CHAPTER 3

TRANSFORMING THE STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1.1 A New Vision and Mission for the Public Service

The public service inherited by the new Government in 1994 was designed primarily to promote and defend the social and economic system of apartheid, and was geared to serving the material needs and interests of the minority. Structured along mechanical, closed models of public and development administration, the principle features of the apartheid bureaucracy included:

• Rigid racial and ethnic segregation;
• Fragmentation, duplication and waste;
• Poor and outdated management practices;
• A regulatory bureaucratic culture;
• Lack of accountability and transparency;
• Poorly paid and demotivated staff;
• Conflictual labour relations.

The new Government's commitment to reconstruction and development, national reconciliation, and democratisation and community empowerment placed considerable emphasis on the need for the transformation of the public service from an instrument of discrimination, control and domination to an enabling agency which serves and empowers in an accountable and transparent way. To this end, and as seen in Chapter 2, the Government adopted in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) the following vision for the public service:

"The Government of National Unity is committed to continually improving the lives of the people of South Africa by a transformed public service which is representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all."

In pursuit of this vision, the Government developed the following mission:

"The creation of a people centred and people driven public service which is characterised by equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics".

In moving towards this vision, the Government identified the following eight priority areas for public service transformation:

• Transforming service delivery to meet basic needs and redress past imbalances
• Rationalisation and restructuring to ensure a unified, integrated and leaner public service;
• Institution building and management reforms to promote greater accountability and organisational and managerial effectiveness;
• Representativeness and affirmative action;
• The democratisation of the state;
• Human resource development;
• Improving employment conditions and labour relations;
• The promotion of a professional service ethos.

The above vision and mission statements were premised on a fundamental re-definition of the role of the state and its relationship with civil society, based on a partnership between them rather than the antagonistic relations that had prevailed in the past. They were also consistent, as noted in Chapter 2, with the provisions of the Interim Constitution and the RDP.

Chapters 3 and 10 of the New Constitution (1996) took this process further by making provision for an integrated, inter-sectoral, and cooperative approach to governance. These provisions commit government in all spheres to be transparent in policy making and inclusive in its approach.

3.1.2 The Meaning of Transformation and Reform

In the WPTPS, transformation was defined as a dramatic, focused and relatively short-term process, designed to fundamentally reshape the public service for its appointed role in the new dispensation in South Africa. As such it could be distinguished from the broader, longer-term and on-going process of administrative reform which will be required to ensure that the South African public service keeps in step with the changing needs and requirements of the domestic and international environments. Whereas the goals of transformation are to be achieved within an anticipated timescale of two to three years, the process of administrative reform will be ongoing.

3.1.3 Changes in Structure and Function

In pursuing the above vision and mission, the Government opted for a "strategic change management" or "strategic-developmental" approach to administrative reform, rather than traditional bureaucratic models or neo-liberal models based on the restructuring and increasing contracting-out of state services. This approach was regarded as the most appropriate given the principles, goals and underlying values of the RDP and the needs of the society in this phase of transition and transformation. The adoption of this approach had important implications for both the functions and structures of the public service in the new South Africa. At the functional level, it involved the move towards a service that is:

• Needs-based, designed to meet the needs of all citizen-customers rather than those of a small minority, or the needs of the bureaucracy itself;
• Mission-driven and results-oriented, focusing on goal-based service and results and outputs;
• Strategic in focus, where the emphasis is placed on strategic planning to achieve desired goals amd to anticipate and prevent problems rather than responding by way of crisis management when they occur;
• Based on a facilitative rather than controlling state, to mobilise the potential of civil society, rather than relying exclusively on public sector resources, thereby empowering citizens to share in the responsibilities of governance;
• Committed to quality, through the effective management of the quality of services rendered to ensure excellence and equity in provision, as well as value for money for both the state and taxpayers.

At the structural level the strategic change management approach involved a major shift from the former mechanical model of public and development administration (with its emphasis on centralisation, hierarchy, the procedural observance of rules and regulations, and insulation from the public) towards a more organic, integrative and adaptive model of corporate governance -- with an increasing emphasis on:

• The decentralisation and devolution of decision-making power;
• The corresponding strengthening of managerial responsibility and accountability for results;
• The democratisation of internal work procedures;
• The establishment of flatter organisational structures;
• The introduction of improved forms of cooperation and coordination (both vertical and horizontal);
• The development of team work and a project or programme-based approach to work;
• The development of new forms of task-related rather than rule-based cultures; and
• The incorporation of civil society bodies into the governance process.

3.1.4 Purpose and Structure of the Chapter: Evaluating Progress Since 1994

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and evaluate the progress that has be made since 1994 towards the achievement of the structural and function requirements of the strategic developmental model of governance advocated in the WPTPS, and the related model of cooperative governance outlined in the 1996 Constitution. As such, a degree of overlap with the previous Overview chapter will be unavoidable. However, this chapter will be able to explore some of the issues raised in Chapter 2 in greater detail, as well as introducing a number of new themes. Repetition between the two chapters will be kept to a minimum.

The chapter is organised into the following sections:

• Managing the "size" of the public service;
• Strategies for managing transformation;
• Managing the machinery of government decision-making;
• Reconstituting the Public Service Commission;
• Management approaches, cultures and practices;
• Managing service delivery;
• Managing institutional performance.

3.2 MANAGING THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

3.2.1 Introduction

The question of the appropriate role and size of the state has been brought into the public spotlight in South Africa by controversies surrounding such issues as the rationalisation of education, the discovery of thousands of "ghost" workers, and the handsome severance packages paid out to former civil servants. This has sparked a public debate as to whether the Government's present policy of rightsizing is effective, feasible and in the interests of economic growth and social development.

Given the bloated, fragmented, and inequitable nature of the apartheid public service, it is not surprising that a broad consensus emerged in the post-1994 dispensation on the need for a much more efficient, effective and equitable use of resources, tied in particular to improving the quantity and quality of service provision and redressing the imbalances of the past. It was also encouraged by global trends towards rightsizing, privatisation and the achievement of greater competitiveness, quality, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in public service provision. Within this broad consensus, divergent views and points of emphasis have emerged, however, on the most appropriate ways of promoting cost-effectiveness, and in particular on the purpose and role of "rightsizing."

3.2.2 The Policy Context in Regard to Rightsizing

3.2.2.1 The RDP and the White Paper

The RDP White Paper (November 1994) and the WPTPS both emphasised the need to reduce consumption expenditure as a proportion of total government spending, and to reduce the wage bill as a proportion of consumption expenditure. The rationale was not merely to save money, but rather to release resources for productive investment in RDP-related initiatives. For this reason it would be vital to ensure that strategies for creating a leaner and more responsive public service were:

• Well-conceived, well-researched, and well-planned;
• Located within a development rather than merely a budget-driven paradigm;
• Developed in close cooperation with staff, unions and civil society;
• Communicated effectively at all levels;
• Designed and monitored effectively to ensure that the process of increasing cost-effectiveness does not impact negatively on staff morale, productivity, representivity and the meeting of basic needs through improved service delivery.

The principal goals of the strategy were:

• To achieve the optimal allocation of human and other resources throughout the service as a whole.
• To realise greater congruence between the needs of the country in terms of the RDP and the size of the public service.
• To facilitate greater representivity and service equity through the identification of both redundant and new jobs.
• To achieve a balance between the needs and priorities of the RDP and the realisation of a fiscal strategy that seeks to contain government expenditure.
• To work towards greater cost-effectiveness through the appropriate allocation and re-allocation of human and other resources towards key priority areas identified in the RDP.

In working towards these goals, the White Paper proposed that a comprehensive review of personnel requirements and staffing structures in all departments and administrations be carried out with a view to realigning them more closely towards the delivery of services to clients and to meeting the outputs required by the RDP. This would be complemented by the introduction of new budgeting systems and the reprioritisation of departmental expenditure. Based on this review, new staffing levels, structures and job descriptions would be introduced, the likely result of which would be "downsizing" in some departments or sections, and "upsizing" in others, within the overall parameters of a leaner service over time. Staff displaced in the process would, where possible, be offered redeployment and retraining opportunities, as well as retrenchment and early retirement packages where appropriate (with due care taken to ensure that such severance schemes do not lead to the excessive loss of key personnel).

The White Paper also proposed that the rightsizing exercise would be complemented by a number of additional and related strategic interventions to assist in the promotion of a leaner and more cost-effective service. These included including efficiency savings, improved productivity, cost-saving adjustments to the remuneration structures, and the contracting-out of services to the private and community sectors, particularly on a partnership basis.

3.2.2.2 GEAR and the Size and Scope of the Public Service

GEAR was unveiled in June 1996, as a response to persistent structural problems in the economy. Through a combination of measures, including fiscal austerity, tighter monetary policy, financial and trade liberalisation, restructuring of state assets and labour market reforms, the Government believed that GEAR would be capable of achieving growth with both job creation and redistribution.

Vital to the success of GEAR would be the introduction of a tighter fiscal policy, aimed at progressively lowering the fiscal deficit target from 4.5% of GDP in 1996/97 to 3.0% of GDP in 1999/2000, and thereby releasing resources for productive investment. Accompanying this would be a reduction in consumption expenditure as a % of GDP from 19.5% in 1997 to 18.1% in 2000. Measures for accomplishing these targets would include:

• A thorough audit of government expenditure to identify those areas in which cuts can be made without detracting from government commitments and priorities.
• Careful management of the overall government wage bill and the rightsizing programme, in ways in which affordability considerations, maintenance of public services, and macro-economic consistency are paramount.
• The strict containment of government spending on other goods and services, and current transfers.
• The elimination or scaling down of government activities which cannot be provided to all or which could be undertaken effectively by the private sector.
• A variety of budgetary reforms, including the move to multi-year budgeting, designed to promote more effective forms of financial planning and monitoring and to enhance the redistributive thrust of government expenditure.

