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Sakeliga has proposed amending the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) to allow US-friendly firms and subnational jurisdictions across Africa to retain access to the US market even where national governments fail to meet AGOA eligibility criteria.

This would move AGOA beyond its current binary framework (under which an entire country is either in or out) towards one that extends benefits to the individual producers and regions that align with market-based principles and sound ethics.

The proposal, set out in our formal submission to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on 15 May 2026, was sent in response to the USTR's call in April for submissions on modernising AGOA. The USTR is seeking proposals against a backdrop of bipartisan concern in Washington that AGOA has become outdated and no longer serves US regional policy objectives. The legislation was extended for one year until 31 December 2026, subject to a comprehensive review.

Sakeliga's dynamic alternative

Sakeliga's position is that a renewed AGOA that works for the sections of African countries that want to meet its market-based standards and ethical requirements – with their positive spillover effects – is far preferable to an AGOA that is inaccessible to anyone at all in those countries.

Sakeliga's submission therefore proposes modernising AGOA through two mechanisms:

Access for Compliant Businesses. 

Trade benefits can be granted directly to individual producers and manufacturers that formally, publicly, and tangibly demonstrate adherence to market principles and labour standards. This could ensure that ethical, productive firms retain access to the US market and are not penalised for the actions of a non-compliant national government.

Eligibility for Compliant Regions.

Trade access can be extended to specific subnational jurisdictions, such as provinces, municipalities, or economic zones, if they meet US standards on property rights and trade barriers, irrespective of the national government's eligibility status.

Both of these mechanisms would rely largely on existing US customs procedures, while moving AGOA toward having the greater flexibility that many legislators, businesses, and policy analysts have advocated for over several years now. Sakeliga’s proposals draw on and extend several notable contributions over the years.

Why this matters now

Numerous African countries, including South Africa, are unlikely to pass a serious AGOA eligibility review on merit.

Under the current trajectory, businesses across Africa face unilateral escalation by the United States, notably through import tariffs, while non-compliant national governments employ delay tactics instead of substantive reform. A subnational and entity-level alternative would decouple the standing of productive African businesses and pro-reform regions from policy disputes between their central governments and Washington, providing a concrete route for them to retain market access on their own merits.

South Africa's government, for example, is failing to uphold market-economy principles and is fast trying to increase race-based trade barriers domestically and internationally – something that contravenes AGOA’s stipulations. Instead of revoking AGOA for all of South Africa, the US could opt to maintain eligibility for goods produced by businesses and those produced within, say, provinces that reject the government’s race-restrictive programmes and conduct business and policy on non-race-restrictive terms.

Alignment with US objectives, at no additional cost

The 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States calls for a pivot from aid-centric reliance towards a framework defined by trade and investment.

Subnational and entity-level conditionality directly supports that shift, linking market access to the achievement of US standards within specific jurisdictions and rewarding proven compliance. Because verification could be funded and managed by the private sector, the model advances these goals at no expense to the United States.

Conclusion

Sakeliga’s AGOA proposal aims to give South African – and all sub-Saharan African – businesses and jurisdictions a reason and a route to resist harmful domestic policies. It also presents the United States with an attractive, workable mechanism of targeted reciprocity, stronger enforceability, and self-funded verification.

Issued by Sakeliga