CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF HOW GOVERNMENT IS WORKING

2.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1.1 Introduction

This part of the Commission's report constitutes an overview of how government is working. It spells out insights into ministries, departments and provinces. This is done through the examination of key themes and issues which have emerged from our studies and investigations. Precisely because this is an overview, much detail and substantiation have been omitted. The detailed evidence for the overview is to be found in the four substantive chapters (chapters 3-6) of the report which focus respectively on:

• Transforming the structures and functions of government;
• Human resources management and development;
• Budgeting, financial management and accountability;
• Information management, systems and technology.

2.1.2 Background

The nineties witnessed a radical shift from the politics of conflict and confrontation to the politics of negotiation and consensus building in South Africa. This sea change, which resulted in the Interim Constitution of 1993 and the New Constitution of 1996, is important as it fundamentally altered the conception of societal transformation and nation building in South Africa.

The major achievement of this process has been the democratisation, for the first time, of South African society. While problems abound, even the most determined sceptics are likely to note the shared conviction among South Africans that "democracy is here to stay." There exists little, if any, threat to democracy itself. The very appointment of this Commission, we hope, is another indication of the widespread commitment to transparency and open governance. It is seldom that a newly elected government would subject itself, so soon after assuming office, to an independent and rigorous examination. We commend the President and the Government for this measure.

In the past three years several government departments and provincial administrations have introduced far reaching institutional changes and policy reforms. The injection of "new blood" into the public service after 1994 has generally resulted in an improvement in the extent of service provision. There have been remarkable cases where new and old managers within the public sector have worked effectively together and mobilised their limited resources to produce innovative and creative ways of improving the service. At the same time, however, there are departments and provinces which have lagged behind in this respect.

In the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS), released in 1995, the Government outlined a broad policy framework for transforming the South African public service in line with the following vision:

The Government of National Unity is committed to continually improving the lives of the people of South Africa by a transformed public service which is representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all (WPTPS, para. 2.1).

In pursuit of this vision, the Government developed the following mission statement:

The creation of a people centred and people driven public service which is characterised by equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics. (WPTPS, para. 2.1)

These statements were premised on a fundamental re-definition of the role of the state and its relationship to civil society, based on a partnership between them rather than the antagonistic relations that had prevailed in the past. They were also consistent with the relevant provisions of the Interim Constitution (Section 212 (2) (b) and Principle XXX of Schedule 4) as well as Chapter 2 of the White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (November 1994).

Chapters 3 and 10 of the New Constitution of South Africa (1996) make provision for an integrated, inter-sectoral, and co-operative approach to governance. These provisions commit all three spheres of government (national, provincial and local) to be transparent in policy making and inclusive in its approach. The New Constitution further stipulates that the public administration should adhere to a number of principles including:

• A high standard of professional ethics be promoted and maintained;
• Services should be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;
• Resources should be utilized efficiently, economically and effectively;
• People's needs should be responded to;
• The public should be encouraged to participate in policy-making;
• Public administration should be accountable, transparent and development-oriented.

Since 1994, the political landscape has been altered, with the introduction of the new central, provincial and local spheres of governments. New national and provincial departments have been established through the amalgamation and restructuring of former apartheid administrations With a few exceptions, most of these have now gone through some form of participatory strategic planning exercise and have formulated their own visions, missions, policy objectives and strategic plans, albeit of varying depth and quality. These have in many cases been made public through the publication of Green or White Papers, provincial Growth and Development Strategies or other policy documents. Greater difficulty has been experienced, however, in securing the necessary buy-in from staff and other stakeholders to ensure effective implementation of such visions and plans.

Three processes appear to have been followed in developing strategic plans, corporate plans or business plans. The first has been an inclusive one, involving the free participation of management and staff, and quite often the involvement of external stakeholders. The level of participation, and enthusiasm on the part of the various constituencies has generally led in such situations to positive outcomes and the broad acceptance of the new mission and vision statements and strategic plans.

The second process has been characterised by the limited or partial involvement of key constituencies. In such cases senior management usually takes the lead, with limited involvement from staff and unions, and typically little involvement from civil society. Such strategic plans are generally met with resistance on the part of those who feel that they have been excluded from the process,

The third process involves those departments and provinces (far fewer in number) that have delayed developing and implementing new strategic plans. A number of reasons are usually given to justify such delays. These include the effects of the "Sunset Clauses" in the Interim Constitution, the time consuming nature of the amalgamation and restructuring of apartheid administrations, delays in the appointment of key personnel, and resistance to change on the part of some senior managers.

2.1.3 The Inheritance - Challenges and Achievements

Our review of the public service has brought home to us vividly how fundamentally flawed was the machinery of government which the first democratic government of South Africa inherited in 1994. This was constructed and managed for the purposes of regulation, control and constraint, and not for those of community empowerment and development. The instruments necessary to begin the process of reconstruction and development simply did not exist. A new machinery and a new culture of governance had therefore to be created. The enormity of this challenge cannot be over-estimated.

Overall, a major achievement has been the re-integration of government, following the country's balkanization under the apartheid system. This involved the complex and difficult task of rationalising and integrating the eleven former administrations of the RSA and the "independent" and "self-governing" homelands into a single unified public service, operating at national and provincial levels. Typically, these various administrations brought with them different accounting and financial systems, different levels of job grading, skills and experience and, in some cases, a different work ethic. The complex nature of this task accounts for many of the problems that continue to afflict the new public service, including corruption and the incompatibility of systems. Considering the abiding self-interest built into these former administrations, the mere achievement of bringing them together is no mean feat. In fact, in regions such as the Eastern Cape and Northern Provinces, many of the persisting problems can be attributed directly to this incorporation process. In the Northern Cape, however, the problems arose differently. Because it was a completely new province, it had no existing public sector infrastructure to draw upon.

Given this situation it was hardly surprising that the new political leadership viewed its inherited public service with a degree of suspicion and scepticism. Nor was it surprising that one of the top priorities for the new Government was the appointment of new senior public servants from within its loyal political ranks. The Commission acknowledges that there was a threat, real or perceived, of political sabotage by intractable incumbents of the previous dispensation. We also acknowledge the need for "political appointments" within the service as a cushion against unsupportive public servants. It has become evident to the Commission, however, that some of those new appointees have not been able to offer much beyond political loyalty, due to the lack of skills. We were also concerned that, in general, senior public service appointments have generally reflected the ethnic or racial composition of the Minister. While we understand the rationale for political appointments into the public service, we feel that this should be an interim and not permanent feature of the service, and wish to emphasise that skill and competence, rather than political loyalty, should be the guiding norm in future, especially as the threat of political sabotage diminishes.

As can be expected, a number of new ministers and senior public officials assumed office without any previous experience or, in some cases, formal training. Often they walked into ill-equipped offices without any "phasing in" or formal hand-over from their predecessors. This, combined with a general distrust of public servants from the previous order, could only exacerbate the existing sense of insecurity and incapacitation. Compounding this was lack of clarity of roles between elected and appointed officials, a recurrent problem in both national and provincial departments.

From the standpoint of the citizen, the result has been a growing gulf between popular aspirations and expectations on the one hand, and government performance on the other. To some extent this was inevitable given the magnitude of the problems inherited from the past and the lack of resources for overcoming them.

The so-called "Sunset Clauses"(in particular Paras 236/7/8 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993) were an additional constraint on transformation, forcing the state to carry many senior civil servants who were anxious, de-motivated and, in some instances, hostile. These sections continue in force in the 1996 Constitution (Schedule 6 para 24 sub-sections 1/2/3 ) unless they are amended, repealed or inconsistent with the new Constitution. Nor are any proclamations issued under these sections affected unless they are likewise amended, repealed or inconsistent.

Recent legislation driven by the Department of the Public Service and Administration (DPSA), and in particular The Public Service Laws Amendment Act 1997, has made it easier in theory for the Government to dismiss incompetent or non-performing officials. But in practice the disciplinary and dismissal process remains slow. The situation is further compounded by the large numbers of supernumerary personnel retained within the public service, as well as by the weaknesses of the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) scheme. As will be seen later in this report, the operation of the VSP scheme has resulted, somewhat perversely in many cases, in the loss of competent staff and the retention of the "dead-wood."