3.2.3 Rightsizing Measures

Over the past two years a number of policy measures have had a bearing on the size of the public service, both in terms of personnel and cost.

Such measures include:

• The Cabinet decision early in 1996 to impose a ceiling on new recruitment, as a quid pro quo for the delegation of personnel powers from the PSC to individual departments and provincial administrations. Neither the number of approved posts nor the salary bill of a department at the date of devolution could be exceeded, except for salary adjustments.
• The Cabinet decision in June 1996 to set annual rightsizing targets for national departments and provincial administrations. These would reflect the personnel needs required for effective service delivery within the context of the need for a leaner public service over time. A committee made up of representatives from the DPSA and State Expenditure was established to oversee this process, and to ensure in particular that targets were drawn up in close cooperation with departments and provincial administrations. The first targets were due to be set for 1 April 1997, but failed to materialise for reasons given below).
• Efforts to abolish most if not all funded vacancies (the total number of which is currently estimated at approximately 60,000).
• Efforts to reduce the estimated 54,000 supernumeraries in the public service who are still on the payroll but surplus to current requirements (largely as a result of the integration of the former "Bantustan" and RSA civil services).
• Efforts to identify and eradicate the estimated 40,000 "ghost" workers in the public service (people on the PERSAL payroll but no longer working for the state).
• The introduction in May 1996 of the voluntary severance package (VSP) scheme, following union endorsement in the Central Chamber of the Bargaining Council in return for the introduction of a new grading system and three-year improvement of conditions of service package, as well as for a government moratorium on compulsory retrenchments.

3.2.4 Assessment and Critique

In its study of the operation of the rightsizing exercise to date, and especially the VSP scheme, the Commission noted that some positive results have been achieved. It has, for example, allowed departments/administrations to dispense with a number of employees whose services were no longer required. And to some extent it has also created capacity to promote representivity (though the actual details on this are somewhat vague). Such benefits have been vastly outweighed, however, by a number of important disadvantages, related in particular to the narrow budget-driven focus of the exercise, its limited achievements, a number of unintended adverse consequences, and the weaknesses exposed by the exercise in the processes of policy implementation and formulation. The Government has itself recently acknowledged many of these limitations and established a project team to investigate ways of overcoming them.

3.2.4.1 Narrow Focus

There is little doubt that the rightsizing exercise to date has operated within a narrow budget-driven framework, rather than the broad developmental paradigm outlined in the WPTPS. The only possible exception was the Cabinet's decision in June 1996 to set up a committee to work with departments and provinces to devise appropriate and feasible rightsizing targets. The first targets were due to be set for 1 April 1997. This failed to materialise, however, largely because of the lack of the required mutual cooperation and agreement on the appropriate staffing levels (targets) per function.

The result has been that little progress has been made so far in realising the broader rightsizing goals set out in the WPTPS, especially in terms of the achievement of a more optimal allocation of human and other resources; the promotion of greater cost-effectiveness by re-directing such resources to priority areas identified in the RDP; the effective linking of rightsizing activities to strategic planning and budgetary processes; the realisation of a positive impact on service delivery and representivity; and the carrying out of a comprehensive review of personnel requirements and staffing structures to ensure that they are realigned more closely to the delivery of services to clients. According to the Commission's survey, as well as the DPSA's Provincial Review Report, for example, most provinces do not prioritise their budgets in accordance with their policy objectives, nor link them sufficiently with their activities. As a result, when cuts are made, they are often carried out in an arbitrary manner without real consideration for the effects on service delivery. There is also little evidence to suggest that the rightsizing exercise has been accompanied by the additional forms of strategic intervention recommended in the White Paper for promoting a leaner and more cost-effective service, such as efficiency savings, improved productivity, and the elimination of waste and corruption.

3.2.4.2 Limited Results

Even within this narrow cost-centred focus, the rightsizing exercise has largely failed to meet expectations. The initial target, announced by the Minister for the Public Service and Administration in March 1996, was that the public service would be reduced by 100,000 posts during 1996/97 and by a similar amount in each of the next two financial years. It was estimated that this would yield savings of approximately R5 billion in the first year, most of which would be set aside to top-up the new conditions of service package. In fact only 18,140 funded vacancies were abolished during 1996/97, with a financial value of R662 million.

At the same time, whilst 39,501 people had agreed to leave the service through VSPs by the end of February 1997, only 1,015 of these posts have so far been offered up for abolition by heads of departments. Although the long-term savings from VSPs are therefore likely to be much smaller than predicted, the short-term costs have been much higher than initially anticipated. The current freeze on compulsory retrenchments has also made it difficult for government to successfully address the persistent problems associated with "ghost" workers and the large number of supernumerary staff. Given these limitations, the use of broad global targets has now been recognised as an essentially arbitrary exercise, and has therefore been jettisoned in favour of a more systematic approach to rightsizing to be promoted by the recently established rightsizing project.

3.2.4.3 Adverse Consequences

The rightsizing exercise to date has not only failed to produce a leaner and more efficient and productive public service. It has also had a number of undesired and serious adverse effects, for example on:

• Staff morale, motivation and productivity (by fostering anxiety and uncertainty);
• Service delivery (through the loss of skilled personnel and the inability to redeploy staff to areas of greatest need);
• Affirmative action and representivity (by placing ceilings on the recruitment of new staff);
• Departmental planning (through uncertainties created by the stop-start nature of several of the rightsizing measures);
• The public service transformation process more generally (by enabling more conservative forces within the service to delay or obstruct the change process).

3.2.4.4 Weaknesses of Policy Formulation and Implementation

In its presentation on rightsizing to the Commission, the DPSA acknowledged many of the above limitations and argued that these essentially reflected problems not of policy but of execution. Measures were designed and processes set in motion at the central level which were not implemented as planned, primarily because there were little incentives for managers to do so. There is no doubt that important weaknesses in implementation have characterised the rightsizing process, particularly in relation to the operation of the VSP scheme. Whilst detailed guidelines were laid down by the Government for this scheme, including the requirement that heads of departments be particularly mindful of the implications for the skills base and cost-effective running of their organisations, the evidence suggests that in many cases these were overlooked or ignored. One result of this has been the serious loss of skilled and experienced personnel in a number of key areas (such as education, health, finance and personnel), whilst many unproductive and supernumerary workers remain in the service. The prohibition on the re-appointment of voluntary retired officials has also been ignored or side-stepped, on occasion, by "back-door" re-hiring as consultants and advisers.

Whilst the Commission agrees that implementation of rightsizing has been ad hoc, fragmented, un-coordinated, and fraught with a variety of problems and contradictions, it also believes that the policy formulation process has been beset by similar weaknesses. Instead of the well-planned, coordinated and consultative approach recommended by the WPTPS, the rightsizing process to date has been characterised by a series of poorly conceived, coordinated and largely unsuccessful initiatives, based on insufficient consultation and agreements struck in the Central Bargaining Chamber without much transparency.

3.2.5 New Developments

The Government's acknowledgement of these problems has prompted the recent establishment of a special project team within the DPSA to develop a more systematic, integrated and consultative approach to rightsizing. The main aim of the project is to develop and implement a process and mechanism through which tangible progress can be made towards the re-organisation and re-engineering of departments/administrations to promote cost-effective service delivery and the optimal utilisation of human resources. The project team currently consists of staff from the DPSA, with assistance from the Departments of Education, Finance and State Expenditure, as well as from the British Department for International Development (DFID).

3.2.6 The International Context

In recent years many countries in both the developed and developing worlds have embarked on a thorough re-evaluation of the role and size of the state and the public service in their societies. This has been in response to a number of factors, including growing disappointment with the results of interventionist and centrally planned development strategies in the Third World; the spiralling costs of state expenditure; the growing impact of global markets, competition and financial mobility; the increasing trend towards economic liberalisation and political democratisation; and the worsening economic crisis in the developing world, and the impact of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes.

In the process a number of themes have begun to emerge, some of which have relevance for the current situation in South Africa. These include:

• A move away from centralised and corporate planning approaches towards more pragmatic approaches based, in particular, upon the principles of sound management, enterprise and a clear sense of mission.
• A redefinition of the role of the state, from that of acting as the principal agent of social and economic development, to that of guiding and facilitating development in ways which ensure effective integration with the world economy.
• Trimming state expenditure and the size of the public service as functions and services are sub-contracted out on a competitive basis to private sector and non-governmental agencies, either on a fully privatised or partnership basis.

In the WPTPS the Government indicated that whilst it could draw valuable insights from these developments, caution and critical analysis would be exercised in considering their applicability to, and possible incorporation in, the South Africa context. This would certainly be the case with respect to the move towards cost reduction, privatisation and the contracting-out of state services, which in a number of countries (especially those experiencing structural-adjustment programmes) has led to adverse effects, in terms of declining service standards, worsening conditions of employment for staff, rising unemployment and the increasing marginalisation of disadvantaged groups, women and children in particular. This is why the WPTPS emphasised that "the move towards a leaner and more cost-effective public service in South Africa will therefore be based ... not on privatisation but on the creation of effective partnerships between government, labour, business and civil society, and the building of high levels of community involvement in the local delivery of services."

