Tebbutt Commission : Part 2B (continued)

He said he and a colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel Blignaut, at about 19:00 went to Rooigrond and waited at the check-point for the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging convoy to arrive. He then went to Mr Terre'Blanche whom he found on a farm of a certain Marais outside Rooigrond with a convoy of about 300 men, ready to move. He gave him General Turner's message that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was not welcome in Bophuthatswana and that they should leave. Mr Terre'Blanche arrogantly said he would not listen to "a little Colonel" as he was there at the invitation of President Mangope. Colonel Botes said he should discuss the matter with General Turner. After an argument it was agreed that Mr Terre'Blanche and one of his generals would accompany Colonel Botes to the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters at Molopo Base while the rest of his forces would wait outside Bophuthatswana until his return. Despite this, however, members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging entered the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, as evidenced by those at Riviera Park. At the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters General Turner also told Mr Terre'Blanche that he was not welcome and must leave. The latter was very emotional. He said he had received an invitation from President Mangope personally to bring his men and come and assist him. He insisted on speaking to President Mangope or Mr Rowan Cronje. President Mangope was not contacted but several telephone calls took place between him and Mr Cronje.

It must here be recorded that Mr Terre'Blanche was invited by the Commission to appear and testify before it. He and three members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, two of whom were described as generals viz. General Josias Alexander (Alec) Cruywagen and General Roelf Jordaan and one Andries Kriel, attended one of the sittings of the Commission. All four of them chose not to testify under oath and to be cross-examined but each made an unsworn statement. In his statement Mr Terre'Blanche told the Commission that he had entered into a written agreement with President Mangope that in the event of a Communist threat the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Bophuthatswana Government would help one another. This had followed discussions he had with the Bophuthatswana Cabinet. In the week prior to 10 March 1994 he had heard of the trouble in Bophuthatswana and within the Cabinet structure. On 10 March 1994 he had telephoned President Mangope who, he said, was very grateful to hear from him. A number of members of his staff were present at the time and listened to the conversation on a loudspeaker telephone. President Mangope told him the situation was critical. He asked him how many men the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would be able to muster to assist. Mr Terre'Blanche said that he had 350 immediately available but by that evening would have many more. He said that before the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging convoy left for Bophuthatswana he again telephoned President Mangope and said he then had 700 men, that they were leaving and would be in Bophuthatswana within two hours. President Mangope asked him to telephone Mr Rowan Cronje to tell him when they would arrive and what route they would be taking. He, however, had no contact with the latter until he spoke to him when he was with General Turner at the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters. He was saddened by the fact that President Mangope was denying that he had asked him to assist. He had numbers of witnesses who could testify that he had done so. He found it difficult, too, to understand why General Viljoen, who had led President Mangope to believe that he could muster 3000 - 4000 men but in the event had only mustered 350, had been asked to prop up a shaky government whereas the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging with 750 men was chased away.

As stated earlier President Mangope testified under oath. He denied that he had ever entered into any written agreement with Mr Terre'Blanche. It was correct that the latter had met his Cabinet on 17 February 1992 at his Terre'Blanche's request. President Mangope said that at that time he was prepared to meet with any political organisation across the political spectrum and had met with the leaders of a number of political parties. Nothing was achieved at the meeting with Mr Terre'Blanche at which President Mangope said, he was disgusted with Mr Terre'Blanche's attitude. The latter said he saw a revolution coming but that he would never be governed by a Black man. President Mangope said: "I met Mr Terre'Blanche that day for the first and last time. I never wished ever more to meet the man." He denied having asked the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging to assist him. He said "I would not even begin to think of touching the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging with a barge pole". He said "emphatically and categorically" that Terre'Blanche's statement that he had invited the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging to assist was a lie. He said that he had received a telephone call from Mr Terre'Blanche on the late afternoon of 10 March 1994 offering assistance. He had told him that under no circumstances was he to put his foot in Mmabatho or Bophuthatswana. Mr Terre'Blanche wanted to know who was in charge of the situation. He gave him the names of Mr Rowan Cronje and General Turner. He only became aware of the presence of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging when he saw them on television that evening. He confirmed that he had, however, asked General Viljoen to assist him and told the members of the Security Council at their meeting on 8 March 1994 that he had done so. The Afrikaner Volksfront's role would be a defensive one to guard vital installations. President Mangope said he had given a lot of thought to calling in the South African Defence Force but he did not trust the South African Government whom he feared might send in its troops to topple his regime. He had also read in the newspapers utterances by people like the late Mr Joe Slovo of the African National Congress that if the Bophuthatswana Government were stubborn about re-incorporation, the Transitional Executive Council would send in tanks to topple it.

