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in Africa

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## South Africa 2014 Election Updates

### EISA Election Update Two

[www.electionupdate.org.za](http://www.electionupdate.org.za)

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## SA Elections 2014: Continuity, Contestation or Change?

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### Contents

#### **“The Path of the Past: South African Democracy Twenty Years On”**

Steven Friedman, Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Rhodes University and University of Johannesburg  
**page 2**

#### **KwaZulu-Natal** **page 12**

Shauna Mottiar- Post Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal

#### **North West** **page 19**

Ina Gouws, North West University, Vaal Triangle Campus

#### **Limpopo** **page 29**

Ralph Matekga, Director, Clearcontent Research and Consulting

#### **Free State** **page 35**

Sethulego Matebesi, Chairperson, Department of Sociology, University of the Free State

#### **Western Cape** **page 42**

Cherrel Africa, Head of Department, Political Studies, University of Western Cape

#### **Eastern Cape** **page 50**

Malachia Mathoho, Musa Sebugwawo and Stephen Shisanya, Afesis-corplan

#### **Mpumalanga** **page 56**

Oupa Makhalemele, Independent Researcher

#### **Gauteng** **page 61**

Waseem Holland, Independent Researcher and Ebrahim Fakir, Manager, Political Parties and Parliamentary Programme at EISA; and 2014 Ruth First Fellow at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

## **The Path of the Past: South African Democracy Twenty Years On**

**Professor Steven Friedman – Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Rhodes University and University of Johannesburg**

Douglass North would have had no trouble understanding that the key issue in this year's election is whether it can strengthen the patterns of the past two decades which have cemented democracy's form – and begin to change those which have denied many South Africans its substance.

North, a Nobel Prize-winning economic historian, came up with the idea of 'path dependency' to describe the way the patterns of the past tend to shape the future.<sup>1</sup> His point was that the institutions which became entrenched in societies could retain a stubborn hold, even when society seemed to have experienced great changes. This is in many ways a useful way of understanding South Africa's first two decades of democracy.

### **The Contours of Path Dependency**

To say this is not to claim, as many now do, that 'nothing has changed' since 1994.

Much has changed. Most South Africans are no longer subject to crippling burdens imposed on them because of their race – the days when most adults spent time in prison simply because they had neglected to carry their 'pass' allowing them into the cities<sup>2</sup> are over. The 'black middle class', which some apartheid strategists hoped would develop a stake in white domination, emerged when minority rule ended. Millions now receive social grants,<sup>3</sup> and significant progress has been made in extending basic services.<sup>4</sup> But path dependency remains a core element of the South African reality, because it is becoming increasingly clear that the 'democratic breakthrough' of 1994 did not fundamentally change the patterns of the past – it simply absorbed a section of the black majority into the institutions which existed then and the elites which dominated them.

One of the key features of the new South Africa is the collective bargaining system, a subject of heated controversy, as employers claim that excessive union rights have created 'inflexible labour markets'. But the system is, in essence, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act extended to include black workers. While workers do enjoy more rights now, the contours of the system have remained much the same over 90 years.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, competitive elections have been institutionalised in the post-apartheid era – despite grumbles that 'voting changes

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<sup>1</sup> Douglass C North *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990

<sup>2</sup> See for example Nigel Worden *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, apartheid, democracy* (5<sup>th</sup> edition) Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012

<sup>3</sup> Servaas van der Berg and Krige Siebrits '[Social assistance reform during a period of fiscal stress](#)', [Working Papers](#) 17/2010, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> Trevor Manuel 'Proof of how much we have done — and must still do' *Business Day* October 21 2012

<sup>5</sup> I am grateful to Sakhela Buhlungu, Dean of Humanities, University of Cape Town, for this observation

nothing', the principle that governments will continue to be elected in regular multi-party contests is under no serious threat and has become an accepted feature of political life. This is no small achievement in a deeply divided society scarred by deep inequalities – yet it continues an unbroken pattern which dates to at least 1910 when the (white) South African state was formed. Regular elections have always been a feature of South African politics – the key change in 1994 was that everyone could participate.

These two examples may show how path dependency can work in democracy's favour: if democratic institutions are created for a minority, they may be more likely to endure when everyone takes part in them. But some of its other consequences are not nearly as benign. The most obvious example is poverty and inequality. As suggested earlier, the 2011 census, the most recent source of data, finds that significant progress has been made in access to services. But income inequality has not changed dramatically since 1994<sup>6</sup> – and it still bears a racial tinge: white incomes have increased faster than those of other races since democracy's advent.<sup>7</sup> In 2010, according to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, black South African investors owned only 18% of the available share capital in the top 100 listed companies.<sup>8</sup> By 2009, the *percentage of black professionals* in accounting, engineering and law remained at 12%, 24% and 21% respectively.<sup>9</sup> So the life chances of the majority are improving, but the hierarchies of the past remain, albeit in a slightly different racial form.

There are similar patterns in access to democratic citizenship and responsive government. In the suburbs, a democracy exists so vigorous in its denunciation of government that it has become difficult to say anything positive about it without risking ridicule or abuse.<sup>10</sup> But in the townships and shack settlements, local power holders seek to retain a monopoly, partly by using force against independent voices which challenge them – the experience of the shack dweller movement Abahlali basemjondolo, which faced severe violence after challenging the authority of the local council in the Durban area,<sup>11</sup> is only one example. This pattern is also part of another path-dependent feature of post-apartheid democracy. While previous elections have, by common consent, been free and fair (at least in the sense that the losers accept the results), they have not been very competitive – voting districts tend to be dominated by single parties whose opponents have conceded their territory to them.<sup>12</sup> This pattern was partly disturbed in the 2009 election by the formation of the Congress of the People (Cope), which challenged the ANC in its areas of dominance. But, this exception aside, the political

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<sup>6</sup> Manuel 'Proof of how much we have done'

<sup>7</sup> Haroon Borat, Carlene van der Westhuizen and Tougheda Jacobs *Income and Non-Income Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa: What are the Drivers and Possible Policy Interventions?* Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, DPRU Working Paper 09/138 August 2009, p.4

<sup>8</sup> *JSE Presents Findings on Black Ownership on the JSE* September 2, 2010 [http://www.jse.co.za/about-us/media/press-releases/full-story/10-09-02/JSE\\_Presents\\_Findings\\_on\\_Black\\_Ownership\\_on\\_the\\_JSE.aspx](http://www.jse.co.za/about-us/media/press-releases/full-story/10-09-02/JSE_Presents_Findings_on_Black_Ownership_on_the_JSE.aspx)

<sup>9</sup> Development Network Africa *Professional Services in South Africa: Accounting, Engineering and Law* 25 January 2009 [http://www.dnaeconomics.com/assets/Usegareth/SA\\_Professional\\_Services.pdf](http://www.dnaeconomics.com/assets/Usegareth/SA_Professional_Services.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Steven Friedman 'Identity Crisis: Electoral Dominance, Identity Politics and South African Democracy' (forthcoming)

<sup>11</sup> See for example [Abahlali baseMjondolo The Attack on AbM in Kennedy Road](http://www.abahlali.org/taxonomy/term/1525) <http://www.abahlali.org/taxonomy/term/1525>

<sup>12</sup> Friedman 'Identity Crisis'

landscape has been an archipelago of political fiefdoms in which allegiance strongly corresponds to race and other ascriptive identities. Finally, despite the fact that the suburbs are the electoral fiefdom of the opposition, they enjoy higher standards of municipal government efficiency and greater responsiveness because, in any democratic society, resources, organisation and the confidence needed to hold officials to account usually translate into influence, regardless of electoral outcomes.

To those who know South African political history, these features of the landscape should sound familiar – they are much the same as those which prevailed before 1994. Then too, some prospered at the expense of the many, the suburbs were much better governed than the townships, and a minority enjoyed the right to speak (and vote) which the majority was denied. For all the real gains made over the past two decades, the country has not embarked on a fundamentally new path. In some ways, this is an asset because institutions which operated then for the few have been broadened (electoral democracy chief among them). But the persistence of patterns of social and economic domination threaten the society.

Thus another form of path dependency is the degree to which citizens continue to use street demonstrations to express themselves: while much media reportage and commentary tend to assume that protest is a new phenomenon, it has been an almost constant reality since 1976, when the Soweto uprising began – only in the mid-1990s, in the first flush of democratic enthusiasm, did protest briefly subside.<sup>13</sup> Protest is a democratic right and there is evidence that protestors are usually the victims rather than the perpetrators of violence<sup>14</sup> – so demonstrations cannot be seen as severe threats to social order. But where citizens feel they have a voice, protest is employed only as a last resort: the fact that it has become a regular feature of public life suggests that many citizens do not believe that they have other ways of making themselves heard. Since most protests remain bottled up in areas where the affluent (and the media) do not go, they have limited effect on the society. They are also unlikely to have much influence on the election. Protest leaders in some areas have successfully organised boycotts of voter registration,<sup>15</sup> but this did not prevent the IEC reaching its target of registering 1,25m new voters.<sup>16</sup> Many of the protests are not aimed at the ANC – they are often organised by ANC politicians seeking to enhance their influence within the organisation.<sup>17</sup> There is, therefore, no necessary reason why the protesters should vote against the ANC. For some years, it has been regularly predicted that protests would be followed by a

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<sup>13</sup> See for example Jerry Lavery 'Protest and Political Participation in South Africa: Time Trends and Characteristics of Protesters' *Afrobarometer Briefing Papers* 102 May 2012

<sup>14</sup> Peter Alexander, Carin Runciman and Trevor Ngwane Growing civil unrest shows yearning for accountability *Business Day* 7 March 2014

<sup>15</sup> Abongile Mgaqelwa and Sipho Ntshobane 'Voter registration boycott' *Dispatch Online* <http://www.dispatch.co.za/news/voter-registration-boycott/>

<sup>16</sup> Independent Electoral Commission 'Outcome of Final Registration Weekend' 11 February 2014 <http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Outcome-of-final-registration-weekend/>

<sup>17</sup> Karl Von Holdt, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi, Kindi Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini and Adele Kirsten *The Smoke That Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Search for a Place in the New South Africa* Johannesburg, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Society, Work and Development Institute, July 2011

significant election stay-away by ANC supporters.<sup>18</sup> The predictions have been inaccurate, partly because protesters often see no contradiction between campaigning against an ANC mayor and supporting the party at the polls.

Path dependency has had a more damaging influence in the formal workplace: the patterns mentioned here are also a key cause of labour conflict, epitomised by the Marikana shootings of 2012. It is now widely agreed that worker indebtedness is a key reason<sup>19</sup> – and this in turn is prompted both by a desire to buy consumer goods which, in an unequal society, confer status<sup>20</sup> and by a need to feed unemployed dependants.<sup>21</sup> Unauthorised strike action on the mines, the rise of the Amalgamated Mining and Construction Union (Amcu), a rival to Cosatu's National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and tensions within Cosatu all suggest that a significant section of union membership is rebelling against a leadership which they believe has failed to protect them from the wage pressures they face. A persuasive analysis thus argues that the bargaining system is facing severe pressure from pre-1994 patterns which it is struggling to manage.<sup>22</sup>

Much the same might be said about the society. Tensions between government and business,<sup>23</sup> which hamper economic progress, industrial conflict, and a national debate marked by angry yelling rather than a search for common ground, all testify to the unresolved tensions which are the legacy of path dependency. The racial features of the conflict are never far from the surface, even if an assertive black professional class is also eager to yell at the ANC government – black business people and professionals recently phoned in to a radio station to say that experiences at white-run workplaces have convinced them that they will not vote for the governing party if it appoints a white person as a provincial premier;<sup>24</sup> a public commentator observes that the political majority remain a cultural minority.<sup>25</sup> That much public commentary which claims to 'speak truth to power' is an attempt to defend the racial hierarchy of the past is evident when a commentator insists that corruption under apartheid was 'incidental', while under majority rule it is 'systemic',<sup>26</sup> or when a journalist, in an article portraying a white constitutional court judge as a moral antidote to a black state

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<sup>18</sup> Susan Booysen (ed) *Local Elections in South Africa: Parties, People, Politics* Bloemfontein, SUN media, 2012, p.99

<sup>19</sup> SARB: Unsecured lending on the rise' Fin24 28 June 2013 <http://www.fin24.com/Debt/News/Sarb-Unsecured-lending-on-the-rise-20130628>

<sup>20</sup> SA Press Association (Sapa) 'More TVs than Fridges in SA Homes' *IOL News* October 30 2012 <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/census-more-tvs-than-fridges-in-sa-homes-1.1414075#.UzwMU6L2B3>

<sup>21</sup> Reuters 'Mine Strike to Drive Up Platinum Prices' *Eye Witness News* 18 February 2014 <http://ewn.co.za/2014/02/18/SA-miners-strike-drive-up-platinum>

<sup>22</sup> Edward Webster 'The promise and the possibility: South Africa's contested industrial relations path' *Transformation* 81/82 (2013)

<sup>23</sup> Chris Barron 'Why business and the ANC fell out of love' *Business Day* March 30, 2014

<sup>24</sup> Kaya FM Today with John Perlman Podcast 'How Important is the Race of a Candidate in Making your Political Choice?' March 17, 2014 <http://www.kayafm.co.za/category/podcast/today-with-john-perlman-podcast/page/2/>

<sup>25</sup> 'White people remain a cultural majority. And it is their world view that continues to dominate the shaping of social and economic relations'. Aubrey Matshiqi 'Why Manuel is right and wrong about Manyi's "racism"' *Business Day* 8 March 2011 <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=136509>

<sup>26</sup> John Kane-Berman 'ANC corruption is systemic, unlike Nats' incidental version' *Business Day* March 24, 2014

president, declares that growing up as a white person in poverty under apartheid meant that he had ‘endured much the same hardship and discrimination as the most unfortunate of his compatriots’,<sup>27</sup> so delegitimising the moral critique of legislated black subordination under apartheid. All this suggests that the racial hierarchies of the past are still alive, despite two decades of political change.

South Africa faces a twin challenge – to retain those aspects of path dependency which strengthen democracy (of which multi-party elections are the most obvious) and to begin dismantling those which threaten it. It is in this context that the country nears the 2014 election. The links between the impending ballot and the points made here may not be immediately apparent, but there is a direct connection. While the election’s capacity to change the society’s direction has been exaggerated, it will test the degree to which the beneficial aspects of path dependency can be maintained – and could begin a process in which some of its corrosive effects are addressed and a new, more sustainable, path emerges.

### **Free and Fair? Elections Under Pressure**

One implication of this analysis is that, while regular elections are now routine, the commitment of the parties to free and fair elections is yet to be fully tested.

It is one thing to hold regular elections when the result is not in doubt, quite another when the outcome could determine who holds power. While whites enjoyed regular elections from 1910, power changed hands at the ballot box only twice – in 1924 and 1948. After that, the white electoral system was never tested. Since 1994, of course, there has been no change of power at the national level and so no test of the system. It is at least possible that, if elections become far more competitive, the integrity of the electoral process will be tested. The background presented here suggests that, if parties’ hold over their bastions or their constituencies is threatened, elections might turn out not to have been institutionalised at all. There are expectations that the 2014 election may provide such a test.

First, the election is expected to be more competitive than any of its predecessors. Second, it has been suggested that its integrity is under threat. On the first score, the governing party faces a greater challenge than in the past. ANC documents acknowledge dissatisfaction within its voter base,<sup>28</sup> and it also enters the campaign with a key sources of election-time organisation, the Congress of SA Trade Unions, at war with itself;<sup>29</sup> another, the ANC Youth League, has been deprived of much of its organisation by the dissolution of branches and regions.<sup>30</sup> The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, is actively campaigning in traditional ANC areas and the Economic Freedom Fighters are seen by commentators as a threat to its electoral base. On the second, allegations of irregularities in municipal elections

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<sup>27</sup> John Carlin ‘Judge shows why constitution is about morals not ceremony’ *Business Day* March 28 2014

<sup>28</sup> African National Congress *Organisational renewal: Building the ANC as a movement for transformation and a strategic centre of power* A discussion document towards the National Policy Conference Version 9, released on 10th April 2012, p.9

<sup>29</sup> Natasha Marrian ‘Vavi court case lays bare divisions among Cosatu leadership’ *Business Day* 28 March 2014

<sup>30</sup> Setumo Stone ‘Four provincial ANC Youth League branches get the chop’ *Business Day* 10 June 2013



in Tlokwe, North West Province,<sup>31</sup> have raised the first serious doubts about the integrity of the Independent Electoral Commission. Allegations of financial impropriety levelled at the head of the IEC, Pansy Tlakula, have prompted one party leader, Bantu Holomisa of the United Democratic Front, to claim that elections will be rigged.<sup>32</sup>

Both the expectation of intense competition and of electoral irregularity seem exaggerated. The leader of the Opposition, Helen Zille, has scaled down her party's initial target of 30% and has predicted that the ANC will win 60%, only a few percentage points less than its current vote.<sup>33</sup> This is consistent with a trend visible in many municipal by-elections – that the ANC remains fairly secure in its traditional strongholds and that the threat to its hold on office is very limited. A very different picture might be evident in 2019 if the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) decides to form a left-wing worker's party to challenge the ANC. In December, Numsa announced that it would no longer campaign for the ANC and that it would be considering a range of options, including a new party.<sup>34</sup> This decision will have only a marginal effect on the current election. While Cosatu's support is crucial to the ANC and Numsa is currently its biggest union, Numsa has left it to its members to decide who to vote for and will thus not be campaigning against the ANC. But, if it forms the party some time after this election, it could fundamentally change the electoral power balance. If the ANC does get a little over 60% in this election, it may be realistic to assume that it will experience a further drop in 2019: a workers' party would then need only around 10% to deprive the ANC of a majority. Local elections in Tlokwe have confirmed a key principle of South African party politics – that the chief threat to the ANC's hold on national government is a split in its own ranks rather than a growth in the support of current opposition parties.<sup>35</sup> The Numsa-initiated party could become that split, in which case, electoral democracy will face its litmus test.

For this election, the fact that the DA is campaigning in traditional ANC areas – and the EFF is seeking support from ANC voters – does destabilise some traditional party fiefdoms and has led to clashes on university campuses.<sup>36</sup> But the 2009 election prompted similar fears, both because the ANC was encroaching on IFP territory and Cope was encroaching on ANC territory: in the event, the conflict was largely contained.<sup>37</sup> Fears of electoral irregularity are based on one incident which was rapidly detected: nor is it clear how Tlakula's financial dealings compromise the fairness of the electoral process. The Electoral Commission allows direct participation by the parties – as long as this remains so, irregularities will be checked by the surveillance of the aggrieved party.