3.2.7 Observations and Recommendations

The Commission welcomes the initiative by the DPSA to establish a consultative project team to develop a more systematic and coordinated strategy for rightsizing, along the lines originally suggested in the WPTPS. Such a strategy, we believe, should be located within the macro-economic constraints established by GEAR, but should nevertheless be driven primarily by the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery rather than by narrow budgetary considerations. Some of the key elements that might usefully be incorporated into such a strategy include:

• The determination of realistic and well-researched macro-economic and budgetary constraints, together with an appropriate short to medium-term expenditure framework.
• The establishment, in the light of such constraints, of short to medium-term priorities with respect to the State's functions and activities in relation to service delivery, transfers and productive investment.
• The reprioritisation of tasks, personnel and budgets to reflect such priorities.
• The determination (together with the financial implications) of which of these functions and activities can best be:
  • financed and provided directly by the State;
  • financed and provided on an "agency" basis by the State;
  • financed by the State but provided by public-private/community partnerships;
  • provided by the State but on a cost-recovery basis;
  • financed by the State but outsourced to the private/community sectors;
  • fully outsourced but regulated by the State.
• The development of a personnel strategy that most effectively addresses the agreed short to medium-term priorities (within budget), based on an evaluation of the relative merits of a broader coverage by less qualified and costly personnel, or a smaller coverage by more qualified and better paid staff. This will require a detailed evaluation of the competencies required at different levels and in different service delivery functions.
• The determination of current and future personnel needs (and expenditure), based on this strategy.
• The development (and costing) of effective institutional mechanisms to support, regulate and monitor outsourced activities.
• The determination of efficiency and other forms of savings (for example on allowances and pensions) to lessen the burden on staff cuts.
• The development of fair but affordable and expeditious policies to deal with staff displaced by the reprioritising, restructuring and right-sizing processes.
• The establishment of effective structures and mechanisms at national, provincial and local levels for consultation and participation by internal and external stakeholders.
• The development of an effective communications strategy.
• The determination of clear roles and responsibilities for the effective leadership and coordination of the right-sizing process at national, provincial and local levels.
• The determination of clear objectives, targets and time-frames for the right-sizing process, in consultation with key stakeholders.

3.3 STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING TRANSFORMATION

3.3.1 Current Reform Strategy

In line with the strategic objectives for transformation laid down in the WPTPS, the Ministry for the Public Service and Administration (MPSA), supported by the DPSA, has embarked on an ambitious programme of legislative and administrative reform since 1995. This reform programme contains an impressive list of initiatives, some of which are still at the conceptual and elemental stage. All of these initiatives have potentially far-reaching implications. They also define the context in which any new reform measures proposed by the PRC will have to be implemented. It has been essential for the PRC, therefore, to take the nature, meaning and force of these reform initiatives into account in rethinking the structure and functions of the public service.

The MPSA/DPSA reform initiatives include the following main elements:

• The introduction of a new legal framework through a series of new and proposed bills/laws addressing specific reform areas such as training and human resources development, affirmative action, service delivery, employment policy and the status and role of the PSC. The legislative programme to date has included The Public Service Commission Act (1997) which defines the status and role of the new PSC, and The Public Service Laws Amendment Act (1997) which effectively replaces the Public Service Act of 1994. This latter Act is particularly significant in that it establishes a line of executive authority to the political heads of departments (ministers and MEC’s) with original powers over matters such as internal organisation, staff appointments, promotion and other career incidents of public servants.
• The development and institution of a range of new administrative reforms, including:
  • A revision of the Personnel Administration Standards (PAS) which regulates the rules and procedures of personnel administration;
  • A review of the existing Staff Code to align it with new legislation, and to move away from rigid rules and procedures towards a new and more flexible set of management guides;
  • A proposed Management Performance System (MPS), which will provide for an assessment instrument linking performance to promotion, training and reward strategies in the public service;
  • A project on rightsizing and retrenchment management in the public service, discussed above, aimed at providing a framework for the reorganisation and re-engineering of departments and administrations in order to accomplish greater cost effective service delivery and optimal utilisation of human and other resources.
• Targeted capacity-building interventions linked to the training and administrative capabilities of the public service generally and provincial administrations in particular. In the human resources development field, the DPSA published three important White Papers during 1997 (on Public Service Training and Education, A New Employment Policy for the Public Service, and Human Resources Management), and also launched a major EU funded training and development programme for public service managers, through the South African Management and Development Institute (SAMDI) and in collaboration with university-based Schools of Public Management. Perhaps the most significant and certainly high-profile intervention has been the series of high-level provincial audits conducted by the DPSA in all nine provinces during the second half of 1997 (discussed above in Chapter 2, Section 2.6). This revealed a number of major shortcomings in the management systems and practices of provincial administrations, including their financial management systems, human resources and staffing situations, information technology management, and strategic management capabilities (see Provincial Review Reports, 1997, DPSA).

3.3.2 Assessment and Critique

Whilst the MPSA/DPSA has certainly been highly proactive and energetic in setting the tone and pace of the transformation/reform agenda, most of the policy initiatives outlined above are currently at the discussion document or Green or White Paper stage. Only a few have as yet been proclaimed in law. It is therefore too early to make a substantive assessment of their current and future impact. For this reason, the PRC's investigation focused on:

• An evaluation of the scope and coherence of the overall strategic transformation/reform agenda as expressed in the reform initiatives presently undertaken by the MPSA/DPSA;
• An identification of the emerging trends, gaps, and areas requiring expansion or improvement.

3.3.2.1 Strategic Location of the MPSA/DPSA

The first point to make relates not so much to the transformation/reform strategy per se, but to the strategic positioning of the core agencies responsible for driving this strategy -- the MPSA (at a political level) and DPSA (at an administrative level). The DG in the DPSA is not however the head of administration at national government level. Such a position is not recognised in the present system of government in South Africa. More importantly, the DPSA, though clearly a significant transversally-focused department with a clear mandate to promote public service change, is not optimally located to fulfil this important strategic mandate. Its status as another line function department, headed by a DG who, at least formally, enjoys the same status as other DG’s, has made it difficult for the DPSA to establish its institutional authority throughout the public service. Perhaps more importantly, the location of this strategic post outside of the core executive agencies of the Offices of the President and Deputy President has served to reduce its status and influence. Our proposal to establish an Office of Public Management within the Office of the President specifically addresses this problem.

3.3.2.2 Strategic Coherence of the Reform Programme

Another critical observation regarding the MPSA/DPSA reform programme concerns its internal coherence and consistency. The reform strategy contains a number of elements which have potentially mutually-conflicting outcomes. A good example relates to the tension between the constitutional and policy imperative of efficiency and effectiveness and the continued adherence to the 1994-brokered agreement to retain staff additional to the existing establishment. This was reinforced by the moratorium on compulsory retrenchments agreed between the government and public service unions as part of 1996 pay and conditions agreement. In addition, voluntary severance packages were initiated by this same agreement as the preferred alternative to forced retrenchments). This problem, as the MPSA/DPSA has acknowledged, continues to impose a serious constraint on any serious attempt at greater public service efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. It would seem crucial, in the view of the PRC, for this agreement to be reviewed if the MPSA/DPSA is to have the capacity to competently carry out its stated commitment to the optimal allocation of resources through right-sizing.

3.3.2.3 Comprehensiveness of the Reform Programme

There appears to be a conscious commitment on the part of the officials of the DPSA to the successful implementation of the transformation and reform objectives outlined in the WPTPS. From its presentation to the PRC, it is also apparent that the DPSA acknowledges that not all elements of the reform programme as outlined in the WPTPS could or should be simultaneously pursued. Whilst this implies the need for prioritisation, it is by no means clear what criteria has been used so far by the DPSA to prioritise certain reform initiatives over others. This needs to be spelled out in a clear Strategic Plan for the DPSA.

3.3.2.4 Elaboration of Strategic Objectives

Whilst substantial progress has been made by the DPSA in concretising and expanding upon a number of the key transformation priorities set out in the WPTPS (for example, Service Delivery, Representivity, and Human Resources Development and Training), progress in other areas has not been so noticeable. This is particularly the case with respect to the transformation goal of "democratising the state." So far this seems to have been interpreted to imply a need to establish internal democracy (through the establishment for example of departmental transformation units), as well as creating mechanisms for greater external accountability. A number of initiatives are underway in these areas, but are at such an early stage of development that it is difficult to evaluate their likely impact or success. There does, however, seem to be a need for a wider interpretation of "democratisation" in this context. This would certainly include the elements outlined above, but in addition the creation of less hierarchical and more corporate models of decision-making and management. These would place particular emphasis on team-work, participation-based management, project-based planning and implementation, and multi-skilling and multi-tasking.

3.3.2.5 The Need for a Strategic Plan for the Transformation Programme

The problem of making a proper assessment of the reform programme is made difficult by the absence of a clear strategic plan mapping out the key reform objectives, tasks, roles, responsibilities and time-frames. The development of such a plan by the MPSA/DPSA is crucial both as a guide to departments and agencies at all levels of the public service, as well as a basis for periodic evaluation of the reform programme itself.