Returning to events at the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters on the night of 10 March 1994, General Turner said he discussed the situation with Mr Cronje and it was decided that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging could remain in Bophuthatswana if they removed all their insignia and placed) themselves under the control of the leaders of the Afrikaner Volksfront. They would be assembled at the Air Force Base. This decision, according to both Mr Cronje and General Turner, was taken so as to get the members of the Afrikaner We Weerstandsbeweging under control and not roaming the streets of Mmabatho and Mafikeng. Genera Turner said that it would have been best if they could have got the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging out altogether but as they would not go, the alternative plan was the next best thing. General Turner said they could not have forcibly removed them as that would have sparked off a war and those who would have got hurt would have been the people of Bophuthatswana. When the conditions were conveyed to Mr Terre'Blanche he was also told that he was a high profile person and although his men could stay under the conditions laid down, he personally would have to leave. Mr Terre'Blanche was not pleased. He had two of his Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Generals with him and the fact that he would have to leave was not acceptable to them. Their reaction was that they were being "chased away like dogs" and that they should take their things and leave. However, after long discussion, the conditions were accepted. Colonel Botes, who was present, said that it was the best that could have been done, having regard to the fact that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were already in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area and reports were already coming in of shootings by them.

It was during those discussions that as testified to before the Commission by a number of black members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging were seen in the Operations Room at the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters at the Molopo Base. Lance Corporal Isaac Moopelwa, a military policeman told how while he was on duty at the gate to the Base cars carrying Colonel Botes, Colonel Blignaut and Mr Terre'Blanche had entered the Base at about 21:00 to 22:00 on the Thursday evening. He later saw them looking at maps, together with a Colonel Schultz and General Turner in the Operations Room. An Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging member told him they had been called by President Mangope to help the Bophuthatswana soldiers. Private Ismail Motsamai who at the time was working in the signals section of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force also saw white people in the Operations Room. He said he saw Mr Terre'Blanche entering the Operations Room with Colonel Pieter Burger, the Officer Commanding the Air Force Base, at about 19:00 that evening. He said the Operations Room was packed out with white people. He entered it and Staff Sergeant Greyling pointed a 9mm pistol at him and told the white men to keep him there. He was kept hostage all night by the white men who he said threatened him and for the whole night forced him to lip his arm and say "AWB, AWB". He was even escorted to the toilet by an armed white female. Some of the men were masked. He left the next morning. He did not report the matter to Colonel Burger who was too busy. The latter was "a changed man who was furious at us". He reported the matter to his senior, a sergeant, on the Monday. Private Motsamai said a Colonel Trent in the Operations Room told him at about 16:30 that he was expecting visitors that evening. Colonel Burger, however, told the Commission he only told Colonel Trent about the arrival of the Afrikaner Volksfront at about 19:30. Private Motsamai said he had also seen on a board giving notice of flights from Mmabatho that President Mangope was flying in his personal helicopter to Ventersdorp that night (Ventersdorp is where Mr Terre'Blanche has his home). He had seen it take off. Again, it must be remembered that President Mangope was already at his home in Motswedi at about 13:00 that day.

Colonel Breytenbach said that on his arrival at Mmabatho Air Force Base he found that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were also concentrated there. He had been instructed by General Viljoen to get them out of Bophuthatswana as soon as possible. Both Colonel Breytenbach and Commandant Steyn said that they were told of the agreement that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members would remain in Bophuthatswana on condition that they removed their insignia and placed themselves under the command of Commandant Steyn and Colonel Breytenbach. They had, however, despite having agreed to do so, done neither of these things. They did not remove their insignia or put themselves under the command of Commandant Steyn, or later, Colonel Breytenbach. They were never in command of them. He then had a meeting with Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging General Cruywagen, first alone with him and later with him and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging General Nick Fourie. They were in camouflage uniforms. He tried to get them to withdraw their men voluntarily. Cruywagen was at first amenable to doing so but when Fourie joined him they became recalcitrant. Colonel Breytenbach said he told them they were under his command and that they were all under the command of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who did not want them there. They would be withdrawn not through Mafikeng but by guides who would take them around the outskirts of built-up areas to avoid confrontation with the local population. They refused to do that. Discussions became very heated. He criticised their lack of discipline and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging leaders left in a huff.

Shortly after this Brigadier Jordaan, who was second in command to General Turner, asked Colonel Breytenbach to withdraw the Afrikaner Volksfront members from their guard duties. They were being equated with the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force were threatening to attack them. Colonel Breytenbach agreed to do so. He called all his men together and told them what was happening. He said that their assistance to the Bophuthatswana Defence Force had effectively ceased. A confrontation was looming between them and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force and they were not properly armed to deal with such a confrontation. They were to be confined to the Air Force Base and if the threat to them became more imminent they would be escorted out of the area by Colonel Swart, who was present at the Air Force Base, at 16:00 in order to get out before dark. They were asked to defend the airport against attack in the meantime. The situation, said Colonel Breytenbach, was very unsatisfactory as they only had the 140 R4 rifles with which they had been issued plus some shotguns and a 20mm aircraft gun as protection against the Caspirs and arrnoured vehicles of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. The threat of attack, however, did not materialize. Nevertheless he gave instructions to Commandant Steyn to take the main body of their men out of the area at 16:00 and leave a small force of about 90 men to protect the Air Force Base. They would be escorted by units of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force.