Given this background, the Commission concludes that what is remarkable is not that there are short-comings in the governance system but rather that it has managed "to stay afloat." We must record how impressed we have been by the progress already made in response to the challenge posed by the flawed inheritance from the previous regime. The magnitude of the task is self-evident. Yet already under the Interim and the new Constitution, a new state has been created with democratic and accountable institutions. A national public service has been and is being re-engineered and re-motivated out of the miscellany of cadres serving the old regime. Its personnel have been integrated into new structures serving national and provincial government that have become remarkably more representative in a relatively short space of time. The aims and objectives of government are being made manifest in a steady flow of policy developments, set out in consultative Green and White Papers. In general, state departments appear strong on policy but weak on delivery. A start, albeit slow and hesitant, has nevertheless been made in giving effect to new policies across the whole spectrum of government.

We shall in succeeding chapters specify the major weaknesses which our investigations and studies have revealed and make proposals in this regard so that the public service at all levels, we believe, will be able to perform better than it does now.

We doubt if our findings will come as a surprise to those working in government. Many of the issues and recommendations in this report were in fact identified and suggested by public servants interviewed by the Commission, many of whom are themselves labouring under the burden of making the best they can of the existing structures and systems and the shortage of necessary skills. We wish to begin our report by acknowledging the commitment, energy and enterprise which many ministers, MECs and public servants are bringing to their work, and to commend them accordingly. We believe they will welcome the opportunities for betterment in the performance of the public service which our proposals are intended to achieve.

What follows summarises our overall impression of how government is working. This is preceded by some assumptions about our point of departure.

2.1.4 Assumptions and Strategic Framework

The Commission is aware of the difficulties arising from the assessment of a public service in transition. It is common knowledge that the measures, strategies and institutions required for transition need not be the same as those required for longer-term consolidation. In fact, in some cases such transitional measures could frustrate the longer-term goals of the public service.

The Commission is mindful of this dilemma and has tried as much as it could to distinguish between short, medium and long-term recommendations. Even then, we caution against inflexibility. We have considered carefully each and every recommendation and are confident that they form a sound basis for a solid public sector.

We have decided at the outset that we would not be evaluating the substance of government policy, as this clearly fell outside our terms of reference, but have noted the absence of policy where this has impinged on service delivery. The only exception in this regard is that of the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) whose substance and policy constitute the focus of our investigation. Even with this caution at the back of our minds, we had to confront initially what amounts to a policy question, namely: What Ought the Public Service to Be Doing?

In trying to get to grips with this question we needed to go beyond the platitude that the purpose of the public service is to serve the government of the day. This is true but hardly helpful. We felt that it was impossible to continue this process unless we agreed, however tentatively, on some common understanding of how the state sees its role. Our approach was to refrain from defining these parameters in the abstract, but rather focus on how the current state defines its role. We considered and debated the following options which are well amplified in the Constitution:

• The state as a creator of the conditions necessary to reach national goals;
• The state as a facilitator;
• The state as a nation-builder;
• The state as a provider of the socio-economic environment.

Given the significance of the Government's Macro-Economic Strategy for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) we felt that it was useful to see how the state was defined in that policy document, notwithstanding the many reservations that were aired about it before the Commission. In GEAR the state is primarily perceived as a facilitator that creates the conditions within which civil society acts. In particular, GEAR's objectives were to:

• Reconstruct the economy and orientate it further towards the export sector;
• Reduce poverty;
• Promote a higher level of economic growth which leads to a sufficient number of new jobs to reduce unemployment;
• Set limits on future government expenditure in order to meet internationally acceptable norms regarding the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP.

The authors of the GEAR document stressed that the new macro-economic strategy was and should continue to be consistent with the principles of the RDP. Whilst acknowledging that the degree of compatibility between GEAR and the RDP has become a subject of heated debate in South Africa, the Commission itself believes that the government should continue to strive to realise the broad principles of the RDP, particularly in relation to the introduction of an integrated, programmatic, needs-based, results-oriented and people-centred approach to service delivery.

The last objective of GEAR listed above, combined with a realistic suite of economic scenarios for South Africa in the medium term, has important financial implications for government. These objectives set clear limits on government spending and size. This leaves government with very little leverage, especially with salaries currently constituting a major part of the current expenditure of the consolidated national and provincial budgets. The picture is uneven. On average, however, according to figures supplied by the Department of State Expenditure (DoSE), remuneration constituted 39.1% of these budgets in 1994-95, 36.2% in 1995-96, 38.2% in 1996-97 and 39% in 1997-98. These percentage figures would be higher if other contractual payments were included.

The high levels of expenditure on public sector remuneration, calculated at R70 billion per annum, is in part due to the development of nine provincial public service administrations as required by the Constitution, as well as the retention of staff inherited from the former Bantustan bureaucracies, particularly in the Eastern Cape and Northern Province. One of the consequences is a very high number of "supernumeraries," calculated currently at 54,000 (DPSA Survey, April 1997).

The salary situation is also confused. On the one hand, departments constantly refer to their failure to attract high calibre people because of poor salaries. Yet, ironically, salaries constitute a high and ever growing aspect of the budget. High public sector employment, especially at lower skill levels, and the lack of a workable mechanism for retrenchment and redeployment of staff, makes it exceedingly difficult to keep within budgetary constraints on the wage bill. While public service salaries appear to be reasonably competitive with the private sector both at the top and at the bottom of the salary scale, the lack of competitive advantage is evident in technical and specialist positions, for instance for engineers, doctors, lawyers, finance and IT personnel. In these areas it is very difficult to recruit and retain capable staff.

Already salaries are rising as a proportion of departmental budgets which have been centrally capped. This in turn impinges on other essential expenditure. Moreover, it will be difficult for government to raise tax rates any further to improve tax receipts if the country is not to exceed internationally competitive levels of tax. Obviously, more effective systems of tax collection are important but the constraints on spending will remain. The main conclusion is that prioritisation will continue to be a key component of good governance. This implies the careful selection of priorities or " trade-offs," a process which is hard to implement in a democratic society where everyone wants his/her expectations to be fulfilled. The number of state employees will have to be limited if the civil service is to be seen as a good, motivational employer. Our views on the size of the public service are elaborated in greater detail in the section on rightsizing (Section 3.2) in Chapter 3 of this report.

International norms for government employment as a share of population for upper-middle level countries such as South Africa would require the reduction of approximately 320,000 public service personnel, at an estimated cost to the fiscus of approximately R16 billion per annum over the next three years. Into this three-year total of R48 billion would have to be factored the cost of training of such employees for employment in other sectors of the economy or self employment. Apart from the additional social costs of such an operation (including their effects on unemployment), the Commission believes that these financial costs are unaffordable. It is also dangerous to accept international norms at face value in view of disparities in the description of employees described as public servants.

The view that the state is responsible for the provision of services is, as far as the Commission is concerned, self-evident. This does not mean, however, that the state has to undertake the actual provision. What is required, in the view of the Commission is a relatively small but highly motivated, focused and well-paid public service This can only happen if core functions are clarified and if public servants adhere strictly to the public service Code of Conduct. In addition, the Government will need to seriously consider alternative service routes and outsourcing to other providers, particularly through creative and innovative partnerships with the private and community sectors.

In the light of this conception of the state, the question of what the public service ought to do would largely be shaped by three considerations:

In the light of the above, it is important to try and specify the specific yardsticks against which government performance should be measured. Or, in other words, what should a professional civil service look like?

2.1.5 A Professional Public Service

2.1.5.1 Promoting Leadership in Government

A professional public service requires professional leadership. International experience suggests that the senior official or officials responsible for exercising this leadership function should be located within the Office of the President, with the necessary management support. It would then be the responsibility of the designated officer (who could and perhaps should also be designated as Head of the Public Service) to promote the continuing development of the senior professional cadre. Regular meetings of this cadre will encourage and facilitate effective coordination of government policy.

2.1.5.2 Creating a Professional Service Ethos

This is one of the nine enabling objectives for a democratic and efficient public administration set out in the Constitution. As such it is of considerable strategic importance for the enhancement of the Government's capability, and should be fully understood.

