The factors that were ultimately to lead to the unrest in March 1994 in Bophuthatswana had their beginning on 2 February 1990 when in a speech at the opening of the South African Parliament that was to shake the world, the then South African President, F.W de Klerk, announced the release of Mr Nelson Mandela from 27 years in prison and unbanned the African National Congress. In the three years that followed two significant events occurred that were to have their impact on Bophuthatswana in March 1994: (a) the negotiation process that was to lead to the putting in place of an interim constitution for South Africa and the holding of a general election in South Africa on 27 April 1994, and (b) the emergence of bitter resistance to that process by right-wing conservatives led initially by the Conservative Party under Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg but which was joined by a number of other conservative right-wing organisations, which included the Afrikaner Volksfront, a senior member of which was a retired former head of the South African Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen and the militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging under Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche.
The negotiation process commenced when the Convention For a Democratic South Africa assembled for the first time at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park on 21 December 1992. Earlier in March 1992 President de Klerk's National Party secured an overwhelming victory in a referendum enabling him to pursue with the African National Congress the negotiation process. As Mr Roelf Meyer, former Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning in the South African Government said, it was obvious by then that a new era would come into being, that apartheid would for ever be gone and that there would be a new constitution which would incorporate all South Africans and that, as a result, the homelands would disappear. Despite many setbacks to it, which need not be detailed here, a constitutional agreement was reached in November 1993 providing for an interim constitution and a Transitional Executive Council pending the outcome of a general election on 27 April 1994.
Bophuthatswana had been one of four homelands given independent status as republics by the South African Government. It received its independence under the Presidency of President Lucas Mangope in terms of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, No 89 of 1977, on 5 December 1977. As appears from the map on Page 2 above, it consisted of seven separate small areas of land, incorporating twelve districts, scattered throughout the former Transvaal Province of South Africa, the former Northern Cape and with one at Thaba Nchu being within the province of the then Orange Free State. The largest area was that around and adjacent to and incorporating the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. Mmabatho became the capital with the seat of Parliament, the Executive Council or Cabinet, the Administration of the Republic and the Judiciary being situated there.
Bophuthatswana additionally had its own Defence Force and its own Police Force. It was, according to the testimony of Professor T van der Walt, the former South African Ambassador there, one of the most successful and peaceful homelands, facts which were corroborated and underlined in his evidence by its former President Lucas Mangope, who also testified before the Commission. The latter will for the sake of convenience be referred as President Mangope throughout this report. He emphasised that there was in Bophuthatswana a total absence of racial discrimination and a complete rejection of the policy of apartheid. Its citizens developed a sense of responsibility towards their non-racial society in which the Government built non-racial schools, clinics, hospitals, cultural centres and a university and developed tourism, by the establishment inter alia of game parks, the agricultural sector and commerce through the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation. It generated 29% of its annual budget.
What follows hereafter comes mainly from the evidence of Mr Rowan Cronje, the Minister of State Affairs, Civil Aviation and Defence in the previous Bophuthatswana Government, from the paper by Dr Jackie Cilliers "Background to Events in Bophuthatswana and from the evidence of Mr R F (Pik) Botha and Mr Roelf Meyer, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Constitutional Development respectively in the former South African Government, and two leading members of the African National Congress, Mr Mac Maharaj, the present South African Minister of Transport, and Mr Popo Molefe, the present Premier of the North West Province.
When the negotiations aforementioned commenced the Bophuthatswana Government was invited to participate in them. As an independent state it made no sense for it to do so but accepting the realities of the times and the points of view of the participating parties, the Bophuthatswana Government decided to do so. President Mangope at all times, however, made it clear that while doing so he would negotiate the best deal that would suit the freedom and independence which his people enjoyed. This latter fact was confirmed by Mr Pik Botha. He said that President Mangope made it clear that he would not surrender his country's self determination but would maintain its independence until after the South African general election and then negotiate a deal to suit his people. President Mangope's stand against his countries losing its independence by being re-incorporated into South Africa was a consistent one. Re-incorporation would only occur if his people, through a referendum or through Parliament, so decided, said Mr Botha. That this was his attitude was emphasised in his evidence by President Mangope who said that his aim was for a federal system of government in South Africa, in which Bophuthatswana, as an independent republic, would be part. This attitude of President Mangope was also referred to by Mr Maharaj and Mr Molefe in their evidence. Reference to that evidence in more detail will be made later herein.
Meanwhile as part of the negotiation process a so-called Record of Understanding was signed on 26 September 1992 between the South African Government and the African National Congress. This created a great deal of concern among the other negotiating parties. President Mangope was particularly concerned. He called the agreement a "Record of Total Betrayal" by the South African Government, which he said had turned its back on those wanting a federal system, including Bophuthatswana. It was, he said, in fact, the end of the latter's relationship with South Africa. As a result of the agreement a body opposed to it known as the Concerned South African Group was formed between the Kwazulu Government, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Conservative Party, and the Bophuthatswana Government. All of these left the negotiation process, except Bophuthatswana which, despite President Mangope's misgiving, decided to continue to involve Israel f in it.
Amongst the right-wing conservatives the negotiation process was seen as a surrendering by the National Party of too much to the African National Congress. On 7 May 1993 some 15000 right-wingers gathered at a stadium in South Africa to vent their anger at the National Party Government. The Afrikaner Volksfront was formed with Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg as its leader and with retired General Constand Viljoen in charge of the portfolio of Defence Affairs. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was also part of it. Assisted by a number of retired generals from the South African Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen formed a "Boer People's Army", drawn from farmers, miners, the Citizen Force and Commandos. Another significant event occurred on 25 June 1993. What was to have been a peaceful demonstration by right-wingers against the negotiating process at the World Trade Centre, where the negotiations were taking place, got out of hand when members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, who were part of the demonstration, ran riot, smashing part of the building and temporarily occupying it. This action brought the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging into disfavour with the rest of the Afrikaner Volksfront and in particular with General Viljoen and his supporters.