<sup>31</sup> Setumo Stone 'IEC 'irregularities' could taint Tlokwe by-elections' *Business Day* 13 September 2013

<sup>32</sup> Fiona Forde 'ANC Plotting to Rig Elections: Holomisa' *IOL News* 2 March 2014

[http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-plotting-to-rig-elections-holomisa-1.1654926#.UziDFaJ\\_Ht8](http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-plotting-to-rig-elections-holomisa-1.1654926#.UziDFaJ_Ht8)

<sup>33</sup> Natasha Marrian 'Modest Zille puts ANC share of votes at 60%' *Business Day* 17 February 2014

<sup>34</sup> National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) 2013 *Numsa Special National Congress December 17 to 20, 2013 Declaration*, Johannesburg: Numsa; Terry Bell 'Numsa, Political Parties and socialism' *Terry Bell Writes* <http://terrybellwrites.com/2014/03/06/numsa-political-parties-socialism/>

<sup>35</sup> After an internal split, the ANC vote in the North-West province municipality of Tlokwe dropped by up to 40 percentage points in some wards 'ANC Loses Support in Five of its Wards' *The Witness* 20 September 2013

<sup>36</sup> Poloko Tau 'Police watch Turfloop campus after clashes over SRC seats' *City Press* 11 October 2013

<sup>37</sup> Reports of Electoral Monitoring Network in author's possession

An allied concern is that enhanced electoral competition and the concomitant threat to the ANC will prompt an assault on another beneficial feature of path dependency: the civil liberties enjoyed in great measure by the suburbs and to a lesser degree by everyone else.<sup>38</sup> While complacency in the face of threat is dangerous for democracies, for now at least, this concern seems have more to do with a largely ignored South African phobia than reality. Almost three decades ago, the liberal scholar David Welsh pointed to the similarities between attitudes to the poor in 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain and mainstream white attitudes to black people here:<sup>39</sup> the dominated group is seen as dangerous and to be biding its time before engaging in savage acts of retribution – the nightmare of the black uprising which despoils that which is valued by the property owners of the suburbs lurks beneath the surface. There is some evidence that this attitude remains prevalent and that, in a particularly poignant example of path dependency, it has been embraced by many middle-class black people – how else can one explain the tendency to bestow mythical powers on politicians who appear eager to lead the uprising such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Julius Malema?

It is only a small jump from this to the notion of the ANC, often seen as the embodiment of the threat, as a wrecker of constitutional democracy when backed into a corner. And yet there is no evidence to support this claim – at least in the suburbs. Perhaps the best evidence was the Public Protector’s report on the presidential homestead in Nkandla – while it was directed at senior ANC figures, including the president, the senior leadership of the ANC not only refrained from attacking the office (rather than the report) but rebuked its youth and student wings for doing so.<sup>40</sup> This probably has less to do with democratic principle than political calculation – a sense by ANC leaders that the costs of acting would sharply outweigh the benefits. This makes the prospect of a lapse into authoritarianism even more unlikely, because democratic attitudes are being retained because of interest calculations, not goodwill. In the townships and shack settlements, pressures to conform will continue, but they do not seem to have been effective enough to prevent the ANC losing municipal by-elections at Nkandla and Marikana.<sup>41</sup>

That said, it does seem obvious that, the more competitive electoral politics become, the more will the commitment to fair electoral contest be tested. The 2014 election is unlikely to be a seismic event. But it will be more competitive than its predecessors and so will further test the degree to which free electoral competition has become ingrained in the post-1994 society.

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<sup>38</sup> Remarks by civil society activist, Centre for the Study of Democracy workshop, 18 March, 2014

<sup>39</sup> David Welsh “Democratic liberalism and theories of race stratification” in Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick and David Welsh (eds). 1987. *Democratic Liberalism in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Phillip

<sup>40</sup> Jackson Mthembu ‘ANC Statement on Remarks of ANCYL and Cosas on the Public Protector’ 24 March 2014 <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=576688&sn=Detail&pid=71616>

<sup>41</sup> ‘ANC loses Nkandla by-election’ News24 6 December 2012 <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-loses-Nkandla-by-election-20121206-4>; Setumo Stone ‘ANC loses ward near Marikana in by-election’ *Business Day* 8 November 2012



## A New Path? The Election and Inequality

In the second half of 2013, the country's most popular Sunday newspaper published an 'exposé' on its front page: it had found an ANC circular to its members of parliament telling them to ensure that they spent the months before the election passing laws which would be popular among voters. Legislation, it said, must make the ANC 'look good' and seven draft laws were identified as 'necessary for election'.<sup>42</sup>

On one level, the breathless report, which conveyed the sense that the circular was a minor scandal, was laughable – parties are, after all, meant to appeal to voters. On another, it was a significant departure, for this seems to be the first time the ANC has made such an appeal to its legislators. This suggests that it is more concerned now than ever before with the need to retain support and that it believes that the best way to do this is to show voters it is looking after their interests (while this last point may appear obvious, embattled governing parties could just as easily respond by whipping up fear of their opponents – the ANC has done a little of this<sup>43</sup> but in the main its response has been to try to show voters it is serving them).

If this attitude persists, it has two implications. First, it is likely to prompt increased ANC attention to the responsiveness of government, particularly in the areas in which ANC voters live. Thus, in a possible straw in the wind, the ANC reacted swiftly to demonstrations in Madibeng (Brits) by forcing senior elected officials to resign<sup>44</sup> and placing the council under administration.<sup>45</sup> The speed of the response was highly unusual and suggested a new sensitivity to voter sentiment. This could have an important impact on the quality of government. While it is common to insist that the government provides inadequate service to citizens because it lacks technical capacity, the evidence suggests that the key problem is inadequate accountability. The National Treasury is often regarded as the most technically proficient government department: this is so because it is held accountable by the market if not by citizens. It seems reasonable to assume that, if other departments face equally strong pressures to account, they would be equally competent. If the ANC feels under pressure to retain citizen support, this is very likely to ensure more effective governance for the grassroots poor in particular.

Second, ANC documents suggest that it believes that a key reason for citizen alienation is that not enough has been done to address poverty and inequality.<sup>46</sup> A strategy to retain support would then translate into an enhanced attempt to address inequities. But it knows too that sustainable changes to the economic patterns of the past cannot be imposed –the co-

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<sup>42</sup> Sam Mkokeli and Thabo Mokone 'Exposed: The ANC's secret election Plan' *Sunday Times* 22 September 2013

<sup>43</sup> SA Press Association (Sapa) 'Ramaphosa warns against return of "boers"' *Mail and Guardian* 11 November 2013

<sup>44</sup> Zain Ebrahim 'Madibeng mayor resigns after Mothotlung mess' *Mail and Guardian* 21 January 2014

<sup>45</sup> 'Madibeng municipality put under administration' *City Press* 11 February 2014

<sup>46</sup> African National Congress *The Second Transition? Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces in 2012* A discussion document towards the National Policy Conference, Version 7.0 as amended by the Special NEC 27 February 2012

operation or at least compliance of the owners of capital is essential if the country is to continue generating enough wealth to address the demands of redistribution. This is why its mid-2012 'Second Transition' document, which sought to address these issues, is long on redistributive rhetoric but very short on proposals – the only one which alarmed business, an apparent promise to dilute the independence of the Reserve Bank, was quickly disavowed by ANC leadership.<sup>47</sup> This suggests that the ANC knows that change must be negotiated with economic power-holders.

But, while the ANC has talked over the past two decades of the need to address poverty and inequality, it has made no serious attempt yet to negotiate a new economic path. Complaining that current patterns are unsustainable is not negotiation. To negotiate, the ANC would need to spell out what it expects of businesses (or other parties) and what it will give in return. If electoral pressures really are compelling it to address these issues more seriously, we would expect it to begin spelling out a negotiation position. This is precisely what the economic section of its election manifesto<sup>48</sup> does: it contains a set of proposals for change and proposed concessions to business concerns in exchange. The 2014 budget speech<sup>49</sup> does much the same, albeit in a more subtle way. This suggests that current electoral dynamics have impelled the ANC for the first time into facing the challenge of negotiating a different economic path.

### **Conclusion: The Pressure for Change**

Whether the two intentions discussed here will survive the election depends partly on the result. If the ANC does not lose much ground, its leadership may conclude that the problems which push them in a new direction were overstated. That would take much of the urgency out of attempts to begin moving away from path dependency in governance and in the economy. But the loss of several percentage points could prompt it to continue these efforts in the period after May 7.

Even if it does lapse into complacency, however, this is unlikely to last long. The pressures which prompted it to adopt its current stance are unlikely to abate – if Numsa forms a party, they could well increase. And even if Numsa does not launch a party, it seems only a matter of time before the ANC faces either a challenge from within the labour movement or another split which will imperil its majority.

None of this may come to a head this election. But this ballot will offer some sense of whether the beneficial aspects of path dependency will survive and those which are damaging

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<sup>47</sup> 'ANC denies it plans changes to Reserve Bank' *Moneyweb* 5 March 2012

<http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-political-economy/anc-denies-it-plans-changes-to-reserve-bank>

<sup>48</sup> African National Congress *Together We Move South Africa Forward: 2014 Election Manifesto* pp.19-22

<sup>49</sup> SA Government 2014 Budget Speech Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan 26 February 2014

<http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/speech/speech.pdf>

will begin to face a challenge. These two issues remain at the heart of South Africa's difficult quest to build a democracy. The issue is not whether they will be tested, but when.

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### Introduction

Twenty years of democratic elections in KwaZulu-Natal have been marked firstly by a reduction of violence in the province given that 'electoral logics replaced war time logics of informal control'<sup>51</sup> and secondly by a turnover of power from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to the African National Congress (ANC).

Despite the reduction of political violence, electoral violence persists in the form of rally disruptions, prevention of electioneering in no-go and stronghold areas, attacks on supporters and confrontations between party representatives.<sup>52</sup> The 2009 election, for example, witnessed clashes between ANC and IFP supporters in the Estcourt area<sup>53</sup> as well as clashes between ANC and Congress of the People (Cope) supporters at a hostel in Umlazi.<sup>54</sup> Indications are that this trend is set to continue, and there have already been reports of party tensions in a KwaMashu hostel this year, where confrontations between IFP and National Freedom Party (NFP) supporters resulted in the death of an IFP supporter.<sup>55</sup>

A scan of provincial election results (depicted in the four tables below) of democratic elections held over the last twenty years tracks the gradual shift of power from the IFP and the subsequent consolidation of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. In the 1994 election the IFP secured 50.32% of the provincial vote and 41 seats in the provincial legislature to the ANC's 32.32% and 26 seats. In the 1999 election the IFP began to lose ground, with 41.90% of the vote and 34 seats to the ANC's 39.38% and 32 seats. The 2004 election saw a shift in power, with the ANC gaining 46.98% of the vote and 38 seats to the IFP's 36.82% of the vote and 30 seats. By the 2009 election the ANC had consolidated its power in the province, with 62.95% of the vote and 51 seats while the IFP dropped significantly to 22.40% of the vote and 18 seats. 2009 official opposition in the province (other than the IFP) was disappointing, with the Democratic Alliance (DA) failing to achieve its target of 10 seats and the Minority Front (MF) receiving only 2 seats following a poor showing from its target constituency.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Schuld, M. 2013. Voting and violence in KwaZulu-Natal's no-go areas: Coercive mobilisation and territorial control in post-conflict elections. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 13 (1), 101-123, p110.

<sup>52</sup> Piper, L. 2004. Politics by other means: The practise and discourse of violence in KZN. EISA Election Update 4, 22-24 and Høglund, K and Jarstad, A. 2011. Toward electoral security: Experiences from KwaZulu-Natal. *Africa Spectrum*, 46 (1), 33-59.

<sup>53</sup> Van Jaarsveld, S. 2009. EISA Election Update 6, 156-158.

<sup>54</sup> Mottiar, S. 2009. EISA Election Update 8, 184-187.

<sup>55</sup> Olifant, N. IFP outraged by alleged police slaying of one of its supporters. *Sunday Tribune*, 16 March, p. 5.

<sup>56</sup> Mottiar, 2009, op. cit.

## Election Results:<sup>57</sup>

### *KwaZulu-Natal 1994*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
Inkatha Freedom Party	1 844 070	50.32	41
African National Congress	1 181 118	32.32	26
National Party	410 710	11.21	9
Democratic Party	78 910	2.12	2
Minority Front	48 951	1.34	1
African Christian Democratic Party	24 690	0.97	1
Pan Africanist Congress	26 601	0.73	1
Freedom Front +	18 625	0.51	0
Africa Muslim Party	17 931	0.49	0
African Democratic Movement	8 092	0.22	0
Workers' International to Rebuild	4 626	0.13	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 664 324</b>	<b>100.36</b>	<b>81</b>

### *KwaZulu-Natal 1999*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
Inkatha Freedom Party	1 241 522	41.90	34
African National Congress	1 167 094	39.38	32
Democratic Party	241 779	8.16	7
New National Party	97 077	3.28	3
Minority Front	86 770	2.93	2
African Christian Democratic Party	53 745	1.81	1
United Democratic Movement	34 586	1.17	1
Federal Alliance	9 762	0.33	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	7 654	0.26	0
Freedom Front	6 804	0.23	0
Afrikaner Eenheid Beweging	5 801	0.20	0
Azanian People's Organization	5 052	0.17	0
Socialist Party of Azania	3 451	0.12	0
Mass United Movement	2 261	0.08	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 963 358</b>	<b>100.02</b>	<b>80</b>

<sup>57</sup> All tables sourced from Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Archive. Available at: <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm>. Accessed on 17 March 2014.

### *KwaZulu-Natal 2004*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1 287 823	46.98	38
Inkatha Freedom Party	1 009 267	36.82	30
Democratic Alliance	228 857	8.35	7
Minority Front	71 540	2.61	2
African Christian Democratic Party	48 892	1.78	2
United Democratic Movement	20 546	0.75	1
New National Party	14 218	0.52	0
Independent Democrats	13 556	0.49	0
Freedom Front +	7 764	0.28	0
Azanian People's Organization	7 061	0.26	0
Pan Africanist Congress	5 118	0.19	0
Socialist Party of Azania	5 023	0.18	0
Christian Democratic Party	4 980	0.18	0
Izwe Lethu Party	4 858	0.18	0
United Christian Democratic Party	3 921	0.14	0
Peace & Development Party	3 154	0.12	0
Royal Loyal Progress Party	3 141	0.11	0
Independent African Movement	1 546	0.06	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 741 265</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>

### *KwaZulu-Natal 2009*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	2 192 516	62.95	51
Inkatha Freedom Party	780 027	22.40	18
Democratic Alliance	318 559	9.15	7
Minority Front	71 507	2.05	2
Congress of the People	44 890	1.29	1
African Christian Democratic Party	23 537	0.68	1
Others	51 951	1.49	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 482 987</b>	<b>100.01</b>	<b>80</b>



## Voter Turnout

Election year	Eligible population	Registered voters	Voter turnout	Ballots cast	Spoilt/invalid votes
2004	9 665 875	3 819 864	73.51%	2 782 565	41 300
2009	10 449 300	4 475 217	79.87%	3 526 700	43 713

KwaZulu-Natal election participation 2004, 2009<sup>58</sup>

Election year 2009 in KwaZulu-Natal reflected a rise in the number of registered voters: 4 475 217, which translates into a voter turnout of 79.87%. This is as compared with election year 2004, which recorded 3 819 864 registered voters and a voter turnout of 73.51% (as reflected in the table above). The trend between the last two election periods is therefore an increase in voting activity.

## Party dynamics

Analysts predict that the ANC will hold its lead in KwaZulu-Natal in the 2014 election. Indeed, it has been suggested that the KwaZulu-Natal province is an integral part of the ANC's strategy to retain its national voting figures.<sup>59</sup> An Ipsos survey, which undertakes a 'Pulse of the People' study every six months, revealed that its randomly selected sample of eligible voters secured 56.6% of the vote for the ANC and 9.8% of the vote for the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal for 2014. The same survey recorded 11.2% of the vote for the DA and 0.9% of the vote for the MF.<sup>60</sup> Two new political parties emerge as possible contenders for increasing support in the province in the upcoming election.

The first is the NFP, an IFP breakaway party formed in 2011 by Zanele Magwaza-Msibi, mayor of Zululand. Magwaza-Msibi formed the NFP after she cut ties with the IFP and the party managed to secure 1.2 million votes in the 2011 local government elections. The NFP claims to be a party for all people but one that is sympathetic towards the poor, the marginalised, youth, widows and orphans. Its strategy is 'constituency based': 'we believe that we need to remain with the people'. The party launched its election manifesto in Durban recently, with a turnout of some 45,000 people. Its aim is to secure 1.8 million votes in the May 2014 election.<sup>61</sup>

The second emerging opposition party, reflecting national trends, is the Economic Freedom Front (EFF) represented in KwaZulu-Natal by provincial convener Vusi Khoza. A controversial figure, Khoza claims to be a whistle-blower in the Manase Report, which

<sup>58</sup> Data in this table is compiled from the EISA, IEC and Statistics SA websites (Accessed on 18 March 2014):

<http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm>

<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/146/Voter%20Turnout/KN.pdf> at:

<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/45/Voter%20Turnout/KN.pdf>

<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022009.pdf>

<https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022004.pdf>

<sup>59</sup> Data in this table is compiled from the EISA, IEC and Statistics SA websites (Accessed on 18 March 2014):

<http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm>

<sup>60</sup> Ipsos survey: provincial political party support in a moderate voter turnout scenario, 16 January 2014.

Available at: <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/19/107490.html>. Accessed on: 17 March 2014.

<sup>61</sup> Khoza, A. 2014. I'll show you how this game is played. *Sunday Tribune*, 16 March, p. 10.

focused on exposing corruption in the eThekweni Municipality. He states that the EFF has made ‘massive inroads’ in KwaZulu-Natal, setting up branches in ‘most regions’ and increasing its card-carrying membership to 500,000. Khoza, discussing challenges of funding, argues that the EFF is ‘a party for the poor that represents the interests of the poor. And poor people always come to the fore when there is a call to say fund your own revolution’.<sup>62</sup>

### **The role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

Civil society organisations such as NGOs and CBOs collaborate more with the state<sup>63</sup> than the ‘new social movements’, which aim to transform elements of the social, political or economic system,<sup>64</sup> and which are also evident in KwaZulu-Natal. This is especially the case during the course of elections in the form of the KwaZulu-Natal Democracy and Elections Forum (KZNDEF). The KZNDEF was formed in 1998 with the objective of ensuring a provincial electoral environment to accommodate free and peaceful participation. This was particularly in light of the election-related violence, intimidation and political intolerance in the province. The Forum is a network of 17 civil society organisations, most of which are part of the KwaZulu-Natal Community Based Organization Coalition (COMBOCO), which represents some three hundred organizations throughout the province. It has five subcommittees: Democracy and Voter Education; Violence Monitoring; Mediation and Conflict Resolution; Election Observation and Legal Compliance and Litigation. Elsewhere<sup>65</sup> I have argued that while it is not possible to directly attribute lower levels of election-related conflict and higher levels of peace during elections in KwaZulu-Natal to the work of the Forum, it is possible to suggest that it has made significant inroads towards promoting a democratic-spirited electorate more inclined towards peaceful rather than conflict-based elections. The work of the Forum has resulted in it building extensive capacity to respond to conflict and promote peace. This includes the establishment of a pool of election observers, monitors, mediators and skilled trainers. The KZNDEF was re-launched in August 2013 in the run-up to the 2014 election and is currently running a ‘Phendula: Why Vote’ youth political dialogue hosted by the Democracy Development Programme (DDP).