The concept is that at the highest levels of the public service (Director General, Deputy Director General, and Chief Director) the professional skills required are qualitatively different (though not necessarily more important) from those required at lower levels. At the lower levels, skills and experience necessarily relate to the specific responsibilities of each line department. At the higher levels these technically related skills become progressively less dominant. They are displaced by more generic and transversal skills and competencies, related in particular to the formulation of policy, the development and management of strategic vision and plans, the management of human and other resources, the coordination of policies across government, handling public relations and the media, and the management of the often sensitive interface between appointed and elected officials. Thus, the skills base for top management runs across the whole of government. The incumbents of these posts have the responsibility to pass on these skills to the management cadre and potential cadres below them.

This development is now widely recognised, particularly in Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Australia, the UK, Canada and Malaysia where the top cadre has been designated as a distinct component of the public service, the Senior Executive Service. The number of grades in this top echelon varies from country to country. In the UK it comprises Grade 5 (Assistant Secretary) to Grade 1 (Permanent Secretary). No such gradings are suggested in this report, however.

It has also been recognised in such countries that those officers already in or about to enter the senior management cadre will benefit from training to develop the capacities they will increasingly need to exercise. Such training is often given in collaboration with the private sector, as in the UK "Top Management Programme." It naturally follows that a senior management cadre so created will take on a distinctive professional ethos, incorporating all the values appropriate to a public service at any level plus the values and standards appropriate at these highest levels of activity. This ethos will, of course, condition the development training programme .

Three supporting structural developments will be important to foster such a professional service ethos in the South African context. Firstly, regular meetings of the senior cadre will be necessary to encourage and facilitate better coordinated programmes of government policy. Secondly, efficient management support will be necessary to facilitate the continuing development and renewal of the cadre within the recommended Office of Public Management, to be located within the Office of the President. Thirdly, structures and processes will need to be put into place to ensure that the ethos created within the senior cadre is successfully cascaded down to other levels of the service.

2.1.5.3 Setting the Standards of Public Service Performance

Current standards of service delivery satisfy neither the public nor the officials who aspire to serve them. This is hardly surprising, given the problems faced by the new Government when it took office in 1994. But the Commission believes that improvement, even dramatic improvement, is possible. This, we suggest, imposes two tasks on the Office of the President. The first is to initiate and sustain a national programme of public service standards, however modest. This would be a public declaration of what citizens could and should expect from service delivery. Such service standards would need to be put forward by line ministries and departments, in consultation with their provincial counterparts. The second is to institute a system of rewards for outstanding service delivery and the achievement of designated standards. Whilst the additional costs of such a process would most likely be very small, the potential benefits can hardly be over-stated, as is shown by the widespread international experience.

2.1.5.4 Eliminating Corruption

In moving towards a more professional ethos in the South African public service, it will be necessary to eliminate the corruption and fraud which unfortunately is still widespread in parts of the service. Whilst it was not part of the PRC's brief to investigate corruption, we were naturally concerned at the instances of fraud, mismanagement, abuse of authority, and lack of accountability when these were revealed to us. In different parts of this report we therefore make recommendations, inter alia, for strengthening accountability, introducing more effective and prompt control and disciplinary systems, providing incentives for exemplary behaviour, and introducing training courses in public service ethics.

2.1.6 The Political-Administrative Interface

A weakness in our present system of governance is the uncertainty, even confusion, as to the relative responsibilities of ministers and MECs on the one hand, and senior officials on the other. This became very clear in much of the evidence presented before the Commission. If ministers and MECs act as managers, involving themselves in details of administration, and if senior officials act as politicians, involving themselves in political processes outside their departments, this is to the detriment of their proper and necessary roles. Within the governance of the modern democratic state there is need for both elected and appointed officials with distinct but complementary roles. There is a wealth of international experience, in a variety of differing constitutional contexts, which points to the need for a clear definition of these roles.

Elected officials, such as ministers and MECs, should bring the following to their offices:

• Authority endorsed by the democratic process;
• Skills of political leadership in determining and promoting policies to meet the needs of society;
• The obligation to consult with the President/provincial premiers and colleagues for the policies pursued and the decisions taken by their Departments;
• The ultimate responsibility to account to the President/provincial premiers, to the National Parliament/provincial legislatures, and to the public for what has been done or not done by government.

Appointed officials, in contrast, should bring to their offices:

• The proven ability, knowledge and experience required to carry out the tasks of government in the field to which they are assigned;
• The status derived from having been appointed on merit rather than through patronage;
• The obligation to put their ability, knowledge and experience to work in support of the minister/MEC;
• The responsibility to account, either directly or through senior officers, to the relevant minister/MEC, to parliament or the provincial legislature as required, and to the public for the performance of their departments.

These roles of elected and appointed officials thus require different but complementary skills which must be combined for effective governance. Elected officials needs skills in political debate and public presentation, and in translating popular concerns into deliverable policies, for example. These are not likely to be shared by the public service officials working for them. At the same time, appointed officials need professional and technical skills in financial and general management, which similarly are not likely to be shared by their ministers and MECs.

International best practice suggests that the following are the key roles of elected and appointed officials respectively:

The Role of Elected Officials should be:

• To provide vision and policy direction;
• To oversee and monitor the implementation of policy;
• To secure from colleagues support in the form of necessary resources for their ministries and departments to effectively carry out policy;
• To represent the ministry in cabinet and parliament or, the case of MECs, to represent the provincial department in the provincial executive council (EXCO) and legislature;
• To account publicly for the performance of the ministry;
• To take collective responsibility for cabinet decisions;
• To be accountable to the legislature for their actions.

The Role of Appointed Officials should be:

• To inform and advise elected officials accurately, completely and on time;
• To implement policy and ministerial decisions efficiently and effectively, and in particular in ways which provide value for money;
• To be fully accountable to ministers/MECs and, where appropriate, parliament;
• To utilise in the carrying out of these functions all relevant sources of data and advice, whether within or without the machinery of governance, so as to give their ministers/MECs the broadest possible basis for policy consideration and determination.
• To co-ordinate, control, manage and communicate within their departments.

Given the difficult and complex nature of the transition in South Africa, it is remarkable and noteworthy that substantial, and in many respects successful, progress has been make towards these ends. But we are not there yet. We therefore believe it is important that authoritative guidance on the roles and relationships of political and administrative persons be issued by the President and endorsed by parliament as a foundation for the future governance of South Africa.

There is also a need to ensure a common understanding among ministers, deputies, MEC's and appointed officials of the machinery, systems, principles and practices of government and administration. This is to increase knowledge and skills but also to avoid conflicts inherent in the political-administrative interface. Such measures are also necessary to underpin the investment in the long-term development of a professional managerial corps throughout the public service.

We see the Code of Conduct already published by the Public Service Commission as a valuable contribution towards meeting this requirement. But the purpose and aims of the code cannot be fully met by promulgating it in the President’s name. Guidance and support will be necessary for both elected and appointed officials, if the code is to become a living reality.

2.1.7 The Objectives of Reform

It is essential to recognise that the reform and continuous development of governance in South Africa has to begin at the centre of government itself and will need to embrace the totality of government structures, from the Presidency and Cabinet to ministries, departments and provinces.

The objectives of reform can be plainly set out. Government must be able:

• To formulate policies which are well-founded on relevant data, coherent and well coordinated, fully and prudently costed to ensure value for money, and prioritized within available resources;
• To facilitate the efficient and effective implementation of such policies, and to ensure that they are regularly monitored and reviewed.

From our international specialist studies we observed that the Government has four main instruments at its disposal to pursue its objectives effectively. These are:

• The structures of the Government (including ministries and departments, organisational components, associated executive and/or advisory agencies, commissions, and the like);
• The personnel employed in government, or attached to in an advisory or consultative role (for example, from the private sector, non-governmental organisations, civics and trade unions);
• The financial and physical resources of government (including its revenues, and capital assets of land, buildings, equipment and so on);
• The information base of government (the national statistical data and the operational data relating to resources, personnel and performance in service delivery without which government cannot effectively operate).

The Commission has addressed each of these instruments separately in our review. Our detailed findings and recommendations, derived from our consideration of these four issues, are set out in chapters 3-6 of this report.