The schism between the National Party and the right-wingers grew, the latter developing an ever more-militant stance. General Viljoen was, however, a moderating force within the right-wing and it was with the Afrikaner Volksfront that during 1993 the Bophuthatswana Government formed the so-called Freedom Alliance, the other members being the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Kwazulu Government. Mr Cronje emphasised that this was not a political alliance but a negotiating alliance. Despite this, the Bophuthatswana Government was asked by its partners to withdraw from the negotiation process, something however, that it declined to do. It continued to participate actively and was part of an organisation called South African Tswana Undertaking which was a study group which researched and reported to the negotiating Council on the borders of a future province for the region including Bophuthatswana which, save for a few towns, is the present North West Province.
It is at this stage necessary to refer to the evidence of Mr Maharaj and Mr Molefe as to the attitude of the African National Congress towards Bophuthatswana. I heir evidence was mutually corroborative and differed only in a few minor and irrelevant aspects. It is perhaps best summarised in the submission of Mr Molefe to the Commission. He outlined the African National Congress's policy of the establishment of a non-racial, non-sexist democracy in a united South Africa in which all citizens, black and white, had full equality and in which independent "homelands", such as Bophuthatswana, had no part. These "homelands" were part of the apartheid structure, which had never been accepted by the majority of the people living in them from their inception. For instance, only some 17 % of people in Bophuthatswana had voted in the elections there in 1977. Bophuthatswana's independence, so said Mr Maharaj, was a sham, over 7() % of its budget being financed by South Africa. It was not internationally recognised, said Mr Molefe. It is on record that its citizens required South African passports to travel abroad. However, the Bophuthatswana Government continued to assert that it was independent and to give a clear message that it was not going to tolerate a South African election in which its citizens would participate.
It is also a matter of history that in 1988 there was an attempted coup by a group of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force led by Warrant Officer Timothy Phiri and Mr Rocky Malebane-Metsing, the then leader of the People's Progressive Party wishing to oust President Mangope and his government. President Mangope was regarded as a tyrant and his government was unpopular with most of the public. The South African Government sent in a contingent of army troops to put down the coup to restore President Mangope and his Government to office and to ensure stability in Bophuthatswana.
In February 1992 a delegation of leading members of the African National Congress led by Mr. Mandela, as he then was, met members of the Bophuthatswana Government led by President Mangope. Mr Molefe was part of the African National Congress delegation. He said that Mr Mandela reasserted the African National Congress's policy to create a united South Africa from which the homelands would disappear. He requested that he and President Mangope should together address a series of meetings in Bophuthatswana where they would inform their supporters of the building of a united South Africa. The offer was rejected by the Bophuthatswana Government who insisted that the African National Congress should recognise that Bophuthatswana, unlike other ethnic republics or homelands, was not a product of the apartheid regime. The African National Congress should recognise it as a sovereign state. It should also register as a political party in Bophuthatswana. The African National Congress in turn would not accept these terms. One of the points raised at the discussion was the question of the African National Congress's wishing to make Bophuthatswana ungovernable and of its toppling the Government. Mr Mandela, according to both Mr Molefe and President Mangope, assured the latter that the African National Congress had no intention of making his country ungovernable or of overthrowing its Government by violence.
In the year that followed, political activity in Bophuthatswana by the African National Congress increased, despite its not being registered as a political party. The Bophuthatswana Government, however, according to the evidence of several witnesses, including Mr Molefe, clamped down on political activity by those opposed to it including organisations such as student and teacher associations, Lawyers for Human Rights and political parties such as the African National Congress, using the police force to repress such activities by breaking up meetings and employing violence and force to do so. The question of free political activity became an issue between the African National Congress and the Bophuthatswana Government. Mr Molefe described how he had personally experienced police harassment at African National Congress meetings and many other witnesses gave like testimony.
Meanwhile, as a result of the negotiation process, the Transitional Executive Council came into being, the South African Act providing for it viz. Act 151 of 1993 being promulgated on 18 October 1993. On 17 November 1993 the interim constitution (Act 200 of 1993) was finally agreed upon. The interim constitution provided for the repeal of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act which would occur on 27 April 1994. The date for the general election, viz. 27 April 1994, had been fixed some time previously and to facilitate the election the Independent Electoral Commission was appointed in January 1994 under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Johan Kriegler, a South African Judge.
Late in 1993 an Act of Parliament viz. the Restoration and Extension of Citizenship Act, No 196 of 1993 was passed in South Africa restoring South African citizenship to citizens of Bophuthatswana as from 1 January 1994 and enabling them to apply for and obtain South African identity documents so as to allow them to vote in the election. A large number of citizens did so.
All these events had a marked effect in Bophuthatswana. The burning question was whether it should remain independent or whether it should be re-incorporated into South Africa and its citizens be allowed to take part in the South African general election. There was a division of opinion not only within the structures of Government but also among the citizens generally where it would seem that most favoured re-incorporation, particularly in the urban areas. In the Cabinet the split was, according to Mr Cronje and with which President Mangope agreed, about 50/50.
President Mangope's attitude to the question was that he was strenuously opposed to re-incorporation. He argued that Bophuthatswana's independence had historically been removed from it by the British Government which had made it part of the British Protectorate known as Bechuanaland. When Britain later relinquished control of the territory two separate entities were created viz. the Republic of Botswana, lying to Bophuthatswana's north, and Bophuthatswana. Bophuthatswana was established as a homeland republic in December 1977 in terms of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, 1977. By so doing, so the argument went, South Africa was merely restoring to it its long lost independence. For this reason President Mangope contended that Bophuthatswana was different from other homelands created by the South African Government during the apartheid era and was not part of the apartheid structure.
President Mangope's resistance to re-incorporation became manifest in a number of spheres and on a number of occasions.
