measures citizen attitudes towards reconciliation, transformation and national unity in post-apartheid South Africa. Change in these complex social trends is measured through six key indicators: human security, political culture, cross-cutting political relations, race relations, historical confrontation and dialogue. As one of the few dedicated social surveys on reconciliation in Africa and worldwide, the Barometer has become an important resource for encouraging national debate, informing decision-makers, developing policy and provoking new analysis and theory on reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

South Africans' views on reconciliation:

> Since 1994, there is no more violence. People came together and voted and forgave each other. We now live in a democracy. We have freedom of speech. Unlike before.

> The word reconciliation is going to take a long time because nobody is telling us what it is. Because if you tell a person to reconcile, they don't know what they should do.

> I think past governments must reconcile with the people of South Africa. Because they are the ones that brought on apartheid that split our nation. So I think it's them, they have to ask us for forgiveness.

> I think like it's hard for you to go forward if you keep looking back, like people always looking back at apartheid. So how are you going to move forward if you have one eye looking back over your shoulder.

> Then there's poverty and your social class. People still categorise each other according to class. There's your top, then you get your middle class, then you get your lower class. No-one has moved beyond those categories. That is why you cannot have true reconciliation if people in the same communities still have that outlook.

For more information, visit the IJR website at **www.ijr.org.za**, the Reconciliation Barometer blog at **www.reconciliationbarometer.org**, or follow us on Twitter at **@SABarometer**.