Following a general overview and assessment of the structural and functional challenges that have faced the process of building a professional public service in South Africa, we will look in this overview at the main government structures and how they are working.

2.2 OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM PROCESS

The wholeness of government is weakened, indeed threatened in South Africa by both structural and functional defects. Structurally, the national machinery is too fragmented. There are too many departments with too narrow a focus. The whole machine is headed by too many ministers supported by too many private offices, directors general and their support staff. This in turn has created major problems of coordination. In addition every separate department is potentially another self-regarding vehicle for thrusting policies at provincial and local government.

Functionally, there exists what many have described to us as a vacuum at the centre of government. Somewhere between the offices of the President and Deputy President, and between these and the departments lies a space which is conventionally filled in virtually all systems of government by a central secretariat or cabinet office. The function of such an office is to ensure that issues and policies requiring consideration by the President, Deputy President and Cabinet are identified, that the ground work for their presentation is thoroughly prepared with all the relevant departments involved, that there is comprehensive and comprehensible briefing, that policies and outcomes are properly and promptly secured and recorded, that implementation follows, and that progress is effectively monitored.

Some of the other main problems and challenges revealed by the PRC's investigations to have beset the reform process are highlighted briefly below.

2.2.1 Lack of Clear Vision and Strategic Direction

Three years after the political settlement in South Africa, and despite the national vision contained in the WPTPS, there seems to be a lack of consensus on a common and shared vision. Instead a plethora of visions have been developed by departments and provinces, often quite different from each other in content, context and direction. Variations in vision statements appear to have been inspired by different interpretations of the New Constitution, the RDP, the WPTPS, and more recently GEAR. Similarly, whilst most departments and provinces have embarked upon some form of strategic planning, there have been significant variations in how such plans have been developed, the degree of participation and buy-in by staff and external stakeholders, and the ways in which the policy outcomes have been implemented and evaluated.

2.2.2 Lack of Vision-Building and Strategic Planning

Vision building and strategic planning has also been adversely affected in some departments and provinces by the lack of clarity in the respective roles and responsibilities of:

• National departments and their provincial counterparts (with a number of provincial departments claiming that their national counterparts had done little to build their capacity);
• Political leaders and senior administrators (with a number of senior officials complaining about inappropriate political interference);
• Provincial Directors-General and their political heads on the one hand, and provincial departmental heads on the other.

2.2.3 Lack of Skills and Capacity

In many strategic planning processes, much of the work has been facilitated by outside consultants, with little evidence of any significant skills transfer to staff within the organisations. With a few exceptions, therefore, it does not seem that strategic planning processes have made a major contribution to the building of public sector capacity. Within the public sector, there is also little agreement as to where the strategic planning functions should be placed. Although some departments have established inclusive and participative transformation units, others have not. There is little doubt that the lack of in-house expertise and capacity has hindered the process of setting new goals and priorities. Another factor is the degree of "new blood" that has been brought into senior positions within departments and provincial administrations. Where there has been significant change in this respect, new ideas tend to have been generated at a faster pace. However, the relative inexperience of many "newcomers" in the formal and informal ground-rules of the organisation has in some cases meant that they have struggled to win broader acceptance for these ideas.

2.2.4 The Lack of Effective Organisational Arrangements

A number of departments and more particularly provinces have not as yet designed new and more effective structures in line with their new vision, strategies and functions. This has been especially evident in those provinces that have had to go through the difficult and time-consuming exercise of amalgamating and integrating a number of former apartheid administrations. Such provinces have clearly become overwhelmed in the rationalisation process, to the detriment of other forms of structural innovation and improvements in service delivery.

2.2.5 Lack of An Appropriate Communication Strategy

In many departments and provinces the lack of ability to communicate internally and with clients has severely affected efficiency. There are reports that cabinet decisions are not always adequately communicated to Heads of Departments. In addition, strategic plans, vision and mission statements, together with strategic objectives and goals, are frequently not adequately communicated to key stakeholders. This has often led to confusion and the stifling of opportunities for mutually beneficial inter-sectoral collaboration.

2.2.6 Lack of Coordination

Effective coordination within and between the spheres of government is clearly vital, especially if the public service is to contribute meaningfully to the kind of integrated approach to reconstruction and development advocated in the RDP, WPTPS and other policy papers, as well as to the system of co-operative governance spelled out in the 1996 Constitution. However, virtually all of the studies initiated by the Commission pointed to serious weaknesses in the current structures and mechanisms for coordination, both within departments and provinces and between the different spheres of government. The lack of effective coordination mechanisms was also highlighted as a major problem by most departments and provinces who made presentations before the Commission.

2.2.7 Lack of Effective Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

Present institutional arrangements within government also lack monitoring and evaluation systems to measure performance and evaluate policy outcomes. Annual reports, which national and provincial departments prepare, are largely dry, skeletal and not always helpful. These largely fail objectively to outline successes and failures of the previous year. In addition, they are not flexible enough to give immediate feedback to policy makers and implementers.

2.2.8 Conclusions and Recommendations

From this brief overview of the transformation process, the Commission believes that there is an urgent need, inter alia, for:

• A clear and commonly accepted national vision, elements of which can be found in a range of policy documents from the RDP to GEAR.
• Clear and unequivocal commitment to change, particularly on the part of political leaders and senior public service managers.
• Institutional re-engineering, to cluster and re-configure a number of government departments, as well as to foster multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approaches to reconstruction and nation building, to develop innovative horizontal coordinating mechanisms, and to simplify current government bureaucratic procedures.
• Mechanisms to review legislation, in particular to ensure compliance with the New Constitution.
• An effective communication strategy, to ensure that every structure of government has built-in mechanisms for effective communication, vertical and horizontal as well as internal and external.
• Improved systems of human resources development, to build the skills and capacity required by the new public service in South Africa.
• Effective forms of inter-sectoral coordination, both vertical and horizontal, to foster better integration in policy-making, goal setting, and the implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects.
• Improved systems of monitoring and evaluation, in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness within government, and objectivity in measuring policy outcomes.
• Improved opportunities for participation by staff and customers-citizens, which will be vital, in the Commission's opinion, to secure the necessary levels of ownership and support for the change process.

2.3 THE PRESIDENCY AND CABINET

2.3.1 The Office of the President

"What is the role of the President's Office in the initiation, formulation and coordination of policy, what is the filtering down process of policy from cabinet to departments, how is the work of Directors General coordinated and by whom? It does seem Chairperson from the questions posed as well as other signs that we, who in a sense are working at the centre of government, pick up that there is a concern at times even a pre-occupation with what is described as coordination of government or actually lack of coordination of government." (Statement made by Professor Jakes Gerwel, Director General, Office of the President, before the PRC, 25.09.97).

"There is a problem in so far as the coordination of the policy. We inherited a Cabinet Secretary from the old Apartheid Regime. Literally Comrade Mandela just went into the same office that Mr. De Klerk, Mr. Botha and their predecessors had previously occupied. There were no changes whatsoever - completely none. The only thing that really happened there is that the office was divided into three -- one for Mandela, the other for De Klerk and the third for Mbeki...De Klerk’s office was better resourced than the others in so far as personnel and everything was concerned. The office of Mandela is the smallest office of a President I've ever seen in my life up. That of Mbeki was about the same, with the most senior public servant there being a Chief Director. There was nobody really politically responsible for running the administration of the Presidency, due specifically to the nature in general of the Government of National Unity. There was also nobody senior enough to take decisions there on the questions of administration in general." (Statement made by Dr Zola Skweyiya, Minister for the Public Service and Administration, before the PRC, 07.11.97).

These statements reflect the Commission's concerns regarding the management of the Office of the President, as well as the relationship between the offices of the President and Deputy President. A substantial number of directors-general and some ministers have intimated to the PRC that, rather than being the source of administrative support and locus of effective coordination, the Presidency has occasioned a tremendous amount of frustration. With respect to the relationship between the Offices of the President and Deputy President, the Commission was concerned about what we saw as a potential overlapping of support structures and functions, especially in the context where the distribution of powers and functions between the two offices appear to be ambiguous, and where there are two DGs, two legal advisers and other parallel structures with little relationship to each other and which are potentially conflicting.