Mr Molefe testified that between January and March 1994 he led an African National Congress delegation consisting of a number of prominent members of the African National Congress in a series of meetings with a Bophuthatswana Government delegation consisting of several members of the Cabinet under the leadership of Mr E Keikalame. The key issues for discussion at these meetings were (i) the future of Bophuthatswana; (ii) Bophuthatswana's participation in the South African election on 27 April 1994 and transitional arrangements; and (iii) the need for free political activity in Bophuthatswana. Mr Molefe said that every time the African National Congress delegation thought that they had made some progress, the Government delegation would "throw a spanner in the works" by demanding the recognition of Bophuthatswana as a unique entity when compared with other homelands, warranting different treatment and its own special place in the new South Africa. Mr Molefe submitted in evidence a report on one such meeting held on 18 February 1994 where the latter's standpoint was again stressed, the Government delegation requiring the African National Congress to respond to either an option that Bophuthatswana continue as an independent state or as such, be part of a confederal agreement with South Africa rather than giving up its independence. The report records that "the African National Congress delegation explained with great patience that the developments which had taken place in South Africa over the last year in the negotiation process could not be undone. A new constitution had been agreed upon. That constitution recognised South Africa as a single united entity. The demarcation of South Africa into provinces node provision for the re-incorporation of all homelands. The specific needs and demands of people in different parts of South Africa could be met in terms of the new constitution and demarcation of boundaries within the framework of provincial government which was provided for in the constitution." The report on this section ends with the laconic condiment "This discussion did not lead anywhere." A further meeting at which draft proposals to amend the interim constitution would also be discussed was scheduled for 20 February 1994. On the question of free political activity sought by the African National Congress, the Government delegation refused to respond positively to it. Its attitude was that free political activity existed for registered political parties in Bophuthatswana. The African National Congress was not one but was a South African organisation and therefore not entitled to operate freely in Bophuthatswana.
Mr. Molefe testified that while the meeting of 18 February 1994 was in progress, the African National Congress delegation received information that the African National Congress offices in Mafikeng were being raided by Bophuthatswana police. He protested vigorously to the Government delegation asking them to find out what was happening and why, but the latter refused to do so.
Mr Molefe said that the meeting scheduled for 20 February 1994 never took place nor did the Government respond to the African National Congress proposals. A deadlock had been reached.
The attitude of President Mangope viz. that he was strenuously opposed to re-incorporation became generally known. This attitude had its effect on a number of the sectors of the population. One of these was the 64 000 members of the public service.
A leading member of the public service, Mr Fanele Patrick Funani, now of the Public Service Commission at Mafikeng, testified that there was considerable dissatisfaction within the public service. There were three main factors for this. First, in 1993 those civil servants holding the ranks from Deputy Director to Permanent Secretary in their departments were given increases of up to 50% to ensure parity for them with their counterparts in South Africa. The lower echelons were excluded. Second, the Pension Fund to which civil servants belonged, viz. the Sefelana Employee Benefits Organisation, which, according to President Mangope, had assets of over R4 billion, had been investigated by a Commission of Enquiry chaired by Mr Justice H Hendler, a Judge of the Bophuthatswana High Court, in regard to allegations of misconduct by its Chief Executive Officer. President Mangope refused to make the report or its findings public, causing fears that the fund was not in a healthy state. These fears were exacerbated by Cabinet Ministers and employees of Sefelana Employee Benefits Organisation withdrawing their funds and investing them with an insurance company, Sanlam. Third, civil servants were well placed to know that for financial and economic reasons Bophuthatswana could not remain independent in the new South Africa. The resistance to re-incorporation was therefore cause for great concern.
Government's association with right-wing partners increased that concern. During October 1993 an attempt to form an Association of Public Servants was put in motion with the appointment, first, of a steering committee and then of a Task Team formed by representatives of each department. Meetings were held by this Task Team with the Cabinet. At the second of these in January 1994 President Mangope announced that he was going to retrench civil servants, that appointments had been frozen and that he did not owe the Task Team a report on Sefelana Employee Benefits Organisation. At this meeting the Government's intransigent stance on re-incorporation was also raised, the feeling being expressed that Bophuthatswana would be unable to sustain itself as it only generated less than 30% of its budget, being dependent on South Africa for the remaining 71% which would disappear if Bophuthatswana decided to go it alone. President Mangope, said Funani, became angry and said he would retrench sufficient public servants to enable him to cope within the 30% even "if he was left with only five". He repeated this remark at the opening of the Congress of his ruling party, the Christian Democratic Party. Questioned about these allegations during his evidence, President Mangope denied ever having approved the 50 % increment of salaries. He said he told the civil servants he could not afford such an increase. tie said that there was never an investigation into the Sefelana Employee Benefits Organisation fund itself, only into the misconduct of its chief executive officer and that he was under no obligation to make the report of that investigation known to the civil service generally. He also refused to pay out any pension benefits to people who were still working. It was clear from his evidence that he was insensitive to the concerns of the public service, stubbornly refused to consider their demands and arrogantly dismissed them as trouble makers with whom he would have no truck.
At subsequent meetings President Mangope also accused public servants of being influenced by the African National Congress, an allegation he repeated in his evidence and to which reference will be made again later. They would be dismissed from their jobs if it were found that they were members of the African National Congress. Evidence as to the latter was given to the Commission by several other witnesses as well.
Mr Funani said the public service was becoming extremely agitated and each department agreed to draw up a list of its demands and if they were not met by a specified date, the members of the department would go on strike. Common to the demands of all departments was the payment of their pensions and the re-incorporation of Bophuthatswana into South Africa. A meeting to co-ordinate the strike action was held at Ga-Rona Square in Mmabatho. At that meeting President Mangope ordered the police to disperse the crowd and to expel all public servants from their offices in the Ga-Rona Building. President Mangope in his evidence admitted that he had ordered the civil service members away. He said he saw it as his duty to do so because they had not come to work but were on strike and were not prepared to do their duties as public servants. This action forced the members to hold future meetings outside Bophuthatswana at a place on the South African side of the border some 15 km distant from Mmabatho known as Rooigrond. It also led to the creation of a Crisis Committee, chaired by Funani, which had the support of the entire public service. Widespread strike action then followed which the Bophuthatswana Police Force tried to disrupt, frequently using force to do so. The members of some 52 departments went on strike, causing the complete collapse of the public service. These strikes were not only confined to the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area but extended also to other parts of Bophuthatswana. On 8 and 9 March 1994 the Crisis Committee met the Transitional Executive Council informing it that the administration in Bophuthatswana had collapsed and asking the Transitional Executive Council to arrange Bophuthatswana's re-incorporation into South Africa.