### **Protests and their impact**

The province, following national trends, also displays an increase in levels of informal methods of political participation in the form of protest – dubbed ‘service delivery’ protest. According to the Municipal IQ Hotspots Monitor, a local government data and intelligence service, KwaZulu-Natal experienced a rise in service delivery protests from 6% in the January – July period of 2012 to 14% in the January – July period of 2013.<sup>66</sup> Just as is the case nationally, protest in KwaZulu-Natal emanates mainly from poorer neighbourhoods,

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<sup>62</sup> Hlongwane, A. 2014. Rebel with a Khoza. *Sunday Tribune*, 9 March, p. 11.

<sup>63</sup> See Habib, A. 2005. State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in *Social Research*, 72 (3), 671-692.

<sup>64</sup> See Ballard, R. Habib, A. Valodia, I. Zuern, E. 2005. Globalisation, marginalisation and contemporary social movements in South Africa. *African Affairs*, 104 (417), 615-634.

<sup>65</sup> Mottiar, S. 2010. The role of civil society in elections: The KwaZulu-Natal Democracy and Elections Forum – reducing conflict dynamics and promoting peace. *Journal of African Elections*, 9 (1), 110-127.

<sup>66</sup> Municipal IQ Press Releases 6 August 2012, 7 August 2013.

townships and shack settlements. Reasons for protest are usually framed as material demands for services such as housing, water, electricity, access to healthcare, education, development and employment as well as calls for greater accountability at local levels of governance. Despite this, however, analysts warn that the term ‘service delivery’ protest is inaccurate given that protesters are demanding a voice and a chance to be active rather than passive citizens following the principles of participatory democracy.<sup>67</sup> A scan of media reports<sup>68</sup> reflects Durban protest ongoing in Hammarsdale, Durban central, Kennedy Road informal settlement, KwaMashu, KwaDukuza, Lamontville, Lindelani, Marianhill, Marianridge, Mayville, Ntuzuma, Siyanda, Umlazi, Wentworth, Clare Estate, Puntan’s Hill and Chatsworth. Protest by striking students and labour is also constant, and in 2011 numerous mass protests were registered in relation to the May municipal elections, reflecting breakaway party politics between the IFP and NFP as well as various internal ANC battles.

For the most part, which goes some way to explaining why the governing party has been returned to power in the province, ‘service delivery’ protesters don’t seem to be opposing the ANC or the state but rather insisting on ‘delivery of promises’ and ‘having their voices heard’ at the local level.<sup>69</sup> In this sense protesters do not constitute a counter-hegemonic force but are ‘more interested in obtaining a piece of the pie on offer by the state than challenging it altogether’.<sup>70</sup> In some cases, however, and particularly where social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo (ABM), the Unemployed People’s Movement (UPM) and the Democratic Left Front (DLF) are active, community leader narratives are informed by a broader national outlook and consideration of systemic and structural causes of local problems.<sup>71</sup> This may indicate a growing counter-hegemonic consciousness ‘where people are able to penetrate the common sense that keeps most passive in the face of injustice’.<sup>72</sup> Drawing from a sample of respondents interviewed in a Durban ‘hotspot’ for protest, Cato Manor Ward 30, protesters in Durban remain loyal to the voting process and seem to employ a ‘dual repertoire’ of voting as well protesting in between elections. All of the respondents interviewed indicated that they had voted in the last election and only two of them said they would consider abstaining from voting should their protest issues remain unresolved.<sup>73</sup> Abstaining from voting in Durban is a tactic famously employed by the shack dwellers

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<sup>67</sup> Friedman, S. 2009. People are demanding public service not service delivery. *Business Day*, 29 July and Pithouse, R. 2011. The service delivery myth. Dispatch Online, 3 February, *Pambazuka News* 110209.

<sup>68</sup> See Bond, P. 2012. Durban’s corruptions and disruptions – Dennis Brutus Memorial Debate. UKZN’s Centre for Civil Society 24 May 2012. Available at: <http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Durban's%20corruptions%20and%20disruptions.pdf> Accessed on 10 March 2014.

<sup>69</sup> Mottiar, S. 2014. Protest and participation in Durban: A focus on Cato Manor, Merebank and Wentworth. Forthcoming.

<sup>70</sup> Sinwell, L. 2011. Is ‘another world’ really possible? Re-examining counter-hegemonic forces in post-apartheid South Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38 (127), 61-76.

<sup>71</sup> Mottiar, S. 2013. From ‘popcorn’ to ‘occupy’: Protest in Durban, South Africa. *Development and Change*, 44(3), 603-619.

<sup>72</sup> Runciman, C. 2011. Questioning resistance in post-apartheid South Africa: A response to Luke Sinwell. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38: 130, 607-614.

<sup>73</sup> Based on findings from a social protest research study conducted by the author in Cato Manor Ward 30 in Durban in September 2013. Methodological note: this study is based on a small sample of ten households and should not be taken as totally representative of protest trends in Cato Manor.

movement (ABM), which, in previous elections, mobilised under the call (originating from the Anti-Eviction Campaign's) 'No Land, No House, No Vote'. This campaign currently seems to be under debate. Some ABM members argue for continuing to abstain, given that voting for a party that doesn't deliver on promises is 'wasting' the vote. Others argue, however, that it may be time for ABM members to vote for an opposition party.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Shoji, S. 2014. Should 'No Land, No House, No Vote' battles take place in the 2014 elections? Available at: <http://abahlali.org/?s=election> Accessed on 19 March 2014.

## North West

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Dr Ina Gouws – North West University (Vaal Triangle Campus)

### Election Results

#### *North West 1994*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1 310 080	83.33	26
National Party	138 986	8.84	3
Freedom Front Plus	72 821	4.63	1
Pan Africanist Congress	27 274	1.73	0
Democratic Party	7 894	0.50	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	5 948	0.38	0
African Christian Democratic Party	5 570	0.35	0
African Democratic Movement	3 569	0.23	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 572 142</b>	<b>99.99</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: EISA <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/sou1994resultsf.htm>

#### *North West 1999*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1 030 901	78.97	27
United Christian Democratic Party	124 874	9.57	3
Democratic Party	42 593	3.26	1
New National Party	29 931	2.29	1
Freedom Front (FF)	17 964	1.38	1
United Democratic Movement	16 785	1.29	0
African Christian Democratic Party	12 227	0.94	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	9 613	0.74	0
Federal Alliance	7 157	0.55	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	6 759	0.52	0
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging	6 637	0.51	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 305 441</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>33</b>

Source: EISA <http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/south-africa-1999-north-west- legislature- results>

### *North West 2004*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1 048 089	80.71	27
United Christian Democratic Party	110 233	8.49	3
Democratic Alliance	64 925	5.00	2
Freedom Front Plus	17 123	1.32	1
African Christian Democratic Party	15 138	1.17	0
United Demographic Movement	12 513	0.96	0
Independent Democrats	5 709	0.44	0
New National Party	5 592	0.43	0
Azanian People's Organization	3 718	0.29	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	3 211	0.25	0
National Action	1 389	0.11	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 298 563</b>	<b>100.01</b>	<b>33</b>

Source: EISA <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/sou2004results8.htm>

### *North West 2009*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	783 794	72.89	25
Congress of the People	89 573	8.33	3
Democratic Alliance	88 728	8.25	3
United Christian Democratic Party	56 678	5.27	2
Freedom Front Plus	19 463	1.81	0
African Christian Democratic Party	7 366	0.69	0
United Democratic Movement	5 467	0.51	0
Independent Democrats (ID)	4 984	0.46	0
Movement Democratic Party	4 432	0.41	0
African People's Convention	3 116	0.29	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	2 831	0.26	0
Azanian People's Organization	2 712	0.25	0
SA Political Party	1 832	0.17	0
African Christian Alliance	1 750	0.16	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	1 619	0.15	0
National Democratic Convention	978	0.09	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 131 873</b>	<b>105.15</b>	<b>33</b>

Source: EISA <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/sou2009resultsh.htm>



## Voter registration numbers

<b>Election year</b>	<b>Eligible population</b>	<b>Registered voters</b>	<b>Voter turnout</b>	<b>Ballots cast</b>	<b>Spoilt/invalid votes</b>
1999	*<2 218 360	1 527 672	86.87		21 722
2004	**<2 521 142	1 749 529	75.55		23 224
2009	***2 521 142	1 564 357	70.80		21 007

Source: EISA <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/sou1999results7nw.htm>

\*Source: 1996 census NWP age 15- unspecified  
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/NWPPrimary.pdf>

\*\*Source: 2001 census NWP age 15-unspecified  
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/NWPPrimary.pdf>

\*\*\*Source: 2001 census NWP (age 15 is now 19)  
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/NWPPrimary.pdf>

## Party dynamics

Politics in the North West Province reflects the deep divisions in the South African body politic. The largest portion of this province used to be called the Wes-Transvaal (part of the old Transvaal province). It has always been a mainly rural area with ‘typical’ rural towns, racially divided by apartheid. The evidence of these divisions can still be found in these towns. During apartheid the then National Party (NP) and the Conservative Party (CP) were the strongest white parties in this region. They held heavily contested elections and the CP had a few strongholds in towns like Koster and Ventersdorp. Added to the mix was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a far-right-wing nationalist group headed by the late Eugene Terre’blanche. With the end of apartheid the CP dissolved (many members are believed to have moved to the NP) and the AWB. The NP still contested elections in 1994 and as the NNP (New National Party) in 1999 and 2004 before it merged with the ANC after the elections in 2004.

The North West province has always been an ANC stronghold since the first democratic elections in 1994, and the party appears to be invincible in the province, but not without its own internal tensions and deep factionalism. Support for the ruling party declined somewhat in 2009 with the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE). The Democratic Alliance (DA) has since become the second-strongest contender, although being a distant second contender.

The relationship between the two strongest political parties in the North West and within themselves is characterised by factions, infighting and controversial negative campaigning. The current factional relationships within the African National Congress (ANC) in the North West began with the formation of the nine provincial administrations created in 1994. A 50 000-strong homeland civil service had to be combined with 20 000 from the Cape and Transvaal administrations. This did not happen peacefully. Junior officials and public workers loyal to the ANC formed crisis committees, which demanded that 23 former Bophuthatswana Bantustan officials be removed from their posts. R50 million was spent on severance packages for senior officials. What followed was factionalism between

departmental heads nominated by the committees and administrators supposedly loyal to the former leader of the homeland, Mr Lucas Mangope. There ended up being three factions in 1993/1994, according to Theo Venter.<sup>75</sup> This history has an impact on the way in which factions within the ANC are formed.

The first faction had a strong Vryburg base, the second included Hammanskraal and Brits and the third grouping was Klerksdorp, Maquassi, Potchefstroom and Ventersdorp. The latter group was strongest at the time because of the support from the National Union of Mineworkers and a then stronger South African Communist Party. The Vryburg group wanted to be part of the Northern Cape, but were demarcated into North West. The Pretoria/Brits faction wanted to be in Gauteng and the Potchefstroom et al faction was jealous of the other groups, because they were responsible for the ousting of Lucas Mangope after the latter resisted reincorporation with the Republic of South Africa running up to the elections in 1994. The three groups could not agree on a premier for the province and eventually an outsider by the name of Popo Molefe, co-founder of the Azanian People's Movement and the United Democratic Front, and who was 'broadly associated' with the province, was appointed. His brief was to balance power and 'share the spoils' between factions. To this day, whether on provincial or local level, senior positions are divided between factions to try to avoid conflict.<sup>76</sup>

The factions are now mostly divided into those that supported President Zuma and those who supported Deputy President Motlanthe going into the Mangaung conference of the ANC in 2012 after the bruising factionalism experienced in the lead-up to and during the ANC's conference in 2007, in Polokwane. Attempts to heal these rifts and factions have not borne fruit. Recent events suggest that efforts by the ANC national leadership to avoid conflict are not working. A series of events can be catalogued as evidence:

- Phakoe murder
- Chika murder 2012
- Mataboge shooting 2012
- Tlokwe municipal council defections 2013
- Battles of legitimacy of mayors in Zeerust and Mahikeng 2013
- Violent protests 2013/2014

The relationship with the ANC and its voters is taking strain under these circumstances, as the section on protests below highlights.

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<sup>75</sup> Mr Theo Venter is a political analyst with the North West University and an expert on the political landscape of the North West Province. Most of the information for the ANC factionalism was taken from an interview he had with Mandy de Waal of the Daily Maverick.

<sup>76</sup> Mandy De Waal, "ANCs shootings and shootouts in the 'problem' province of North West." *The Daily Maverick* (2012). <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-03-ancs-shootings-and-shootouts-in-the-problem-province-of-north-west/#.Uy1chs7WjV8>

These incidents naturally influence the relationship between the ANC and opposition parties in the province. The DA in North West has been growing steadily since the Democratic Party's 0.50% in 1994. This was before the DP, NNP and ID merged to become the DA (the NNP left the alliance shortly after to merge with the ANC). Since then the DA got 8.25% in 2009, narrowly outshone by the now famously imploding Cope, which became the official provincial opposition with 8.33%. The DA has been fighting tough battles with the ANC in North West, trying to cash in on the ANC's faction fights. It succeeded for a while in Tlokwe in 2013, where the DA managed to have a municipal mayor for the first time in North West after ANC councillors, unhappy with the status quo at the time, supported a motion of no confidence against the ANC mayor and a DA councillor was elected mayor. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC intervened and after by-elections were held, the ANC won back the mayoral seat. It must be mentioned that there were reports of irregularities in the voting process lodged by the DA and independent candidates in which the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was implicated. The outcome of the investigation into these allegations has not published at this time but a lack of confidence in the IEC has taken hold by the opposition in Tlokwe.

The DA launched an aggressive campaign in the North West for the 2014 elections focusing on townships and rural areas. Its latest 'conquest' is the support of the Barolong people of Mahikeng. The DA has had its own challenges, with internal disagreements about certain national policies such as Employment Equity (EE) and land reform. These disagreements surfaced when statements were made by spokespeople about these policies, only to be retracted and rephrased by party leadership later on. There appears to be a faction that is frustrated with party leader Helen Zille and those loyal to her. Near the end of 2013 there were reports of party leaders dividing their loyalties between Mmusi Maimane (premier candidate for Gauteng) and Lindiwe Mazibuko (DA parliamentary leader). There were also reports of an 'internal battle' over the use of party resources by both Maimane and Mazibuko. A spokesperson made these reports out to be rumour-mongering.<sup>77</sup>

A major new disagreement amongst DA members and leadership is the campaign message about former president Thabo Mbeki. There are those in the DA ranks who disagree with the party placing Mbeki's presidency central to the DA campaign as 'a good story to tell', especially since the party launched scathing attacks on his presidency in the past.<sup>78</sup> Land reform is the policy most likely to make things difficult for the DA in North West from all sides. After initially botched communication about the DA's stance on the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill, the party explained that it supported land reform but not at the expense of the right to private ownership and food security. The problem for the DA in North West is that white farmers (a fairly important section of the DA's base) received these statements negatively. The Freedom Front Plus (FF+), which relies strongly on farmers'

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<sup>77</sup> News24. "Mazibuko speaks out against DA infighting." *News24* (2013).

<http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Mazibuko-speaks-out-about-DA-infighting-20131117>

<sup>78</sup> Gareth van Onselen. "DA MPs disagree with party's Mbeki message." *Business Day Live* (2014).

<http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/03/13/da-mps-disagree-with-partys-mbeki-message>

support, jumped at the chance to suggest to farmers that the DA has deserted them and that they should come to the FF+ fold for support.

It is not clear how many black votes the DA will gain in the North West for supporting land reform even amid ANC faction fights. It may very well be a disputable point, since there is a new player on the ground in the form of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

In an Ipsos survey on provincial party support among voters published in November 2013 (six months before the 2014 elections) numbers show that the EFF may very well be the official opposition in North West after the elections.<sup>79</sup>

Several large mines in the North West have been hit by protests and strikes, sometimes turning violent, most notably Marikana in 2012. The EFF has positioned itself as a champion of the plight of mine workers against perceived failed ANC policies. Although the EFF is championing the rights of the poor, it has also attracted well-educated youth disillusioned by the exclusionary nature of and institutional racism experienced in the corporate sector of South Africa.

The EFF claims to have over 100 000 members, 60% of whom are young people.<sup>80</sup> Tensions between the ANC and the EFF are high. The ANC has shown signs of intolerance the more threatened it perceives itself to be. There are reports of the ANC preventing political parties from moving freely to campaign in certain areas. The EFF has made allegations that the ANC in North West has prevented it from using municipal venues (stadiums and community halls) for gatherings and proceeded to ‘illegally occupy’ venues booked by the EFF.<sup>81</sup>

### **Role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

Civil society organisations are an important part of any democratisation process in that they provide an important link between citizens and state. They support decision-making processes and can influence the mood regarding an event such as a national election.

It has been a challenge finding civil service organisations active in the North West Province with campaigns such as voter education for the 2014 elections. A conversation with an official in the IEC office in Mahikeng revealed that the IEC is relying on its own historically effective methods to educate voters about the election process. The IEC uses democracy education facilitators to conduct demonstrations and workshops to teach potential voters how the voting process works. They are involved in the registration process as well. These facilitators are independent contract workers trained by the IEC.

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<sup>79</sup> Mari Harris. “ANC polling at 45% in Gauteng – Ipsos.” *PoliticsWeb* (2014).

<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=511359&sn=Detail>

<sup>80</sup> Elfias Torerai. “North West is ours”. *The New Age* (2014). <http://thenewage.co.za/120186-1007-53-North-West-is-ours>

<sup>81</sup> Malusi Gigaba and Floyd Shivambo. “Has intolerance overtaken our politics?” *The Sunday Independent* (2014). <http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/has-intolerance-overtaken-our-politics-1.1651313#.Uypp2s7WjV8>

The North West is predominantly rural, and large portions of the economically active population are farm workers. In the past the IEC has had difficulty getting access to farms either because of farmers' fears for their security or politically motivated resistance. For the 2011 local government elections the IEC collaborated with Agri-SA North West, supported by the provincial department of agriculture and rural development, to try to overcome these obstacles. The campaign included educating voters and farmers on the importance of allowing farm labourers to exercise their democratic right to vote. The result was positive.<sup>82</sup> The IEC is therefore continuing these collaborations in 2014.