The submission of the Office of the President to the Commission suggested that the nature of this office was not only characterised by the core requirements of the public service but also reflected the personality of the current incumbent. From the point of view of the Commission, this was by no means exceptional in international experience and may well have been necessary in South Africa in the exigencies of the 1994 transition. The Commission, however, in considering the long-term future of the office, adopted a more structural approach to the matter. Its recommendations on the offices of the President and the Deputy President and its approach to the re-configuration of ministries and departments (which will be discussed in a later section of this overview) are therefore based on efficacy, function and economies of time and cost.

As indicated above, this should be the core and apex of the whole system of governance in South Africa. But currently it is not providing the necessary support required for the Head of State or for the effective running of government as a whole. The evidence before the Commission left us in no doubt but that the current process of policy formulation and decision taking by the Cabinet and ministers is unsatisfactory. Ministers collectively are not as well served as they should be in this respect. Their decisions are often taken without effective coordination, both laterally across departments, and vertically between national departments and their provincial counterparts. Many of the other changes recommended in this report will not be effectively implemented, we believe, if these questions surrounding the role of the Offices of the President and Deputy President are not first resolved.

In South Africa, the Office of President has to support and service two distinct functions:

• The role of Head of State, with a heavy international and diplomatic workload as well as the role of representative of the nation;
• The role of Head of Government, with a heavy workload overseeing the functioning of government as a whole, presiding over cabinet, and participating actively in the whole range of national, provincial and local affairs.

The Commission identified a number of roles and responsibilities which we believe should be contained within the Office of the President. In many countries these roles are separated, each served by its own dedicated structures and personnel, though necessarily closely linked. The work-load is not significantly reduced if they are combined, and each still requires its distinctive support.

We therefore see the need for four separate entities to be identified in the Office to the President:

• The Private Office, whose role would be to meet the day-to-day requirements of the President, in terms of diary management, incoming and out going correspondence, briefing for engagements both internationally and domestically, record-keeping with regard to meetings and all necessary follow-up action, parliamentary affairs, political liaison and consultation, and transportation and related logistical requirements.
• Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (OCS). The role of the OCS would be to support and service meetings of cabinet ministers whether under the chairmanship of the President or Deputy President or any other minister. This function would also cover meetings of the President and/or ministers with provincial premiers and parliamentary portfolio committees, as well as international ministerial meetings. It would be the function of this office:

• To determine for ministers the arrangements and agenda for cabinet, cabinet committees and other ministerial meetings;
• To commission and present briefing memoranda;
• -To maintain records of all meetings; and most importantly,
• To secure from ministers and departments the required follow-up action.

The OCS would also be expected to play an important role in inter-departmental and inter-governmental coordination. As such it would need to liaise effectively with a number of special strategic inter-departmental planning, priority determination, programming and budgeting units, as well as with the Inter-Governmental Forum and MINMECs. In particular the OCS would be expected to play a key role in overall policy coordination and planning, especially though not exclusively in the budgetary and financial fields. This would involve regular liaison with the Departments of Finance and State Expenditure. It will be the function of the OCS to ensure that departments consult with it and appropriate role players in respect of policy and draft legislation. This will avoid the tabling of contradictory or inconsistent cabinet memoranda, and enable the OCS to identify timeously any possible unintended consequences of draft legislation and policy.

In addition to the Cabinet Secretariat, there are two central ministries which support the President and the Cabinet in the whole range of governance, namely the Ministry of Finance and the proposed Office of Public Management (see below). Besides these central agencies there will also be the required cabinet committees, supported by the relevant committee of the Cabinet Secretariat, headed by the Cabinet Secretary, reporting directly to the President.

• The Office of Public Management (OPM), which would replace the DPSA as it is currently constituted. The role of the OPM will be to discharge the responsibility of the President for the efficient and effective coordination and direction of public service. The OPM will consist of a number of specialised strategic support units that would take responsibility, inter alia, for HR practices, personnel, affirmative action and employment equity, industrial relations, policy formation, planning and general oversight of the service. The OPM will also provide support to the Cabinet Secretariat for purposes of the coordinated implementation of government policies. Two important units currently in the Office of the Deputy President (the Office on the Status of Women and the Office on the Status of Disabled Persons) will formally be located as chief directorates within the OPM. This will enable them to promote and integrate their respective projects more effectively and with more clout than is currently the case. A new unit entitled the Organisational Review Agency will similarly be located in the OPM. Its functions are elaborated in Section 2.5.7.8 below. The direction and oversight of the OPM would be the responsibility of a minister, as this would facilitate the necessary separation of the President from the day-to-day oversight of the OPM.
• The Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC), which would replace the Public Service Commission as it is currently structured by the 1996 Constitution. The OPSC, we recommend, should be a lean, independent, statutory commission consisting of 3 senior, experienced managers (drawn from the public and private sectors) to monitor, inspect, review, and assess the performance of the public service and to make recommendations and advise the President and Parliament and, where appropriate, the provincial premiers and legislatures. The OPSC should have a small but expert support service for this purpose, as indicated in more detail in Section 2.5.5 below.

Clearly, all the four units above would need to work co-operatively together on a day-to-day basis.

In recommending the above, we have not distinguished here between the roles of the President and Deputy President, since the allocation of duties will be determined between them. It would, however, be necessary in any arrangement for the Deputy President to have comparable private office support. Nor have we set out an elaborate organogram with numbers and grades of the senior posts required to support the Office of the President in this way. Such details would need to be researched and planned at greater length. We are of the view, however, that there would be no significant increase in costs as a consequence of these recommendations, and probably a saving resulting from the proposed restructuring of the DPSA and the PSC.

The Commission believes that the Office of the President, in line with its constitutional mandate, should take up its responsibilities for the more effective coordination of cabinet and government as a whole, including monitoring and following-up its decisions.

If, within the Presidency, letters are not answered or even acknowledged, and if priorities of policy and programme cannot be judged independently or effectively coordinated, not only is the Head of the State and Government let down, but a signal is being sent throughout government. Our proposals for strengthening the Office of the President, along the lines set out above, should help to enhance the prestige of the presidency abroad, the cohesion of the country internally, as well as the image of the President generally. The core function of the office, in the view of the Commission, will be to render effective support to the President and Cabinet so that they can take informed decisions that can filter down timeously to the relevant organs of government through effective and professionally managed structures.

It should be clearly understood, however that we make no case for extravagance or self- indulgence in strengthening these offices, but for the deployment of administrative discipline and professional skills so that, qualitatively, they can perform and be seen to perform to the highest standards, and set a benchmark of quality in governance overall. To this end, it will be necessary to define the responsibilities which these offices have to undertake. For this purpose, we regard the Office of the President and the Office of the Deputy President as one. The distribution of duties between them will be largely determined by their personal relationship and the circumstances at any particular time, although each of them will of course need a private office.

In the view of the Commission the support system for these responsibilities is not adequate and the organisation and design of the Office of the President is in need of strengthening. Existing structures are currently deliberately lean "to reflect the nature and style of the incumbent." There is no guarantee that without formal structures to facilitate, monitor, communicate and co-ordinate policy in the future, that these will be effective. At the very least, systems need to be institutionalised and standardised.

2.3.2 A Central Cabinet Secretariat

From the above it is clear that the Commission believes strongly that the Cabinet could and should be involved much more deeply in policy formulation and coordination across government as a whole. In particular it should facilitate closer collaboration between the relevant ministerial sectors, between national and provincial spheres of government, and between these sectors and spheres and the key central ministries of Finance, State Expenditure and (as currently constituted) Public Service and Administration.

This in turn requires in our view a strong and effective Central Secretariat equipped with personnel of the highest calibre and with appropriate professional skills. Such a secretariat should not confine its functions to running the private offices of the President and Deputy President, but should play a key role, together with the proposed Office for Public Management, in ensuring clearer direction and more effective coordination at the apex of government, as well as thoughout the public service as a whole.

Our proposals for a Central Cabinet Secretariat and Office of Public Management would, we believe, substantially strengthen the apex and core of the National Government. We have not, however, thought it right to go into the detail of how the Office of the President, enhanced as we suggest, should be organized. Decisions of principle would need to be taken on our recommendations and only in the light of those decisions would it be practicable to draw up an organization chart and write the job descriptions for the posts that would need to be filled for adequate reform.

