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Risks ahead of the constitutional referendum in Burkina Faso

Introduction

Long known for its relative stability in a particularly troubled region, Burkina Faso is now at a crossroads, torn by political differences over the proposed constitutional amendment to allow current President Blaise Compaoré to run for another term in 2015. Since July 2013, the country has been experiencing socio-political tensions over plans to establish the Senate. The opposition suspects those in power will use this to revise Article 37 of the constitution, which currently limits to two the number of five-year terms a president can serve, and organise a constitutional referendum for the same purpose.

Burkina Faso's stability had suffered a severe blow during the major crisis that followed the assassination of journalist Norbert Zongo in December 1998 and, more recently, in 2011 during a mutiny of the presidential guard, which almost resulted in the collapse of the Fourth Republic. A Council of Elders was established in 1999 to make proposals on how to reconcile the country, while it was also responsible for reviewing certain provisions of the constitution, including Article 37.

The current debate on the proposed constitutional amendment has also shaken the ruling party, the *Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès* (CDP), resulting in the resignation of several of its prominent figures in early 2014. These individuals then united to create a new party, the *Mouvement du peuple pour le progrès* (MPP). This event significantly altered the balance of political power on the national political landscape, introducing changes the scale of which will only become fully apparent in light of the upcoming elections, particularly the 2015 presidential poll.

This report is based on interviews conducted in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, in the period 9–20 April 2014 and focuses on four points. It first provides an overview of the country's socio-economic situation. Secondly, it analyses the new balance of political power that has emerged from dissent within the CDP. Risks related to holding

a constitutional referendum in the current context are then discussed, while, finally, recommendations are made to prevent political instability in the country.

A fragile socio-economic context

Burkina Faso is currently weakened by widespread anger and socio-economic demands that, although kept under control so far, present a real risk of stirring up social unrest. This situation partly explains the country's fragility.

For more than a decade Burkina Faso has been enjoying relatively high

countries in 2013. A survey conducted by Afrobarometer in partnership with the Centre for Democratic Governance in Burkina Faso reveals that 44% of respondents believed the economic situation to be good, while 46% believed that their living conditions had not improved.⁴

In such a context, population growth raises concerns. If the annual population growth rate (2,9% in 2012⁵) remains constant, the population will have doubled by 2025 to reach over 25 million, compared to the current figure of around 16 million,⁶ of which more than half is

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Despite the country's current economic performance, poverty remains endemic in Burkina Faso

economic growth. Between 2000 and 2006 its gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 6%, peaking at 7,4% in 2005.¹ According to the World Bank GDP reached 10% in 2012. The economic outlook for subsequent years forecasts a decline in GDP, which is predicted to be around 7%.²

However, despite these figures, Burkina Faso remains one of the poorest countries in the world. If government reforms initiated over recent years have improved the country's macroeconomic framework, citizens have as yet seen little impact on their daily lives. The distribution of the economic growth is largely unequal and a minority – which is reputedly close to those in the power – controls several key sectors of the national economy (e.g. real estate, construction and public works, mining, etc.).³

In 2012 the United Nations Development Programme reported that between 2011 and 2012 no major improvement was recorded in Burkina Faso's Human Development Index (HDI); indeed the country, which was ranked 161st in 2010, dropped to 183rd out of 187

aged under 25. In addition, despite the country's current economic performance, poverty remains endemic in Burkina Faso. This situation is combined with a difficult political climate.

The political impact of recent resignations within the CDP

The resignation on 4 January 2014 of nearly 70 members of the CDP National Political Bureau, followed by the creation of the MPP on 25 January, significantly changed Burkina Faso's political landscape. This event was even more far-reaching because among those who resigned were three figures who for some considerable time had been the powerbrokers and heavyweights of the Compaoré regime, i.e. Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Salif Diallo and Simon Compaoré. When leaving the party, they took many of the party's top echelons and supporters with them.