Most political parties have a strong focus on the youth for the 2014 elections. An organisation dealing with youth involvement in the elections is InkuluFreeheid. This is a youth-led, non-partisan movement providing a platform aiming to unite South Africans and organisations in finding solutions to current challenges. This group was established in February 2013. The main purpose of InkuluFreeheid is to deepen democracy, enhance social cohesion and find solutions to pressing economic challenges. One of the campaigns launched to achieve these goals is the "Our Vote Our Voice" (OVOV) campaign. The campaign has three basic views:

- Hosting a website that compares party policies. Parties represented have been invited to review the content and policy material.
- A national grassroots movement of community-led soapbox rallies that stimulate local level action and democratic engagement. People and organisations are invited to organise their own soapbox events in their community.
- An online documentary series featuring top political leaders, young leaders in entertainment, business, law and civil society encouraging young people to participate in the 2014 election.<sup>83</sup>

The OVOV movement is having a soapbox event in North West to encourage young registered voters to go to the polls to vote.

### **Protests and their impact**

Protests are called 'service delivery protests', because those experiencing poor or no service delivery feel that their local authorities have failed them and that protests are the only way to make their voices heard. Mostly township and informal settlement inhabitants are participants in protests. The reasons given by these communities for protests are dissatisfaction with basic municipal services such as potable water, electricity and sanitation as well as the frustration experienced due to high levels of poverty as a result of high unemployment. The period in the lead-up to elections tends to intensify the occurrence of protests.

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<sup>82</sup> Thabo Rapoo. "IEC's state of readiness in the North-West." *SABC* (2011).

[https://www.google.co.za/?gws\\_rd=cr&ei=JTDVUumgDsWOtAbzpYCYDQ#q=IEC%27s+state+of+readiness+in+North+West](https://www.google.co.za/?gws_rd=cr&ei=JTDVUumgDsWOtAbzpYCYDQ#q=IEC%27s+state+of+readiness+in+North+West)

<sup>83</sup> NGO Pulse. "InkuluFreeheid." *NGO Pulse* (2013). <http://www.ngopulse.org/print/33039>

After 20 years of democracy inhabitants of poorly serviced areas appear to have lost patience and trust in local authorities governed by the ANC, and the North West is no exception. As the ANC is the governing party in North West, its actions (or lack thereof) will be the focus of trying to understand the reasons for the protests.

As stated earlier, ANC faction fights in North West have preoccupied the organisation for many years. Service delivery has suffered, as the manner in which the factions within the ANC are formed requires that for them to stay in power they need to surround themselves with loyal cadres who expect something in return for this loyalty.<sup>84</sup> In the North West, the impact of such actions were meant to be dealt with, after President Zuma signed a proclamation in 2009 for the investigation of widespread financial irregularities in all North West municipalities.

One of the reports into the infighting among ANC leaders was prepared by the Department of Cooperative Governance. The ANC leaders in North West were tasked with addressing the findings of the report. The ANC had to admit that most of the municipalities in North West were ‘in a state of paralysis and dysfunction’ and that local government is therefore perceived to be incompetent and riddled with corruption and maladministration.<sup>85</sup>

**Table 1: Total crowd incidents by province (2011)**

<b>Province</b>	<b>2011 population estimate</b>	<b>Peaceful incidents</b>	<b>Peaceful incidents per thousand</b>	<b>Unrest incidents</b>	<b>Unrest incidents per thousand</b>
Gauteng	11,328,203	9209	0.81	1097	0.10
Limpopo	5,554,657	4066	0.73	222	0.04
North West	3,253,390	6980	2.15	695	0.21
Mpumalanga	3,657,181	1944	0.53	358	0.10
KwaZulu-Natal	10,819,130	8555	0.79	546	0.05
Eastern Cape	6,829,958	3578	0.52	322	0.05
Free State	2,759,644	2606	0.94	413	0.15
Western Cape	5,287,863	3148	0.60	599	0.11
Northern Cape	1,096,731	1990	1.81	243	0.22

Source: Peter Alexander (2012)<sup>86</sup>

Table 1 compares the numbers of incidents with size of population. In North West there were approximately 3,253,390 people in 2011. There were far more peaceful incidents of protest

<sup>84</sup> Stephen Grootes. “Where ignorance fear to tread.” (2013). *The Daily Maverick*

<http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-01-17-north-west-protests-the-politics-of-failure/>

<sup>85</sup> Johan Burger. “The Reasons Behind Service Delivery Protests in South Africa.” *Polity.org.za*. (2009).

<http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-reasons-behind-service-delivery-protests-in-south-africa-2009-08-05>

<sup>86</sup> Ibid



(such as strikes, etc.) than unrest incidents, but with a number of 695 the North West has had more protests than any other province. One labour protest in 2012 took a turn for the worst.

The “Marikana Massacre” of 16 August 2012 started as a strike by mineworkers over a wage dispute. Thousands of miners gathered on a koppie near an informal settlement. Police arrived and ordered the miners to disperse. When they did not, the police opened fire, allegedly in self-defence. Thirty-four of the strikers were killed and many suffered injuries. The official investigation by the Marikana Commission of Inquiry is still continuing.<sup>87</sup>

The most prominent protest in 2013 happened in the North West in January 2013. In Mothutlung, a township near Brits (Madibeng), four people died in a clash with police during a protest. The reason for this protest was the lack of water in this township because of broken pumps the Madibeng municipality failed to fix. Some of the findings in the Special Investigation Report (SIR) presented to the North West provincial government revealed that the Madibeng municipality spent R4.9 million on tenders awarded to companies owned by its own employees, and that several fictitious companies were paid for incomplete or no work done. The report found once again that factional politics was at the centre of this corruption and mismanagement.<sup>88</sup> The allegations made in 2013 is that the broken pump wasn’t fixed so that companies awarded the tender to tank water into the township could continue their contracts.

Most protests in North West Province thus far involved poor black residents in North West municipalities taking to the streets. The previously advantaged white population in these towns do not appear eager to join protests. However, this tendency changed in the town of Koster (KgetleIngrivier local municipality). On 6 February 2014 black and white residents protested together in the streets of Koster against the lack of service delivery by the municipality.



Source: Susan Cilliers (2014)

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<sup>87</sup> Paul Botes & Niren Tolsi. “Marikana. One year after the massacre.” (2013). *Mail & Guardian*  
<http://marikana.mg.co.za/>

<sup>88</sup> Mmanaledi Mataboge. “Deals for pals choke the North West Province.”. *Mail & Guardian* (2013.)  
<http://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-25-00-deals-for-pals-choke-north-west>

The residents' main grievances were irregular or no refuse removal, sewage spills because of inadequate maintenance and the roads in Koster disintegrating. Residents alleged that they have reported these issues to the municipality for years without positive results. The protesters handed over a memorandum in which they demanded the resignation of the mayor and the municipality being placed under administration.<sup>89</sup>

It is still unclear how the protests will impact on the 2014 elections, either in party support patterns or in turnout and participation.

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<sup>89</sup> Susan Cilliers. "Wit, swart betoog saam in Koster." *Beeld* (2014). <http://www.beeld.com/nuus/2014-02-06-wit-swart-betoog-saam-in-koster>

## Limpopo

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**Ralph Matekga – Director - Clearcontent Research and Consulting**

### Introduction

Less than two months before the May 7 2014 elections, expectations are high as to whether the elections will usher in a shift in voting patterns in South Africa. Historically, the electoral performance of the ANC in Limpopo shows that the ANC has been able to attain over 80% of the provincial share of the votes since 1994. The party attained 92% in 1994; 89% in 1999; 89% in 2004; and 85% in 2009.<sup>90</sup>

This represents a consistent trend, especially given that the parties that have come second and third since 1994 have also remained below the 10% threshold. It may be important to explain this trend and assess the extent to which it is useful in projecting how the 2014 elections might bring about change, if at all, in party support patterns. Voting patterns emerge out of a combination of multiple factors, ranging from how issues are framed to opportunities for social and economic mobility. Patterns are also influenced by factors such as voter registration numbers and turnout. This section assesses election results in Limpopo with the aim of assessing a trend.

The 2014 elections will occur against the background of intense community protests. Limpopo remains one of the provinces with relatively lower levels of such occurrences, although the province has experienced gradual increases in the past few months. The question to be addressed is what inferences can be drawn from the number of protests being recorded in Limpopo. Do the lower levels of protests signal that the voting patterns experienced in the last elections in the province will most likely be repeated in the 2014 elections? How will the recently recorded voter registration numbers impact on election results in the Limpopo?

### Election Results

#### *Limpopo 1994*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1,759,597	91.6	38
National Party	62,745	3.3	1
Freedom Front	41,193	2.1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,863,535</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>40</b>

1994 election results, Limpopo (data adopted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)

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<sup>90</sup> *Electoral Commission*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 22, 2014, from Electoral Commission of South Africa: March Electoral Commission of South Africa,[<http://www.elections.org.za>]

### *Limpopo 1999*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1,464,432	88.3	44
United Democratic Movement	41,700	2.5	1
New National Party	28,159	1.7	1
Democratic Party	23,486	1.4	1
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	23,325	1.4	1
African Christian Democratic Party	18, 281	1.1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,599,383</b>	<b>94.7</b>	<b>49</b>

1999 election results, Limpopo (data adopted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)

### *Limpopo 2004*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1,439,853	89.2	45
Democratic Alliance	57,930	3.6	2
United Democratic Movement	27,780	1.7	1
African Christian Democratic Party	20,418	1.3	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,545,981</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>49</b>

2004 election results, Limpopo (data adopted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)

### *Limpopo 2009*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1,265,631	84.9	43
Congress of the People	112,325	7.5	4
Democratic Alliance	51,856	3.5	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,377,956</b>	<b>95.9</b>	<b>49</b>

2009 election results, Limpopo (data adopted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)

### **Party dynamics**

The results of the four successive general elections (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) paint a picture of a consistent pattern when it comes to the distribution of votes among the top three performing political parties in Limpopo. While the ANC has consistently attained the highest percentage of the votes in the province, the two parties that followed have not been able to break the 10% ceiling. The results in Limpopo further indicate that there has been a pattern of alternation between the two political parties that attained second and third position. The average electoral share for political parties attaining second and third places in Limpopo as measured from 1994 to 2009 elections remains at 4.6%. Cope was been able to garner a seemingly miraculous 7.5% of the votes in the province in 2009 election. This raised the average performance of opposition parties in the province, which would otherwise be less than 3%.

It is interesting to note in relation to the makeup of the top three performing political parties in Limpopo that it is only the ANC that has consistently appeared in the list, while the second and third places respectively have seen alternations among other parties. In 1994 elections, National Party (NP) and Freedom Front (FF) attained second and third places respectively in the provincial share of votes in Limpopo. The 1999 elections, however, saw the newly formed United Democratic Movement (UDM) attaining second place to the ANC, while the National Party came third.


The 2004 elections had the newly amalgamated Democratic Alliance (DA) attaining the second place, while the UDM moved into third place. Strengthening this alternation trend among the opposition, in the 2009 elections, the then newly formed Congress of the People (Cope) came second, with the DA shifted to third place.

This is significant in the sense that it shows that any shifts in terms of voting behaviour is happening among opposition party support and does not affect the ANC. Noteworthy is that the parties that occupy the second and third places respectively have not demonstrated growth in terms of their electoral share. Consistent rotation of parties in the second and third places is also an indication that opposition parties find it difficult to both consolidate their position as well as increase their margins in Limpopo.

The following inferences can be drawn in relation to election results and voting patterns in Limpopo:

- Limpopo Province lacks the necessary dynamism to inspire shifts in voting patterns.
- The increase in voter registration as measured from the 1999 to the 2004 elections has not had an impact on the voting patterns, and neither has it had real effect on the electoral share held by the party that has consistently secured the highest percentage of votes in the province.
- A high level of rotation in the second and third places held by opposition parties across all elections indicates poor levels of competition between opposition parties and the governing party in the province.
- New political parties have consistently performed better than existing opposition parties; however, they fail to consolidate their respective position, often sliding to lower positions in subsequent elections.

The following graph shows how the total votes in the province were apportioned across the three top performing parties in the four successive elections from 1994 to 2009.



**Figure 1: Three top performing parties in elections from 1994 to 2009**

### Voter registration and turnout trends


Limpopo Province has shown a steady increase in voter registration since 1999, while the voter turnout has remained between 69% and 89%. The voters' roll in Limpopo Province, as measured from the 1999 elections to date, does not show any major changes. Despite the cumulative increase in the voter registration figure, the absolute number of people who cast their votes remain almost the same, at about 1 700 000 people across all elections held thus far since 1994.

Election year	Eligible population	Registered voters	Voter turnout	Ballots cast	Spoilt/invalid votes
1999		1 847 766	89%		30 760
2004		2 187 912	75%		29 166
2009		2 256 073	69%		22 956

Election registration and turnout, Limpopo (data adapted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)

Although voter registration in Limpopo is increasing steadily, the turnout is not showing a similar trend, it is actually dropping slightly. Figure 2 demonstrates this slight decline in turnout.





**Figure 2: Voter registration and turnout (figures adapted from Electoral Commission of South Africa)**

### Protests and their impact

Compared to other provinces, Limpopo remains one of the most docile provinces in terms of expression of political activities. Being one of the provinces with lower levels of service delivery and also the most rural, Limpopo would normally be expected to be a host to robust engagement between citizens and political parties regarding the role of the state in the lives of citizens. According to the 2009 Service Delivery Index, Limpopo boasts the highest number of people living in formal dwellings.

However, only 23% of the population has access to formal sanitation, with waste removal being afforded to only 18% of the total population.<sup>91</sup> Census 2011 revealed that Limpopo Province has the lowest proportion of households that have their refuse removed by a local authority.<sup>92</sup>

Political protest within communities in South Africa has largely been driven by service delivery concerns. The higher demands for service delivery coincide with growing citizen engagement in public life, either through formal institutions or in the form of community protests. Limpopo has an acute need for services, but there is no positive correlation between service delivery shortfall and political dynamism or intra-party engagements in the province. The 2012 Municipal IQ service delivery protests monitor shows that out of the total number of protests experienced in the country, Limpopo accounts for roughly 5%, the lowest levels of

<sup>91</sup>. Empowerdex. (2009). *Service Delivery Index (CityDex)*. Empowerdex.p 2

<sup>92</sup> (2012). *Census 2011*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

protests after Northern Cape, with 4%.<sup>93</sup> Out of the total protests measured from February 2007 to May 2010, Limpopo accounted for 5%, with Northern Cape recording the lowest levels at 2% (Hirsh & Karamoko, 2011, p. 24).

According to the Department of Cooperative, Human Settlements and Traditional Affairs in Limpopo (Limpopo Department of Cooperative Governance, 2014), [‘Cooperative’ – in source] in the past six months (as of 19 March 2014) the province has experienced only five protests, some of which had to do with citizens’ demands for better safety and security. Concerns that might exist in Limpopo in relation to services seem not to be translated into political engagements or intra-party engagement. This deficit might have to do with lack of robustness within the civil society sector in the province. It is arguable, however, that the lower levels of civic engagement in the province is largely responsible for the prevalent voting patterns in the province.

## **Conclusion**

Limpopo Province is experiencing a peculiar pattern in terms of voting behaviour observed from the 1994 elections up to the 2009 elections. A closer observation of this trend indicates that there might not be any major shift in terms of voting patterns in the province in the forthcoming May 7 elections. Newly formed opposition political parties might perform better than already existing opposition parties, but they might not pose a significant shift in the electoral share that has been attained by the ANC, which has consistently dominated the province in the past elections. Thus, there might be competition and subsequent shifting of the votes among opposition parties, leaving the electoral share of the dominant ANC largely untouched.

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<sup>93</sup> Municipal-IQ. (2013, January 16). 2012 tally: a violent and diverse year for service delivery protests.

## Free State

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**Dr Sethulego Matebesi – Chairperson: Department of Sociology, University of the Free State**

### Introduction

Various commentators suggest that the General Elections of 2014 will be one of the most fiercely contested polls since the advent of democracy. Over the past two decades, governmental processes were unprecedented in their participatory and inclusive nature. Like other fragile states, however, South Africa also became beset by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and high levels of unemployment, poor governance, and widespread violence. It is against this background that the forthcoming elections will be contested.

In the Free State (FS), the outcomes of provincial elections have been heavily skewed in favour of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC started its dominance in 1994 with 76%, followed by 81% in 1999, 82% in 2004, and 71% in 2009.<sup>94</sup> The 2009 election showed a decrease of 11% in the performance of the ANC. This decline in the ANC's performance could be ascribed to a growing alienation of its traditional support-base, political infighting and the emergence of the Congress of the People (Cope).

Both Cope and the emergent Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) will potentially pose a serious challenge to the ANC among its traditional constituency in the province. But politics in the Free State is also impacted on by other role players, other than the political parties, and this article will focus on citizens participation by focusing on voter registration and turnout; the role of civil society-and faith-based organisations in elections; and the nature, prevalence and the possible impact of protests on the forthcoming elections.

### Election Results

#### *Free State 1994*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
African National Congress	1 037 998	76.65	24
National Party	170 452	12.59	4
Freedom Front +	81 662	6.03	2
Pan Africanist Congress	24 451	1.81	0
Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa	17 024	1.24	0
Democratic Party	7 664	0.57	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	6 935	0.51	0
African Christian Democratic Party	6 072	0.45	0

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<sup>94</sup> For detailed information on the Free State provincial election results consult the website of the Independent Electoral Commission

African Democratic Movement	2 008	0.15	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,354,266</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission<sup>95</sup>

The ANC received the vast majority of votes (76.6%) in 1994, followed by the National Party (NP) with 12.5%, and the Freedom Front+ (FF+). As a result, the majority of seats (24) were allocated to the ANC (Table 1).

### *Free State 1999*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	881 381	80.79	25
Democratic Party	58 163	5.33	2
New National Party	56 740	5.20	2
Freedom Front	22 996	2.11	1
United Democratic Movement	18 194	1.67	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	12 548	1.15	0
African Christian Democratic Party	9 827	0.90	0
Federal Alliance	8 798	0.81	0
United Christian Democratic Party	8 543	0.78	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	5 119	0.47	0
Afrikaner Eenheid Beweging	4 390	0.40	0
Unemployment Labour Alliance	2 974	0.27	0
Socialist Party of Azania	1 235	0.11	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,090,908</b>	<b>99.99</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission<sup>96</sup>

In 1999, the ANC vote (80.7%) was considerably higher than in 1994, which increased its seats to 25 in the provincial legislature. As shown in Table 2, the Democratic Party (DP) made significant gains by moving from the sixth position in 1994 to second in 1999. Both the DP and the New National Party (NNP) – now called the Democratic Alliance (DA) after their merger – obtained 2 seats and FF one. During the subsequent provincial elections in 2004 (Table 3), the ANC continued its dominance of the provincial vote share, with a marginal 1-point increase and the DA winning only 8.4% and the FF+ 2.4%.