3.3.2.6 Linking Administrative and Financial Capabilities

Currently there is disturbingly weak link between the administrative reform process on the one hand and the national budgetary and financial policy planning systems on the other. This results largely from the fact that the MPSA/DPSA necessarily functions as a separate department not directly linked to the Departments of Finance and State Expenditure where real budgetary strategies are planned and controlled. The need for a high degree of integration between these two levers (administrative and financial) of transformation and reform, however, is clearly evident in the experiences of successful reform projects undertaken in many Commonwealth countries such as Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

3.3.3 Global Lessons in Managing Public Sector Transformation

The PRC's overview of public service change and reform in countries such as Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand and the UK highlights the importance of the following:

• A Strategic Centre which controls the "strategic levers" of change at policy and operational levels, and which is centrally located in an institutional authority which can reach into all parts of the public service, nationally and provincially. This centre is usually located in the Office of the Prime Minister or President with key responsibilities for driving the change process assigned to the Head of the Civil Service (usually though not exclusively combined in one post as the Cabinet Secretary).
• Such a strategic centre, as lead agency of the transformation process, should exemplify the qualities of responsibility, merit and transparency in their own operations; thus setting a model for the rest of the public service.
• Administrative reforms should be closely linked to substantive policy reforms and developments.
• The change process need not and should not be based on an over-simplified dichotomy between radical once-off transformation on the one hand and incremental reform on the other. In fact, as the WPTPS itself acknowledges, there will usually be a need to combine transformation in some areas with more gradual piece-meal reform in others. What is really needed is an approach which is strategic, yet pragmatic and feasible.
• Whilst most successful reform experiments have pursued a comprehensive and holistic approach to transformation and change, they have also acknowledged that not everything in the system can be changed at the same pace or at the same time.
• There should be close proximity and effective sequencing of administrative reforms and financial planning and management strategies as close as possible to the policy planning centres in government. A weak or indirect link will usually mean that new reforms cannot be properly costed and planned over time, thus standing the risk of being unsustainable.
• The change process must enjoy and draw on the widest possible support base at all levels and spheres of government, including management, staff, unions and customers-citizens.
• A crucial catalytic role has to be played in the reform process by the managerial corps who will have to be responsible for the detailed management and implementation of the reform process.

3.3.4 Observations and Recommendations

The Commission proposes:

• That the Government should consider disestablishing the Ministry and Department of Public Service and Administration, as presently constituted, and relocating its core functions, powers and capabilities within the Office of the President, as an Office for Public Management (OPM), as discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
• That the core functions and capabilities of the OPM should find institutional expression through the establishment of a number of units (with the status of Chief Directorates), dealing inter alia, with HR management, personnel, affirmative action and employment equity, industrial relations, policy formation, planning and general oversight of the service.
• That the post of Head of the Public Service be created which will directly establish a link between the role of Cabinet Secretary and the execution of government business.
• That a Cabinet Committee on Finance be established, chaired by the Minister of Finance, to oversee the synchronisation and sequencing of administrative reforms with the budgetary process and financial management strategies.
• That a Technical Committee also be established to service and support this Finance Committee, with representation from the Departments of Finance and State Expenditure and the proposed Financial Planning and Management Unit in the DPSA/OPM.
• That the Government review the agreement with public sector unions on the retention of staff additional to the establishment, in order to create an appropriate institutional climate for an effective approach to right-sizing and restructuring.
• That the different transformation objectives be prioritised and aligned so as to provide an effective basis for the development by the DPSA/OPM of a clear long-term strategic plan, which can guide and provide direction to the transformation efforts in all parts of the public service.
• That the DPSA/OPM initiate a project to investigate concrete ways of democratising internal work procedures and systems which ideally should link participative and project-based management techniques with the current revisions of the Staff Code and Public Service Regulations.

3.4 MANAGING THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING

3.4.1 Introduction

The 1996 Constitution defines the powers and structures of political executive decision-making such as the Cabinet and Provincial Executive Councils (EXCOs), as well as the principles and context under which public administration should operate. Despite this, there remains considerable uncertainty and confusion as to who is or should be responsible for managing what in the public service. Recent legislation has gone some way to clarifying the situation. But more still needs to be done.

3.4.2 Executing Authority in the Public Service

Under the 1994 Public Service Act, the Minister for the Public Service and Administration was endowed with the legal authority over national public service norms and standards, salary determination and related conditions of employment. Other powers over personnel matters were shared between the Minister and the Public Service Commission.

The promulgation of the Public Service Laws Amendment Act in 1997 marks a significant shift in the development of a new macro-legal framework for regulating the basic institutions of the public service. This new Act establishes a new line of executive authority very different from that prevailing under previous legislation. Executive authority is now directly vested in the political heads of Departments, that is Ministers and MECs. Thus, ministers (in the case of national government) and MECs (in the case of provinces) are accorded original powers with respect to crucial public service powers such as internal organisational, staff appointments, promotion and other career incidents. Ministers/MECs may delegate the administrative functions associated with these powers to their respective Heads of Departments.

3.4.3 The Status and Role of Heads of Departments

The 1994 Public Service Act defined national government departments and provincial administrations as distinct legal entities. Provincial Administrations, by virtue of this definition, were seen as a single legal entity -- in other words as a department. By extension, the Act of 1994 defined all administrative entities functioning under the jurisdiction of a Provincial Administration, including line function units, as sub-departmental entities. Each national department and provincial administration was assigned a Head of Department (HOD) and accounting officer, designated at the level of Director-General. The de facto heads of individual departments within provincial administrations were designated at the rank of Deputy DGs.

The 1994 Act clearly under-estimated the scale of management responsibilities of provincial departments. It assumed that the same management strategy for national departments could be applied to provincial administrations. It also failed to address the substantive powers allocated to provincial governments and their administrations under the 1996 Constitution.

The 1997 Public Service Laws Amendment Act seeks to redress such anomalies, weaknesses and problems, in particular by explicitly recognising each provincial department as a legal entity in its own right. Furthermore, the 1997 Act establishes an original line of authority in that it confers the power of executing authority to ministers and MEC’s. This implies that ministers in the case of national departments and MECs in the case of provincial departments will now be politically responsible for matters such as internal organisation, appointments, promotions, and career incidents.

The new Act, in theory at least, opens the way for a much more direct relationship of accountability between MECs and their respective heads of department who, in contrast to the previous legislation, are now defined and acknowledged as de jure as well as de facto HODs. The new Act would therefore seem to remove the Provincial DG from the accounting equation. It also confers the same accountability relationship between provincial MECs and their HODs as that between national Ministers and their HODs. As such, it opens the way for a significant improvement in managerial responsibility and accountability.

Nevertheless, the 1997 Act does not explicitly and satisfactorily clarify the exact status and role of the provincial DG. Whilst it has removed the DG as chief accounting officer, the new Act does not positively define the new role of the provincial DG. Greater clarification is clearly urgent, especially, in the view of the PRC, as it would still be crucial to establish a strategic management centre in the provincial administrations. The provincial DGs could well play an important role in this context.

3.4.4 Relations between Political and Administrative Agencies

Whilst there appears to be a general appreciation of the distinction between "political" and "administrative" in official circles, the Commission could identify few explicit guidelines regulating the relationship between the political heads of departments (ministers and MECs) and the senior public servants with whom they work on a day-to-day basis. This has led to a number of positive spin-offs but also to serious problems. On the one hand, the relative ambiguity between the roles of political appointees and administrators has created the space in some cases for a high level of interaction and cooperation between them in policy development and management. On the other hand, however, such ambiguity, in certain instances, has led to role confusion, role conflict, and the over-extension of roles. This has been especially the case where elected officials feel that administrators do not satisfactorily carry out their mandate, where personal tensions exist, or where the competency of administrators has been called into questioned. At the same time, administrative officials have frequently complained about what they see as inappropriate levels of political interference in their day-to-day work. Problems such as these have been evident at all levels of government, although they have been especially pronounced in the provinces, particularly in those where entirely new administrations have had to be established. The relationship between elected and appointed officials is addressed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.6), where tentative guidelines for a protocol outlining the political-administrative interface are also set out.

3.4.5 Relationship between Legislatures and Administrative Agencies

The national and provincial legislatures are assigned important oversight functions in the 1996 Constitution, to be exercised in particular through the system of portfolio and standing committees to which both elected officials and public servants are accountable. A number of initiatives are currently underway to build the capacity of parliamentary institutions to discharge these oversight functions. These do not fall within the purview of the PRC's investigations. What is pertinent is the capacity of the public service and public servants to adequately anticipate and respond to the oversight responsibilities exercised by the legislative agencies at national and provincial levels; and it is from this point of view that the PRC has approached this issue. In this respect, the Commission's investigations identified a number of constraints requiring remedial attention. These included:

• Weak information management systems in many departments (especially though not exclusively in the provinces), capable of speedily and accurately supplying the information required by the various legislative committees;
• The lack of understanding amongst public servants, especially at the middle and junior levels, of the role, rights and responsibilities of legislatures;
• Weak communication channels between individual departments and the legislative committees responsible for their oversight.

3.4.6 Observations and Recommendations

3.4.6.1 New forms of Executing Authority in the Public Service

• The Commission feels that it will be necessary for government to clearly explain the full meaning and implications of the 1997 Public Laws Amendment Act to ministers and MECs, public servants, and the public.
• It will also be necessary for the process of the delegation of managerial authority to be regulated by executive guidelines for elected officials and their respective HODs. These should be drawn up by the DPSA/OPM.