In the letter announcing their resignation, the former CDP members questioned the party's internal functioning, citing 'repeated violations [of] the core texts, the "militarisation" of its organs and

bodies, [and] management practices based on exclusion, denunciation, intrigue, hypocrisy, [and] cliques'. They also denounced the regime's plans to revise Article 37 of the constitution.⁷

In addition to these reasons, the resignations stemmed from growing discontent and frustration among these individuals, who felt marginalised in favour of a new generation considered to be outside the party, and especially coming from the *Fédération associative pour la paix avec Blaise Compaoré* (Fedap-

those who resigned to capitalise on the resentment against the regime and stage a grand entrance into the political arena.

Balance of power in favour of the opposition?

The birth of the MPP, which immediately formally joined the ranks of the political opposition, has brought a new dynamic to the struggle led by the opposition against the ruling party's plans to establish the Senate, which they suspect of being intended to further

organisations (CSOs) also participated, brought together tens of thousands of people. According to most observers the crowd observed during the January demonstration was unprecedented in size. The demonstration's success echoed the one organised on 28 July 2013 by the opposition leader, Zéphirin Diabré, to oppose the establishment of the Senate and the revision of Article 37.

However, the fact that most MPP leaders were initially part of the Compaoré regime works against them and undermines their credibility. The same applies to the alternative they can offer to a regime that many acknowledge can claim some genuine achievements, despite the fact that it has been in power for more than two decades and has several negative features. Similarly, because of his status as a relatively recent member of the opposition, the leader of the *Union pour le progrès et le changement* and leader of the political opposition, Zéphirin Diabré, suffers from the same criticism because he was also a member of the ruling regime.

Yet the opposition's capacity to mobilise the majority of the population and to generate and sustain their support over time are still to be seen, as well as how determined it will be to oppose the regime, which still firmly holds the reins of power.

The CDP – in troubled waters, but still afloat

An assessment of the extent to which the recent dissent within its ranks has affected the CDP varies depending on how one views the situation. According to official party statements, the general tendency has been for the CDP to minimise the importance of the resignations, while some commentators described them as a political 'earthquake'. Most political actors (including within the presidential camp) and political observers – some

After the rift in the CDP, the opposition and some members of society began to believe in the possibility of the regime's end

BC), founded in 2007 and dedicated to providing support – including financial support – to President Compaoré. The former CDP figures had felt progressively sidelined since 2009, particularly following the party's fifth congress held in March 2012, at which they were relegated to the position of mere political advisers. In these positions they claim they were not consulted when major decisions were being made, notably in nominating the party's candidates for the December 2012 elections and in renewing the party structures.⁸ The rise of Fedap-BC, in which the president's brother, François Compaoré, has significant influence, was seen as part of the president's plan to position his brother to take over power from him.⁹

The departure of former senior CDP members and the creation of the MPP are also the result of political ambitions, including presidential ones, that could not be fulfilled in a party that had excluded and marginalised those holding such ambitions. The socio-political context, characterised by the strong mobilisation of the opposition and civil society observed in previous months, has helped

President Compaoré's attempt to remain in power. Due to its leadership's experience, the MPP is an important ally for the opposition.

After the rift in the CDP, which some may have perceived as a sign of the implosion or at least a serious weakening of the Compaoré regime, the opposition and some members of society began to believe in the possibility of the regime's end. This feeling, shared by several observers in Burkina Faso, would have confirmed assassinated journalist Norbert Zongo's belief that real opposition to the CDP would come from within its own ranks.

The ability of the opposition to gather thousands of people against the proposed constitutional amendment confirms the feeling that a new dynamic is at work in Burkina Faso. This was evidenced by the demonstrations organised on 18 January 2014 in the capital and other regions of the country, as well as by the first MPP congress in April, and finally by the large rally held on 31 May at the *Stade du 4 août* in Ouagadougou. The January and May demonstrations, in which civil society



Opposition leaders during the 31 May 2014 rally in Ouagadougou (lefaso.net).