### *Free State 2004*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	827 338	81.78	25
Democratic Alliance	85 714	8.47	3
Freedom Front +	24 946	2.47	1

<sup>95</sup>Independent Electoral Commission 1994 National and Provincial Elections. *April (1994)*: <http://www.elections.org.za/content/uploadedfiles/NPE%201994.pdf>

<sup>96</sup>Independent Electoral Commission 1999 *Report, Electoral Commission of South Africa: National and Provincial Elections, 2 June 1999*, 79

African Christian Democratic Party	13 119	1.30	1
Pan Africanist Congress	11 969	1.18	0
Dikwankwetla Party of SA	9 806	0.97	0
United Democratic Movement	8 947	0.88	0
New National Party	8 295	0.82	0
United Christian Democratic Party	7 825	0.77	0
Independent Democrats	5 289	0.52	0
Azanian People's Organization	3 571	0.35	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	3 563	0.35	0
National Action	1 224	0.12	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,011,606</b>	<b>99.98</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission<sup>97</sup>

The emergence of the Congress of the People (Cope), an ANC breakaway party formed in 2008, drew some support away from the ANC, though a limited amount. The ANC's share of the provincial vote dropped by almost 10% from 81.7% in 2004 to 71.1% in 2009 (Table 4). Cope became the official opposition party with 4 seats after replacing the DA, which maintained its 3 seats.

### *Free State 2009*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress (ANC)	734 688	71.10	22
Congress of the People (Cope)	120 018	11.61	4
Democratic Alliance (DA)	119 844	11.60	3
Freedom Front (FF+)	20 780	2.01	1
Others <sup>98</sup>	37 992	3.67	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1, 033, 322</b>	<b>99.99</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission<sup>99</sup>

### **Voter registration and turnout**

Voter registration and voter turnout are strong indicators of citizens' commitment to voting and participation. The eligible voting age population (VAP)<sup>100</sup> in the FS has increased by more than 180 000 due to population growth between 1999 and 2009. As shown in Table 5, the number of registered voters increased by more than a 160 000 over the same ten-year period. Despite the growth in the eligible VAP and registration figures, voter turnout based on the eligible VAP decreased significantly (by 11.6%) between the 1999 and 2009 elections. Moreover, Table 5 shows that the turnout for registered voters remained relatively high at 75.5% between 1999 and 2009. The highest turnout of registered voters of 77.7% was

<sup>97</sup> Independent Electoral Commission 2004 "Free State Legislature" IN *Report on the National and Provincial Elections*, 60,

<sup>98</sup> For a detailed lists of parties without seats for the 2004 Free State Provincial result consult <http://www.elections.org.za/NPEPWStaticReports/reports/ReportParameters.aspx?catid=7>

<sup>99</sup> Independent Electoral Commission. 2009 *Report, Electoral Commission of South Africa: National and Provincial Elections* 22 April (2009): <http://www.elections.org.za/>

<sup>100</sup> This data, obtained from the SAIRR (South African Institute of Race Relations), includes only the population 20 years?

recorded in 2004. While registration rates have been generally high for the FS, turnout as a proportion of the VAP remained low at 61% or less in the past two elections.

<b>Election year</b>	<b>Eligible population</b>	<b>Registered voters</b>	<b>Voter turnout</b>	<b>Ballots cast</b>	<b>Spoilt/invalid votes</b>
1999	1 513 052	1 225 730	75.55	73.22	16 943
2004	1 725 022	1 321 195	77.76	59.56	15 795
2009	1 701 600	1 388 588	75.55	61.65	15 744

Source: SAIRR 2004/05 and 2010 Surveys<sup>101</sup>

## Party dynamics

Political parties occupy a central role in political systems with party formations, as they allow for the articulation of varying political interests. An evaluation of inter- and intra-party relations enables us to determine the nature of the political system and democracy in any given society.<sup>102</sup>

In the FS, inter-party relations have been characterised by attempts of opposition parties to challenge the dominance of the ANC. This has often been done by making public pronouncements on points of disagreement with the ANC or by criticising the ruling party and the conduct of its leaders.

The criticism from opposition parties against the ANC in the FS intensified after Premier Ace Magashule established a project called Operation Hlasela. The DA leader at time, Roy Jankielsohn, said that the “private sector are being conned into contributing to the Hlasela fund under the pretext that this was a government programme, while it is in fact the premier's election campaign fund.” This led to the investigations of the project by the Public Protector in 2012.<sup>103</sup> Shortly afterwards, the DA under the leadership of Patricia Kopane accused the premier of feeding funds to the firm that built the province's controversial R40-million website. Lately, the opposition parties outcry has been over the ANC's Free State health MEC Benny Malakoane, who was arrested in July 2013 on charges of corruption and fraud involving about R13 million. Interestingly, Helen Zille, the DA's national leader, also entered the fray when she indicated that no public official in the DA would survive a track record such as that of the MEC of Health in FS.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>101</sup> SAIRR (South African Institute of Race Relations). *2004/05 South Africa Survey*. Johannesburg: SAIRR, (2005); SAIRR. *2010/11 South Africa Survey 2010/2011*. Johannesburg: SAIRR (2011).

<sup>102</sup> Sonni, Tyoden. “Inter and intra-party relations: Towards a more stable party system for Nigeria. *The Constitution* 3 (2013): <http://cencod.com/?cat=10>

<sup>103</sup> Bekezela, Phakathi. “DA requests probe on use of 'public funds' for ANC anniversary.” *Business Day* 06 September (2012): <http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/11/17/da-requests-probe-on-use-of-public-funds-for-anc-anniversary>

<sup>104</sup> SAPA (South African Press Association). “Free State MEC would have been fired if he was in the DA: Zille.” *Times Live*, 04 March (2014): <http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/03/04/free-state-mec-would-have-been-fired-if-he-was-in-the-da-zille>

After very robust and intense battles during the campaigns for the 2009 elections, all three major parties in the FS had a fair share of intra-political squabbles to deal with. The ANC in the FS is a party beset by infighting (and at times even physical fights) and court battles. Various opposing factions within the party clashed as tensions peaked during the auditing of the validity of branch general meetings and credentials at regional conferences. The faction led by MKMVA calls itself “Regime Change.”

The deployment of the National Executive Council (NEC) task team did not help much, as six party provincial leaders took the provincial ANC to court in 2012, arguing that the elections were rigged and the entire conference was invalid. The Constitutional Court ruled that the provincial elective conference held in June 2012 was invalid and unlawful. The ANC then was forced to disband the provincial executive committee (PEC) and re-schedule the elective conference.<sup>105</sup>

Recently, the DA’s candidate for premier in the FS, Patricia Kopane, has come under fire from within the ranks of her own party for her good portrayal of former South African president, Thabo Mbeki. Many senior party leaders believed that such statements defy the party’s damning historical portrayal of Mbeki.<sup>106</sup>

In 2013, divisions emerged in the eastern Free State-based Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA) over whether the opposition should align itself with the ruling ANC party in the forthcoming elections. Several senior members – some of whom are councillors in the Maluti-a-Phofung Local Municipality where the DPSA is the official opposition with eight seats – were considering quitting the party over what they regard as “selling out the DPSA for personal gain”, and that the appointment of their party leader as head of the public safety and transport portfolio in the ANC-dominated council was to buy his silence.<sup>107</sup>

### **Role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and faith-based organisations (FBOs) are varied in their character and in their purpose. In the FS, traditional mainstream CSOs such as the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) and faith-based organisations such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) play an important role by highlighting the need for democracy and the significance of participating in the elections. The SACC in the FS is facing serious challenges due to lack of funds. The organisation, however, tasked individual church leaders to work with all political parties as well as encourage church members to contribute to an environment that will ensure free and fair elections. Members of the SACC will also act as election observers in their communities.

Currently, there seems to be low levels of interest in election-related activities by CSOs in the province. Many organisations consulted hinted that their levels of advocacy will increase

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<sup>105</sup> Michael, Tlhakudi. “ANC puts its infighting aside.” 22 August (2013): <http://www.thenewage.co.za/mobi/Detail.aspx?NewsID=105263&CatID=1018>

<sup>106</sup> Gareth van Onselen. “DA MPs disagree with party’s Mbeki message.” *City Press* 16 March (2014): 8.

<sup>107</sup> FS Times. “Party rows over ANC move.” *Free State Times* 31 August (2013): <http://fstimes.co.za/?p=1631>




closer to the elections when greater levels of political activity are expected to intensify. It is not yet clear what role many of the community organisations (the so-called concerned residents' groups) involved in service delivery protests will play in the forthcoming elections.

### Protests and their impact

This section of the article focuses on protests – the collective action by a group of community members directed towards local municipalities over the dissatisfaction of perceived poor delivery of basic municipal services. Since the dramatic eruption of protests in predominantly black communities in September 2004, South Africa has witnessed unrest of significant proportions at the local level. Unlike other forms of protests such as industrial action, service delivery protests have a greater potential to impact an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Figure 1 shows overall trends in service delivery protests in the FS between 2007 and 2013. The protests have increased substantially from approximately 7% in 2007 of the total incidences nationally, reaching unprecedented high levels of 16% and 15% in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

**Figure 1: Service delivery protests in the FS, 2007-2013 (%)**



Source: Municipal IQ<sup>108</sup>

One of the events that have drawn international attention to protests in South Africa has been the death of Ficksburg community leader, Andries Tatane, at the hands of police. Following Tatane's death, there has been public outrage about the manner in which he died. The

<sup>108</sup> Municipal IQ. "Press Releases: Municipal IQ's Municipal Hotspots results". [www.municipalIQ.co.za](http://www.municipalIQ.co.za)

Meqheleng Concerned Citizens group planned to hand over a memorandum about demands for issues, including proper water supply, repairs to sewerage drains and waste removal.<sup>109</sup>

Since then, sporadic outbreaks of protests have been noted in several small towns in the FS. The capital city Bloemfontein also experienced several protests since 2012. These protests were led by the Mangaung Concerned Residents Committee, and the main grievances included alleged corruption within the provincial government, the new unused taxi rank, the relocating of the zoo and alleged bogus government websites that cost the taxpayer millions of rands.<sup>110</sup>

Since 2013, about 26 towns in the FS have had no water at all in certain areas, experience water supply disruptions, or have extremely unhygienic water coming from their taps.<sup>111</sup> At this point, however, it is highly unlikely that service delivery protests, or any other form of protests, in the FS will have any significant impact on the forthcoming elections.

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<sup>109</sup> Mahabane, Itumeleng (15 April 2011). "[Death in Ficksburg shows how we value life](http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/04/15/itumeleng-mahabane-death-in-ficksburg-shows-how-we-value-life)". *Business Day* 15 April (2011). <http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/04/15/itumeleng-mahabane-death-in-ficksburg-shows-how-we-value-life>

<sup>110</sup> Refilwe, Mekoa. "Protest march in Mangaung today." 26 April (2013). <http://www.ofm.co.za/article/130986/> protest- march-in-Mangaung-today.

<sup>111</sup> Patricia, Kopane. "Severe water supply problems in 26 FState towns - Patricia Kopane". 18 June (2013). <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71651?oid=384129&sn=Detail&pid=71651>

## Western Cape

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### Introduction

The Western Cape is a politically unique province where electoral trends stand in sharp contrast to those in the rest of South Africa. While at the national level the African National Congress (ANC) has won all democratic elections by large majorities, outcomes in the Western Cape have resulted in three different political parties – namely, the National Party (NP), the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) – assuming power in the province.

### Election results

**Table 1: Western Cape Provincial Results (1994-2009)**

Party Name	Total no. of votes				Percentage			
	1994	1999	2004	2009	1994	1999	2004	2009
National Party/ New National Party	1,138,242	609,612	170,469	NA	53%	38%	11%	NA
African National Congress	705,576	668,106	709,052	620,918	33%	42%	45%	32%
Democratic Party/ Democratic Alliance	141,970	189,183	424,832	1,012,568	7%	12%	27%	52%
Freedom Front / Freedom Front + (VF Plus)	44,003	6,394	9,705	8,384	2%	0.40%	0.62%	0.43%
African Christian Democratic Party	25,731	44,323	53,934	28,995	1%	3%	3%	2%
Independent Democrats	NA	NA	122,867	92,116	NA	NA	8%	5%
United Democratic Movement	NA	38,071	27,489	14,013	NA	2%	1.75%	0.71%
Congress of the People	NA	NA	NA	152,356	NA	NA	NA	8%

Source: Independent Electoral Commission. Retrieved March 21, 2014 from <http://www.elections.org.za>

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<sup>112</sup> I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Nosiphiwo Nabatala, Mfundo Mazwi and Ashlyn Bailey, who assisted with research for this article

In the first democratic election, the National Party won an outright majority in the Western Cape – 53% of the votes for the Western Cape provincial legislature against the ANC's 33%. The NP managed to successfully capitalise on the underlying fears of voters in the Western Cape, depicting the ANC as a violent and dangerous party that would destroy South Africa. In 1994 the ANC secured only 33% at provincial level in the Western Cape. At this stage the DP secured only 6.6% of the provincial vote.

In the 1999 election the contest remained primarily one between the ANC and the NP, now renamed the *New National Party* (NNP). It was in this election that the distribution of power shifted dramatically, with the NNP losing its majority status in the Western Cape. Its share of the vote dropped by 15% to 38% – 4% less than that of the ANC. The ANC increased its share of the vote to 42%, an increase of 9.1%. This happened as voters in the Western Cape watched ANC incumbents at national level under the leadership of Nelson Mandela lead South Africa from the brink of civil war into constitutional democracy. Nonetheless, a NNP/DP alliance kept the ANC out of power in the Western Cape, and Marthinus Van Schalkwyk became the new premier. By the second democratic election the DP had made modest advances, doubling its share of the vote in the Western Cape to 12%. In June 2000 the Democratic Party and New National Party announced that they would unite as the Democratic Alliance, with the aim of building a political movement that would effectively challenge the ANC for political power.

In 2004 the ANC's largely positive campaign, which focused on the celebration of ten years of democracy, yielded dividends. Voters in the Western Cape rewarded the ANC with 45% of the vote, just short of an outright majority. The ANC took power from the NNP and Ebrahim Rassool became the premier of the Western Cape. While the DA increased its support base to 27% in 2004, opposition voters did not feel inclined to vote against the ANC. By 2004 the NNP, in coalition with its former arch-enemy the ANC, preached a campaign message that completely contradicted its messages of 1994 and 1999. The NNP's support base was decimated by its incongruent and internally inconsistent campaign messages. The NNP, whose share of the provincial vote had crumbled to 11%, was dissolved into the ANC.

In 2009 the balance of power in the Western Cape again shifted – this time from the ANC to the DA. Dramatic national developments which occurred between 2004 and 2009 underpinned this shift in power. With the NNP absorbed into the ANC, the contest was now between the DA and the ANC. The DA's campaign of 2009, consistent with its previous hard-hitting messages, now took place in a completely different political context. National events between 2004 and 2009 created a situation where the DA's messages were much more salient to voters in the Western Cape. As is well known, these national developments included the highly publicised rape trial of President Zuma and his removal as the deputy president of the country following the corruption trial of Schabir Shaik. Additionally, the dramatic events at the ANC's 2007 national conference, in which Jacob Zuma secured the position of ANC president, culminated in the removal of Thabo Mbeki as president of the country. These events also precipitated the resignation of several ANC members, and the Congress of the People was formed under the leadership of Mosiuoa Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa. In the Western Cape these national events had a very damaging effect on

perceptions of President Zuma. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed that respondents in the Western Cape had very little trust in him. Ebrahim Rasool was also removed as the premier of the Western Cape. These public sentiments were harnessed by the DA through an extremely effective election campaign. The DA had won an outright majority of 51.3%, while the ANC dropped down to 31.6%.

**Table 2: Western Cape Seat Allocation (1994-2009)**

Party Name	Total no. of seats			
	1994	1999	2004	2009
National Party (NP)/ New National Party	23	17	5	NA
African National Congress	14	18	19	14
Democratic Party / Democratic Alliance	3	5	12	22
Freedom Front / Freedom Front Plus +(VF Plus)	1	0	0	0
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1	1	3	2
Independent Democrats (ID)	NA	NA	3	3
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	NA	1	1	0
Congress of the People (COPE)	NA	NA	NA	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>44</b>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission. Retrieved March 21, 2014 from <http://www.elections.org.za>

Other parties have not featured strongly in the Western Cape. The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) has managed to maintain a presence in the Western Cape. In 1994 it won 1.2% of the vote in the Western Cape. This increased to 2.8% in 1999 and 3.4% in 2004. However, 2009 saw its support base decline from 3.5% to 1.5%. The Independent Democrats (ID), under the leadership of Patricia de Lille, won 7.8% of the vote in the Western Cape in the 2004 election but by 2009 this had dropped to 4.7%. The ID has since merged with the DA. In 2009 the newly formed Congress of the People (COPE) managed to secure 7.7% of the vote and three seats in the Western Cape legislature.

### **Voter registration**

Voter registration in the Western Cape has been relatively high since 1994. Registration declined in 2004 and 2009, but has since increased. When the voters' roll was certified by the IEC in March 2014 2 941 333 out of 3771 271 eligible voters in the Western Cape were registered to vote. This amounts to a registration level of 78%.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Independent Electoral Commission. Registration Statistics as at 26 Mar 2014 (2014). Retrieved March 26, 2014 from <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Voters-Roll/Registration-statistics/>

**Table 3: Western Cape Voter Registration (1994-2009)**

<b>Election Year</b>	<b>Eligible Voting Age Population (VAP)</b>	<b>Registered population</b>	<b>Percentage Registered</b>
1994	2 405 919	NA	
1999	2 317 171	1 864 019	80.4%
2004	3 024 207	2 220 283	73.4%
2009	3 746 547	2 634 439	70.31%
2014	3 771 271	2 941 333	77.9%

**Sources:**

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 182-220.

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election 99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 173-209.

Piombo, J. 'The Results of Election 2004: Looking Back, Stepping Forward'. In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (2005). 231-249.

StatsSA. Data extracted from the mid-year population estimates, 2009.

Independent Electoral Commission. Retrieved March 24, 2014 from <http://www.elections.org.za>

Participation rates have fluctuated. Participation as a proportion of registered voters declined from 86% in 1999 to 72% in 2004 and then increased to 78% in 2009. Participation as a proportion of the voting age population (VAP) declined from 89% in 1994 to 69% in 1999. It then declined more dramatically to 53% in 2004 and then stabilised at 55% in 2009. Similar patterns are evident for the provincial ballot.