One of the departments which had collapsed was the Health Department in which services at hospitals had ceased to function and where conditions had become chaotic. Dr Mohamed Hafiz, the Associate Superintendent of the Bophelong Hospital, some 2 km south of Mafikeng described how during February 1994 members of the staff went on strike. The ambit of the strike grew to such an extent and so many staff members stayed away from work that a decision was taken to close the general section of the hospital, a number of patients being transferred to the Victoria Hospital, a private hospital, in Mafikeng. Although the psychiatric section was kept open, lack of staff and particularly security personnel enabled psychiatric patients to walk free from the hospital. The keeping of records went entirely by the board. The mortuary also became so full of bodies that Dr Hafiz had to stop any more being taken in. Here, too, there were no records kept. The Hospital could only open again after the South African Defence Force had stabilised the situation. Things only returned to normal finally on about Monday, 14 March 1994. At another hospital viz. Thusong Hospital, all staff went on strike, resulting, according to a mortuary attendant there, Isak Molefe, in chaos in the register of bodies there. Chaos of a different kind occurred at the Victoria Hospital where, according to the manager there, Ms Annelé van Schijndel, because of the strikes at other hospitals, staff had to cope with more patients, particularly on 10 and 1 I March 1994, than they could handle.
The dissatisfaction in the Public Service also spread into the Bophuthatswana Police Force and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. The situation in the Bophuthatswana Police Force was described by certain senior officers viz the former Commissioner of Police, General P F Seleke, his second and third in command, Brigadier Derek Waller and Brigadier M J Gaobepe (as they then were), Directors Oupa Pilane and Mashopo Sedumedi, and two police officers who were involved in attempting to curb the unrest at ground level viz Captain Gopolang Tatisi, the commander of the Flying Squad, who in March 1994 was a Warrant Officer in the Flying Squad with a unit of about 20 men under him, and Colonel Charles Hosking of the South African Police Services who was a Major in the Bophuthatswana Police Force in March 1994.
Both the latter told the Commission of the concern among members of the Bophuthatswana Police Force about their salaries and whether these would be paid if Bophuthatswana was not re-incorporated into South Africa and about their pensions. The re-incorporation became a major issue and there was great anticipation among the police that they would all become members of the South African Police. In early March, however, President Mangope announced that Bophuthatswana citizens would not take part in the general election and that the independence of Bophuthatswana would be maintained. That announcement, said Captain Tatisi, "signified the end of the dreams of the police of becoming members of the SAP". This led to groupings within the Bophuthatswana Police Force, with one group wanting independence and sovereignty maintained, one, mainly seconded officers South African Police, being neutral, and one wanting re-incorporation. The latter group was the majority one. It became difficult for them to continue to serve loyally in the Bophuthatswana Police Force.
Added to this was the hostile attitude of the general public to the police who had to take firm action against sections of the public, particularly the university students, during demonstrations against the Mangope regime for wishing not to seek re-incorporation. Policemen and women were being intimidated. They and their families were threatened, their houses were attacked and they were the target of insults. Taxi drivers refused to transport them. These facts were confirmed by General Seleke. General Seleke was, however, the subject of the ire of many of the police. Many wanted him to resign. Colonel Hosking also said that General Seleke was totally out of touch with what was happening and refused to see the danger signs. An example of this was, when at one of the regularly daily meetings of senior officers, one of them, Colonel Short suggested that because of the hostility to them, police personnel should be allowed to come to work in civilian clothes and be allowed to carry firearms, which they could not then do. General Seleke accused Colonel Short of being an inciter and ordered him out of his office.. General Seleke said he did not remember the incident but in any event the suggestion would have made no sense as the policeman's uniform was the symbol of his authority.
Despite these difficulties police continued to carry out their duties efficiently and to maintain law and order. Tensions were, however, mounting and eventually a group of policemen mutinied. The group joined protesting students at the University of Bophuthatswana where a police Nyala vehicle was set alight and the police handed over their own weapons and others that had been taken from an armoury to the students. In another incident a memorandum drawn up by a group of policeman led by a Lieutenant Lethlogile setting out their dissatisfactions, asking for re-incorporation into South Africa and calling for the resignation of General Seleke, was taken by the group to the South African Embassy and handed over to the Ambassador there.
It was these actions, amounting as they did in the case of the first-mentioned group to a mutiny by members of the Bophuthatswana Police Force, that led to a breakdown in the policing system creating among the more unruly elements of the population the perception not only that police activities had ceased but that the Bophuthatswana Police Force were allied with them. This was the trigger on 10 March 1994 for widespread looting and arson in many parts of Bophuthatswana and especially in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area where the shopping complex of Mega City was the particular target of the mobs. The occurrences there and the events of 10 and 11 March 1994 will be dealt with in detail later herein, as will the dissatisfactions within the Bophuthatswana Police Force.