Important dates

4 January 2014: Resignation of tens of CDP members, including key figures.

18 January 2014: Demonstrations organised against the referendum by the opposition in Ouagadougou and in several other cities.

22 January 2014: Creation of a pro-referendum Republican Front composed of some 40 political parties from the presidential camp.

30 January 2014: Launch of a domestic mediation led by former president, Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo.

21 March 2014: Ivorian president Alassane Ouattara meets with the three main former CDP figures: Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Salif Diallo and Simon Compaoré.

25 March 2014: President Ouattara meets with the leader of the opposition, Zéphirin Diabré.

31 March 2014: The opposition launches its campaign against the referendum.

of whom had previously regarded this event as a deliberate move on the part of President Compaoré – agree that the rift in the CDP is a serious setback for the regime, especially in terms of its attempt to amend the constitution.

President Compaoré's silence on the matter, as well as his absence from the public arena, provided some indications of how the resignations were viewed at the highest level of the state. Later, the

Notwithstanding the difficulties the CDP went through following the spate of resignations, it would be premature to consider them a fatal blow. The party remains by far the largest and most powerful political force in Burkina Faso. This is a party with a history – it is well established across the country and has significant financial resources, including those that have thus far given it many years in power. The party has 70 seats

The opposition's capacity to mobilise the majority of the population is still to be seen

president undertook a tour of the country that several observers compared to a pre-referendum campaign.

The resignations also affected the climate within the CDP and its activities.¹⁰ The party took some time to recover and fill empty positions in its central and regional bodies. It has also attempted to remobilise its followers. However, efforts to ready the party for battle have not been easy. The speed with which replacements were made impacted on the competence of the new members and cast doubts on their ability to lead a party in crisis.

in Parliament out of 127 (although legitimate doubts exist as to the number of parliamentarians still loyal to the party), 12,352 local councillors out of 18,527, 318 mayors out of 370, and 12 presidents of regional councils out of 13.

The party's attempts to regain control of the political situation were also illustrated by the renewal of social measures (initially adopted on 11 September 2013), amounting to 11 billion CFA francs, following an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 24 March. It should be noted that these measures were not included in the 2014 budget

submitted to the National Assembly in December 2013, which emphasises their exceptional character.

Challenges to a constitutional referendum

The current political context, combining with socio-economic challenges and the ongoing debate over the envisaged

when two consecutive five-year term were permitted. However, although this opened the doors to a potential change in the presidency, it has not translated into reality, so much so that several socio-political actors have come to the conclusion that the main objective of the revisions has been to maintain Compaoré's hold on power.

in Congress by the president of Burkina Faso'. However, in the current state of existing laws and regulations, even in the event of a negative vote in the National Assembly, the ruling party can still refer the matter to the population to decide. The population can also be consulted directly, without first going through the National Assembly.¹¹

Focusing on the parts of the constitution that cannot be called into question through modification, many observers believe that the CDP-dominated National Assembly has deliberately chosen not to make Article 37 sacrosanct. In 2011 the Advisory Council on political reforms (CCRP), whose mission was to collect proposals from stakeholders on policy reforms to be implemented to improve governance, left Article 37 as it was due to a lack of consensus.¹²

Those who focus on a *political* argument refer to the referendum as an instrument through which the sovereign wishes of the people can be expressed. For them, when a national issue is divisive, it must be submitted to the people. However, this argument does not meet with the approval of the entire political class, for at least two reasons. Firstly, the proposed referendum serves the interests of one person more than those of the nation as a whole. Secondly, the institutions responsible for organising a referendum on an issue of this importance do not have the necessary credibility among many stakeholders. Any lingering doubts about the transparency of voting and social tension in major cities are therefore factors for concern.