**Table 4: Voting age population, registration and turnout in the Western Cape (National Ballot)**

<b>Election Year</b>	<b>Eligible Voting Age Population (VAP)</b>	<b>Registered population</b>	<b>Valid Votes cast</b>	<b>Percentage turn out based on eligible population</b>	<b>Percentage turn out based on registered population</b>
1994	2 405 919	NA	2 126 013	88.90 %	NA
1999	2 317 171	1 864 019	1 601 922	69.13%	85.93%
2004	3 024 207	2 220 283	1 605 020	53.07%	72.28%
2009	3 746 547	2 634 439	2 049 097	54.69%	77.78%

**Sources:**

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 182-220.

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election 99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 173-209.

Piombo, J. 'The Results of Election 2004: Looking Back, Stepping Forward'. In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (2005). 231-249.

StatsSA. Data extracted from the mid-year population estimates, 2009.

**Table 5: Voting age population, registration and turnout in the Western Cape (Provincial Ballot)**

<b>Election Year</b>	<b>Eligible Voting Age Population (VAP)</b>	<b>Registered population</b>	<b>Valid Votes cast</b>	<b>Percentage turn out based on eligible population</b>	<b>Percentage turn out based on registered population</b>
1994	2 405 919	NA	2 137 742	88.85%	NA
1999	2 317 171	1 864 019	1 587 978	68.53%	85.19%
2004	3 024 207	2 220 283	1 582 503	52.32%	71.27%
2009	3 746 547	2 634 439	1 987 777	53.05%	75.45%

**Sources:**

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 182-220.

Reynolds, A. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election 99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki*. Cape Town: David Philip. (1994). 173-209.

Piombo, J. 'The Results of Election 2004: Looking Back, Stepping Forward'. In J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds). *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (2005). 231-249.

StatsSA. Data extracted from the mid-year population estimates, 2009.

**Party dynamics**

The fact that no party in the Western Cape can take its supporters for granted has resulted in high-stakes elections and increased contestation. Afrobarometer surveys reveal that voters in the Western Cape exhibit lower levels of party identification than voters in other provinces.<sup>114</sup> Since the DA seized control from the ANC in 2009 relations between the DA and the ANC in the Western Cape have been characterised by dysfunctional competitiveness. Besides policy differences and the usual vigour with which incumbent and opposition parties engage each other, the political landscape in the province has become toxic. Each party has come to consider the other as being the primary obstacle to its goals and appears driven by the desire to highlight the shortcomings of the other.

The acrimony and hostility permeate almost all visible engagements between these two parties. Constructive engagement is rare, and governance in the province is marked by high levels of distrust. The ANC in the Western Cape has criticised the DA as being uncaring, inaccessible and unresponsive to the poor, highlighting in particular the disparity between the rich and poor in the province.<sup>115</sup> The DA in turn charges that the ANC is trying to destabilise the province and sabotage its governance efforts.

114 Africa, C. "Party Support and Voter Behaviour in the Western Cape: Trends and patterns since 1994". *Journal of African Elections*. (2010): 1-27.

115 See for example Fransman, M. "DA-led Western Cape has let down the poor". *The New Age* (2014) Retrieved March 24, 2014. From <http://thenewage.co.za>



These destructive patterns of engagement are especially pronounced during the campaign period and are compounded by the importance accorded to the 'coloured vote'. The reason for the alternation in power is said to lie with the coloured majority in the province. These explanations, which are premised on the racially based motivations of voters, feed into the choices, rhetoric and behaviour of political parties. Perceptions of the importance of the 'coloured vote' have resulted in campaigning that often encompasses unintentional or deliberate racial mobilisation and inflammatory political rhetoric. Ultimately citizens suffer because the province is plagued by issues which require the involvement of all stakeholders. Indeed Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu went as far as to call Cape Town a "ticking time bomb with violent crime leading to a 'grotesquely abnormal' situation which will only get worse if urgent action is not taken".<sup>116</sup>

### **Protests and their impact**

The Western Cape has been plagued by protests. In 2012 farm workers in the Western Cape embarked on protest action for higher wages and improved working conditions. The protests highlighted issues of poor pay, poor working conditions and adequate housing as their main problems. The violence that erupted in many farming towns resulted in the loss of life.<sup>117</sup> Following the farm worker protests, protests sprung up in the townships of Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and Nyanga in what became known as the "poo protests" in which protestors threw faeces on the stairs of the provincial legislature of the Western Cape and later at the Cape Town international airport.<sup>118</sup> Thousands of people took to the streets marching through the city centre of Cape Town causing damage to many businesses in the CBD. Several other protests were held by the "poo protestors" in which the national roads had to be closed.

In a study published in June 2013, the intelligence Bulletin reports that 25% of protests taking place in the country took place in the Western Cape, costing the province R13 million. Between 2012 and 2014, the farm worker protests and service protests have been the biggest and most violent protests the province has seen. Reasons for the protests include access to land, adequate housing, proper sanitation and the lack of jobs. Residents of townships, where the majority of protests take place, raised issues of using portable flush toilets inside their dwelling when it rains and the areas they live in being dirty and refuse not being collected.<sup>119</sup> Other grievances include dissatisfaction with local council and administrations that are unresponsive to citizens' needs as well as corrupt.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Van Zilla, L. "Tutu's unity plea to halt Cape violence". Independent Online (2014). Retrieved March 24, 2014. From <http://iol.co.za>

<sup>117</sup> Underhill, G. "Agri SA: Western Cape Farm Workers Protest Politically Motivated" Mail and Guardian (2013). Retrieved March 10, 2014. From <http://www.m&g.co.za>

<sup>118</sup> Davis, R. "Western Cape Protests: calmer day, thicker plot". Daily Maverick (2012). Retrieved 10 March 2014. from <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za>

<sup>119</sup> Davis, R. "Western Cape Protests: calmer day, thicker plot". Daily Maverick (2012). Retrieved 10 March 2014. from <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za>

<sup>120</sup> Nleya, N. "Linking Service Delivery and Protest in South Africa: An exploration of evidence from Khayelitsha". (2011). UNISA Press.

There are clear political dynamics underpinning the volatile situation in the Western Cape. In addition to issues of service delivery, political tension has been cited as a contributing factor.<sup>121</sup> The DA blames the ANC for fuelling protest action, while the ANC blames the DA for not adequately dealing with the socio-economic issues faced by township residents. The DA was convinced during the farm workers protest that the ANC was deliberately stimulating anger among the residents in order to push its political agenda.<sup>122</sup> On the other hand, leaders of the landless people's movement argue that protests seem to be the only way to get the leadership of the province to pay attention, because once in power they turn against the voters.<sup>123</sup> These factors are compounded by what has been termed "unmonitored urbanisation", wherein migration from other provinces puts pressure on provincial resources.<sup>124</sup>

### **The role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

In the context of elections civil society organisations and faith-based organisations can play an important role by educating citizens about elections, their rights and the value of elections within democracy. During elections and the pre-election period CSOs and FBOs can help to ensure a conflict-free, peaceful, tolerant, free and fair electoral environment.<sup>125</sup> The IEC also recognises the role of civil society in promoting civic and voter education. The IEC 2013 annual report indicates that successful meetings were held with civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, and traditional leaders to strengthen preparations for the 2014 elections.<sup>126</sup>

The Western Cape is home to a vast number of civil society organisations (CSOs) and faith-based organisations (CBOs). As of January 2014, the Department of Social Development listed a total of 8 750 organisations registered in the Western Cape.<sup>127</sup> However, given the scale of violence in the province, the focus of religious groups and leaders in the Western Cape has been on conflict resolution. On 26 November 2013 a number of religious groups and civil society organisations in the Western Cape joined together and released a declaration signed by many well-known religious leaders such as former Archbishop Desmond Tutu, current Archbishop of Cape Town Thabo Makgoba as well as many religious academics.<sup>128</sup>

<sup>121</sup> Coetzer, P. "Service delivery protests: More symptom then Cause" The Intelligence Bulletin (2013). Retrieved March, 10. 2014. From <http://www.theintelligencebulletin.co.za>

<sup>122</sup> Davis, R. "Western Cape Protests: calmer day, thicker plot". Daily Maverick (2012). Retrieved 10 March 2014. from <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za>

<sup>123</sup> Smook, E. Protests are our right. (2009) Retrieved March 8, 2014 from <http://www.wordpress.com>

<sup>124</sup> Coetzer, P. "Service delivery protests: More symptom then Cause" The Intelligence Bulletin (2013). Retrieved March, 10. 2014. From <http://www.theintelligencebulletin.co.za>

<sup>125</sup> Mottor, S. "The role of civil society in elections: The Kwazulu-Natal Democracy and election Forum- Reducing conflict dynamic and promoting peace". *Journal of African elections* 9.1 (2010):110-127

<sup>126</sup> Independent Electoral Commission "Independent Electoral Commission 2013 Annual Report" (2013). Retrieved March 24, 2014 from <http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/Reports/>

<sup>127</sup> Department of Social Development. Registered NPO's in the Western Cape. (2014). Retrieved March 24, 2014 from [http://www.dsd.gov.za/npo/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=cat\\_view&gid=90&Itemid=39](http://www.dsd.gov.za/npo/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=90&Itemid=39)

<sup>128</sup> All Africa "South Africa: Civil Society warns of 'growing assault on democracy'" (2013). Retrieved March 24, 2014 from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201311261561.html>

This declaration calls for the faith community to take the lead in restoring the democratic values that are being denied “by political leaders who are trying to make the Western Cape ungovernable”.<sup>129</sup> In their declaration they cited the growing attack on public transport, violent protests in Cape Town in which stalls of informal traders were looted as well as the dumping of human waste on government buildings, which they see as an attack on democracy.<sup>130</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The trends outlined above are likely to continue. Since the DA won the province by such a narrow majority in 2009, the Western Cape is once again emerging as an attention-grabbing province. The 2014 election will be a high-stakes election marked by intense campaigning. At the time of publication service delivery protests continued.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> “South Africa: Civil Society warns of ‘growing assault on democracy’”. *All Africa* 26 November (2013) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201311261561.html>

<sup>130</sup> “Democracy in Danger in the Western Cape” *All Africa* 26 November (2013) <http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00071822:953b49c71c4e4360edcdcf8198077f46.pdf>

## Eastern Cape

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**Malachia Mathoho; Musa Sebugwawo and Stephen Shisanya – Researchers;  
Afesis-corplan**

### **Party dynamics**

The Eastern Cape (EC) has a number of political parties that compete for political control of the province. In the 2009 provincial elections only five political parties made it into the 63 seats provincial legislature. The African National Congress (ANC) 44 seats; Congress of the People (Cope) 9 seats; Democratic Alliance (DA) 6 seats; United Democratic Movement (UDM) 3 seats and African Independent Congress (AIC) 1 seat. While 2014 elections race gets tighter the EC province is still free from political violence and thus far parties have enjoyed a violence free election campaign.

In the 2009 elections Cope replaced the DA which was the traditional main opposition party (official opposition) in the EC legislature. For the 2014 election campaign the DA's campaign tone in the province appears to be focused not on winning the province and become a governing party, but rather on winning back status as official opposition in the legislature. Cope, currently the official opposition in the Province has itself been embroiled in internal battles. Mirroring what has transpired nationally in Cope.

Interminable rifts within Cope have germinated another new party in the EC. Cope in the Eastern Cape splintered, with former Cope leader Mluleki George forming a break away party, the United Congress (Unico) in November 2013. George blamed Cope leader Mosiuoa Lekota of not leading Cope properly as the reason of forming a break away party.

The party will contest the 2014 elections nationally and in the Eastern Cape Province. The United Democratic Movement with its stronghold in the EC province managed only 3 seats out of 63 seats of the EC legislature in the 2009 elections. In the 2014 elections the UDM is expected to get a boost from forging a relationship with former Cope leader Sam Shilowa and a faction of Cope in the Eastern Cape Province.

## Election Results

**Table 1: Party votes distribution in the Eastern Cape over the voting periods, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009**

	1994			1999			2004			2009		
Party Name	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	59,475	2	1	24,837	1.1	1	22,324	1	1	12,108	0.54	0
Vryheidsfront /Freedom Front	23,167	0.8	0	7,287	0.3	0						
African Christian Democratic Party	14,908	0.5	0	20,857	1	0	17,372	0.78	0	11,974	0.53	0
African Democratic Movement	4,815	0.2	0									
African National Congree	2,453,790	84	48	1,606,856	74	47	1,768,987	79.3	51	1,552,676	68.8	44
Democratic Party	59,644	2.1	1	136,859	6.3	4						
Merit Party	2,028	0.1	0									
National Party	286,029	9.8	6									
Inkatha Freedom Party	5,050	0.2	0	7,166	0.3	0	4,373	0.2	0	2,270	0.1	0
Afrikaner Eenheidsbewe ging	-	-	-	3,673	0.2	0						
Federal Alliance	-	-	-	3,575	0.2	0						
New National Party	-	-	-	70,141	3.2	2						
United Democratic Movement	-	-	-	296,015	14	9	205,993	9.23	6	93,196	4.13	3
Azanian People's Organisation	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,884	0.17	0			
Democratic Alliance/ Demokratiese Alliansie	-	-	-	-	-	-	163,785	7.34	5	225,310	9.99	6

**Table 2: Voters turn out**

<b>Elections 1999</b>			<b>Elections 2004</b>			<b>Elections 2009</b>			<b>Elections 2014</b>
Registered voters	Turn out	% Turn out	Registered voters	Turn out	% Turn out	Registered voters	Turn out	% Turn out	Registered voters
2, 454,543	2, 188, 184	89.15%	2, 849,486	2, 277, 391	79.92%	3, 056,559	2, 344, 098	76.69%	3,240, 059

**Table 3: 2014 registered voters**

<b>National and Provincial Elections (NPE) 2014 Certified Voters' Roll: 5 March 2014</b>			
<b>Percentage (%) registration against Stats SA Voting age population (VAP) by province</b>			
Province	STATS SA VAP Estimate	Certified Voters' Roll (5 March 2014)	% Voter registration
Eastern Cape	3 794 352	3 240 059	85.4%

Sources:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern\\_Cape\\_Provincial\\_Legislature](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Cape_Provincial_Legislature)

<http://www.news24.com/Elections/News/ANC-submits-provincial-candidate-lists-to-IEC-20140311>

<http://www.dispatch.co.za/news/da-aims-to-topple-cope-as-ec-official-opposition/>

<http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/25ef400043062f8080179f895990ad13/Newly-formed-UNICO-launches-its-manifesto- in-E-Cape-20142202>

<http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/c18e220041d677dda5c2ed5393638296/Newly-launched-party-aims-to-do-well-in-elections-20131511>

<http://www.dispatch.co.za/news/shilowas-cope-faction-set-to-join-udm/>

### **Role of civil society and faith-based organization**

There has been a noticeable contribution of civil society organisations to election processes in the Eastern Cape Province. NGOs have often used public information gatherings such as seminars, public dialogues, public forums, public information, education and deliberation, advocacy and expression, Afesis Corplan for example, had on numerous occasions organised hosted seminars to debate and disseminate election messages (Election 2014, what is it in it for the Eastern Cape, a seminar hosted by Afesis Corplan on March 27, 2009).


The Eastern Cape NGO Coalition, a network of NGOs and Community based organisations in the Eastern Cape Province joined forces with the Daily Dispatch, the East London based daily newspaper, to host a public dialogue entitled “You and the Constitution”. With Judge Albie Sachs as the key speaker the dialogue reflected on the constitution as a framework for meaningful public participation including participating in political processes. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) was previously involved in election processes through active involvement in voter education, public dialogue and election observation.

However in the lead up to the 2014 elections, details are scanty as to what efforts will be undertaken by the SACC and attempts at gleaning this information from the provincial office in the Eastern Cape, proved fruitless. Many NGO's and CBO's in the Eastern Cape, including Afesis-corplan, have planned for hosting political party seminars and debates where party representatives have an opportunity to engage each other and participants on crucial issues affecting the Eastern Cape in reference to their party manifestos.

### Protests and their impact

Protests have escalated in number and have become a daily occurrence in the Eastern Cape Province. In fact, at one time, the Eastern Cape registered marginally more protests than Gauteng, a traditional protest province<sup>132</sup>.

**Figure 1: Service delivery protests by province**



**Source:** Karamoko Jelani & J. Hirsh, 2011. Community Protests in South Africa: Trends, Analysis and Explanations. [http://www.mgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community\\_Protests\\_SA.pdf](http://www.mgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community_Protests_SA.pdf). (Accessed 17 March 2014).

<sup>132</sup> Business Day live, Protests in Eastern Cape echo those in Gauteng. Available online: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/12/12/protests-in-eastern-cape-echo-those-in-gauteng>. (Accessed 17 March 2014).



The reasons for the outbreak of protests in the Eastern Cape Province are numerous and vary from shack-dwellers in Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage) and Buffalo City (East London) to smaller towns such as Port St John's and Molteno to some deep rural villages<sup>133</sup>.

The dynamics and geographical sites of protests in the Eastern Cape constantly shift from one area to another. The major causes of these focus on actual service delivery concerns ranging from housing, electricity; water and sanitation and roads. For example, the recent protests in Uitenhage in the wake of the demolition of illegally built shacks were as a result of high levels of frustration and distrust. They destroyed not only community infrastructure but also directly targeted councillors and their property as well as foreign shop owners<sup>134</sup>.

A Protest broke out in Missionvale, Port Elizabeth and Cookhouse near Cradock where residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the rate of housing delivery. On June 18, 2013, The Daily Dispatch reported the eighth incident of increasing violent unrest connected to service delivery failure in Buffalo City<sup>135</sup>.

At the beginning of the month of March this year, a service delivery protest broke out in Reeston, an informal settlement located on the Mdantsane Access road in East London. Chaos broke out as a result of residents gathering to protest over the poor state of gravel roads in that informal settlement. As a result, the residents blocked the main road with burning tyres and tree stumps paralysing traffic.


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<sup>133</sup> Ibid

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> Daily Dispatch, *Violence grows as desperate Buffalo City service protests go unheard*. Available online: <http://www.dispatch.co.za/uncategorized/violence-grows-as-desperate-buffalo-city-service-protests-go-unheard/>. Accessed (17 March 2014)

**Figure 2: Service delivery protests by district in the Eastern Cape**



**Source:** Karamoko Jelani & J. Hirsh, 2011. Community Protests in South Africa: Trends, Analysis and Explanations. [http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community\\_Protests\\_SA.pdf](http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community_Protests_SA.pdf). (Accessed 17 March 2014).

Press reports appear to repeatedly predict a decline in the ANC support in the days leading up to general elections. However, the real impact, either on party support patterns or on voter turnout is in fact unpredictable and unknown. Some indicators, though concerning local government, in which the issues are different and not analogous to national elections.