2.3.3 The Office of the Deputy President (ODP)

The constitutional provision for the Office of the Deputy President (ODP) in the 1993 Constitution was unchartered territory for the post-apartheid state. The Interim Constitution allowed for two such deputies with delegated powers from the President. The 1996 Constitution is silent on the precise role, functions, staffing and structure of the ODP except in so far as it requires the President until April 30 1999 to consult with him/her in respect of the development and execution of policies of the National Government, including all matters relating to the management of the Cabinet and the performance of cabinet business as well as certain appointments under the Constitution (See Note to Section 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108, 1996).

The precise structure and functions of the ODP would therefore appear to revolve around its responsibility to assist the President in carrying out the functions of government, ensuring cohesiveness in these functions, and providing advisory services including political, legal, economic, programmatic and administrative support when required. It is, however, an office in a state of development, and needs to be assessed in terms of its ability to provide the necessary support to the President.

Over the past three years the ODP has assumed a distinctive character as an authoritative locus for a number of important units and policy fora. These enjoy the status of the office to make their maximum impact on the country but have no formal relation to each other except in so far as they are priority "projects", for the most part developmental and transitional in character. These structures include the Youth Commission, the RDP (after the closure of that office), and the offices on the Status of Women and Disabled Persons. In the case of the latter offices, their interventions in national policy, although important, have depended to a considerable extent on the energy of their personnel. Structurally these two offices function separately from the DPSA which formulates policy and provides the substance of the regulatory framework on issues of concern to them, such as equity and employment practices in the public service.

In addition, three important cabinet committees have been established within the ODP, comprising ministerial clusters to provide greater coordination and cohesion in the development of government policy-formation. The significance of these committees could well increase either in the ODP or the Office of the President after the transitional period ends in 1999. The three committees are on Economic Affairs, Social and Administrative Affairs, and Security and Intelligence Affairs.

Presently, the outcomes of the discussions in these fora are of an advisory nature and the mechanisms by which they feed into the inter-governmental and cabinet structures are unclear. As ad hoc bodies they are informal but of some importance, not least for the purposes of policy cohesion and the articulation of guidelines to the three advisors in the Deputy President’s Office (for economic, legal and political affairs respectively).

The Coordination and Implementation Unit (CIU) is a new unit in the process of formation in the ODP. Its performance could not be assessed by the Commission as it is largely in the planning stage. The unit will be overseen by a Deputy DG in the Deputy President's Office, and will be divided into four parts, each headed by a chief director with responsibility respectively for coordination and implementation in the following broad sectors:

• The Social Sector (encompassing Education, Health, Housing and Welfare).
• The Economic and Development Sector (encompassing Finance, Trade and Industry, Public Works, Transport and Tourism, and Minerals and Energy);
• The Justice System Sector (encompassing Correctional Services, Safety and Security and Justice);
• The International Relations Sector (encompassing Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs and Trade and Industry).

The CIU by itself will not be able, of course, to guarantee the necessary coordination. This will also involve a greater commitment to coordination from all departments and agencies, especially by senior managers. Nevertheless, the CIU could and should play an important facilitating role. However, if the CIU is shortly or eventually to provide the necessary support for cabinet committees, its structure would need to conform more directly with the existing committee structure, unless this is to be radically changed. As the functions assigned to the ODP are dependent on the tasks delegated to it by the President, the precise form of the ODP will change from time to time, depending on the exigencies of the moment, and cannot be fully anticipated. The terms of reference of the CIU, however, provide an important basis for strengthening support to the Cabinet and the implementation, coordination and management of government policy. It would, however, be more appropriately located in the Office of the President.

Currently the terms of reference of the CIU overlap widely with the activity of the Office of the President, namely:

• To co-ordinate policy and governance;
• To integrate, and synthesize all spheres of government;
• To monitor the implementation process;
• To co-ordinate the different clusters;
• To reconcile different government activity as one whole.

Yet the functional relationship of the CIU to the structures in the Office of the President is unclear. This will have to be resolved if the unit is to be effective in the short term. Further consideration is needed as to whether the CIU is the appropriate design for a structure within the proposed Office of the Cabinet Secretariat. If effectively managed, the CIU could well help to strengthen efforts to communicate policy, coordinate inter-sectoral activities and monitor progress but it could not do this without an immediate interface with the Office of the President.

2.4 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (IGR)

Whilst inter-governmental relations (IGR) are only at a formative stage in South Africa, the relationship between and within the different spheres of government has emerged as an issue of key concern to the Commission. We were particularly concerned with the management of inter-governmental relations and the viability of the mechanisms for the communication of cabinet policy to departments and provinces throughout the government machine. In this, the role of the centre, the efficacy of existing structures, and their capacity to implement national policies were a cause for considerable concern. Our views on this subject are further elaborated in Annexure 4, attached to this report.

2.4.1 Weaknesses at the Centre of Government

Concerns about weaknesses at the centre of government were a recurring theme during the public hearings of the PRC and in the specialist and process studies conducted by the Commission’s task teams.

In view of these shortcomings the Commission has dealt at length with the inter-sectoral management of affairs between and across the three "spheres" of government. Similarly, in view of the importance attached to this matter, the Commission initiated specialist studies to examine the issue of Inter-Governmental Relations in more detail and to make recommendations as to how relations might be improved (see Annexure 4).

Of considerable interest to the Commission was the viability of the structures and mechanisms established so far to promote and co-ordinate IGR. In addition to the Cabinet and line ministries, these include the Inter-Governmental Forum (IGF), MINMECs, the NCOP and various Technical Committees.

2.4.1.1 The Inter-Governmental Forum (IGF)

This body was established to provide an opportunity for consultation and joint decision-making between ministers and premiers on all matters of mutual interest. It is, however, an informal body and has no legal basis for the decisions reached by its members. No legal mechanisms are available to ensure that governments adhere to the decisions taken by the IGF. It depends therefore largely on mutual trust.

The permanent members of the IGF are all at the heart of the public administration system and are central to inter-sectoral coordination. They presently include the Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, the Minister for the Public Service and Administration, the Minister of Finance, the Director General of the President's Office, the nine provincial premiers, and, ex-officio, the President and Deputy President. The main functions of the IGR are the establishment and implementation of an integrated and coordinated IGR policy framework; multi-sectoral or lateral policy issues, finance and fiscal matters and constitutional concerns.

The coordination of this body rests with the Minister for Constitutional Development who presides over meetings and presents the decisions of the IGF to cabinet.

2.4.1.2 Ministerial Forums (MINMECs)

These are sectorally-based meetings of national ministers and provincial MECs, established to promote co-operation, coordination and communication between the national departments and their provincial counterparts. MINMECs comprise a national minister and members of the executive council (MECs) in each of the provinces, e.g. the Minister of Finance together with the MECs for finance in each of the provinces. Depending on the sector, MINMECs reportedly meet fairly regularly, and discuss the implementation of government policies and the division of financial and other resources. Their deliberations are less overarching and more sectoral and detailed in character than the matters discussed by the bodies such as the Cabinet or the Inter-Governmental Forum.

The responsibilities of the MINMECS include:

• The harmonisation of legislation within a given sector;
• The division and deployment of financial resources;
• The harmonisation of programmes on a national basis;
• Consultation and negotiation on national norms and standards;
• The integration of inter-governmental policies and strategy;
• The formulation of joint programmes and projects;
• The sharing of sectoral information;
• The assignment of roles and responsibilities between spheres of government.

2.4.1.3 The National Council of Provinces (NCOP)

Chapter 4 of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for an NCOP, which provides a direct channel for provincial governments to participate in policy formulation at national level. Structurally the NCOP comprises a ten person delegation from each of the provinces including four "specialist" delegates, (the premier/or delegate, plus three others) who, within their level of competence, can issue legislation of common interest to all provinces which can feed into the national legislative process. The impact of this relatively new structure has still to be felt by government but, given its inclusive character and its potential to marshal provincial opinion, it is likely to play an increasingly significant role.

However, the NCOP is designed more for the discussion and determination of broad policy than for the management of inter-governmental relations. Nevertheless, the desirability of a formal linkage between the premiers and the Office of the President as a means of communicating policy and avoiding potential conflicts is a matter needing serious consideration on the part of government.