Pursuant to his instructions, Commandant Steyn moved the main body of the Afrikaner Volksfront members out of the Air Force Base at 16:00. A small force of about 90 men was left behind. They were escorted out later. The Afrikaner Volksfront convoys were not escorted through any built-up areas, but by detour routes round the outskirts of those areas. The main convoy ,;vas escorted by way of back routes. It was during this phase that the deceased, FRANCOIS ALWYN VENTER (Case No. S7) was shot. As appears from the detailed discussion of the case, the deceased was probably shot by an unidentified member (or members) of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force when he was in a part of the Afrikaner Volksfront convoy leaving Bophuthatswana. The remaining members of the Afrikaner Volksfront were escorted out of Bophuthatswana by a convoy of South African Defence Force vehicles under Major Christiaan Jacobus Serfontein. It was during that phase that the deceased FRANCOIS WILLEM JANSE VAN RENSBURG (Case No. 9) was shot. Major Serfontein's description of what happened, as appears from the detailed discussion of the case, is the following.

On 10 March 1994 it became known that there was Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging activity in the area and that members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging were converging on Mmabatho. It also 'became known that Afrikaner Volksfront members were proceeding to Mmabatho to stabilise the situation there. On the morning of 11 March 1994, his unit, consisting of about 100 men, moved into Mafikeng to the South African Embassy. They passed Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging bakkies on the way. Some of these tried to force their way in between the South African Defence Force convoy vehicles, others just stood parked alongside the road. At about 16:00 that day his unit received instructions to occupy the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Headquarters and also the Air Force Base and to escort the right-wingers from the Air Force Base and out of Mafikeng. At the Air Force Base he met Colonel Burger of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force and one Lennert Veenendal of the Afrikaner Volksfront. Other Afrikaner Volksfront leaders such as General Constand Viljoen and Colonel Jan Breytenbach were also present. There were no Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging leaders there. There was a large group of men clad in khaki, said Major Serfontein, whom his unit would assist in escorting out of Bophuthatswana. He told them that he would order four Caspirs to lead the way with three more Caspirs to bring up the rear. The Afrikaner Volksfront vehicles, which numbered about 80 bakkies, would be in between. The Afrikaner Volksfront members were armed with R1 and R4 rifles.. He told them that he would accept no responsibility for any of their activities. The convoy which was, he thought, the last to leave the Base, travelled without incident from the Air Force Base to the Mmabatho Sun Hotel and then turned right into Voortrekker Road. Off to the right hand or western side of Voortrekker Road there was at that time a disused Air Force Base with an old runway and an old hangar. These were separated from Voortrekker Road by a low wall, about one metre high. As the convoy moved along Voortrekker Road and past this wall, the convoy came under fire from behind the wall. People in the convoy jumped from their bakkies and sought shelter on the eastern side of the road. Major Serfontein said he saw that tracer bullets were being fired at the right-wingers. It was not automatic fire, rather the firing came from a number of weapons. From the fact that tracer bullets were used, which were not available to the civilian population, he concluded that the firing came from military personnel. The incident lasted about two minutes. It was during this that Van Rensburg was wounded. Thereafter the convoy continued out of the area without further hindrance.

When the decision was taken to call in the aid of General Viljoen and his Afrikaner Volksfront men at the Security Council meeting on 8 March 1994, General Turner, as head of the Army, was present. There is some doubt as to whether General Seleke, as head of the Police, was there. He told the Commission he was present but not when the decision was taken. He did not see General Viljoen at the meeting although the latter was there throughout. President Mangope and Mr Cronje said General Seleke was present at the time. General Turner was not sure whether he was there or not. General Seleke said that because he was not there he did not know of the decision. President Mangope said that even if he was not there, General Seleke should have known of it from the documentation that was sent to Security Council members immediately following meetings of it. He, conceded, however, that he, as Minister of Police, had not told General Seleke about the decision. Whatever the position, General Seleke said he only heard of the presence of the right-wingers on 10 March 1994. His second in command, Brigadier D C Waller, testified that he first became aware of their presence when he saw groups of whites on vans as he was going to work on the Friday morning. He had heard shooting during the Thursday night but could not say where it had come from. It would seem therefore that the decision to call in the Afrikaner Volksfront was not communicated to the Police upper command. The ordinary policemen certainly knew nothing of them coming as was testified to by Colonel Hosking and Captain Tatisi. Insofar as the Army is concerned, Bophuthatswana Defence Force Regimental Sergeant-Major Phuduhudu said he was the link between the top structure of the Army and the troops. He was not told of the decision to invite in the Afrikaner Volksfront. He was bitter that this had not happened because if there was any joint planning with the right-wing he would have expected to be informed as he was responsible for conveying such information to the troops and for their discipline in any joint action. The troops were deeply resentful at the presence of right-wingers in the area. Colonel Focke, the Operational Commander and Acting Officer Commanding of No 1 Military Area under Colonel Swart, testified that on 10 March 1994 he was in charge of a Joint Operations Centre with the Bophuthatswana Police Force, situated between Mafikeng and Mmabatho. At between 14:00 and 15:00 that day members of the Bophuthatswana Police Force went to hand their memorandum to the South African Ambassador while others had laid down their arms at the university. Policing had thereafter ceased to exist and the Joint Operations Centre was then entirely in the hands of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. He was not told that the right-wingers had been invited into the area as, being one of the commanders of the Joint Operations Centre, he should have been His men therefore also did not know that they were coming. General Turner also conceded that when the Afrikaner Volksfront started moving in was the first that the troops knew about them. He said that as the decision for them to be brought in was only taken late on the Thursday afternoon, there was not enough time to follow the usual procedure of telling the troops beforehand.

