The movement for democratic change sweeping across most of North Africa, which has already toppled two of Africa’s despots and longest-serving heads of state, will have far-reaching ramifications transcending the undercutting political and economic issues that sparked what has been aptly described as ‘the people’s revolution’. The regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, who a few months ago seemed like Africa’s baobabs, finally succumbed to the magma of protests and the demands of the people on 14 January and 11 February respectively. Indeed, the revolution achieved in two months what opposition parties and Islamic extremists were unable to achieve in twenty-three years in Tunisia and thirty years in Egypt. As the revolution faces its toughest battle yet in Libya and the difficult transitions encountered in Tunisia and Egypt, it is still uncertain as to what kind of political dispensation will emerge from its ashes and what the future holds for peace and security in Africa’s Maghreb region. Of particular concern is the impact that the revolution will bring to bear on terrorism in North Africa.

Terrorism has impacted in several ways on the political and leadership dynamics in North Africa and the greater Middle East region. In the 1980s and 1990s, terrorist and radical extremist groups unleashed a spate of violent attacks against most regimes in North Africa, bringing them to the brink of collapse. As a consequence, many of the states responded with a heavy military crackdown and draconian policies that were aimed at flushing out insurgent and terrorist elements. The tragic attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11), and the ‘war on terror’ that ensued, further consolidated these policies. Terrorism and counter-terrorism provided a justification for the long and oppressive regimes of autocrats such as Ben Ali and Mubarak, who presented themselves as the only viable alternative to the Islamist opposition so often associated with radicalism and terrorism. However, this strategy did, to some extent, produce some short-term positive results. With the exception of Algeria, where the Selafist Group for Preaching and Combat now called by its new name, Al-Qaeda in the land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), continued to terrorise the Algerian population, major attacks in the region had ebbed by the end of the decade. After 9/11, however, this threat seemed to have re-emerged as a chain of mass casualty terrorism hit the region with shocking attacks in Tunisia (2002), Morocco (2003), Egypt (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2011), Algeria (2002 and 2007) and Mauritania (2005).

Revolutions can provide a framework for addressing cross-cutting political, socio-economic and cultural issues by converging various interests and creating opportunities for inclusive and broad-based national reconciliation or by establishing new dynamic institutions that may be more in tune with the aspirations of the people. The movement across the region has been, in every sense of the word, a revolution of the people, by the people and for the people, orchestrated and commandeered by the mass media. It has even won the support of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas and the previously outlawed Ennahdha party of Tunisia, as well as terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and AQIM. In this context, the revolution has helped to bring together various interests and offers a watershed opportunity to address complex issues that have given rise to terrorism in the region.

With its promise of a new political order that transcends individual or specific group interests, the revolution has attracted many political actors clamouring for a piece of the cake. For example, previously banned Islamist radical groups such as the Ennahdha party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are now vying for positions in the new political order and even promising to respect the democratic voice of the people. Indeed, if the post-revolutionary political order opens up space for broad-based and inclusive participation in transparent and fair political and economic processes, most radical Islamic groups may find new opportunities to share power and abandon violent jihadism. But this will depend on a number of factors, including the inclusive nature of the transitions taking place in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the outcome of the Libyan civil war. The revolution has firmly established the supremacy of the people and unravelled the political rhetoric that Islamist and terrorist organisations are the only forces for change in North Africa and the Middle East. The revolution also has discernable shortcomings, which may not bode well for the fight against terrorism in North Africa. The Libyan civil war is a peculiar case in point, where the revolution is facing a litmus test as a social force. The recent twist in the conflict in Libya, with the involvement of the US and other Western powers under NATO command in the context of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) on the no-fly zone in Libya, makes it highly vulnerable to terrorism. Although previously there existed no known rapport between terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda with the government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the sustained involvement of Western countries in the conflict could trigger the involvement of terrorist groups, who may see it as another display of Western imperialism. Gaddafi is determined to fight a war of attrition against the West. Given his previous record of supporting insurgencies and rebel movements, including the recent recruitment of mercenaries from within Africa, it is evident that his means of winning such a war do not preclude the option of recruiting and sponsoring terrorist groups to fight his war. Furthermore, terrorists are in constant search for safe havens, which they could find in the conflict in Libya or in other parts of the Middle East, where the revolution has brought anarchy to Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.

The stakes are high with diverse actors, most with differing expectations and wide-ranging political agendas for the post-revolutionary order in North Africa. It is possible that the anxiety that triggered the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia could end with bitter frustration if the process and outcome do not meet the expectations of the people. This could be a recipe for future terrorism in the region. The 1991/92 elections in Algeria must serve as a lesson learned. The current political calculus of terrorist and Islamic groups favours participation in the post-revolutionary order. Anything short of democracy and liberalism will have debilitating consequences on security in North Africa. The transitional military regimes in Tunisia and Egypt must therefore act with both speed and transparency in establishing the democratic agendas of these countries. A sustained Western military involvement in the Libyan civil war will also not augur well for the fight against terrorism in North Africa. Local and regional solutions must be encouraged and supported.

Written by Martin Ewi, Senior Researcher, International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria Office