3.4.6.2 The Status and Role of Heads of Departments

• The PRC strongly recommends that the status and role of provincial DGs be clarified in law and practice. Whilst the Commission supports the apparent "de-linking" of provincial DGs from chief accounting officer responsibilities, we nevertheless feel that it will be crucial, to avoid possible institutional fragmentation, for them to assume a key co-ordinating role in the provinces.

3.4.6.3 Relations between the Political and Administrative Agencies

• The Commission feels that government should develop and implement a professional protocol specifying broad guidelines to facilitate more appropriate management of the relationship, roles, and responsibilities of elected officials and public servants.
• Government should also introduce effective orientation programmes for newly elected officials (Ministers, Deputies, MEC’s) to ensure a common understanding of the machinery, systems, principles, practices, checks and balances of government and administration.
• Government should also ensure that a similar induction and orientation programme is developed and introduced for newly appointed administrators, especially at top and middle management levels, focusing in particular on the legislative and policy context of administration.

3.4.6.4 Relationship between Legislatures and Administrative Agencies

• Guidelines should be developed to ensure more effective liaison between departments and the relevant legislative committees.
• Information management systems in departments must be developed in such a manner as to facilitate the timely and effective generation and dissemination of information requested by such committees (for more details, see Chapter 6 below).
• Departments must make adequate provision for the electronic capturing of public and official data and information (Internet and E-mail), and linking this information network to the legislatures for effective communication purposes.

3.5 THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

3.5.1 The Service Commissions under the Interim Constitution

Chapter 13 of the Interim Constitution (Sections 209, 210 and 211) made provision for an independent and impartial Public Service Commission (PSC) composed of three to five Commissioners appointed by the President. The PSC (which replaced the former Commission for Administration and took over most of its staff) was assigned both executive and monitoring functions, and in particular was mandated under the Constitution to make recommendations, give directions and conduct enquiries regarding the organisation, administration, conditions of service, personnel administration, efficiency and effectiveness, and comportment of the public service. The Commission was also assigned an important role in capacity building and human resource development, particularly through its responsibility for SAMDI. Provincial Service Commissions were also established in all nine provinces by the Constitution to carry out similar functions with respect to provincial administrations (with the exception of remuneration levels and conditions of employment which remained a function of the national PSC unless otherwise delegated).

Between 1994 and 1996 the functions and operation of the Service Commissions were a cause of concern within the public service, most notably in relation to the fact that their independence and effectiveness were threatened by a potential conflict of interest between their role as an independent monitor and arbiter of the activities, ethos and comportment of the public service and their role as a direct implementer of civil service policies. Concerns were also expressed by many departments and provincial administrations about the undue length of time and red tape frequently involved in obtaining Service Commission decisions and recommendations, as well as about the lack of clarity in the respective roles of the PSC and the Office of the Ministry for the Public Service (subsequently to become the DPSA). For these reasons, amongst others, the WPTPS recommended that a comprehensive review of the Service Commissions be undertaken as part of the work of the PRC. The White Paper also recommended that in the interim the Service Commissions and the Ministry for the Public Service should address some of the above concerns, particularly by expediting the decision-making process, reducing unnecessary red-tape, and delegating personnel powers where possible to departments and provinces.

3.5.2 The PSC under the 1996 Constitution

In line with the recommendations of the WPTPS, steps were taken early in 1996 not only to delegate some of the functions and powers of the PSC but to re-define and re-allocate them. This followed the proposals made by a joint working group of the Ministry and the PSC set up to take stock of the historically accumulated functions within the PSC, to address the concerns voiced about the Commission's executive powers, and to consider the demands increasingly expressed by Ministers and departments for greater autonomy, flexibility and responsibility with respect to personnel matters in order to effectively discharge their functions under the new system of governance introduced since April 1994.

After examining the operation of Service Commissions in a number of other countries, the working group recommended a new model for the PSC which confined its role primarily to monitoring, evaluation and research, whilst at the same time proposing that its executive functions (with regard, for example, to human resources policy and practices, conditions of service, labour relations, the formulation and amendment of legislation, and the responsibility for SAMDI) be transferred to the Minister for the Public Service and Administration, to be delegated where appropriate to other ministries, departments and provincial administrations. Following Cabinet endorsement of the working group's proposals, arrangements were put in place to effect this transfer of functions, including the redeployment of staff from the PSC and Provincial Service Commissions and the winding down of their executive functions.

This de facto situation was subsequently given constitutional recognition by the 1996 Constitution and legislative backing through the 1997 Public Service Commission Amendment Act and the 1997 Public Service Laws Amendment Act. Chapter 10 of the 1996 Constitution replaces the PSC and Provincial Service Commissions with a single independent and impartial Public Service Commission, comprising 14 commissioners, five of whom will be appointed by the President with the approval the National Assembly and nine (one per province) who will be appointed by the President on the nomination of the Provincial Premiers and with the approval of the provincial legislatures.

The main functions and powers of the new PSC set out in the 1996 Constitution are:

• To promote the values and principles of public administration set out in section 195 of the Constitution throughout the public service;
• To investigate, monitor and evaluate the organisation, administration and personnel practices of the public service, and in particular the adherence to the values and principles set out in section 195, as well as to public service procedures;
• To propose measures to ensure effective and efficient performance;
• To give directions aimed at ensuring that personnel procedures relating to recruitment, transfers, promotions and dismissals comply with the values and principles set out in section 195 of the Constitution;
• To advise national and provincial organs of state regarding personnel practices;
• To report its findings and recommendations at least once a year to the National Assembly or Provincial Legislatures as applicable;
• To report issues of immediate operational concern to the relevant executive authority;
• To investigate grievances of employees and recommend appropriate remedies.

To fulfil these constitutional obligations the Commissioners will need to be assisted by able personnel and supplied with the necessary resources. In this regard it is anticipated that the Commission's Office will consist of a fairly small post establishment with a high level workforce. This will almost inevitably involve further reductions from the PSC's current staffing complement of 148, as well as training and re-training of those staff that do remain.

3.5.3 The Changing International Context: The Need for Transformation and Reform of Service Commissions

Public service commissions were bequeathed by the British to most of their former colonies, and currently exist in nearly all Commonwealth countries. Drawing from the tradition established by the UK Civil Service Commission in the mid-nineteenth century, the main function of such independent and impartial commissions is to insulate the public service from political manipulation and patronage and thereby to promote the ethos and values of probity, integrity and selection by merit. Despite broad similarities in their responsibilities, commissions vary considerably in terms of size (ranging from Malta with a staff complement of 12 to Canada with one of 1,950), operating methods, and the precise nature of their relationship to central personnel offices and line departments.

The need for transformation and reform, that has characterised most public services in recent years, has highlighted a number of important tensions and contradictions in the role and operation of the service commissions. In the first place, and at the general level, the constitutional position of the commissions orientates them towards stability rather than change. As public service reform is usually driven to a greater or lesser extent by political concerns, the service commissions have often found it difficult to act as a focal point for change, especially in terms of the policy framework for personnel management which underpins most areas of reform.

In the second place and more specifically, the trend towards accountability for results rather than process, and the need for greater decentralisation, managerial responsibility, flexibility, responsiveness and equity, has posed particular difficulties for the service commissions. Terms such as responsiveness or equity, emerging from concerns to improve the performance of the public service, have sometimes been seen from the commission's perspective as code words for the introduction or re-introduction of a political spoils system. Does accountability for results mean making the careers of public servants dependent on the whims of their managers? Will decentralisation and delegation open the floodgates to abuses in recruitment and promotions?

As the new service commissioners have not yet been appointed, the PRC was unable to assess the workings of the new model for the PSC. The vacuum created whilst the new system replaces the old enabled the PRC, however, to consider what is perhaps a more fundamental question - whether there is a need for a PSC at all. The PRC is of the opinion that such a need exists but the body currently in place needs to be quite radically and more appropriately structured so that is capable of carrying out the above functions more efficiently, effectively and cost-effectively. In coming to this conclusion, we have been mindful of the need to provide a rationale, as well as to address a number of serious problems and challenges that will inevitably confront our proposal.

3.5.4 Assessing the Need for a Service Commission

3.5.4.1 Rationale

In arriving out our rationale for a major change in the composition and nature of the PSC we identified two broad and related reasons for calling the continued existence of the organisation as currently constituted into question. The first relates to the roles and relationships of the new body. The second relates to its likely efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

It was not clear to the PRC how the PSC would interact with key departments, such as the Office of the Ministry for the Public service and Administration, the DPSA, the Auditor-General, Public Protector, the Departments of Finance and State Expenditure and the Central Bargaining Chamber. Given the current roles of many of these existing bodies in the monitoring and evaluation of public service delivery, it was not immediately apparent to the PRC what "added-value" the PSC would bring in this regard. Nor was it clear whether the PSC would be responsible for ensuring that the public service was representative, efficient and effective, or whether it would simply report on defaulting departments after which it would be left to other structures to make the appropriate interventions. If the latter, these functions could be outsourced to the private sector, research and tertiary institutions, according to the specialisms needed, with the activities of such bodies overseen by a reconstituted PSC with a much smaller staff establishment.