The dissatisfaction of members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force was described by the Chief of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force during March 1994, Major-General H S (Jack) Turner, by two of his senior officers, Colonel A J Botes and Colonel Hans Swart and by the Bophuthatswana Defence Force Regimental Sergeant-Major, Sergeant-Major K G Phuduhudu. General Turner testified that in the period prior to March 1994 there was a great deal of tension in the Bophuthatswana Defence Force over the question of re-incorporation. What he described as the leader group i.e senior officers, unit commanders and Base sergeant-majors, were concerned that if Bophuthatswana did not participate in the election and be re-incorporated into South Africa they would become isolated from the South African Defence Force on which the Bophuthatswana Defence Force was very dependent for weapons, armed combat equipment, medical supplies and assistance, and financial assistance. The latter was of particular concern as Bophuthatswana Defence Force members felt that without it they might lose their jobs or not be paid their salaries and lose their pensions. General Turner said he raised these concerns with President Mangope who received them positively and asked General Turner to raise them with the Defence Committee. Shortly thereafter the leader group met President Mangope and again expressed their concerns. He, however, then said that he got the feeling that the soldiers were being disloyal and said that if they found the South African Defence Force so attractive they should go to it and he would get someone else to do their jobs. This caused much disappointment as the men had spoken from the heart to their Commander-in-Chief, the President and were angered by his response to their concerns. Early in March all troops from the Military Base, or Molopo Base, as it was known, were addressed by President Mangope who again expressed the view that there was disloyalty among them and said that if they were dissatisfied he would get others to do the job. President Mangope, during his evidence before the Commission did not challenge the accuracy of General Turner's account. General Turner said that President Mangope's attitude "did not go down very well" with the troops.
The concerns of the Public Service as to their pensions and salaries and the mounting wave of strikes among civil servants, hospital staffs and hotel workers at some hotels engaged the attention of the Cabinet as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Council, chaired by President Mangope, on 1 March 1994 Earlier the Cabinet had also commissioned a study by one of its members which had been put before them, as to what would happen if Bophuthatswana should not be re-incorporated but choose to "go it alone". Three scenarios had been presented (i) if South Africa continued to furnish financial assistance; (ii) if such assistance became limited; and (iii) if it should cease altogether. The need to cut back in their budgets should the last scenario occur was stressed to Ministers who were asked to draw up plans to effect an immediate cut of 25 %. It should also be noted at this stage that Bophuthatswana was a member of a Customs and Excise Union with South Africa from which Bophuthatswana derived some R2 500 million per annum, which was paid to it quarterly. Since the signing of the Record of Understanding with the African National Congress, these payments by South Africa had become irregular due to the intervention of the Transitional Executive Council. The Transitional Executive Council had also prevailed on the Development Bank not to make a loan to the Bophuthatswana Government. The Record of Understanding was described, as mentioned earlier, by President Mangope in his evidence as a "Record of Betrayal". The policy of the African National Congress, he said, was, in accordance with their resolve to do away with the independent homeland republics, to cause the destabilisation of Bophuthatswana so as to make it ungovernable and thus to topple the Government. That this was planned, so President Mangope contended, was evident from a meeting of the ANC/COSATU/ SASCO/SACP/MDM held on 18 May 1993, referred to as the "Anti-Bophuthatswana Campaign Conference", at which an action programme aimed at securing inter alia free political activity and the re-incorporation of Bophuthatswana was drawn up. Part of the action plan of the African National Congress was to infiltrate bodies such as the public service, to disseminate propaganda against Bophuthatswana's maintaining its independence and sovereignty and to engage in "rolling mass action" such as the organising of strikes to disrupt the administration of the country. Both Mr Cronje and General Viljoen as well as General Turner spoke of a three-phase campaign of which the "rolling mass action" was the second phase, the third being a militant one in which African National Congress members would invade the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area in large numbers and attack its citizens there. Intelligence sources, said Mr Cronje, General Viljoen and General Turner, had informed them that this was to occur over the weekend of Saturday and Sunday, 12 and 13 March 1994. This aspect will be referred to in more detail later herein.
Another sector that also had the same concerns at the civil servants was the members of the teaching profession. Their grievances were described to the Commission by Mr David van Wyk, presently a member of the provincial executive of the South African Communist Party, who was a teacher at the Mmabatho High School during March 1994. He was also a teacher there in the years preceding March 1994. The teachers' grievances, he said, related to certain of their professional aspects of teaching such as, inter alia, a lack of confidence in the administration of the profession by head office and circuit office personnel, promotions, the Bophuthatswana Teachers Association, the management style of principals and the preferential treatment of expatriate teachers. In addition they were concerned about the payment of their salaries, their pensions and the need for Bophuthatswana to be re-incorporated into South Africa and the right to vote in the elections of 27 April 1994. There were, he said, upwards of 30 000 teachers in Bophuthatswana. In August 1993 a large number of teachers went on strike over the grievances. Disciplinary action was to be taken against those who had done so. This was, however, postponed to March 1994 when disciplinary hearings were to be held. This factor and the other concerns, particularly their perceived inability to take part in the South African elections, led to a massive stay-away of teachers in February - March 1994. Large numbers of teachers had applied for r South African identity documents after 1 January 1994 and he had personally been present at a New Year's Eve party near a dam on 31 December 1993 when about 1 000 revellers had thrown their Bophuthatswana identity documents into the water of the dam. Levels of discontent increased in early March 1994 and on 7 March 1994 a mass meeting was held at Rooigrond where the teachers also elected representatives to the Crisis Committee which was referred to by Mr Funani in his evidence and to which reference has also been made above. Mr Van Wyk said he was present at that meeting. He also took part in a march to the South African Embassy in Mafikeng where the teachers demanded that they as South African citizens, be protected against the Bophuthatswana Government and its police who had taken heavy handed action against them. A communication centre was set up at the Mmabatho High School to which teachers could pass information as to what was happening in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area which information was in turn, passed on to Mr Mandela Those teachers' representatives on the Crisis Committee were also part of the delegation that met with the Transitional Executive Council on 8 and 9 March 1994 to ask the Transitional Executive Council to request President F W de Klerk to intervene in the situation.
During this period the broadcasting services of Bophuthatswana also stopped operating. Its members considered that the Government was manipulating the electronic media and that correct information was not being disseminated to the public. Their credibility was, as a result, in issue. That, together with certain heavy handed action by the Government against them due to their desire to re-incorporate, led to a strike causing the breakdown of the services.