2.4.1.4 Technical Committees

Quite a number of technical committees have been established to support the political structures for IGR, and to promote co-operation and consultation at the administrative level. The most prominent of these structures is the Technical Inter-Governmental Committee (TIC) established as the administrative support structure of the Inter-Governmental Forum (IGF). It discusses matters falling within the responsibility of the IGF and makes proposals on how to address them. It also facilitates, guides and monitors the implementation of decisions taken by the IGF and reports back on progress. This body meets on a quarterly basis and is chaired by the Director General of the Department of Constitutional Development.

In addition to the TIC there are technical committees for each of the twenty MINMECS. Each of these committees is supported by an array of sub committees, both technical and inter-sectoral, and is attended by all the relevant national and provincial DGs.

2.4.2 Overall Assessment of Inter-Governmental Relations

Having noted the instruments and developing forms of IGR, it is to some extent possible to assess the system as a whole. In doing this we are mindful that our Constitution is less than two years old. It is therefore not surprising that the form of inter-governmental relations, as set out in the Constitution, is in many ways not working as smoothly as intended. A culture of inter-governmental relations, based on technical capacity, has still to evolve.

Inter-governmental relations in South Africa (as elsewhere) are shaped by political, administrative, legislative and financial factors and these individually and collectively impact on the overall performance of the system of government.

2.4.2.1 The Marginalisation of the IGF

The IGF has recently been subject to severe criticism, especially from provincial governments. Amongst the points of critique raised are the following:

• Because MINMECS are responsible for most line function coordination between national and provincial departments, there remains relatively little for the IGF to do.
• Agendas of the IGF contain few matters of substance or importance and they lack focus.
• There is a feeling that most IGF meetings are of an informative rather than of a consultative and deliberative nature.
• Ministerial attendance of IGF meetings has been poor, particularly on the part of national ministers, and this reflects the lack of importance attached to this structure by the National Government.
• The relationship between the IGF and other IGR structures, MINMECS in particular, is unclear and confusing.
• The IGF appears to have little if any decision making authority.
• The establishment of the NCOP has served in some ways to further marginalise the IGF.

Our conclusion is that the efficacy of the IGF is open to considerable uncertainty, given its increasingly limited use. Meetings of the IGF initially took place on a monthly basis, but in 1996 these were rescheduled to bi-monthly meetings, and in 1997 they were further reduced to quarterly meetings.

2.4.2.2 MINMECs: Constraints and Deficiencies

The contribution of MINMEC structures to inter-governmental co-operation and coordination has been substantial, but the institution, as a whole, has not been without its limitations. Amongst the stated shortcomings of the MINMECs are the following:

• They are highly sectorally focused and pay insufficient attention to related functional areas; as a consequence, they encourage the fragmentation of policy formulation;
• The large number of MINMECs necessitate numerous meetings and this leads either to poor attendance or attendance by low ranking officials;
• MINMEC agendas are dominated by issues which should more properly be dealt with by technical committees;
• MINMEC meetings are dominated by the National Government and do not really lend themselves to consensual decision-making;
• The management of meetings, the preparation of supporting documentation and the conduct of proceedings are poor;
• There is a lack of clarity over the decision-making authority of MINMECs and insufficient capacity to implement decisions.

These constraints, notwithstanding, MINMECs do have an important role to play in promoting IGR, and a number of departments are attempting to overcome the deficiencies identified above. A more effective means for promoting multi-sectoral coordination between MINMECs is, however, clearly necessary if the present fragmented and uni-sectoral approach to policy formulation is to be overcome.

2.4.2.3 Technical IGR Structures: Uneven Performance.

The technical committees and structures set up to facilitate IGR have had mixed success. While some are clearly functioning well and are actively promoting the development of integrated government systems, others appear to be functioning with little effect or not at all. Technical structures set up to coordinate activities between national and provincial line departments are generally functioning well, but inter-sectoral committees have had only limited successes. The Technical Inter-governmental Committee, for example, has been severely criticised for its failure to promote more effective IGR at the national level.

Special task teams, however, have been successful in bringing together inter-sectoral teams from national and provincial departments (examples include the National Sanitation Task Team, and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk). The success of these teams appears to stem from their results orientation, their specific terms of reference and set time frames.

2.4.2.4 IGR Between National Departments: Poor Coordination and the Limited Role of the Centre

Without exception officials interviewed at the national level spoke of the poor coordination of activities between national departments. This appears to be due in no small measure to the fact that there has not, hitherto, been an effective mechanism for ensuring coordination of administrative activities at this level. It is significant that virtually all the committees, technical teams, and working groups set up to promote IGR, focus on relations between national and provincial departments, while relatively little attention has been paid to strengthening co-operation and coordination between national departments.

It is evident, moreover, that IGR was not a strong feature of the previous political dispensation and many national departments operated with a considerable degree of independence. The Bantustan system and the racial segregation of areas and services also served to fragment governmental activity to a considerable extent. Although both the Cabinet and the State Security Council did coordinate activities to an extent, their focus was often narrow and their focus oppressive. The State Security Council, as might be expected, focused its attentions on security issues, the promotion of the economy (countering sanctions) and other issues important to the survival of apartheid rule. As a consequence, there has not been a strong historical foundation or institutional memory of effective IGR on which to build.

In addition, the Interim Constitution did not provide any guidance on the question of IGR, and this issue was only addressed in the Final Constitution. For the first two years of the new Government, therefore, there was uncertainty as to what form IGR should follow.

2.4.2.5 Gap at the Centre of Government

It is evident that the National Cabinet provides a focal, and generally effective platform for coordinating national policy. However, once policies have been made at this level, there is no institution in place to follow decisions up, both to ensure that they are being implemented and to ensure that this is being done in the agreed manner.

At one stage it had been thought that the Director General in the Office of the President, who is also Secretary to the Cabinet, would play such a coordinating role. It was also felt that this same DG could perform a function similar to that of the Secretary to the Cabinet in the United Kingdom, and in a number of Commonwealth countries, and assume the role of head of the civil service. This never transpired, however, in part due to the fact that the DG's role was confined, in practice, to a more limited role of administrative secretary to the President's Office and the Cabinet itself. The Commission's proposal for the creation of a head of the public service addresses this.

2.4.2.6 Role of the Department of Constitutional Development (DCD)

In an effort to address the above shortcoming, the Department of Constitutional Development has assumed a proactive role in promoting inter-sectoral IGR. However this is an intervention that has not been welcomed by all other departments and could, if not carefully pursued, aggravate rather than promote IGR. This is because there needs to be a clear distinction between the Department's defined role of promoting IGR and its presently assumed role of coordinator. At present the two roles are blurred, and it is doubtful whether the Department carries sufficient political stature to be able to fulfil the role of coordinator. Our proposal for the establishment of a Chief Directorate for Inter Governmental Relations, located in the Office of the President, seeks to remedy this.

Some steps have, in any event, been taken at the national level to promote more inter-sectoral coordination. These include the establishment of the Budget Council (an expanded version of the Finance MINMEC, which includes Directors General of the Departments of Finance and State Expenditure), the Treasury Committee (comprising the ministers of Finance, Home Affairs, Labour, Trade and Industry) and the Coordination and Implementation Unit (CIU) currently being set up in the Office of the Deputy President. This collective involvement of departments with a stakeholder role to play in coordination is, in our view, one which should be encouraged.

2.4.2.7 IGR within the Provinces: Failures in Coordination

Failure to coordinate policy at the national level has had a "knock-on" effect in the provinces. Perhaps the most glaring examples of the shortcomings of uni-sectoral IGR is to be found in the sphere of budgeting. Broad agreement on sectoral policy in areas of concurrent responsibility is generally reached through the various MINMECS. Provincial budgets are, on the other hand, approved through the Budget Council (the Finance MINMEC) applying formula derived by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). However, as there is no formal institution through which the Budget Council and individual MINMECS are able to discuss policy implementation, there is invariably a mismatch between available funds and the programmes agreed upon by the MINMECS. This is a serious deficiency that needs to be addressed urgently by government.