Whilst the Commission appreciated the need for an independent body to promote the enabling values and principles governing the administration of the Public Service as set out in Chapter 10 of the Constitution, it did not consider the proposed revision of the structures of the Public Service Commission appropriate, cost effective or necessarily efficient for this undertaking. We were particularly concerned about the cost of the PSC in times of financial stringency, especially as the appointment of the 14 new PSC commissioners (with salary packages equivalent to those of Ministers) is likely to be based on political acceptability as much if not more than professional and technical expertise in the areas of monitoring, evaluation and research. Similarly, we were equally concerned about the appropriateness and relevance of the skills and competencies of many of the current staff of the PSC to the new needs of the organisation. If the PSC is to remain, there would clearly be an important need to bring in new blood, as well for the redeployment, training and re-training of current staff.

3.5.4.2 Addressing Problems and Challenges of the PSC

As stated in Chaper 2, the PRC's proposal, if accepted, may require a constitutional amendment, requiring a two-thirds majority in the National Parliament. The Commission is mindful of the problems and dangers of amending a Constitution that is only a year old. It is also mindful, however, of the fact that the Constitution is a living document that must be attuned periodically to changing needs and realities. However, we do not believe the independence of the Commission will be compromised by our recommendation. Moreover, the changes envisaged do not promote any sectional interests and the change should be seen as primarily structural, cost effective and professionally appropriate. With respect to the PSC we feel that it might be less difficult, traumatic and costly to make the necessary constitutional changes now, before the new body becomes fully operational, rather than waiting to a later date.

If our proposal is accepted, it will inevitably take some time to make the necessary constitutional adjustment. This gives rise to a more immediate practical difficulty, associated with the fact that the 14 new PSC commissioners are about to be appointed. The PRC therefore recommends an immediate moratorium on this process, whilst the implications of our proposals are being fully considered.

We realise that our proposal is of direct concern to the provinces in respect of standard setting and monitoring regarding the ethos and comportment of the public service, as addressed in the Constitution through the nomination of 9 of the 14 PSC commissioners from the provinces. The PRC proposal changes this. The Commission, however, is not sure, whether this will be a big loss, especially as it is unclear whether, the new PSC will be in a position to establish effective provincial offices in any case. We also feel that provincial influence could be ensured, if our proposals are accepted by re-inforcing the parallel monitoring and inspection units already functioning in the offices of the Provincial Premiers ( and ensuring that these are created in the provinces where these have not already been established). Such provincial units would be required to report on their findings both to the Premier and the Provincial Legislature. In addition there should be an effective co-ordinating structure to ensure effective and regular communication and liaison between their work and that of the independent commission located in the Office of the President.

3.5.5 Observations and Recommendations

The Commission recommends:

• That serious consideration be given by the President to replacing the PSC as envisaged in the 1996 Constitution by the alternative structures recommended in this report.
• That if the Commission's recommendations in this regard are accepted, an appropriate Constitutional Amendment be prepared, if necessary, for consideration by the National Parliament.
• That in the interim an immediate moratorium be placed on the appointment of the 14 new PSC commissioners.
• That if the Constitutional Amendment is approved by Parliament, a central public service monitoring and inspection unit be established in the Office of the President, as an independent commission of 3 senior, experienced managers (2 from the public and one from the private sector). This unit will be called the Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC) and will monitor, inspect, review, assess and advise the President about the implications of policy decisions and actions in these fields, and to recommend changes based on its findings and conclusions.
• That the newly established OPSC be responsible for all the constitutional functions outlined above, with the exception of that of investigating grievances of employees which will in future would be more appropriately handled by the mechanisms established under the 1996 Labour Relations Act (although the OPSC would still retain general oversight over these processes and report on them to the President and Parliament).
• The OPSC should have a small but expert staff to provide professional, technical and administrative support. It should also have the power to contract-out some of its day-to-day monitoring and inspection functions to suitably qualified and accredited individuals and organisations (for example in the private, NGO or tertiary education sectors).
• That parallel monitoring and inspection units be established in the offices of the Provincial Premiers to carry out similar functions with respect to the nine provincial administrations.
• That a co-ordinating structure be established to ensure effective liaison in the work of the national and provincial units.
• That a comprehensive skills audit of the existing staff of the PSC be carried out with immediate effect.
• That, based on this audit, appropriate arrangements be made for the transfer of current PSC staff to the national or provincial monitoring and inspection units, and for the redeployment or voluntary retrenchment of staff not transferred.
• That such arrangements pay due regard to fairness, equity and the promotion of representivity within the public service.

3.6 MANAGEMENT APPROACHES, CULTURES AND PRACTICES

3.6.1 Introduction

The policy imperatives of reconstruction and developments, as spelled out in the RDP White Paper, the WPTPS and other core government policy documents since 1994, presented the state and the public service with a formidable set of challenges. As the first reform phase -- with its emphasis on rationalisation, integration and building the capacity of hitherto fragmented public service institutions -- is now well underway, the next period of development presents government with what is perhaps an even more formidable challenge. This is the modernisation and development of the public service into an agency that is professional and highly motivated, with a strong sense of mission and a deep commitment to the concept of serving the people. In laying out a strategic context for the development of the new public service, the WPTPS outlined a number of guidelines for a system and culture of public service management appropriate to these new policy challenges. The 1996 Constitution, likewise, provides a number of normative principles which are broadly descriptive of the type of managerial culture appropriate for the future tasks of transformation and development of the South African public service. These include:

• Professionalism, impartiality and excellence;
• Accountability and transparency;
• Participatory policy-making;
• Efficiency, effectiveness and equity;
• A developmental and service orientation.

3.6.2 Building a New Managerial Professionalism

In its efforts to develop a new managerial culture, the MPSA/DPSA, as noted above, has embarked upon a number of reform initiatives, including a project to develop new management guides aimed at providing managers with more simplified and less rigid procedures and staff practices than is presently the case. The PSC has also developed a new Code of Conduct for the public service which sets out a number of professional and ethical standards that public servants are expected to adhere to in the performance of their duties, in their personal conduct, and in their relationships with the public, the executive and legislatures, and their peers. These initiatives are significant and if successfully developed may provide a framework for the development of more professional values and conduct than those contained in the current Staff Code and the remaining Personnel Administration Standards. However, these new codes and guidelines still need to be given wide expression in the organisational culture of the departments and agencies throughout the public service.

3.6.3 Strengthening Management Capabilities

The WPTPS, as we saw earlier, advocates a strategic change management approach to encourage new forms of managerial leadership, devolution of decision-making, as well as the democratisation of internal work procedures and the substantive incorporation of civil society into the governance process. This approach signals a significant challenge to the traditional administrative-based management system which prevailed in South Africa and, to a greater or lesser extent, elsewhere in the world until quite recently. Since 1995, the MPSA/DPSA has been actively encouraging the evolution of a system of management approximating this vision. However, as far as the PRC could determine, there does not as yet appear to be any comprehensive description in official documentation of the core features, basic operational principles or specific practices associated with this approach.

There are however a number of indicative reform measures which broadly seem to define the direction the MPSA/DPSA is taking. The Public Service Act (1994) advocates a "top management model" which sees the senior management echelon (from Director-General to Director) functioning as a closely integrated strategic management unit based on close consultation, coordination, planning and decision-making involving the core policy-making actors in the department/administration.

In practice however, the "top management model" is essentially a loose description which has been variedly interpreted and implemented. Since 1994, national departments and provincial administrations have adopted and developed various managerial systems in order to provide a mechanism for strategic coordination and planning. In some cases, particularly in the provinces, this has involved the DG and Deputy DGs, usually drawn from all the line function and central policy units. In other cases, and more typically in national departments, top management has come to refer to, and include all senior managers from Director upwards.

Because of the variety of ways in which the "top management" model has been operationalised, and given its relatively vaguely defined nature, it is difficult to make any conclusive assessment of its strengths or weaknesses. In theory, this has allowed different departments to create management tools appropriate to local circumstances. In practice however, the PRC found that in many departments and especially provinces the basic management system has not functioned consistently and effectively. Meetings of top management, as variously defined, have tended to become more focused on crisis-management issues or administrative detail than on issues to do with strategic change management.

3.6.4 Promoting a Decentralised Approach

In line with recent international precedents, the WPTPS encouraged the need for decentralisation of managerial functions within and across the public service. This trend has subsequently been actively promoted by the DPSA. As seen above, in terms of the new Public Service Laws Amendment Act of 1997, strong executive authority is accorded to elected officials and their respective heads of department. As such it has created a framework for substantive delegation of managerial authority to various levels of management within the public service. This legal framework nevertheless still requires strong support from the MPSA/DPSA to ensure that managers fully understand the implications. As noted in other parts of this report, it is also likely to require additional enabling legislation, particularly in relation to performance-related contracts, to provide the necessary incentives for managers to use their new-found decentralised powers effectively and responsibly, in line with nationally determined norms and standards.

3.6.5 Observations and Recommendations

• The Commission believes that it is essential for government to invest in the long-term development of a professional managerial corps throughout the public service.
• This belief is based on the Commission's recognition of the need:
  • To move away from the traditional career-based model of public service management, in favour of a model based on contract-based employment of the entire management echelon. The present contract system applying to DGs should, in the opinion of the Commission, be progressively applied to other levels of management, from Deputy DGs to Directors;
  • To develop all-round managers with experience in a range of portfolios, by creating opportunities for greater mobility;
  • To develop a managerial esprit de corps through joint workshops and training opportunities.
• The Commission further believes that an active decentralisation programme be adopted, were appropriate, and promoted by the MPSA/DPSA, particularly through a newly-created Decentralisation Unit to form part of the proposed Office for Public Management in the Office of the President.
• Such a decentralisation programme should examine and create a framework for a range of Executive Agency Models (along the lines, for example, of those in the UK) with a specific focus on large service delivery departments where the effective management of complex units is rendered particularly difficult in the context of current bureaucratic constraints. Such models could vary in their degree of autonomy. In this respect, note should be taken of those departments such as Transport that have adopted such agency models.