Finally, advocates of an *ethical* argument evoke the promise allegedly made by the president to leave office at the end of his fourth term, accusing him of not keeping his word. In an interview with the Burkinabe press a constitutionalist illustrated the problems the continent faces with presidents attempting to change the constitutions of their

The current political context poses a threat to national peace and social cohesion

amendment of the constitution, poses a threat to national peace and social cohesion. This risk is further increased by the 2015 presidential elections. The situation in Burkina Faso – a country that is located in a particularly unstable region – requires careful attention.

In this context, the debate on whether or not to hold a referendum to amend Article 37 of the constitution, the failure of various mediation efforts, the presence of the army (given the role it has played throughout Burkina Faso's turbulent history), and the desire for change among a significant part of the population are all factors pointing towards a period of uncertainty ahead for the country.

Constitutional amendment: a legitimate exercise plagued by 'rigging'

Burkina Faso public opinion is divided on whether or not to hold a constitutional referendum that would allow President Compaoré to seek another term, despite the fact he has already led the country for 27 years, including 23 years serving four constitutional mandates. The constitution adopted in June 1991 has been revised five times (in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2009 and 2012). The 1997 revision removed the provision limiting the number of presidential terms. This limitation was reintroduced in 2000,

This debate is important for the future of the country. It raises three types of arguments: legal, political and ethical.

Firstly, some evoke a *legal* argument to support the proposed referendum. For them, nothing in the present constitution prohibits the amendment. In fact, Article 166 of the constitution prohibits any modification unless it calls into question the nature and the republican form of the state, the multiparty system and the integrity of the national territory. Articles 161 and following, which set the conditions of a constitutional revision, state that 'any proposed revision should be first submitted to the Parliament for consideration'. The constitution further states that 'the proposed revision is adopted without a referendum if approved by a majority of three-quarters of the members of Parliament convened



Rally of President Compaoré's supporters in Bobo Dioulasso, 12 April 2014 (Bayiri.com).

respective countries to extend their terms in office, stating that:

Africa seems struck by a kind of fatalism that is difficult to exorcise as long as this question replaces the political agenda of governments during their second term. The number of countries involved is impressive and it's a real shame for Africa: Guinea (1990), Chad (2004), Togo, Cameroon (2008), Djibouti, Algeria, Niger (2009), Comoros (2010), Benin (since 2012),

a referendum, the mediators proposed the establishment of a 'restructured Senate' and a 'democratic transition' at the end of President Compaoré's current term, i.e. a two-year transition whose terms would be discussed by the parties. Unsurprisingly, the opposition has reacted negatively to this latest proposal, which, in its view, has no constitutional basis.

As proof of its lack of confidence in the process, the opposition requested

The institutions responsible for organising a referendum do not have the necessary credibility among many stakeholders

Burkina Faso (1997, 2000, 2005 and once again in 2013.) We thought that by protecting this provision in the constitutions we had found a solution to the undemocratic use of the Constitution that it encouraged.¹³

The failure of mediation attempts

Faced with a looming crisis, a group of Burkina Faso personalities led by former president Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo attempted a mediation in February 2014. Ouedraogo was supported by Paul Y. Ouedraogo, archbishop of Bobo Dioulasso, Samuel B. Yaméogo, president of the Federation of Churches and Evangelical Missions, and Mama Sanou, president of the Muslim community in Bobo Dioulasso. The objective of this initiative was to establish a dialogue between the CDP and the opposition to ease the tensions in the socio-political climate.

However, the initiative encountered many difficulties, largely related to the irreconcilable positions of the various role players and the lack of trust among them. To deal with the opposition's refusal to support the modification of Article 37 and

that the CDP produce a mandate from the president authorising the party to negotiate on his behalf and guaranteeing its commitment to respecting the decisions taken at the end of the mediation. When the ruling party refused to produce such a document, arguing that Compaoré was above political parties, the opposition walked out of the talks. The failure of this mediation before it had even begun further reduces the chances of dialogue.