By the Friday morning the public was aware that Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were present in the area. Many of them were wearing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging insignia. It is also clear that by that time members of the public had also become victims of shooting by members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. Colonel Focke said that on that morning his men told him of the presence of the right-wingers and said that some of them were shooting people. He said that the troops became very upset and angry and demanded to know from him why the right-wingers were there. They said that if they got no answer they would take the law into their own hands and attack the Air Force Base where they knew the right-wingers were. Colonel Focke said he spoke to Brigadier Jordaan but the latter could give no satisfactory explanation for him to give to his troops of whom some 300 to 400 men, consisting of platoon and unit commanders as well as ordinary soldiers, had come to see him about the situation. At 14:00 on the Friday, General Turner met all the troops at the Molopo Base and told them what the situation was. He said the Afrikaner Volksfront members had been withdrawn from the strategic points to the Air Force Base and would be taken from the area. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members would also be taken out. The troops said that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging had fired on their houses and families and were still roaming around. The troops said they wanted to attack the Air Force Base. General Turner said he was able to calm them down and persuade them not to do so.

The troops, however, saw this as being sinister particularly when those arms were the ones handed out to the Afrikaner Volksfront members. Corporal Tebogo Moka said that on 9 March 1994 he and others were ordered to clean the R4's. There was no inventory of those weapons at the Air Force Base. He said that at about 15:00 on 10 March 1994 he saw General Viljoen at the Air Force Base. On 11 March 1994 he and a Sergeant Sautlweng saw a convoy with men in khaki clothing heading for the Air Force Base. They went there and saw that the black guards who were usually there were not present but the whole Base was filled with whites in khaki clothes, many of them armed with R4 rifles. He also saw a green Toyota Bophuthatswana Defence Force bakkie with a 20mm "cannon" on it parked in the main hangar. Corporal Moka said the man responsible for all this was a Staff Sergeant Greyling. He also said that Colonel Burger had a key to the weapons safe and often opened it. On Monday, 14 March 1994 they wanted to do a stocktaking of the weapons but Colonel Burger refused to allow them to do so. Corporal Moka had no comment to make when asked if he knew that the weapons had been moved because of the better facilities at the Air Force Base nor when asked if he knew that the weapons remained on strength at the Molopo Base which was why there was no inventory of them at the Air Force Base. He also had no comment when told that the stocktaking of the weapons was Colonel Burger's responsibility and he had done it personally. It is clear from Corporal Moka's suspicions as expressed in his evidence, even if unfounded, that the troops, due to the lack of communication of the facts to them, regarded the entire presence of the right-wingers, the distribution of the weapons to them and their deployment in Mmabatho with the utmost suspicion and resentment, particularly in the light of the activities of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members in the area.

The anger and resentment of the armed forces were also described by the commander of a special task force in the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillipus Marx. He testified that on 10 March 1994 he and his unit were told that Afrikaner Volksfront members were to enter Bophuthatswana and also that members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging had come into Mafikeng from the Zeerust direction. He went to Riviera Park and then to the Molopo Base for further orders. At the Base he saw two vehicles entering it, one with Colonel Botes and Lieutenant-Colonel Blignaut in it, the other with Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche and three other armed white men. Following discussions in the office of Colonel Swart they all went to the Operations Room where certain key points were established for when the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would leave the area. Apart from General Turner, Brigadier Jordaan, Colonel Botes, Colonel Swart, himself and Mr Terre'Blanche there were also two black of ricers present viz. a lieutenant and a captain. On 11 March 1994 his instructions were to stabilise Mega City and hand it over to members of the Afrikaner Volksfront for them to guard it. He did so. At about noon at the Air Force base he found 200 -300 troops of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who were very agitated and upset at the presence of right-wingers in Mmabatho.

He immediately contacted General Turner to suggest to him that the right-wingers should be withdrawn as his own men were greatly upset at their presence. General Turner said he had already given instructions for that to happen. Colonel Marx said he then heard of the skirmish near the TTA where the three members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging viz. Fourie, Uys and Wolfaardt were lying near their car. He went there and saw the three men. He tried to get ~ ambulance to take them to hospital. He first tried doing so over the telephone without success and then went off to the hospital to arrange for one. On his way there he was told over the radio that the three men had been shot dead. He found this to be so when he then returned to the scene. Colonel Marx said the unhappiness of his men continued throughout the day. At about 17:00 he and his unit came across the convoy of right-wingers near the Molopo Base that were busy leaving the area via the road to Zeerust. He went to the Base. While there he found himself isolated from all the other officers and surrounded by about 50 troops who were out of control. The gates of the Base were closed behind him and the men hurled insults at him. He decided to get away.