Meanwhile students at the former University of Bophuthatswana who had for months prior to March 1994 been demanding that Bophuthatswana should be reincorporated into South Africa, became even more vociferous in those demands in the weeks preceding the week of 7 to 14 March 1994. This provoked as reaction from the Bophuthatswana Police Force. Police forces were us forcibly break up demonstrations, student leaders and lecturers at the University being subjected to assaults by members of the Bophuthatswana Police Force.
It is perhaps convenient at this stage to say something further about the role of the Bophuthatswana Police Force in the former Bophuthatswana and what happened to the police force in the week of 7 to 14 March 1994. The information in this regard comes from the evidence of certain members of the former Bophuthatswana Police Force who testified before the Commission. While reference will be made in due course to all those witnesses, including the former Commissioner of the Bophuthatswana Police Force, General J Seleke and his second in command, Brigadier Charles Waller, particular reliance at this stage will be placed on the testimony of Captain Kedirile Andrew Lethlogile (then a lieutenant), Colonel Charles Hosking, Directors Oupa Pilane and Mashopo Sedumedi, and Captain Gopolang Tatisi.
Lethlogile was the leader of a number of police dissidents who on 10 March 1994 marched to the South African Embassy to hand a memorandum to the South African Ambassador in which they asked, inter alia, that Bophuthatswana be reincorporated into South Africa and that they and all the people of Bophuthatswana be allowed to take part in the elections on 27 April 1994. They also called for the resignation of General Seleke.
Lethlogile after referring to the collapse of the civil service and in particular the health services, said the Bophuthatswana Police Force and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force were deployed at hospitals not only to secure them but to provide essential services there. The demand of the civil servants to participate in the 27 April elections enjoyed massive support of the citizenry at large and was "the talk of the town". As time progressed the situation went from bad to worse. The police had come to be regarded as the dividing line between the aspirations of the people and the political interests of the Bophuthatswana Government. had, in the minds of the community, gained a reputation for high-handedness in dealing with those who were seen to be opposed to the policies of the ruling party. They were on several occasions called upon to break up gatherings. One of these was that of the civil servants at Ga-Rona Square.
The community took it upon themselves to vent their anger and frustration on the police. The youth in particular warned that they would take to the streets against the police and the Mangope regime.
It was against this background of strikes, civil unrest and Police and Army discontent that the Bophuthatswana National Security Council met on Tuesday, 8 March 1994. It was created by Bophuthatswana Act 27 of 1981, initially as an advisory body to the Cabinet, but after the attempted coup of 1988, it acquired a more important role, many of its decisions relating to security being taken without recourse to the Cabinet. Moreover, its executive officer or secretary, Mr J J L Esterhuizen, liaised closely with the intelligence services of the South African Government. Presided over by President Mangope, who as we have seen, was also the Minister of Police, it consisted of the Commissioner of Police, General Seleke; the head of Bophuthatswana Defence Force, General Turner; the head of the National Intelligence Service, Mr R Knowles; and certain selected Cabinet Ministers such as the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence, Mr Rowan Cronje. General Constand Viljoen was invited to be present at the meeting.
The situation pertaining in Bophuthatswana was debated and a decision was taken that if the situation should deteriorate and become critical, General Viljoen would be asked to come in to assist and bring in members of his "Boer People's Army" in order to do so. They would not be used in an offensive capacity but would be deployed in a defensive capacity to guard key installations and buildings so as to free up the Bophuthatswana security forces for more urgent matters. If they were brought in they would not enter Bophuthatswana armed but would be issued with weapons prior to their deployment as mentioned.
The purpose of this decision and the motivation for it was, according to Mr Rowan Cronje, President Mangope and General Viljoen, the following. The pressing issue was whether Bophuthatswana should be re-incorporated into South Africa and its citizens be allowed to participate in the general election of 27 April 1994. This, said Mr Cronje and President Mangope, was a decision for the Bophuthatswana Parliament to make. Parliament was not in session at the time but had been recalled for Tuesday, 15 March 1994, the earliest date according to Mr Cronje, for which it could be convened. In the meantime, again according to Mr Cronje and General Viljoen, the Bophuthatswana Intelligence Service had alerted them to the fact that reports were coming in of large numbers of African National Congress cadres that were gathering to be bussed into Mmabatho over the weekend of 12 and 13 March 1994 to forcibly overthrow the government. Reports were that some 6 000 members were set to invade Mmabatho over that weekend. The Afrikaner Volksfront's "Boere People's Army" was to be used to keep the situation stable over the weekend so as to enable Parliament to meet to take the all-important decisions required of it on Tuesday, 15 March 1994. It was those factors that prompted the decision of the Security Council on 8 March 1994 to call for General Viljoen's assistance and that of the Afrikaner Volksfront's "Boere People's Army" if the position became critical between then and the weekend. General Viljoen said it was the understanding that his men would be under the command of General Turner. He was willing to make his men available under those conditions because, as he put it, he told President Mangope that they were brothers in the Freedom Alliance and "When your neighbour's house is on fire, you help him". He said that he told President Mangope that he would discuss the matter with the chairman of the Conservative Party, Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, and make available a few thousand farmers. President Mangope said they were not prepared to have any members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging present. They in their uniforms would be completely unacceptable and might even result in a mutiny among members of his own armed forces. General Viljoen said that he would see to it that none of the members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would be allowed in. General Viljoen said that pursuant to his undertaking, on his return from Bophuthatswana on Tuesday, 8 March 1994, he met Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg and told him of the request from President Mangope. He also told him of the latter's concerns about the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and he asked Dr Hartzenberg to telephone Mr Terre'Blanche and tell him that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging were not to go to Bophuthatswana. Dr Hartzenberg did so in General Viljoen's presence. Mr Terre'Blanche, said General Viljoen, accepted the instruction.
General Viljoen said that at the meeting of the Security Council on 8 March 1994 he was given the assurance that the presence of the African National Congress cadres would be monitored and he said that he and his men would not move in unless the shooting phase was likely to happen. He put Colonel Jan Breytenbach and Commandant Douw Steyn, both retired South African Defence Force Officers of outstanding merit, in charge of the operation. They would be responsible for getting the men to Mmabatho if President Mangope summoned them to come.