Inter-sectoral coordination within the provinces is limited and the development of integrated programmes is not taking place. This is due partly to the confusion that prevails in certain provinces over the coordinator role of the provincial DG, but it is also due to a failure to institutionalise inter-sectoral meetings, to coordinate policy formulation, and to ensure that policies are implemented collaboratively. In a number of provinces there appears to be poor coordination between the treasury and line departments and this leads to a situation where programme budgets do not match available funds.

A further constraint at the provincial level relates to poor coordination between policy makers and administrators. Officials interviewed at national and provincial level spoke of the problem of policy decisions being taken without consideration being given to local capacity.

2.4.2.8 IGR and Local Government

Very few IGR structures have been set up to promote coordination between local government departments and the other two spheres of government. Despite the provisions of the 1996 Constitution, local authorities have yet to be integrated as a distinct sphere into the broader system of government. Formal institutions to promote inter-governmental relations between local and national and provincial governments are either embryonic or non-existent. As a consequence, where concurrent responsibilities extend to the local level, these are generally not integrated with national and provincial programmes. Part of this has to do with the fact that the focus of IGR thus far has been on the relations between national and provincial governments, but it also has to do with the variable capacities of local government.

2.4.2.9 The Impact of Financial Systems on IGR: Mismatch of Budgets

The formula and procedures for the financing of the different spheres of government are addressed in detail in Chapter 5 of this report. However, mention must be made of the impact which the financial regimen is having on IGR and on the performance of provincial and, to a lesser extent, local governments. A failure to coordinate sectoral programmes with national and provincial budgets is, in particular, an ongoing problem in many of the provinces.

2.4.2.10 Review of the Legislative Framework: Continuing Impact of the Previous Social Order

Many of the dimensions of IGR between and within the three spheres of government continue to be shaped by legislation derived from the previous political order. Much of this is inappropriate for a democratic non-racial society, especially as it serves to perpetuate the fragmentation of service delivery.

It is widely recognised internationally that the codification of IGR in legislation is in no way a sufficient condition for improved inter-governmental coordination. However, as a report prepared by Department of Constitutional Development makes clear:

• The Constitution requires that there be an Act for inter-governmental relations and the settlement of inter-governmental disputes; this is a mandatory requirement and the National Government has no discretion in this regard.
• Co-operative government is a legal norm governing all official conduct and creating positive and negative obligations for all spheres of government which is enforceable in court. If government does not take the lead in providing a coherent interpretation of this regime, a justiciable norm will be established. That is to say, the interpretation presented to the Constitutional Court on the day will be established as the legal precedent that will shape policy choices, with potentially far reaching practical consequences.
• There is already in existence an informal, pre-constitutional system of inter-governmental relations, which is regularly criticised for its inefficiencies. Positive legal steps need to be taken to alter this system.
• The right time for policy and the completion of an appropriate evolutionary cycle are facts which are neither self-evident nor mutually exclusive of government taking a lead in guiding the development of IGR in a balanced way.
• The Constitution does not specify whether IGR and dispute settlement should be dealt with in more than one Act, nor does it preclude other, non-legislative ways of providing for inter-governmental relations. These need to be elaborated.

2.4.2.11 The Commission's Concerns regarding IGR

Although the Department of Constitutional Development's proposed White Paper on IGR will, in the first instance, provide a guide to policy, it should also help to establish a framework for subsequent legislation. Current policy concerns relate to the following issues:

• The extent to which the national departments should be responsible for the implementation of co-operative government;
• The type of policy instruments required to fulfill that responsibility;
• The timing of policy and legislation;
• The scope, goals and objectives of policy;
• The establishment of a balance between the natural evolution of IGR and the need for prescription;
• The content of policy.

2.4.2.12 Conclusions and Recommendations

The following summary conclusions represent the most significant issues to emerge from the PRC's review of IGR.

• The Commission's review of the multiple structures established to promote IGR in the public service, suggests that in and of themselves they are probably adequate to redress the diverse dimensions of inter-governmental relations. What is required, instead, is the more efficient operation of these structures, and a better understanding of their objectives.
• The institutionalisation of procedures (processes) and the routinisation of meetings is essential. There will also need to be some sanction to ensure compliance with regulations.
• Improved information flows between and within sectors in all three spheres of government is a matter of considerable importance. It is evident that provincial officials and political office bearers are often not well briefed before entering into negotiations with other levels of government. Because of this, they commit provincial departments to the implementation of policy which they lack the administrative and financial capacity to fulfill.
• There needs to to be greater attention paid to the strengthening, and where necessary creation, of mechanisms to engage civil society in the processes of inter-governmental relations.
• Inter-governmental relations between local government and the other two spheres of government are weak and will need to be strengthened as a matter of urgency.
• Communication is poor. It is evident that decisions taken at the highest policy levels (the Cabinet, IGF and MINMECS) are not always adequately conveyed down to the implementing department. Alternatively, decisions taken are not adequately monitored and followed up. In that respect, the IGF is not functioning well and it should be either restructured or abolished.
• There is a strong need for the development of a coordinating mechanism at national level. The establishment of the Coordination Implementation Unit in the Office of the Deputy President could fulfill this role. The transfer of the IGR function from the Department of Constitutional Development to the Office of the President is a matter of priority.
• Consideration should also be given the creation of a stronger portfolio for the Secretary to the Cabinet as the head of the civil service. There is a need for an effective mechanism to follow up decisions taken by the Cabinet in order to ensure that policy is being implemented and that it is being implemented in the correct manner.
• There is no institution assigned responsibility for overall planning at either the national or provincial levels; this will need to be addressed. In the provinces, such an activity should be vested in the DGs office.
• There is a pressing need for the transmission of a coherent national vision for development from the National Government; at present the RDP has faded into obscurity in certain quarters, while GEAR remains highly controversial.
• There needs to be far greater clarity on the responsibilities of the different national departments, and a clearer demarcation of responsibilities to avoid unnecessary overlap, duplication and conflict.
• There needs to be a review of political portfolios at national and provincial level in order to ensure that there is congruence between them. The present configuration of portfolios appears ad hoc, and creates problems for IGR and inter-sectoral coordination.
• There needs to be greater clarity on the obligations of different spheres of government where there are concurrent responsibilities. This will require both detailed discussion and, in certain instances, legislation.
• A review of legislation on operational matters is a matter of urgency in many sectors, and may call for the blanket repeal of certain acts.
• It needs to be recognised that a lack of capacity exists in all three spheres of government (but particularly at provincial and local levels). This is a serious constraint to efficient IGR and that this will need to be addressed.
• Serious consideration should be given to the asymmetrical devolution of functions (i.e. the devolution of some of the functions to provinces and municipalities where there is capacity to undertake services rather than delaying such devolution until there is capacity overall) as has been proposed by the Department of Housing. This could go some way to redress problems of capacity without violating the provisions of the Constitution.
• A closer integration of budgeting processes with sectoral and inter-sectoral planning processes is vital to the implementation of more effective IGR.
• Further expansion and development of Internet and E-Mail systems and extensive training in their usage would help to facility information flows between officials in the different spheres of government.

2.5 NATIONAL MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS

As we have indicated earlier, there is no intention in this overview to give a blow by blow account of departments and ministries. We adopt a two-pronged strategy here. In the first place, we provide, in a separate appendix at the end of this report (Appendix 3), a list of comments and observations made by individual Commissioners in respect of specific departments. These do not constitute the Commission findings, but simply impressions gleaned by Commissioners. They are merely intended to assist departments and ministries in their planning.

Secondly, we identify issues, whether department-specific or cross-cutting, which are worthy of the Government's attention. These are discussed below.

2.5.1 Differing Concepts of Transition

All departments claimed to be engaged in some form of transformation. Yet the conceptualisation of transformation varies considerably across the public service -- with some departments emphasising representivity or accountability, and other placing a greater premium on service delivery or institutional change (see Section 4.2 in Chapter 4). Few departments seem to have adopted the holistic and integrated approach to transformation advocated in the WPTPS. Transformation strategies have sometimes differed according to the nature of departments. Direct service departments such as Health, Education, Welfare and Water Affairs seem to have been better able to link their transformation programmes to service outcomes than those rendering indirect services such as Finance, State Expenditure and Public Works.

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