3.7 MANAGING SERVICE DELIVERY

3.7.1 Introduction

The paramount importance of the efficient, effective and equitable management of service delivery has been highlighted in the 1996 Constitution, the RDP White Paper, the WPTPS, and GEAR, as well as in a number of subsequent policy documents from the DPSA, and a wide range of sectoral discussion documents and Green and White Papers from different ministries, departments and provinces. These policy statements culminated in 1997 with the publication by the DPSA of the White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery, under the title of Batho Pele or People First.

The PRC endorses these policy initiatives as well as the principles that underpin them. Such principles relate to a new form of service delivery that is:

• Appropriate in terms of quality and quantity to address the needs of different constituencies;
• Non-discriminatory in terms of race, gender, age, disability, culture, and region;
• Equitable, involving corrective action to redress past imbalances;
• Developmental, to raise the quality of life in an integrated and empowering way;
• Democratic, participatory and people-centred;
• Ethical, honest and impartial;
• Based on commitment and a strong ethos of service;
• Professional and competent;
• Efficient and effective;
• Responsive to grass roots needs and changing conditions;
• Legitimate and respected;
• Transparent and accountable, politically, administratively and financially;
• Creative, entrepreneurial and flexible, to deal with changing environments and conditions;
• Realistic and feasible within macro-economic constraints;
• Coordinated with other role players;
• Affordable and sustainable;
• Based on the "one-stop-shop"service concept.

With respect to the effective implementation of these policy initiatives, the record, as the DPSA's Provincial Report shows, is somewhat mixed and uneven at best. Given the new Government's short period in office, this is not altogether surprising. Whilst some departments have business plans which provide for specific implementation strategies, others are in the process of developing such plans or have no plans at all. This situation complicated the work of the PRC, and rendered the Commission's findings and conclusions somewhat preliminary and tentative.

3.7.2 Challenges and Constraints in Service Delivery

Despite the lack of a full picture on the management of service delivery, the evidence that does exist points to quite a major gap between policy objectives and the implementation and achievement of successful outcomes. The WPTPS suggest a number of reasons for this situation. These include:

• The detrimental legacy of apartheid;
• The general lack of sufficient resources (knowledge, experience, commitment, funds, technology, equipment, etc) to effectively address the many developmental needs of South Africa;
• Organisational cultures, structures and practices which are not conducive to effective, efficient and productive service delivery outputs;
• Socio-economic malpractices such as nepotism, corruption, and crime;
• The international political economy which still operates with a bias towards earlier developed countries in the Northern hemisphere;
• Too short time period since 1994 to effectively implement the new policies of the Government.

The Commission believes that many of these problems can be overcome in time through improvements in the management of public sector service delivery. To achieve this, however, it will first be necessary to address a number of additional and important management constraints, as follows.

• Structural Constraints. As stated earlier, many departments are still in the process of restructuring in line with their new vision and mission statements (Education and Finance for example). Their organisations are therefore not yet geared to provide or facilitate the quality and quantity of service delivery needed in order to achieve their stated objectives. In addition, a serious lack of strategic management capacity in government results in un-coordinated activities, causing unnecessary wastage of scarce resources and sometimes contradictory policies which defeat national objectives.
• Functional Constraints. In some departments the vision, policies and business plans to steer appropriate service delivery are not yet in place (Finance and Justice for example). They are therefore not in a position as yet to devise optimal implementation strategies. In addition, most departments and the operational units within them lack the necessary delegated power and responsibility in areas such as finance, procurement and personnel functions to provide prompt and effective service delivery.
• Process Constraints. Many of the processes and procedures through which services are provided are still based to a large extent on the ruled-based bureaucratic norms bequeathed by the previous regime. The result, not surprisingly, is that these processes continue in many ways to serve the bureaucratic needs of the public service rather than the needs of consumers and clients (for prompt and efficient service, shorter waiting times and queues, and so on). This picture was confirmed by the special Process Study on Service Delivery, commissioned by the PRC (see Annexure 7 -- the study was conducted in Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and North West Provinces, and targeted the areas of Justice and Safety & Security, Home Affairs, Housing, Public Works, and Health and Welfare). Whilst revealing and acknowledging a number of recent improvements in such departments, this study nevertheless revealed a wide range of procedural bottlenecks that were continuing to hamper prompt and efficient levels of service delivery.
• Financial Constraints. In the area of financial management, outdated financial practices and systems and a serious lack of appropriately trained staff have led to ineffective financial accountability and control, thus aggravating the waste of scarce resources. A consistent complaint from line function departments is the lack of effective delegated powers over issues such procurement. These and other financial constraints are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this report.
• Provisioning. Most departments shortage from serious shortages of resources (such as office space, equipment, computers, software, and so on), which inhibits their service delivery capacity.
• Human Resources Constraints. Service delivery is also constrained by the lack of staff in general, and the lack of skilled and representative staff in particular (especially in the professional and technical grades).
• The Uneven Nature of Reform. As noted above, some departments have completed their re-organisation programme whilst others have barely started. Given that service delivery requires effective inter-departmental and inter-governmental coordination, the uneven nature of the transformation process is a major constraint.
• Balancing the Needs of the Service with those of the People. The culture of any organisation is the product of the influence on the behaviour of two forces: the drive for the members of the organisation to establish internal accommodations with each other in their joint interests and the need for the organisation as a whole to meet the needs of its customers and service users and to adapt to changing external circumstances. A fundamental generic problem with public services everywhere is that they are facing new demands as a result of democratisation and an unsettled and shifting external environment, and are broadly failing to meet those demands because of the strength of the internal forces which resist change in the perceived interest of maintaining internal harmony and cohesion. This is particularly the case in South Africa.

3.7.3 Observations and Recommendations

• Departments should very directly focus on their core competencies and functions and do not be involved in peripheral activities.
• Policy and service delivery programmes should be designed for implementation. Clear, concise, realistic, and feasible policy objectives, implementation strategies and action plans should be conceived, allocating clear and unambiguous roles to all role-players involved.
• Appropriate results-oriented service standards and benchmarks should be included in the implementation strategy plans of departments.
• Strong, coherent and pro-active political and administrative leadership is needed to steer the implementation process forward.
• Implementation structures or agencies should be designed in the most appropriate way for the specific tasks which they have to fulfil, and be flexible enough to accommodate to changing needs and circumstances.
• Service delivery components should have appropriate and sufficient powers, functions and resources to enable them to provide effectively the services for which they are responsible.
• Implementation strategies should be explicitly conceptualised, planned and explained in business plans, including who should do what, how, when, why and for whom.
• Implementation of policy programmes or projects should not proceed without the consideration of a systematic appraisal of the most feasible alternative service delivery strategies, taking into account:
  • the most important direct, indirect, hidden and opportunity costs and benefits involved,
  • the optimum degree of public participation in the delivery programme,
  • the most appropriate time frames for implementation (short-medium-long term),
  • the degree of change that would result (incremental or radical), and the policy implications and consequences of these results, and
  • the sustainability of the programme.
• The consideration of more appropriate alternative service delivery systems should include the provision of services:
  • By the organisation itself (at national or provincial level or through regional, district or local offices);
  • By delegated agents (provincial or local governments, statutory agencies, NGOs or private sector organisations);
  • By partnerships between the Government and private and community sectors.
• The principles of effectiveness, efficiency, economies of scale, and integrated, one-stop-shop services should guide the selection of the most appropriate policy implementation strategy. Decision-making discretion should therefore be devolved as close to target audiences as possible, and the principle of using the most cost-effective service delivery agencies be accepted where necessary.
• Effective interdepartmental and inter-governmental coordination mechanisms should exist to ensure optimal service delivery outputs.
• High priority should be accorded to staff recruitment and training to create or strengthen service delivery commitment and capacity, especially in the area of project management.
• Policy projects and programmes should be costed as separate expenditure items, in order to facilitate the assessment of their success or failure.
• Systematic data must be gathered before the initiation of a new policy project, and ongoing information gathering and monitoring will need to take place to enable effective evaluation at different stages of the project cycle.
• Implementation strategies should be designed and planned in a flexible way, in order to adapt to changing objectives, strategies, circumstances or conditions during the life cycle of the project.

3.8 MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

3.8.1 Introduction

Internationally, no other aspect of government activity epitomises the changes sweeping across the world than the rising significance of performance monitoring and evaluation. With both internal and external pressure to be more efficient, effective and especially cost effective, many governments are introducing different legislation, procedures, functions and systems whose main purpose is to contribute to the effective monitoring and evaluation of performance. The United States has enshrined this commitment in legislation (through the Government Performance Results Act of 1993), and many other countries are poised to follow suit.

It is in this area that the South African Government and the public service face a serious challenge to the success of their policies and programmes. International best practice suggests that effective performance monitoring and evaluation requires the conscious or deliberate creation of a system that can be fully integrated into the total function and activities of the public sector. The core prerequisites for creating such a performance monitoring system include:

• A clear and agreed understanding of the meaning, nature and functions of performance monitoring and evaluation;
• Legislative provision for monitoring and evaluation;
• Structural provision and logistics;
• The determination of key areas to monitor and evaluate;
• The determination of appropriate performance measures and indicators;
• Financial provision;
• Effective links between monitoring and evaluation and the policy and decision-making process.