It is even more disturbing to see that the polarisation of the political debate has also affected religious and traditional authorities that, although considered to act as social regulators, have been taking positions on political issues or even becoming directly involved in politics. This undermines their position as actors who can bring about compromise. The Catholic Church is a good example – on 15 July 2013 it expressed its opposition to the establishment of the Senate.¹⁴ In February 2010 the Burkina Faso bishops had already expressed their opposition to the amendment of Article 37.¹⁵ This is not the case of the Muslim community, whose positioning is not clear. Finally, the Mossi chieftaincy was also affected by

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THE NUMBER OF TIMES THE JUNE 1991 CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN REVISED

(IN 1997, 2000, 2002, 2009 AND 2012)



President Blaise Compaoré during a public meeting in Sanguié Province, 10 May 2014 (Government Information Service).

the political climate, although the extent is difficult to measure. The most striking illustration is the case of Larlé Naba Tigre, one of the 'ministers' of Mogho Naba, king of the Mossi, who resigned from the CDP, for which he was a member of the Parliament, to join the MPP.

Efforts undertaken by Burkina Faso personalities to foster the dialogue went alongside the mediation of Ivorian president, Alassane Ouattara. With the unease increasingly felt within the CDP, he became involved before the January 2014 resignations with a view to reconciling the different protagonists. These attempts were unsuccessful. In January 2014, after the split, a delegation led by the president of the Ivorian National Assembly, Guillaume Soro, accompanied by the minister of the interior and security, Hamed Bakayoko, and the minister for presidential affairs and younger brother of the Ivorian president, Tené Birahima Ouattara, went to Ouagadougou. Later, President Ouattara separately received those who had resigned, Zéphirin Diabré and some members of the CDP. However, the Ivorian mediation, perceived as being close to the Burkina

Faso leadership, was met with suspicion by the opposition.

One of the peculiarities observed in the socio-political situation in Burkina Faso is the extreme hesitation to become involved on the part of major external actors. So, although the current climate is worrying, no official and unequivocal position has for the moment been expressed similar to the opposition firmly displayed, particularly by the United States, to any constitutional amendment that would allow the current leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi to re-stand for election.¹⁶ The role played by President Compaoré in regional stability and the strategic ties that he has consolidated over time – including in the fight against the terrorist threat in the Sahel-Sahara region – make him a privileged partner of particularly Western countries. These considerations probably explain the attitude of the international community.

Will the army get involved?

If there is one aspect of political life in Burkina Faso that has unanimous support, it is the omnipresence of the military at the centre of power since

independence. To date, the country has experienced four military coups (in 1980, 1982, 1983 and 1987). Some observers believe that, even if the country has undertaken political reforms to meet the democratic aspirations of its citizens over the past three decades, it has for a significant part of its history been ruled by the military, and continues to be. As a political figure in the country has pointed out, despite the appearance of civilian rule, 'the army does everything in Burkina Faso'.¹⁷

In the past, the army's pre-eminent position has fuelled political violence. It has greatly contributed to creating and sustaining a climate of generalised insecurity that has been maintained by the actions of particular units of the army, particularly those who later turned against the regime, forcing President Compaoré to briefly withdraw inland during the 2011 mutinies. On other occasions the army has repressed any attempts by the masses to demand democracy and development. However, the situation changed in 2011 when a student uprising following the death of Justin Zongo was accompanied by the rebellion of soldiers of the presidential guard who were deemed loyal to the president. This was an isolated event, but could have been affected by an international context characterised by popular uprisings in the Arab world.

As a result, the role the army has played in the past in political life seemed to resurface. The assassination of President Thomas Sankara will long remain a mystery, as well as the conditions in which other people have disappeared, including the journalist Norbert Zongo. These events further demonstrate the use of violence in politics in Burkina Faso.