He drove the vehicle in which he was travelling through the wire fence encircling the Base but was fired on by the troops who were using a light machine gun. He continued through the fence but the wire wrapped itself around the axle of his vehicle. He then grabbed his R4 rifle, pistol and radio and hid under a bush until nightfall when he was able to make his way back to his unit. Colonel Marx denied that he had joined members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging during the day and fired on civilians. He also denied vigorously a suggestion put to him in cross-examination that he was an Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging sympathiser. He described it as a "ridiculous suggestion". His own house, he said, had been attacked and looted. He also denied that when he had run from the Base and hidden that he had in fact run to join the right-wingers. That too, was a ridiculous allegation. It would appear from his cross-examination that certain of the troops believed him to have had Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging sympathies. Apart from the suggestions to that effect put to him there is, however, not a little of evidence to support those suggestions and the Commission is unable to find that they are substantiated in any way.

As will appear from the description of the individual deaths investigated by the Commission, the evidence is overwhelming that Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were already roaming the streets of the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area on the Thursday afternoon and night and early on the Friday morning before going to the Air Force Base and were involved in a large number of incidents in which people were shot. In his statement to the Commission, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging General Cruywagen sought to absolve his men from the blame for these incidents and to lay it at the door of the Afrikaner Volksfront on the basis that as the Afrikaner Volksfront and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were all khaki-clad, his men were being confused with the Afrikaner Volksfront whose members were responsible for the shooting. The evidence is, however, again overwhelming that those members of the Afrikaner Volksfront that came into the area were well disciplined men under a rigid command structure, who remained in their convoy into the Air Force Base and, save for those who were deployed for an hour or two in Mmabatho and then withdrawn to the Base, remained there throughout the Friday until escorted out of the area late that afternoon. In contrast the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were roaming the streets at will and the evidence is that groups of men were seen leaving the Base throughout the day.

It is also not disputed that whereas the Afrikaner Volksfront members waited to be escorted out of the area late that afternoon, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members decided to leave unescorted at about midday. They also did not choose to make their departure along the back routes along which it was agreed they should travel so as to avoid a confrontation with the population but chose to drive through the streets of Mmabatho and Mafikeng to reach the roads leading out of the area to the South African border. This evidence was that given by Lance Corporal Andy de Koker of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, who saw the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging convoy approaching from the direction of the Air Force Base along the Vryburg-Mafikeng road. The men in it were wearing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging insignia. It was also given by Lieutenant Jafta Dikobe of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who was with De Koker at the time, by Inspector Phaladi Mokgoko of the Bophuthatswana Police and by Colonel Hosking as well as by the large number of civilian witnesses who testified before the Commission in regard to the individual deaths, many of the deceased in those cases having been shot by members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging at that time. Their evidence is to be found in the detailed description of the individual deaths and need not be repeated here. It was also as the convoy was leaving the area that it was ambushed and brought under fire by units of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force leading to the deaths of the three Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members, Nicholaas Fourie, Jacobus Stephanus Uys and Alwyn Wolfaardt (Cases No 6, 55 and 59). The detailed evidence in regard thereto is set out in the discussion of Case No 6 and, once more, need not be repeated here. Both the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Generals Cruywagen and Jordaan in their unsworn statements described how the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members had left the Air Force Base, some in convoys and some on their own, in order to go home; how they had travelled through Mmabatho, as it was "the only route they knew"; and how they had been ambushed and fired upon by units of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force suffering not only the deaths of Messrs Fourie, Uys and Wolfaardt but also having others of their members wounded. By nightfall of Friday, 11 March 1994 therefore all the right-wingers had left the area and returned to South Africa.

Meanwhile early on the Friday morning a contingent of the South African Defence Force under Major-General (then Brigadier) Johan Coetzer entered Bophuthatswana and went to the enclave of the South African Embassy to protect it. General Coetzer testified that he and a brigade of the South African Defence Force had been engaged in training exercises in the Zeerust and Lichtenburg areas in the week before. They had been told to be on standby to go to Bophuthatswana if necessary. On Thursday, 10 March 1994 at about 23:00 he was told that the situation in Mmabatho had deteriorated and that people were driving about and shooting others. He was instructed by the head of the South African Defence Force, General G L Meiring, to have by 06:00 on Friday, five companies of men at the South African Embassy in order (a) to protect South Africans and their interests and (b) if requested by the Bophuthatswana Government, to help to stabilise the situation there.