From its hearings and investigations, as well as its comparative survey of international best practice, the PRC is convinced that much more could and should be done to put these prerequisites effectively in place throughout the South African public service.

3.8.2 Outline and Assessment of Current Situation

3.8.2.1 The Meaning of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation

During its investigations it became evident to the Commission that there was a lack of a clear and agreed understanding of the meaning of performance monitoring and evaluation. Terms such as monitoring, evaluation, review, audit and even supervision are often used interchangeably. Greater clarity is clearly required. In the Commission's view monitoring refers to the task of measuring the extent to which policy objectives have been achieved (in relation to outputs, outcomes, as well as structures and processes). Evaluation is concerned with the interpretation of such monitoring information in ways which can usefully inform the on-going policy formulation and implementation processes (by suggesting corrective forms of action, for example). Together these two related but discrete activities form the key components of effective performance review. These distinctions are not merely a question of semantics.

3.8.2.2 Legislative Provision

Despite the recent plethora of new laws and policy documents in South Africa, the Commission found little evidence of a single law or government policy directed specifically towards the establishment, operation, finance and use of monitoring and evaluation in the public service, save for the Kwa-Zulu Natal Government Performance Act of 1997. While the 1996 Constitution and macro- and sectoral policy documents provide some guidelines as to the importance of effective and accountable governance, the lack of a clear and coherent policy on monitoring and evaluation is, in the Commission's view, a major deficiency. So too is the lack of enabling legislation to enforce compliance with such policy.

3.8.2.3 Structural Provision for Monitoring and Evaluation

Structural provision refers to the extent to which specific and effective structures have been set up for monitoring and evaluation at different levels in the public service. Such structures need to be well-coordinated and resourced, and to have clear objectives, reporting lines, effective performance indicators and criteria, and above all the clout in the organisation to be taken seriously. Our review of South African departments and provincial administrations suggests that such criteria are not being fully met. Whilst there are a number of organisations, agencies and units involved in different aspects of public service monitoring and evaluation -- including legislative standing and portfolio committees, the PSC, the Auditor-General, the Central Statistical Service, the Efficiency and Effectiveness Directorate within the DPSA, and performance evaluation units in a growing number of departments and provinces -- their activities do no seem to have been coordinated effectively. Their work has also been limited by a number of constraints, including the lack of clear purpose, effective performance measures and indicators, reliable information, skilled personnel and appropriate resources. Moreover, with respect to the departmental evaluation units, it seems that their reports are often not fed effectively into the on-going process of departmental strategic planning and review.

3.8.2.4 Areas to Monitor and Evaluate

The shortcomings of those monitoring and evaluation structures that do exist in organisations can often be traced to technical problems, relating to what precisely is being measured. The identification of which tasks, outputs and outcomes should be measured, at which level and for what purpose constitutes an important aspect of government and indeed corporate performance. Current indications in South Africa are that considerable work still needs to be done in most departments and provinces in relation to these important issues. International best practice suggests that there are three main levels at which different kinds of monitoring and evaluation reports are required:

• The supervisory level, where middle-managers such as deputy and assistant directors primarily require efficiency performance reports;
• The executive managerial level, where DGs, Deputy DGs and chief directors require reports on the effectiveness of departmental strategy in meeting service level needs and objectives;
• The political level, where ministers and portfolio committee members require reports on the broader social impact and outcomes of government policy.

3.8.2.5 Performance Measures and Indicators

To be able to monitor and evaluate policy processes, performance and outcomes, it is generally recognised that a set of key performance measures and indicators will need to be put in place. These will need to be capable of measuring what they set out to do in a reliable and meaningful way, and thereby providing managers at different levels with accurate and relevant information that can be used to inform the on-going process of policy formulation, implementation and review. Although the use of performance measures and can form an indispensable part of an effective system of planning and review, the Commission recognises from its investigations that there are a number of major problems in their use. These include:

• The over-reliance on quantitative data (which is easier to measure) at the expense of what is often more useful qualitative information;
• The tendency to try and measure too much, resulting in a mass of data that is hard to disaggregate and interpret;
• The tendency for public servants to concentrate only on those aspects of their work which they know will be measured.

It is important therefore that a manageable set of meaningful indicators should be selected, and that monitoring data (both quantitative and qualitative) should be interpreted sensitively, rather than being used in an over-simplistic way as conclusive proof of success or failure. Such data should instead be used to try and obtain a realistic view of progress that has been made and to highlight those areas where scope exists for further improvement or investigation.

From the Commission's hearings and investigations it is clear that most departments need much more support and guidance (including training) in devising and implementing appropriate performance measures and indicators. Greater clarity is also needed on the nature and functions of different indicators, particularly in relation to:

• Efficiency (were human, financial, institutional and technical resources used in the most efficient and cost-effective ways?);
• Effectiveness (were the policy output and outcomes achieved?);
• Equity (to what extent have policies and strategies served to eliminate existing disparities, to promote greater representivity, and to ensure greater equity in employment and service delivery?);
• Responsiveness (how responsive has policy implementation been to the actual needs of customers and clients?);
• Appropriateness (have policies and strategies been appropriate to meeting the requirements of the overall policy context set by the RDP, GEAR etc?).

3.8.2.6 Financial Allocation

Effective systems of monitoring and evaluation do not come cheap and, as part of the cost part of the organisation, they are often one of the first activities to be cut in times of financial stringency, such as the current situation in South Africa. It was apparent from the Commission's investigations that current systems are significantly under-resourced, with obvious implications for their effectiveness.

3.8.2.7 Links between Monitoring and Policy

The final shortcoming identified by the Commission with respect to monitoring and evaluation is the inappropriate level at which the findings are often submitted. Frequently information is given to people who have little authority to take appropriate corrective action, and findings often fail to reach the appropriate decision makers at the right time. The links between monitoring and evaluation and the on-going process of strategic planning are therefore weak, and need to be strengthened.

3.8.3 Implication of Limitations in Monitoring and Evaluation

Whilst the Commission's investigations revealed an encouraging level of awareness of the necessity of effective systems of monitoring and evaluation, they also revealed that the translation of such awareness into effective implementation has been sketchy at best. Without legal provision for the establishment, development, implementation, and regulation of the procedures and provisions for monitoring and evaluation, there is no real reason for any functional head to perform, other than for reasons of personal or professional pride. While the Commission recognises that the move towards performance-related contracts for senior officials may assist in this respect, there is nevertheless an urgent need to provide a legal framework for such contracts in order to make them effective. Without such a legal basis, the introduction of performance-related contracts is likely to be largely ineffective.

3.8.4 International Best Practice

International experience indicates, amongst other things:

• That for the monitoring and evaluation function to be effective it must necessarily have the shortest possible reporting line to the key decision-makers in the organisation (currently this is not the case in most South African departments where monitoring units if they exist at all are usually headed by third tier managers - Assistant & Deputy Directors in the main).
• That a degree of operational independence is necessary to ensure credibility of evaluation results. In this context the Commission found that in a number of departments in South Africa the evaluation department reports directly to a manager responsible for delivery of service, leading to a possible conflict of interest. In contrast, the Efficiency and Effectiveness Directorate within the DPSA seems to represent a fair resemblance of independent evaluation capacity. Unfortunately the activities of this unit to date have been somewhat limited in scope.
• That the involvement of customers and clients is an indispensable part of any effective and accountable system of monitoring and evaluation (through the Citizens' Charter initiative in the UK, for example). Currently this is another weak link in the monitoring and evaluation processes in South Africa. However, the Batho Pele White Paper on Service Delivery recommends that all national and provincial departments publish an Annual Report to Citizens including, inter alia, an evaluation of performance against targets and an explanation, where appropriate, of why service has fallen short of what was promised. Opportunities will clearly need to be created to solicit citizen feed-back on such reports if this exercise is to usefully guide future efforts to improve service delivery.

3.8.5 Observations and Recommendations

• Monitoring and evaluation of performance is a very expensive venture. But the cost incurred in the development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation system pale in comparison to the cost of continued implementation of ineffective, cost-inefficient, and perhaps even harmful interventions. It is for this reason that the Commission recommends as a matter of urgency that more effective systems of monitoring and evaluation are designed, developed and implemented.
• While the Commission could recommend a number of piecemeal reforms in this respect, we feel that the current situation demands a more comprehensive intervention. This we believe should take the form of a White Paper on Public Service Monitoring and Evaluation, together with enabling legislation, where appropriate, to ensure the necessary levels of compliance.
• Responsibility for the White Paper should rest with the DPSA/OPM, in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders within and outside the public service. It is anticipated that the reconstituted PSC will have a major role to play in this regard. The White Paper, we believe, should include, inter alia:

• • A clear statement of policy and commitment;
  • A review of current challenges and opportunities, as well as international best practice;
  • Purpose, functions and guiding principles of performance monitoring and evaluation;
  • Key areas and levels for monitoring and evaluation;
  • Key generic or transversal performance measures and indicators (to be adapted by departments to suit their specific needs and circumstances);
  • Key structures and agencies, together with a clear statement of their respective roles and responsibilities;
  • Institutional support programmes, including training and staff development;
  • Financial implications and provision.

Contents Chapter1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Appendicies