It should be remembered that one of the constituent members of the Afrikaner Volksfront when it was formed, was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. It was still such a constituent member in March 1994, hence General Viljoen's assurance that he would see to it that no member of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would be among those who would go to Mmabatho to assist President Mangope pursuant to the decision of the Security Council to invite in the right-wing Afrikaner Volksfront to assist in Bophuthatswana should the situation warrant that happening.
This decision will be referred to and commented upon in detail later in this Report but it was this decision more than any other that was to light the touch paper that caused the situation to explode into the violence of 11 March 1994.
One comes then to the events of Thursday, 10 March and Friday, l1 March 1994.
On the Thursday the uprisings were becoming more intense. Public disapproval became targeted on President Mangope and at about 14:00 he was advised by General Seleke that for his safety he should leave Mmabatho and to go his tribal home at Motswedi. He was then immediately flown there by helicopter.
It was also at about that time that Lieutenant Lethlogile's march to the South African Embassy and the handing over of the memorandum of the dissident police members took place. It was also then that the other police members joined the mobs and laid down their weapons. From then onwards, although some policemen still tried to maintain some form of law and order, policing as such effectively ceased to exist. The upper command had come completely ineffectual: no orders or direction came from it to those lower down in the command structure: the command structure had fallen apart and there was no communication whatsoever from those in command to those below them.
In this climate, the mobs took to the streets and widespread looting started, particularly in the large shopping complex of Mega-City.
Meanwhile two significant events occurred. The first was a telephone call from the leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche, to President Mangope, having reached his home at Motswedi, offering him the assistance of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. President Mangope said he told Mr Terre'Blanche not to come. His presence was not wanted. He nonetheless told Mr Terre'Blanche to contact Mr Rowan Cronje but according to Mr Cronje, Mr Terre'Blanche did not do so.
The other event was that late on Thursday afternoon on the instructions of President Mangope, Mr Cronje contacted General Viljoen and said he had confirmation of the presence of the African National Congress cadres that were to enter the area. General Vil~oen said he then gave instructions for his men to be mobilised and to move into Mmabatho.
Meanwhile, however, despite any assurance that Mr Terre'Blanche may have given to Dr Hartzenberg, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging also mobilised and began assembling at different points preparatory to moving into Bophuthatswana and more specifically into the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area.
It would seem that two contingents of Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members converged on the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area: one from the direction of Lichtenburg and one from the direction of Zeerust. The latter apparently entered Bophuthatswana earlier than the former and already in the late afternoon and early morning of the Thursday, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members were seen in the streets of Mafikeng. The arrival of the Zeerust contingent and the events relating to it were graphically described to the Commission by the then City Secretary of Mmabatho, Mr Peter Waugh. Before coming to that, however, it is convenient to record that Mr Waugh also described how in the week prior to the Thursday, strike action at the Bophelong Hospital had caused a meeting of the top municipal officials to be held with members of the Bophuthatswana Defence and Police Force to put in place a contingency plan in terms of the Civil Defence Act to deal with the situation as they felt that the hospital strike would escalate. That did occur. All public servants attended a meeting on 5 March 1994 at the Convention Centre in Mmabatho where President Mangope was booed off the stage because of his resistant attitude to the incorporation of Bophuthatswana and his derogatory remarks about the behaviour of the public servants.
Earlier on 4 March 1994 the President had announced that Bophuthatswana would go it alone. Mr Waugh said that following an emergency meeting of the Town Council on 8 March 1994 it was decided that because of the worsening situation municipal employees should, save those involved in essential services, not have to go to work on 10 March 1994. Of those essential services only about 20% turned up and it was then decided to abandon all services. Mr Waugh said he had to convey this to the Bophuthatswana Police and the Town Clerk, one Johan Botha, had to convey it to the Army. Mr Waugh said he go': hold of Brigadier Gaobepe who told him that the whole police administration was in disarray, that a police Nyala had been burnt at the University and that police had laid down their arms.
Returning to the presence of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Mr Waugh said he lived at the time in Riviera Park. In front of his house was a service road and a road reserve. He said that on the Thursday he got home at about 16:45. At about 17:45 he saw a red Nissan bakkie with an Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging flag on it and two whites in it parked in the road reserve. He Advent over to them and asked them what they were doing there. One said they had been informed by President Mangope to come and help him to quash the uprising and they were looking for space to park people. They had received their instructions over the Marnet radio system, a radio communication system installed on many farms and in many smaller local authorities throughout South Africa. Mr Waugh said he told the men that they should leave town as their presence was not welcome and would only aggravate the situation. He told Mr Johan Botha of their presence and it was agreed that he should telephone the South African Embassy and tell them what he had found out. He spoke to a senior official there, one Piet Gerber, who told him, aver discussing the matter with the South African Ambassador, that he should feed through all the information he could every half-hour to the Operations Room of the South African Defence Force in Pretoria. He did so from about 18:30.
At about 21:00 he was asked to relay all information to an operations room that had been set up in the South African Embassy. Mr Waugh said he conveyed the information that the men were arriving in sedan cars, in bakkies, in half-ton trucks and one-ton trucks, some with three to four people in them, some with two to three. They were dressed in khaki clothes but some were in camouflage uniforms. They were wearing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging insignia. There were some women among them. They had cool boxes containing food with them. They were armed with rifles, shotguns, pistols, hunting rifles (some with telescopic sights) and some were carrying R4 and R5 rifles. Mr Waugh said he counted about 300 vehicles which were parked in the road reserve. A man with a loud hailer who described himself as a "Commandant" was organising the vehicles into sections, directing those from the Free State to park in certain parts and those from the then Transvaal in others and even those from certain towns to occupy particular places. Mr Waugh said that throughout the night he could hear vehicles leaving the camp and returning to it. He presumed they had gone into Mafikeng and Mmabatho. Mr Waugh said that a local Dutch Reformed Church Minister, the Reverend Steenkamp, who said that members of his congregation were worried, told him that the call on Marnet was not directed to the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging but to General Viljoen and all right-wing organisations to send their people to the area.