General Turner testified that he had spoken early that morning to General Coetzer who had indicated the willingness of the South African Defence Force to assist if requested to do so. General Turner had, however, requested him not to do so until the Bophuthatswana Government negotiated with the South African authorities. It will be recalled that Bophuthatswana was still then an independent state and the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council were bound by an Inter-State treaty between the two countries not to interfere in Bophuthatswana's affairs unless requested by the latter to render it assistance. General Turner said he then met with General Seleke and Mr Cronje. The situation looked really bad. He telephoned President Mangope at Motswedi and told him of the situation and how bad it was and requested him to see President F W de Klerk about it. President Mangope, however, asked Mr Cronje to go on his behalf to discuss the fact that Parliament would be sitting on the Tuesday when a decision would be made on participation in the South African election and a statement would then be issued which should calm the situation. General Turner said he thereafter met President Mangope personally at 10:00. President Mangope had heard of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging presence and of the shootings that had occurred and said that the security forces must get them out. The members of the Afrikaner Volksfront would remain. That, however, gave rise to an impossible position in having the Afrikaner Volksfront remain in the area as the public and the Army resented the presence of all the right-wingers. He told President Mangope that he felt they should immediately call in the South African Defence Force who were at the Embassy and willing to help. President Mangope appeared to agree but while they were talking Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg arrived and talked to the President whose mood then changed. He said that no South African Defence Force troops must at any stage be allowed into Bophuthatswana.

On Friday, 11 March 1994, Mr Mac Maharaj of the Transitional Executive Council and Mr Fanie van der Merwe, representing the South African Government, as the Joint Executive Secretaries of the Transitional Executive Council, were mandated by the Transitional Executive Council to travel to Mmabatho to provide the Transitional Executive Council with an on-the-spot assessment of the situation in 130phuthatswana. They attended a meeting at 15:00 at the South African Embassy at which General Meiring, General Van der Merwe, Mr "Rusty" Evans and General Turner, with Brigadier Jordaan were present. General Turner told those present that the situation was desperate. He reported that the Bophuthatswana Police had lost complete control and that he was also having difficulties with the members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. The Bophuthatswana administration had also collapsed and law and order in the country had ceased to exist. He wanted to ask the South African Defence Force to come into Bophuthatswana to help to stabilise the situation but he would have had to consult with President Mangope before doing so. General Meiring wanted immediately to deploy the South African Defence Force to restore law and order but Mr Maharaj wanted to report back to President F W de Klerk and Mr Nelson Mandela so that whatever action was taken as far as Bophuthatswana was concerned was mandated by them. Mr Maharaj telephoned Mr Cyril Ramaphosa who was with Mr Mandela and asked him to report what the situation was to Mr Mandela. Mr Van der Merwe reported in similar vein to Mr Roelf Meyer of the South African Government.

Once again it was, Mr Peter Waugh who described how this took place. He said that a Joint Operations Centre of senior officers of the South African Police and South African Defence Force was set up. He attended a meeting at this Joint Operations Centre at 18:00 where those present were briefed on the deployment of South African Defence Force members at certain strategic points. Community leaders were to be told that the South African Defence Force would henceforth be in control of the situation, the aim being to try to get people's lives back to normal as soon as possible. The Mayor went on the CON network - the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation still then not broadcasting news bulletins - to call for calm and for people to go back to work. On Saturday and Sunday, 12 and 13 March 1994, policing returned to normal. Members of the Bophuthatswana Police and Defence Forces also joined the Joint Operations Centre. Services were re-established and on Monday, 14 March 1994 about 80% of people had returned to work and things in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area began to be normal once again. An unfortunate aftermath of the events of the previous week, however, said Mr Waugh was that the community had become a divided one. Relations up to then between blacks and whites had been excellent and were based on mutual trust and respect. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging invasion largely destroyed that with the blacks not trusting the whites. That trust and the good relationship had to be built up all over again.

The role of the South African Police in stabilising matters was described by Brigadier Pierre Wessels. He said that the intention was that the South African Police under his command would co-operate with and support the Bophuthatswana Police and Defence Forces in restoring law and order. Brigadier Wessels said that the command structure of the Bophuthatswana Police Force like the Bophuthatswana Police Force generally was non-existent. He was, however, prepared to accept that he would come under the command of General Seleke. Their first priority was to see to it that there was a police presence and visibility on the streets of Mmabatho/Mafikeng. They also drove through the streets and, using a loudhailer, called on people to pack the goods they had looted out on the pavements. The public co-operated and literally millions of rends worth of goods were recovered in this way for which the business community expressed their praise for the South African Police's actions. Brigadier Wessels denied emphatically that any members of the public had been shot by any of his men in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area and in particular by members of the Internal Stability Unit. The South African Police, he said, had come into the area when all shootings has stopped. While this may be so in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area, as appears from the detailed discussion of the deaths in the other areas, it is likely that some of these were caused by members of the Internal Stability Unit.