The 2011 mutiny was fuelled not only by social unrest, but also by suspicions of corruption and embezzlement among the military hierarchy. Although the government was able to contain the

army's dissatisfaction, using a carrot and stick approach,¹⁸ the impact of the mutiny on the morale of the armed forces should not be underestimated. It is true that since President Compaoré assumed the duties of defence minister everything has remained quiet in the barracks. However, numerous observers believe that dissatisfaction in the army runs high, because generous concessions have been granted to certain units over others. Some interviewees even referred to a 'military lockdown', which they say is clear from the promotion and appointment of new military leaders to deal with any eventuality. The experience

Norbert Zongo in 1998. Indeed, debates surrounding issues such as Article 37, the independence of the judiciary and lack of social justice had already been the subject of recommendations by the Council of Elders (see above).²⁰

The justice system is generally seen as an instrument in the hands of those in power. This challenges and undermines its credibility and ability to resolve disputes impartially, including political ones. This situation results in a growing number of citizens expressing their discontent by resorting to a form of mob justice. While these challenges remain, it is worth noting that significant progress

The role played by President Compaoré in regional stability makes him a privileged partner of particularly Western countries

of the region in recent years has shown that coups are rarely masterminded by the military high command and are frequently orchestrated by the rank and file, who are often excluded from the benefits that come with political power.

Faced with the current impasse, it is not easy to determine the army's position. In the event of social and political instability – especially if the political class does not reach a consensus – there are fears that the army will become involved.¹⁹ Such a move will not be without consequences in a context where coups and unconstitutional changes in Africa are less and less tolerated.

A frustrated civil society

The current political and socio-economic context is characterised by a profound crisis of confidence vis-à-vis both state institutions and the relationship between political and social actors. Many observers believe that most of the current problems are not new and had already been raised following the assassination of

has been made in Burkina Faso, especially in terms of civil liberties and freedom of the press.

Together with these changes, civil society has grown more mature and has become a key actor in the country's socio-political life, with high demands and expectations in relation to human rights. For instance, it was under pressure from organisations such as the Collective against Impunity that the government was forced to investigate the assassination of Norbert Zongo.

Equally, it was civil society that first warned against a possible removal of the limitation of the presidential mandate. As an illustration, in May 2010 a group of people (composed of a lawyer, a journalist and a political scientist) launched a petition against the revision of the constitution. More recently, in January 2014 the movement known as *Balai citoyen* (Citizen Broom) launched a petition entitled 'Respect for the rule of law in Burkina Faso'. This movement, together with other CSOs, also joined





Rally of the opposition and some civil society movements in Ouagadougou, 31 May 2014 (AFP/Ahmed Ouoba).

the 18 January national rally organised by the opposition against the proposed referendum. On 3 March 2014 a national forum of CSOs was also organised in Ouagadougou to discuss the 2015 presidential election – particularly in relation to Article 37. Participants in this forum called for strict compliance with the constitution by inviting the government to avoid any modification of Article 37. They also proposed a roadmap for peaceful, transparent and fair elections. All these events illustrate the broad mobilisation of a significant part of Burkina Faso civil society.

It is nonetheless necessary to mention another civil society movement that is close to the government and is symbolised by Fedap-BC, one that supports the constitutional amendment. On 11 January 2014, during a rally held in Burkina Faso's second city, Bobo Dioulasso, Fedap-BC called on President Compaoré to stand in the 2015 presidential elections for the sake of the country and subregional stability.

Conclusion

The current situation not only affects Burkina Faso, but also West Africa and the entire continent. Debates over constitutional amendments are often a source of socio-political tension and instability. They also constitute tests for the democratisation process and the progress made on the continent over the past two decades in this regard.

The outcome of the ongoing debate on plans to amend Article 37 and the current deadlock will undoubtedly impact on efforts to consolidate the democratic process and political life in other African countries. While alternating protests and meetings seem to be turning the situation into a war of attrition, breaking the stalemate will depend on the determination of those in power to modify the constitution without consensus, and that of the opposition, and civil society opposed to it, to resort to other means to achieve their aims.