Recently concluded local government by-elections for ward 3 in Buffalo City for example, the Democratic Alliance (DA) retained the ward<sup>136</sup>. The victory saw DA's support increase from 54% to 82 %. This itself, while not generalisable, is noteworthy.

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<sup>136</sup> Daily Dispatch, *Landslide poll boost for DA*. Available online: <http://www.dispatch.co.za/news/landslide-poll-boost-for-da/>. (Accessed 17 March 2014).

## Mpumalanga

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### Oupa Makhalemele – Independent Researcher

#### Introduction

The four tables below reflect the ruling party African National Congress (ANC) as a dominant party in Mpumalanga Province. With its electoral share hovering around the mid-80 percentile region, the ANC has since 1994 left opposition parties in the province trailing far behind, perhaps indicating the lack of options for the majority of the electorate in Mpumalanga. In 1994 the ANC took 84.83% of the vote, scooping 26 seats. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party, came a distant second at 4.48%; while the New National Party got 2.28% and the Freedom Front 1.70% – taking a seat each in the Provincial Legislature. In 1999 the ANC took 84.86% of the vote, again winning 26 seats, while the Democratic Party won 4.46%, the New National Party got 2.47% and the Freedom Front won 1.70%.

A newcomer, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), won 1.42%. Again, these four parties won a seat each in the 1999 elections. The 2004 elections saw the ANC win 86.30% of the votes, taking 27 seats, one more than in the previous two elections. The rechristened Democratic Alliance took 6.94%, winning two seats in the provincial legislature, while the rechristened Freedom Front Plus won 1.24% and took a single seat in the legislature. In the 2009 election a similar picture emerged, with the ANC winning 85.55% and taking 27 seats, while the DA won 7.49% and two seats and the newly formed Congress of the people (Cope), which was a recent ANC break-away party, won 2.91% of the vote and won a single seat in the legislature.<sup>137</sup>

#### Election results<sup>138</sup>

##### *Mpumalanga 1994*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
African National Congress	954, 788	84.83	26
Democratic Party	50, 421	4.48	1
New National Party	27, 909	2.28	1
Freedom Front	19, 170	1.70	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,052,288</b>	<b>93.29</b>	<b>29</b>

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<sup>137</sup> Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Archive. Available at: <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm> . Accessed on 17 March 2014.

<sup>138</sup> All tables sourced from Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Archive. Available at: <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm> . Accessed on 17 March 2014.

### *Mpumalanga 1999*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	954,788	84.86%	26
Democratic Party	50,421	4.46%	1
New National Party	27,909	2.47%	1
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front +	19,170	1.70%	1
United Democratic Movement	16,013	1.42%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,068,301</b>	<b>94.91%</b>	<b>30</b>

### *Mpumalanga 2004*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	959,436	86.30%	27
Democratic Alliance	77,119	6.94%	2
Vryheidsfront Plus/Freedom Front +	13,732	1.24%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,050,287</b>	<b>94.48%</b>	<b>30</b>

### *Mpumalanga 2009*

<b>Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	1,110,190	85.55%	27
Democratic Alliance	97,204	7.49%	2
Congress of the People	37,789	2.91%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,245,183</b>	<b>95.95%</b>	<b>30</b>

### **Voter registration and turnout**

There were 1,277,783 registered voters for the 1999 elections in Mpumalanga. The actual voter turnout was 1,147,086, representing 89.8% of the registered voters in the province. Of the ballots cast, 21,502 were invalid, leaving a total of 1,125,584 of valid votes.

The 2004 results were mixed. While the number of registered voters was higher than 1999, at 1,442,472, only 78.30% of those registered actually turned up for the elections, compared to 90.08% in the previous elections.

In the 2009 polls 1,696,705 of residents of Mpumalanga registered for the elections, while 1,363,836 (or 80.4%) went to the polls. 20,583 (or 1.5%) of the votes were spoilt, leaving 1,343,253 (or 98.5%). More residents of Mpumalanga voted in the 2009 elections than they did in the 1999 elections.

Election year	Eligible population	Registered voters	Voter turnout	Ballots cast	Spoilt or invalid votes	Valid ballots
1999	1 800 000*	1 277 783	90.08%	1 151 038	21 502	1 129 536
2004	1 800 000*	1 442 472	78.30	1 129 484	17 792	1 111 692
2009	?	1 696 705	77.61%	1 316 894	19 119	1 297 775

Source: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Archive. Available at: <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm>

\* These estimates are based on the number of people living in Mpumalanga at the time and who were 18 years or older<sup>139</sup>.

The Independent Electoral Commission's recent voter registration drive in November 2013 and February 2014 saw 5.5 million people in total visiting polling stations. This number included approximately 2.3 million new voters. The number of registered voters has thus been increased to 25.3 million, representing 80.5% of the 31.4 million people eligible to vote nationally. 2.3 million new voters were born after 1994, the year of the first democratic elections in South Africa. They will be voting for the first time.

## Party dynamics

According to a survey run by Ipsos, titled *Pulse of the People*, these voting patterns are likely to remain largely unchanged come the 7 May 2014 elections. In the study, a randomly selected sample of people aged 18 years and above was asked which parties they would vote for if the elections were to be run the next day in their province. Based on the assumption that not all people eligible to vote would do so, the survey found that the ANC would win the vote by a relatively moderate 63.4%, while the official opposition, the DA, would gain 9.1%. Interestingly, the survey found that the newly formed parties would make a better showing than some of the older parties. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) would garner 6.8% and the Agang South Africa (AgangSA) party 4.6% of the vote in Mpumalanga. Sandwiched between these two would be African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), with 5% of the vote.<sup>140</sup> As the numbers above indicate, the only party whose support has been growing steadily in Mpumalanga is the DA. Many analysts, however, attribute this to a lack of diversity in the political landscape, and a lack of a real alternative – which speaks to the frustrations and aspirations of the majority of the electorate.<sup>141</sup> The entry into the landscape of the EFF, some believe, will most likely present such

<sup>139</sup> Statistics SA, (1999), Mid-year population estimates South Africa, available on: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022009.pdf>

Statistics SA, (2004), Mid-year population estimates South Africa, available on: <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022004.pdf>

<sup>140</sup> Ipsos survey: *Provincial political party support in a moderate voter turnout scenario*, available on <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/19/107490.html>, Issued 16 Jan, 2014, accessed on: 15 March 2014

<sup>141</sup> Academic Achille Mbembe was quoted as saying in Forde, F, 2014, 'The ANC is hurting the poor,' *Independent Online*, available on: <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-is-hurting-the-poor-1.1671748>, accessed 6 April 2014.

an alternative, although the party's longevity and its ability to withstand challenges ranging from defections to potential internal squabbles remain to be assessed.

Parties are vying for the youth vote as South Africa enters twenty years of democracy, the first time the so-called 'born-frees'<sup>142</sup> will be going to the polls. The ruling party, the African National Congress, looks poised to win these elections, thus consolidating its twenty-year dominance nationally (although the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) seems to have consolidated its dominance in the only province it governs – the Western Cape).<sup>143</sup> Indications so far are that Mpumalanga is likely to continue showing support for the incumbent ANC, and the EFF is likely to make a poor showing by comparison despite its appeal to the marginalised unemployed youth, who are in the majority.

The ANC's stronghold, Mpumalanga, was chosen as the venue for the January 8 Statement. 2014 being the election year, the event, held in Mbombela on Saturday 11 January, was also the launch of the party's election manifesto.

The 2014 general elections approach at a time when divisions within the ANC and its allies reach new highs. Cosatu, the party's alliance partner, is reeling as its biggest affiliate union, Numsa, has broken ranks with the union federation, and has resolved to withdraw its endorsement of the ANC in the latter's election campaign. The booing of Jacob Zuma at the late Nelson Mandela's memorial in Johannesburg in December, and the public outrage following the so-called 'Nkandlagate' have demonstrated the waning popularity of the party leader and president of the republic.

The ANC Mpumalanga province-to-province list was described by some as indicative of factions within the party. The list – topped by incumbent chairperson and Premier David Mabuza – excluded provincial ANC veterans such as Fish Mahlalela (member of the legislature), Candith Mashego-Dlamini (MEC for health), Pinky Phosa (MEC for economic development), Madala Masuku (MEC for finance and SACP central committee member) and Sibongile Manana (MEC for arts and culture).

Other senior members in the province known to be in the anti-Zuma camp, notably Thomas Bongo and Peter Nyoni, also did not make the list. Mabuza's former deputy Charles Makola was among the PEC members excluded from the list. Former cabinet members Clifford Mkansi turned down his nomination and Meshack Malinga was also left out.

Also not elected were tripartite alliance members, the provincial SACP's Secretary Bonakele Majuba and William Lubisi, the Mpumalanga legislature speaker and SACP PEC member.

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<sup>142</sup> The term 'born-frees' refers to those youth who are eligible to vote for the first time, having been born after the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994.

<sup>143</sup> See the Ipsos survey: provincial political party support in a moderate voter turnout scenario, 16 January 2014. Available at: <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/19/107490.html>. Accessed on: 15 March 2014.

Allegations of impropriety were made against the procedure that led to the creation of this list, including the failure of David Mabuza to recuse himself as the process's chairperson, given that he had an interest (that of being on the list). Allegations were made that monies were seen dished out and that there was a list of names that delegates were instructed to vote for. These developments notwithstanding, the ANC does not seem to be in danger of losing its traditional support at the polls, according to the recent Ipsos Markinor polls. According to the polls, the ANC will secure 63.4%, followed by the DA at a distant 9.1% of the vote. Newcomer the EFF is predicted to come in at a third position, with a share of 6.8% of the vote.

### **Role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

On 24 January the IEC sent out a tender notice for a service provider that would supply voter education in Mpumalanga using the medium of street theatre. The road show is titled: "The Voter and Balloting Theatre and Edutainment Roadshow" and is expected to visit municipalities in Ehlanzeni District as follows:

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Date</b>
Barberton	March 19
Nelspruit	March 20
Thulamahashe	March 21
Sabie	March 21
Komatipoort	March 22

Source: Low/Laevelder, 21 March 2014, accessed 22 March 2014

### **Protests and their impact**

Mpumalanga has not been spared the nation-wide spate of public protests. As recently as Thursday 20 March 2014, the community of Lochiel near Oshoek embarked on a service delivery protest on the R17 road between Oshoek and Lochiel. They demanded RDP houses, water supply and sanitation. Earlier in January, ANC members in Pienaar and Bohlabela were reported to have organised protest marches, aimed to coincide with the ANC's 11 January manifesto launch. These planned protests were prevented from taking place, however. The ANC in Mpumalanga announced two weeks later that it would establish an investigation into the violent service delivery protests. The task team would comprise NEC and PEC members of the party, and is due to give a full report of the investigation in June 2014.

These protests, often dubbed service delivery protests, are often about tensions within the ruling party over the distribution of patronage at provincial and local government levels. With the disgruntlement over the provincial electoral list, some view the protests as instigated by members of the sidelined faction among the ruling party. These factors notwithstanding, the ANC's chances at the polls do not seem threatened by these protests.

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### Introduction

Gauteng is the province with the highest population and contributes 33% to the national economy of South Africa and 10% to the GDP of the entire African continent. Gauteng is also the most expensive province to live in South Africa, and this may shape the electoral landscape for middle- and working-class voters. The province has been governed by the ANC since the onset of democracy. Since 1999, the ANC has consistently been able to retain a similar percentage share of voter support in the province over successive elections. The DA, the main opposition party nationally and in Gauteng, has increased its share of support in small increments. A study of the results of the Local Government Elections of 2011 indicates that Gauteng and the Western Cape are the only two provinces where the DA has made marked inroads in voter support among African township voters.<sup>144</sup> This point must be taken with tentative caution, since local government elections are not an adequate predictor of patterns and trends in national elections because of the different electoral systems used, the varying nature of the issues at stake and the lower voter turnout levels in local elections. In any event, a cursory glance at successive election in the Gauteng province shows that the Democratic Party, one of the progenitor parties of the current Democratic Alliance (DA), performed exceptionally well in the 1999 elections, almost tripling its support from 1994.

By contrast, the subsequent DA increased its support modestly from the DP's relatively good performance in 1999 of 17% to the DA's 20%. But between 2004 and 2009 the DA only increased its support very modestly, if at all, by one percentage point and got one more seat in 2009 than it did in 2004. Comparing the DA's performance growth in Gauteng 2014 from 2009 on the back of poor growth from 2004 to 2009 will confirm whether voters would more likely have supported a principled 'liberal' party such as the Democratic Party rather than a perceptibly ideologically unrooted DA<sup>145</sup>.

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<sup>144</sup> Fakir, Ebrahim, and Waseem Holland. "Changing voting patterns?" *Journal of Public Administration: Special Issue 1* 46 (2011): 1139-1152.

<sup>145</sup> For a discussion of the DA's ideological ambiguity see: a. McKaiser, Eusebius: Could I Vote DA?, A voter's dilemma, 2014, Bookstorm and also b. Fakir, Ebrahim " DA has no deep penetration into SA's grassroots", New Age, 25 November, 2012 : [http://www.thenewage.co.za/71540-1007-53-DA\\_has\\_no\\_deep\\_penetration\\_into\\_SAs\\_grassroots/?switcher=1](http://www.thenewage.co.za/71540-1007-53-DA_has_no_deep_penetration_into_SAs_grassroots/?switcher=1)



## Election Results

### *PWV, now Gauteng, 1994*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
African National Congress	2 418 257	57.6	50
National Party	1 002 540	23.88	21
Freedom Front +	258 935	6.17	5
Democratic Party	223 548	5.32	5
Inkatha Freedom Party	153 567	3.66	3
Pan Africanist Congress	61 512	1.47	1
African Christian Democratic Party	25 542	0.61	1
Federal Party	16 279	0.39	0
African Muslim Party	12 888	0.31	0
Women's Rights Peace Party	7 279	0.17	0
Luso South African Party	5 423	0.13	0
Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa	4 853	0.12	0
African Democratic Movement	4 352	0.1	0
Ximoko Progressive Party	3 275	0.08	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4 198 250</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>86</b>

Table 1: from EISA website <http://www.content.eisa.org.za/sites/eisa.org.za/files/imports/import-data/WEF/sou1994resultsh.htm>

### *Gauteng 1999*

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
African National Congress	2,485,064	67.85%	50
Democratic Party	658,231	17.97%	13
New National Party	142,563	3.89%	3
Inkatha Freedom Party	128,717	3.51%	3
United Democratic Movement	71,604	1.96%	1
Vryheidsfront/ Freedom Front	45,749	1.25%	1
African Christian Democratic Party	42,581	1.16%	1
Federal Alliance	32,493	0.89%	1
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	26,774	0.73%	
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging	11,447	0.31%	
United Christian Democratic Party	8,596	0.24%	
Azanian People's Organisation	5,895	0.16%	
The Socialist Party of Azania	1,988	0.05%	
Labour Party	1,088	0.03%	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,662,790</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>73</b>

Table 3: Adapted from IEC website-  
<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/50/Leading%20Parties/GP.pdf>

### *Gauteng 2004*

<b>Party Name</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>% Votes</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	2,331,121	68.40%	51
Democratic Alliance/ Demokratiese Alliansie	708,081	20.78%	15
Inkatha Freedom Party	85,500	2.51%	2
African Christian Democratic Party	55,991	1.64%	1
Independent Democrats	51,921	1.52%	2
Vryheidsfront Plus	45,648	1.34%	1
United Democratic Movement	33,644	0.99%	1
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	29,076	0.85%	1
Nuwe Nasionale Party / New National Party	25,992	0.76%	
United Christian Democratic Party	8,857	0.26%	
Azanian People's Organisation	8,670	0.25%	
Christian Democratic Party	7,773	0.23%	
Nasionale Aksie	4,712	0.14%	
Peace and Justice Congress	3,208	0.09%	
The Socialist Party of Azania	3,191	0.09%	
Economic Freedom Movement	1,862	0.06%	
Pro-death Penalty Party	1,825	0.05%	
Black Consciousness Party	1,236	0.04%	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,408,308</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>73</b>

Table 3: Adapted from IEC website-  
<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/50/Leading%20Parties/GP.pdf>

### *Gauteng 2009*

<b>Party Name</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>% Votes</b>	<b>Seats</b>
African National Congress	2662013	64.04%	47
Democratic Alliance/Demokratiese Alliansie	908616	21.86%	16
Congress of the People	323,327	7.78%	6
Vryheidsfront Plus	67660	1.63%	1
Inkatha Freedom Party	61856	1.49%	1
African Christian Democratic Party	36099	0.87%	1
Independent Democrats	25243	0.61%	1

United Democratic Movement	16480	0.40%	
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	12880	0.31%	
United Christian Democratic Party	10,091	0.24%	
Azanian People's Organisation	8,927	0.22%	
Movement Democratic Party	5,731	0.14%	
African People's Convention	5123	0.12%	
Christian Democratic Alliance	2901	0.07%	
African Christian Alliance – Afrikaner Christen Alliansie	2541	0.06%	
Women Forward	1974	0.05%	
Great Kongress of South Africa	1909	0.05%	
National Democratic Convention	1497	0.04%	
Alliance of Free Democrats	1101	0.03%	
New Vision Party	1079	0.03%	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,157,048</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>73</b>

Table 4: Adapted from IEC website

<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/169/Leading%20Parties/GP.pdf>

## Voter Turnout

<b>Election Year</b>	<b>Registered Population</b>	<b>Completed VD's</b>	<b>Total Votes Cast in Completed VD's</b>	<b>%Voter Turnout</b>
2004	4,650,594	4,650,594	3,553,098	76.40 %
2009	5,555,159	5,555,159	4,391,699	79.06 %

Table 5: Adapted from IEC website

<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/169/Voter%20Turnout/GP.pdf>

<http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/50/Voter%20Turnout/GP.pdf>

## Party dynamics

While most political parties' campaigns focus on similar issues and tend to take on national campaign messages, province specific campaigns have been evident among some opposition parties, with the DA primarily latching onto the controversial E-toll system for Gauteng roads and the apparently pervasive abhorrence for it among some sections of the population as a campaign issue. Gauteng and the Western Cape are likely to be the most competitively contested provinces among the parties in forming a provincial government.

On the weekend of the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of February, several parties had campaign events in close proximity to each other. The EFF's launched its manifesto in Tembisa, while the ANC Youth League hosted a campaign event relatively close by, sparking fears that the proximity of these events may spark tensions and conflict between them. The events, however, went off without

incident. The EFF rally and manifesto launch drew massive media and public attention, with (unconfirmed) crowd estimates of 50 000 people. The manifesto launch drew representatives from other “left-leaning” parties, or those that purport to share a common ideological posture, such as the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), the Socialist Party of Azania (Sopa) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC),<sup>146</sup> indicating either the potential for future amalgamations, coalitions and alliances, or issue-based co-operation in the short term.