Mr Waugh said that at about 04:30 on Friday, 11 March 1994 he heard the droning of military vehicles of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force who were escorting masses of private vehicles into the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. Shortly before this the "Commandant" with the loudhailer had called all the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging people at the parking site to a meeting where a prayer was said by a man who was introduced by the "Commandant" as a "Dominee". The latter first read a verse from the scriptures and then prayed for the safety of all those present and for God's help in carrying out the task which had been laid on them "as Afrikaners". He then said that "die Here ons moet bewaar, want dit sal van ons verwag word vandag om kaffers dood te skiet". He asked for forgiveness for their sins and that God should lead them forward along the path into the future in which the existence of the Afrikaner was being threatened. Mr Waugh said he and his wife, who also heard what was said, "recall the horror of hearing those words".
Following the prayers the "Commandant" told the people there that a convoy was on its way to the Air Force Base outside Mmabatho and that as soon as the convoy passed they were to follow it to the Air Force Base. It was the convoy mentioned of Bophuthatswana Defence Force vehicles escorting the mass of private vehicles (which were those of the members of the Afrikaner Volksfront) that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging latched on to.
Mr Waugh said that he was surprised to see about five minutes later a convoy of South African Defence Force vehicles. He asked one of the military police accompanying the vehicles whether they were also going to the same place as the other vehicles and he was told that they were going to the South African Embassy Compound. He asked the policeman if he know that there were Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging personnel ahead of them and the policeman replied that they did know it and that they had been monitoring them all night. He told Mr Waugh that roadblocks had been set up on the South African side of the border with Bophuthatswana who were also monitoring the presence of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. Mr Waugh said that right through the Thursday night he and his wife had heard gunshots. Mr Waugh's assumption that members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging had gone into Mmabatho and Mafikeng is borne out by Colonel Hosking who told the Commission that at about 03:45 he had seen from his townhouse in Mafikeng three civilian bakkies with white men in khaki clothing in them. He had telephoned Mr Esterhuizen, the secretary of the Security Council, to ask him what was going on. Mr Esterhuizen had told him "to leave it as is. Everything is under control". Colonel Hosking also said that he had heard sporadic firing throughout the night. It seems undoubted that He men who Colonel Hosking saw were members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging as the members of the Afrikaner Volkstront were only escorted into the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area at 04:30 on Friday morning. It is also clear from Mr Waugh's evidence that both the South African Defence Force and the South African Embassy knew of the presence of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members outside Mafikeng from about 18:30 on the Thursday and that there was a force of some 600 to 1 000 of them there.
The other contingent of Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members gathered at Rooigrond. What happened in regard to them was described to the Commission by the then Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Colonel Antonie Botes; the Chief of Staff, Operations, Colonel Hans Swart; the then Regional Commander of the Criminal Intelligence Service of the South African Police, Colonel Cornelius McDuling; the latter's then second in command in Lichtenburg, Lieutenant-Colonel Gideon van Zyl; and a Captain under the latter's command, Captain Izaak Marais, as well as General Turner. The picture which emerges from their testimony is the following.
Lieutenant-Colonel Van Zyl and Captain Marais said that al; the time right-wing elements in the then Western Transvaal were engaged in wide spread bombing activities and other forms of terrorism and their units were engaged in investigating these occurrences and arresting the perpetrators. A network of informers had been set up to help them in those tasks. During the afternoon of Thursday, 10 March 1994 information started coming through from these and other sources of large-scale movements of bakkies and other vehicles from various parts of South Africa adjacent to Bophuthatswana, such as Zeerust, Vryburg and Lichtenburg, towards Bophuthatswana. There was at that time no police post at Rooigrond. It came under Lichtenburg. A temporary charge office was set up at Rooigrond under Lieutenant-Colonel Van Zyl in order to monitor the movement of those persons heading for Bophuthatswana. Two check-points were set up, one at Rooigrond and one at nearby Buhrmansdrift. They were manned by members of the Internal Stability Unit. Legal advice was that they could only monitor what was happening, because Bophuthatswana was an independent state, they could not stop persons crossing the border from South Africa into Bophuthatswana. Large numbers of right-wingers in and on bakkies, a few clothed in camouflage uniforms but the majority in khaki clothing, moved through the check-points toward Mmabatho Many had already passed through before the check-points were set up at 18:00, some having gone past as early as 16:00. Most of them appeared uncertain as to where they should go and where they had to assemble, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Van Zyl.
Captain Marais said that he and another policeman, Sergeant Gawie Steyn were driving on the Lichtenburg/Mafikeng road in an unmarked police car when they came upon a convoy of right-wingers travelling towards Mafikeng. They joined the convoy pretending to be part of it. Drivers of the vehicles in the convoy were communicating with one another over Marnet radios. Captain Marais said that while listening to their conversations he became aware that their car had been identified as an interloper and they were forced to race off first to Buhrmansdrift and then to Mafikeng where they were stopped at a roadblock set up by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. They told the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging members there that they were local residents going into the town but they were again identified as interlopers over the radio just as they were allowed to go through and had to flee for their lives into the town where there was by that time massive unrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Van Zyl testified that earlier a civilian from Mmabatho in his private helicopter had asked him to fly with him to see the chaotic situation for himself. He assigned one of his men to do so who reported on the unrest and that several places were on fire.
Lieutenant-Colonel Van Zyl said the men passing through the check-points were heavily armed with shotguns, pistols and many hunting rifles. It was very difficult to determine whether the men were members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or the Afrikaner Volksfront as most of them were khaki clad. At Buhrmansdrift an Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging general with his Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and general's insignia, was however, seen entering Bophuthatswana at 09:40 on the Friday morning.