Recommendations

1 The lack of dialogue and the polarisation of the debate around Article 37 raise fears that rising tensions could escalate into a violent political crisis. Faced with this risk, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), together with the African Union (AU), the United Nations, the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* and other members of the international community, should intervene in the situation in Burkina Faso to prevent any deterioration that would threaten the stability of the subregion. They should call on the country's political class to assume its responsibilities and strive to maintain national cohesion and stability at all costs.

2 ECOWAS and the AU, particularly through their Councils of Elders, should dispatch fact-finding and goodwill missions to help Burkina Faso's social and political stakeholders to build a national consensus on contentious issues.

3 ECOWAS and the AU should also remind Burkina Faso political stakeholders of the need to comply with regional and continental decisions relating to democracy and good governance.

4 If a referendum on changing Article 37 of the constitution is organised, ECOWAS, the AU and Burkina Faso's other international partners should ensure that a credible, free, transparent and peaceful referendum takes place in order to reduce the risk of tension and violence.

Notes

- 1 CEDEAO, République du Burkina Faso et Union Africaine, Burkina Faso: revue des efforts de développement dans le secteur agricole, 9 June 2014, <http://www.caadp.net/pdf/Stocktaking%20-%20Burkina%20faso.pdf>.
- 2 World Bank, Global economic prospects: country and region specific forecasts and data, 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data?variable=NYGDPMKTPKDZ®ion=SST>.
- 3 Interview with academic, Ouagadougou, 10 April 2014; see also MBDHP (Mouvement burkinabè des droits de l'homme et des peuples), *Human rights violations committed during the socio-political and military crisis in Burkina Faso*, Special Report, Ouagadougou: MBDHP, 2012, 13.
- 4 Afrobarometer, *Le paradoxe des conditions de vie au Burkina Faso: des progrès économiques aux retombées sociales limitées*, Ouagadougou, 30 April 2013.
- 5 World Bank, Croissance de la population (% annuel), 2014, <http://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/SP.POP.GROW>.
- 6 World Bank, Indicateurs du développement dans le monde: Burkina Faso, 2014, <http://donnees.banquemondiale.org/pays/burkina-faso>.
- 7 Cf. open letter to Assimi Kouanda, CDP executive secretary, 4 January 2014.
- 8 Interview with former CDP member, Ouagadougou, 15 April 2014; see also interview with Maria-Goretti Dicko Agaléoué Adoua, former CDP executive and 4th vice-president of the MPP responsible for Burkinabe from abroad, *Fasozine*, 50, March–April 2014, 41.
- 9 Interview with academic, Ouagadougou, 10 April 2014.
- 10 It should be noted that, although at the local level, some resignations are still taking place from the CDP, cf. Lefaso.net, Commune de réo: de nouvelles adhésions pour le MPP au détriment du CDP, 4 June 2014, <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article59498&rubrique2>.
- 11 Interview with academic, Burkina Faso, 31 May 2014.
- 12 The CCRP is a consultative framework established in 2011 following the socio-political crisis of that year. It brought together representatives from the regime, civil society and some opposition political parties.
- 13 Seni Ouédraogo, Juridiquement, l'article 37 ne peut être modifié, interview, *Mutations*, 47, 15 February 2014, http://lefaso.net/spip.php?page=impression&id_article=58284.
- 14 Statement by Burkina Faso bishops, 15 July 2013, <http://www.lepays.bf/?LES-EVEQUES-DU-BURKINA-A-PROPOS-DU>.
- 15 Statement by Burkina Faso bishops, 20 February 2010, <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article35631>.
- 16 Interview with diplomats, Ouagadougou, 11 and 17 April 2014.
- 17 Interview with political figure, Ouagadougou, 18 April 2014.
- 18 Hundreds of soldiers were expelled from the army, while arrangements were made to satisfy some of their demands.
- 19 This fear was widely expressed by the majority of people interviewed during the field research trip.
- 20 See also MBDHP (Mouvement burkinabè des droits de l'homme et des peuples), *Human rights violations committed during the socio-political and military crisis in Burkina Faso*, Special Report, Ouagadougou: MBDHP, 2012.



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