Similar to Cope in 2009, the EFF's manifesto launch garnered considerable media attention and coverage, essentially and ostensibly because they were both breakaways from the ANC. Unlike Cope, however, the EFF has absorbed prominent representatives of other apparently left-leaning political formations. The EFF's election manifesto also distinguishes it markedly in its key themes and ideological approaches, and differentiates it from all the other parties. Its campaign mode, paraphernalia, rhetoric and trademark red beret also give the EFF a distinct campaign style, and although there are widespread suggestions that the EFF primarily appeals to poor, marginal and disaffected youth, indications in the Gauteng province are that although this may be true, a large part of the EFF's support is drawn from an ascendant black professional, technical and managerial occupational class frustrated by the perceived lack of transformation in the professions, in industry and in the economy in general. This may be a small segment of EFF support, but is highly visible.

When Cope was formed by former high profile ANC leaders, there was an assumption that they would take with them a huge chunk of ANC voter support. Part of the media and sections of public opinion overestimated projections and inflated expectations of how well Cope would perform in the 2009 elections. As it turned out, Cope achieved 7.7% of the vote share nationally. A much more cautious approach to predictions have been exercised before the 2014 elections, especially with regard to the EFF, viewed like Cope as another breakaway from the ANC, even though this is an inaccurate characterisation of the EFF. Though the EFF in the main appears to include some who broke away from the ANC Youth league, it includes The September National Imbizo (SNI) which began as a social movement initiative, fragments of the African Peoples Convention and some fragments of the socialist oriented black consciousness formations. Consequently, estimates of the EFF voter support for 2014 are being more conservatively estimated.

The EFF's distinct message, however, does differentiate it from Cope in that it has clear, distinct and identifiable policies; they have an appeal across several different political formations as noted above, and propose a radical shift from current government policy which may prove more attractive to a disillusioned working and under class who live in the most expensive province in the country, than Cope might have had in 2009. The EFF will however be faced with the reality

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<sup>146</sup> Sosibo, Kwanele. “EFF launches its election manifesto”. Mail and Guardian Online, (22 Feb 2014)  
<http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-22-eff-launches-its-party-manifesto>

that the cohort within which its popular support is demographically located is unlikely to have registered to vote and, if registered, may be fickle on election day in actually turning out to vote.

After the IEC published the final candidate lists for the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures it became clear that political defections, movement between parties and absorption of parties have been a feature of the electoral landscape in the period immediately before the 2014 elections. A DA MP in the National Council of Provinces, Beverly Abrahams, resigned in parliament before being placed number 118 on the ANC list. Defections from the DA to the ANC at local level in Gauteng continued after that. DA councillors Sam Moimane and Sello Maila left the DA, alleging that they were not allowed to "develop" in the DA because of their race. "I have never experienced apartheid, but I found the symptoms of apartheid in that party," Moimane said.<sup>147</sup> All in all, four councillors of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni left the DA to join the ANC, and four DA councillors in Tshwane left to join the ANC in March. While there has been movement between the ANC and Cope, the only significant movement between parties in Gauteng has happened between the ANC and DA. It is unclear what constituency each of these defectors would take along with them, but sitting MPs of one party being catapulted onto the list of a party it just joins may breed disgruntlement among existing and long-standing members of parties.

The announcement by the DA that Dr Mampela Ramphela from the newly formed AgangSA would be its presidential candidate and the subsequent failure of that agreement has sparked both tensions between the two parties and tensions within them, with some AgangSA members initially resolving to expel Dr Ramphela from the party. The DA Gauteng North leader, Khume Ramulifho, opposed this, suggesting that the move indicated that the DA does not have any other worthy candidates within its party structures.<sup>148</sup> This constituted a substantial public-relations disaster for both the DA and AgangSA. Being an established party, the effect on the DA among its likely voters was minimal, but credibility for AgangSA with no record or party capability to mitigate the negative effects of this flop may be monumental, and may also be currently manifested in a lacklustre and almost invisible election campaign. Both parties appear to have papered over the internal cracks that resulted from the AgangSA-DA deal, with occasional snide swipes directed at each other.

Past election results show that between 1999 and 2004, the DA was able to increase its percentage vote share in the province by 2.8%. Between 2004 and 2009, its vote-share increased by only 1.082%. This smaller increase may have been caused by the emergence of Cope, or it may be that the DA had reached its full growth potential.

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<sup>147</sup> Sarah Evans "ANC to take 'firm stance' on violent protesters", Mail and Guardian online, (06 Feb 2014), <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-06-anc-to-take-firm-stance-on-violent-protesters>

<sup>148</sup> Matlatla George, Mogomotsi, Magome and Aboobaker, Shanti, "Ramphela move causes DA revolt". Sunday Independent, (February 2 2014), <http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/ramphela-move-causes-da-revolt-1.1640491#.Uzq5VKI8GM8>

While the EFF's emergence may serve to fragment the vote for opposition to the ANC in general, the weakness of Cope due to factional battles and the putative merger between the DA and AgangSA means that the DA may be able to secure a slightly wider section of the middle-class vote than it historically has, as a greater number of blacks become upwardly socially mobile and begin to identify with the DA to a greater extent.

### **Role of civil society and faith-based organisations**

EISA, in cooperation with the South African Catholic Justice and Peace Committee and the Cooperative Research and Education (Core), has partnered with community-based organisations to engage in voter education. The project developed a full voter-education programme, which among other activities trained 45 voter educators with an emphasis on youth and women in particular, to conduct voter education in communities in Gauteng.

Youth-oriented and -focused work on the elections is also being carried out by a civil society organisation called InkuluFreeHeid, which launched a comprehensive election-education campaign called Our Voice Our Vote (OVOV) that has as its chief objectives encouraging young South Africans to register to vote in the 2014 general election, and ensuring that they make informed decisions on Election Day.<sup>149</sup> The OVOV campaign has engaged the youth in different areas of Gauteng, educating communities on voting procedures and informing the public by producing policy summaries contained in each of the parties' manifestos.

In addition, many media houses, as well as NGOs and CBOs including religious, professional and business associations, have held election-related public events.

The South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SACCI) held an election debate at the Johannesburg Country Club in Auckland Park on 5 February 2014. Representatives of the six best-represented parties in the National Assembly were invited to address the audience on macro-economic policy issues. The event attracted high-profile representatives of the major parties in the country.

On 23 February 2014, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) held its debate at UJ. The SABC debate takes place every week in the lead-up to the elections, where participants consist of party representatives and academics and themes change in every debate. The first theme was called *Free and Fair Elections in a highly charged atmosphere of violent protests*.<sup>150</sup> Several radio stations, both commercial and from the public broadcaster, have had massive election-related coverage notwithstanding competition from two high-profile murder trials which have captured public attention at the time of the elections.

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<sup>149</sup> From InkuluFreeHeid website- <http://www.inkulufreeheid.org/OVOV/about.php>

<sup>150</sup> <http://www.uj.ac.za/EN/Newsroom/News/Pages/SABC-takes-Election-Debates-to-UJ.aspx>

## Protests and their impact

According to research conducted by Municipal IQ and the University of Johannesburg (UJ), Gauteng as a province experiences the highest volume of community protests in the country, and this may colour the electoral environment. An analysis of the data provided by the researchers shows that Gauteng's high volume of protests is due to a combination of factors. The data also indicates that protests around the country occur most frequently in urban and peri-urban communities.

Being the most urbanised province in the country, Gauteng contains within its provincial borders three major metropolitan areas, and this means that it is likely to have a higher volume of protests than other parts of the country.




Chart 1: from 2011 Multi-level Government Initiative Report, *Community Protests in South Africa: Trends, Analysis and Explanations*, [http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community\\_Protests\\_SA.pdf](http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community_Protests_SA.pdf)






Chart 2: from 2011 Multi-level Government Initiative Report, *Community Protests in South Africa: Trends, Analysis and Explanations*, [http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community\\_Protests\\_SA.pdf](http://www.mlgi.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community_Protests_SA.pdf)

The results of the 2011 census show that Gauteng received the highest proportion of internal migrants in the 10 years between 2001 and 2011, at 26%.<sup>151</sup> Gauteng has the highest overall population and it is also the province with the highest population of migrants from other countries coming into South Africa. Half of Gauteng's population<sup>152</sup> is made up of migrants, and this is one of the factors that government officials point to as an explanatory factor for protests in the province. This reasoning uses the 2008 "xenophobic" attacks as a departure point to explain that the current spate of protests are fuelled by the fact that Gauteng's administrative capacity is overloaded due to both its own large population size and the additional burden that the prevalence of migrants in the province places on it.

Government officials have also stated that the media are not accurate about the way that they label these protests, proclaiming that they are not necessarily "service delivery" protests. In Sebokeng on 5 February when a protestor was shot dead, ANC Provincial Secretary in Gauteng David Makhura said: "They are not service delivery protests". "We have always characterised this, not as service delivery protests, they are protests relating to one type of development issue

<sup>151</sup> Songezo Zibi, "Community protests: the discontent grows", Financial Mail online, (20 February 2014), <http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/02/20/community-protests-the-discontent-grows>

<sup>152</sup> Census 2011, Census in Brief, [https://www.statssa.gov.za/Census2011/Products/Census\\_2011\\_Census\\_in\\_brief.pdf](https://www.statssa.gov.za/Census2011/Products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf)



or the other.”<sup>153</sup> This kind of appeal falls within the broader narrative that the president used to explain protests in the State of the Nation Address. “When 95 percent of households have access to water, the 5 percent who still need to be provided for feel they cannot wait a moment longer. Success is also the breeding ground of rising expectations.”<sup>154</sup> Jeremy Cronin, Deputy Minister for Public Works and SACP deputy general secretary explains that the articulation of this argument was not well explained by the president, but the argument is valid nonetheless. Cronin asserts that it is the uneven provision of services that underpin protests. Cronin also goes on to explain the reason behind the Gauteng protests that were in the media spotlight over the past few months: “While the immediate issues were different in the three townships, in every case, competing ANC factions linked to former councillors and now out of favour local small businesses were behind the mobilisation of angry youth. In deeply frustrated communities, allegations – well-founded or not – of corruption and mispending easily gain traction. And so, once again, it’s not so much the absence of services but desperate competition over who controls their allocation that triggers protest.”<sup>155</sup>

According to research conducted by the Social Change Research Unit at UJ, a total of 43 protesters were reportedly killed by police between 2004 and 2014. Professor Peter Alexander, the Research Chair in Social Change at UJ, said that the number of protests this year has not been exceptional but the number of killings that happened during protests are: “The number of service delivery protests annually in South Africa has been increasing since 2004 and since 2009; more of them have turned violent.”<sup>156</sup> In explaining the sometimes violent nature of protests, Trevor Ngwane, researcher at the Social Change Research Unit, suggests that communities engage in protests after they have exhausted other options of engagement with authorities, suggesting cheekily that “Often when people start hitting the streets they should have a banner saying ‘all protocol observed’”. In stark contrast to this the Human Settlements MEC for Gauteng Ntombi Mekgwe suggests that violence is avoidable, saying: “There are a number of avenues which are available to members of the community to raise their concerns”.<sup>157</sup>

On the appeal by the ANC and other alliance partners that the protests can simply be attributed to factionalism, researcher Carin Runciman on 12 February 2014 at a presentation of the research findings to the media explained that “Such characterisations of these protests serve to delegitimise the grievances and agency of ordinary working-class people”.<sup>158</sup>

<sup>153</sup> South African Press Association, “Protests Not Linked to Service Delivery: ANC”, Sowetan Live, (Feb 7 2014) , <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2014/02/07/protests-not-linked-to-service-delivery-anc>


<sup>154</sup> Cronin, Jeremy, “The real, complex reasons behind protests”. Cape Times (February 26 2014), <http://www.iol.co.za/news/the-real-complex-reasons-behind-protests-1.1653218#.Uzp9T6l8GM8>

<sup>155</sup> Ibid

<sup>156</sup> Laura Grant . “Research shows sharp increase in service delivery protests”, Mail and Guardian online, (12 Feb 2014), <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-protests>

<sup>157</sup> “Gauteng protests linked to polls: MEC”. South African Press Association (SAPA)”. (February 7 2014), <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/gauteng-protests-linked-to-polls-mec-1.1643880#.Uzki0c48GM8>

<sup>158</sup> Op.cit (Grant)



Graph 1: showing Grievances cited by protesters 2004-2013, Media Briefing:Community Protests 2004-2013: Some Research Findings, Social Change Research Unity, Prof Peter Alexander, Dr Carin Runciman and Mr Trevor Ngwane; Social Change Research Unit, Media Briefing Community Protests 2004-2013

The following is an account of some of the more prominent protests that have occurred in Gauteng in recent times.

It is clear that the Community protests that have occurred over the past ten years in Gauteng and across that country cannot simply be characterised by either government successes, uneven delivery of services, internal migrants and the resultant capacity deficit or ANC factional battles. According to the findings of the aforementioned research conducted at UJ, protests are caused due to a number of contributing factors. , The top five grievances were about service delivery in general, housing, water and sanitation, political representation and electricity and corruption, municipal administration, roads, unemployment, demarcation, land, health and crime also featured. Trevor Ngwane, in an interview with the South African Civil Society Information Service, explains that protests are specifically about the issues mentioned above but, taking into account the host of protests and the varying reasons why people engage in protests, the “service delivery” protests are a reflection of communities demanding a better quality of democracy<sup>159</sup>. The engagement in protests by citizens is therefore, part and parcel of democracy because democratic engagement is not limited to the process of voting.

<sup>159</sup> 'Protest Nation': What's Driving the Demonstrations on the Streets of South Africa? From South African Civil Society Information services website, (27 February 2014) <http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1930>

Of importance is the area of Bekkersdal, which has gained notoriety since community members in the township near Westonaria took to protesting from September through to the end of October 2013. Residents demanded the resignation of the Mayor of Westonaria Municipality and that the Municipality be placed under administration. Resident grievances seem to stem mainly from that fact that sewerage had not been collected and then later protests intensified amid claims from residents that the municipality was corrupt. The estimated damages were in the region of about R11.2 million, when protesters destroyed a community hall, a gymnasium, a mobile library and municipal offices.<sup>160</sup>

More recently, Bekkersdal was involved in incidents of violence on the weekend of the 8 February 2014, which was the last weekend of registration for voting in the May elections. The IEC claimed that most of the 22 000 voting stations opened on time without incident, even in areas with a history of protest, but the two voting stations in this area had to be closed due to petrol bombs being thrown at them. The IEC claims that the registration process was going smoothly until the infamous Red Ants Private Security Group was deployed, which aggravated residents.<sup>161</sup>

The media coverage around protests is not able to grasp the deeper motivations of citizens when they take to protesting. What the media coverage is able to illustrate is the dissatisfaction of citizens through the accounts of violence and destruction that occur during the protests.

In Gauteng, the protests have served as an entry-point for parties to engage citizens and the media. In a statement Human Settlements MEC Ntombi Mekingwe said: “We also have no doubt in our minds that this sudden upsurge in violent protests is linked to the upcoming elections”.<sup>162</sup> Whether this statement is factual or not, the statement is made in light of the fact that other parties have used protests in Gauteng and other parts as an element of their electoral strategies.

The EFF has visibly been at the forefront of protests: their red berets can be seen in the protests and during a protest in the North West, pictures were taken showing EFF members dropping tyres to burn at a protest. Julius Malema, the party’s leader, unequivocally supports the community protests and believes that protests are the ANC getting what it deserves.<sup>163</sup> There have been some incidents of protests where EFF members were chased away by community members.

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<sup>160</sup> South African Press Association. “Bekkersdal protests: R11.2m in damage”. CityPress Online, (29 October 2013) <http://www.citypress.co.za/news/bekkersdal-protests-r11-2m-damage/>

<sup>161</sup> South African Press Association. “IEC: Petrol bombs thrown at voting stations”. IOL News, (February 8 2014), <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/iec-petrol-bombs-thrown-at-voting-stations-1.1644034#.UzvZZa8GM8>

<sup>162</sup> “Gauteng protests linked to polls: MEC”. South African Press Association (SAPA)”. (February 7 2014), <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/gauteng-protests-linked-to-polls-mec-1.1643880#.Uzki0c48GM8>

<sup>163</sup> du Plessis, Carien. “Julius Malema says ANC gets what it deserves” CityPress Online, (09 February 2014), <http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/julius-malema-says-anc-gets-deserves/>

At a protest in Protea South in Soweto in August 2013, EFF members were told by community members that they were only welcome to stay at the protest if they removed their red berets, because the community felt that they did not want the protest to dissolve into petty politicking.<sup>164</sup> The EFF's attempted engagement with and inveigling itself within the protests is not surprising, as the party is founded on representing the interests of the "disaffected".

Surprisingly, of late the DA, whose regular constituency is not part of massive direct action apart from its increasing proclivity for organised marches, has also decided to use the protests in Gauteng to interact with the electorate after ignoring them for close on to a decade. Following protests in Sebokeng where protesters were killed, the DA became active in the area to help the families of slain protestors. Musi Maimane, the DA's premier candidate for Gauteng, said: "We would help the family with moving the body of Lerata [Rabolila] from Sebokeng to Ficksburg where he is originally from. Let's register to vote for change. We need to have different kinds of protests not protests about basic needs such as water and electricity ... People are dying during protests and the president or his senior staff fail to address their people. This is not the ANC of Nelson Mandela".<sup>165</sup>

It is interesting that the DA, despite having often been at the forefront of organised marches for a clearly defined objective in the past, have opted to get involved in community protest action which they have traditionally chosen to stay away from, even if their involvement was only after the fact. After "service delivery" protest marches in Sterkspruit in the Eastern Cape in 2013, leader of the DA Hellen Zille, while addressing a crowd, was quoted as saying: "The truth is, protest marches rarely change anything because making a noise doesn't change a government." "It is no good voting ANC on Wednesday and toyi-toying on Thursday. You must vote for a different party".<sup>166</sup>

In the main, it is yet to be seen whether the upsurge of protests will have a major impact at the polls or whether political parties' opportunistic engagement with them will have a marked impact on voter allegiance.

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<sup>164</sup> Toerin, Rieart. "Protea South Residents Chase Away EFF". Eye Witness News, (8 August 2013), <http://ewn.co.za/2013/08/08/Protea-South-residents-chase-away-EFF>

<sup>165</sup> South African Press Association (SAPA). "DA to assist family of slain Sebokeng protester". Mail and Guardian online. (09 Feb 2014), <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-09-da-to-help-assit-family-of-slain-sebokeng-protester>

<sup>166</sup> South African Press Association. "Protest marches not the answer: Zille", (April 5 2013), <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/protest-marches-not-the-answer-zille-1.1496160#.UzvKAa18GM8>