Colonel Hosking described how policemen and women were being intimidated and their families and homes threatened. He personally and members of his unit had been pelted with stones and bricks. Colonel Hosking said that he and others like him got no orders or directions from their superior officers.. He said that at about 16:30 on 10 March 1994 he received instructions from General Seleke to take what arms and vehicles he could and to go to the South African Embassy to arrest Lieutenant Lethlogile, who had led the deputation to present a memorandum to the South African Ambassador. Lieutenant Lethlogile was not there. At the university he saw a burning police Nyala but there was no sign there either of Lethlogile. By that time there was considerable looting taking place particularly at Mega City which was also on fire. The looting had also spread to Mafikeng. He and a small group with him had to disperse a crowd of looters. He returned to Police Headquarters where he told General Seleke that he could not control the situation in Mafikeng without reinforcements and arms. He was issued with arms and ammunition and was able to return to Mafikeng to patrol there. The next day he and a Colonel Hodson went into Mafikeng where they saw roving groups of youths in the town. The atmosphere was very tense. On their way back to Police Headquarters they were stopped by a military policeman of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who was frantic, shouting that the whites were shooting blacks. He heard sounds of shooting coming from the Vryburg/Mafikeng road. A convoy of civilian vehicles - bakkies and cars - drove past in the direction of Mafikeng.

General Seleke said that police were guarding Government buildings, schools and shopping centres. He brought in some 200 - 300 police into the area. Despite this, however, it was not possible to stop the looting. He ordered the minimum amount of force to be used in order to prevent lives being endangered. No arrests were made as there would have been no point in doing so. There were simply not enough police to maintain law and order. As stated by Colonel Sedumedi there was a small number of police who tried to carry out their work properly but the situation throughout Bophuthatswana had got completely out of hand. Earlier, i.e. at the end of February or the beginning of March, due to the growing unrest with the demonstrations and marches on the increase a Joint Operations Centre was created to try and contain the unrest. It consisted of Defence Force and Police Officers. The Joint Operations Centre also lost its police participation following the handing over of the police memorandum to the South African Embassy and the mutinying of the further section of the police. General Gaobepe, who was in March 1994 a Brigadier and then the Assistant Commissioner of Police responsible for operations, also expressed his dismay and dissatisfaction with not having been informed that a contingent of right-wingers was to enter the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. He, as the person in charge of operations within the Police Force, should have been told of this. He found it strange that General Seleke did not know of it. Had the latter known of it, he should have communicated it to General Gaobepe. The presence of the right-wingers and the mayhem of 10 March 1994 was of little concern, it seems, to General Seleke. He said that at between 17:00 and 18:00 he and General Gaobepe heard that one of the dissident policemen, Lieutenant Modirwe, had taken a rifle and a pistol belonging to the police. They had gone in search of him and found him in Mega City where they had recovered the firearms and arrested him. General Gaobepe said that his purpose in going with General Seleke was to assess the situation at Mega City and that finding Lieutenant Modirwe there was coincidental. However, this was, according to his testimony, not General Seleke's purpose. The fact that he was more concerned with the arrest of Lieutenant Lethlogile and the arrest and recovery of firearms from Lieutenant Modirwe rather than dealing with the unrest in the country is evidence of what Colonel Hosking said of General Seleke viz. a total lack of appreciation of the realities and seriousness of the situation in Bophuthatswana at the time by the head of its police services. This, and the resultant dissatisfaction of the members of the Police Force with his command of them, leading eventually to the complete collapse of the police services was a major contributing factor in the breakdown of law and order in Bophuthatswana.

Following the discussions at that meeting, certain far-reaching decisions were taken. As a result that evening the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, together with the Joint Secretaries of the Transitional Executive Council, Mr Maharaj and Mr van der Merwe, and with General Meiring, and the South African Ambassador Professor Tjaart van der Walt, went to see President Mangope at Motswedi. He was informed that as his administration had collapsed and because of the situation that had occurred over Thursday and Friday, 10 and 1 1 March 1994 it had been decided that he should step down as President in the interests of peace in the country, of restoring law and order and of saving lives. He was told that his presidency was no longer recognised by the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council and that therefore he was no longer head of the Government in Bophuthatswana. His own personal safety and that of his family would be guaranteed. A contingent of the South African Defence Force was assigned to see to that. President Mangope's own perception of what happened that evening differs somewhat. He said he was told by the delegation that he was being deposed as President because of the riots, atrocities perpetrated and properties being burnt down. He said he told the delegation that he had done nothing wrong or unconstitutional and that they had no right to depose him. He said it was the African National Congress which was responsible for the riots, its policy being to make the country ungovernable and so to topple his government. He said he told the delegation that Parliament would be sitting on the following Tuesday and that they would decide the question of re-incorporation and participation in the election. It is common cause that the delegation refused to allow that to happen. As Mr Botha, said to have allowed any further delay could well have resulted in the chaotic conditions continuing and further loss of life. President Mangope also said that he was placed under house arrest, but was told on Wednesday, 16 March 1994 that that was no longer the position. This, he said, was done in order to harass him and his family. Be that as it may, the fact is that effectively the Mangope regime ceased as from that weekend. The South African Ambassador, Professor Tjaart van der Walt and Mr Job Mokgoro were appointed the Joint Administrators of Bophuthatswana and took over the running of the country. They immediately issued a decree, the Administration of Bophuthatswana Decree 1 of 1994 suspending substantial portions of the constitution of Bophuthatswana, including its Bill of Rights, to enable the participation of the citizens in the South African election to occur.

As has been set out earlier herein, the African National Congress did not recognise the legitimacy of the homelands created by the Nationalist Party government in South Africa. One of those was, of course, Bophuthatswana. The African National Congress's point of view was that these were part of the apartheid structure and that, should it come to power, they would be dismantled and reincorporated into South Africa. It is also common cause that the African National Congress did not register as a political party in Bophuthatswana. The reason for that, as stated by Mr Maharaj in his evidence, was that the organisation was not going to register as a political party in a country, the legitimate existence of which it did not recognise. There has also been a mass of evidence to the effect that free political activity in Bophuthatswana was oppressed. The Commission had sight of the minutes of the meetings of the Transitional Executive Council in which at almost every meeting complaints of suppression of free political activity, of the breaking up of political meetings by the Bophuthatswana Police, often with the use of force and violence, of the harassment of those wishing to exercise political rights such as students, teachers and political organisations, made to the Transitional Executive Council with requests that it should take steps to ensure that free political activity be allowed without hindrance. These reports and complaints came from Lawyers for Human Rights, whose offices were on occasion raided by the police. One of the organisations whose activities were suppressed was the African National Congress. The evidence of Mr Popo Molefe as to Police harassment and the raiding by Police of African National Congress offices has been set out earlier herein. It has also been set out earlier that the African National Congress from 1993 began increasing its political activity. Mr Maharaj and Mr Molefe both stated that part of the African National Congress's strategy in its struggle against apartheid was mass action. It is clear that this was also to be part of the African National Congress's campaign in Bophuthatswana. A minute of a meeting of a so-called Alliance Campaign Committee held on 18 May 1993 where certain resolutions were adopted for an anti-Bophuthatswana campaign was put before the Commission. This included the setting in progress of mass action. Certain Intelligence documents came into the possession of the Commission. These documents had they been available at the time may, during the course of the evidence of those witnesses who testified on behalf of the African National Congress have been useful to cast further light on their evidence in regard to the role of the African National Congress. The documents suggest that there is substance in the allegations that it was part of the African National Congress planning to infiltrate not only the civil service but also the Police and the Armed Forces. There is, however, no direct evidence that this planning was in fact implemented. The documents mentioned, however, does not affect the Commission's findings in regard to the role of the African National Congress. It is undoubted that there were African National Congress sympathisers in all the bodies mentioned and that they both encouraged and took part in the strike action embarked upon by the civil servants, hospital staff, teachers and broadcasting employees. It is, however, clear to the Commission that although it was the aim of the African National Congress to bring about the demise of the homelands, it was not it who in the event brought about the strikes of public servants, teachers, nursing and hospital staffs and of those in the broadcasting services although members of the African National Congress participated in them. The evidence is overwhelming that these strikes, which started with the public service, originated spontaneously among the members of the various sections of the community themselves. It has already been seen how the public servants in October 1993 formed first a Task Team to discuss their concerns and demands with the Government and when these were not met and President Mangope ordered the forcible dispersing of a meeting of public servants at Ga-Rona Square, a Crisis Committee was formed which led to 52 departments going on strike and the complete collapse of the public service. This was followed by the strikes in the other sectors mentioned. In none of these was the African National Congress the motivating force. That it supported and encouraged the mass action cannot be doubted but that it caused it to take place would, in the Commission's view, be attributing an undeserved importance to the role of the African National Congress in those events.

All three testified that when the decision was taken by the National Security Council on 8 March 1994 to call in the assistance of General Viljoen and the "Boere People's Army" of the Afrikaner Volksfront, if necessary, it was reported that the third phase was planned to take place over the weekend mentioned and that on 10 March 1994 it was reported that some 6000 armed African National Congress cadres were massing preparatory to entering Bophuthatswana. Intelligence reports contain reference to these rumours. Both Mr Maharaj and Mr Molefe denied this. Mr Maharaj was adamant that in terms of what was known as the Pretoria Minute the African National Congress on 6 August 1990 suspended armed operations and the armed struggle and had never reneged on its undertaking to do so. As a senior official of the African National Congress, he said, he knew there had been no plan to resume the armed struggle. It would therefore not have entertained the action alleged. Mr Molefe denied Mat there was any contemplation of the alleged armed action. The Commission had no evidence before it of the massing of any body of persons either on Thursday, 10 March 1994 or on the days preceding it. Mr Cronje reported having received hearsay evidence of people having been wounded near the Bophuthatswana border a day or two before the Thursday. No positive evidence to that effect was forthcoming. Moreover, even if someone had been wounded there is no evidence to suggest that it was by an African National Congress member. Furthermore, as stated by Mr Maharaj, if 6000 people had massed on the border it would have been immediately detected. The South African Intelligence Service was aware within hours of their mobilisation of the movement of some 700 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members towards the border and it is inconceivable that they would not have been aware of 6000 - or even a few hundred - men massing somewhere, particularly if they were armed. Additionally, Brigadier Serfontein's brigade was in the area, monitoring the border with Bophuthatswana. It would undoubtedly have known