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Date
: 29/03/2004
Source: Ministry of Public Enterprises
Title: J Radebe: HSRC Forum 150 Conference
KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY JEFF RADEBE, MP, MINISTER OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
TO THE HSRC FORUM 150 CONFERENCE: Pretoria, 29 March 2004
STABILITY, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
We are now just over two weeks away from the election and all of
our diaries have taken on something of a hectic air! I would
therefore like to thank you for adjusting your conference programme
slightly to accommodate my need to be at another engagement at
10am. I apologise in advance for not being able to spend more time
with you, especially because the topics of the following sessions
are of great interest to us all.
I have been asked to address how we bridge the divide between South
Africa and the region through development. So, let me begin in the
conventional way by providing a thumbnail sketch of the
infrastructure, resource and trade divide that exists between South
Africa and the region. This audience is well aware of the other
socio-economic factors that single out South Africa as an economic
powerhouse in African terms. A glance at any economic map of
southern Africa reveals the high concentration within South
Africa's borders of an immense network of all-weather roads,
railway lines, inland and coastal container terminals, telephone
systems and communications, energy and fuel depots, petrol filling
stations, post offices, banks, police stations and so on. This part
of the world dominates international air passenger and freight
figures for the continent. South Africa's six major ports feature
high on the list of Africa's busiest ports, with Durban at the
top.
Let us sink down into some detail that does not often find its way
into discussions. South Africa is responsible for 42% of railways
in Sub-Saharan Africa, about 47% of the total number of locomotives
of all types in Sub-Saharan Africa, and critically, South Africa
operates 96% of Sub-Saharan and 92% of Africa's total number of
electric locos. South Africa operates 74% of Sub-Saharan rail
freight wagons, and these move 91% of freight tonnage south of the
Sahara.
Africa's rail and port networks are the main gateways and arterial
routes for the continents exports and imports. Where rail is not
well maintained, roads take over. But the majority of African roads
are not all-weather roads, and very few have either tarmac or
paving. These factors influence the transport costs of imports and
exports. It is estimated that freight costs in southern Africa
average about 16,42%, compared to just over 13% for southern
Africa, excluding South Africa. The average costs for land-locked
African countries are over 20%. The comparative global figure for
developing countries stood at 8,7% in 2001.
Delays at border posts between countries also impact negatively on
the ability of countries to trade with each other. These delays
range across the spectrum from about four hours or so between South
Africa and Botswana, and up to 36 hours between Tanzania and Zambia
on the Tazara railway route. Delays cost the region about $48
million per annum!
But we should also note that non-distance related costs, such as
tariffs and port charges, account for between 12 and 40% of inland
trade costs.
When we back up the infrastructure record with the governance and
administration framework, we are told that once again our country
dominates in areas such as efficient and divergent revenue
collection, the integrity of financial institutions, the strength
of civil society, education and higher technical training, medical
infrastructure, etc.
However, I would urge some caution as to what this all means. South
Africa's infrastructure dominance has much to do with this
country's history as a resource for minerals that at the turn of
the 20th century played into a much larger global imperialism where
South Africa's diamonds, gold and its geographic location served
its colonial masters extremely well and ensured that the Cape
became a springboard for imperialist adventures into the interior.
At the same time, the peculiar status of South Africa as, in Basil
Davidson's term, a settler colony for much longer than other
colonies meant that it developed a particularly unique position in
relation to Europe itself.
The years of Union, followed by the white Republic, were years that
saw the emergence of state-sponsored enterprises in the rail,
energy, iron-ore processing and metallurgy sectors. Eskom, Spoornet
and Iscor have their origins in specific attempts by the nascent
white state to undermine its dependence on Europe, whilst the Union
of South Africa itself as a non-federal undertaking was shaped as
much by the threat to unity by increasingly hostile tariff wars
between the rail companies of the four colonies after the
conclusion of the South African Boer war in 1902. These enterprises
would later become avenues for other government policies such as
the employment of white labour, but they started life as creatures
of a particular domestic industrial policy supported by the mining
companies and other established financial interests that pushed
development in a particular direction to the exclusion of other
interests. Interestingly, we still hear echoes of these early
battles in present-day disputes over adjustments to preferential
tariff regimes, and of the role of the state owned enterprises in
South Africa's economy now.
Basically, let us not fall into the trap that suggests that there
is something special about the people who live in South Africa
itself that explains why we have become a regional powerhouse.
There are other factors that explain why the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa has the infrastructure profile it has.
Topography and climate have something to answer for the way in
which infrastructure emerged in Africa, but these by themselves do
not explain the particular colonial paths that development took. We
cannot underestimate the devastation of apartheid South Africa's
deliberate and calculated policy of destabilisation. To cut a long,
painful and detailed story short, we are still counting the costs
today of the widespread implementation of a coherent state plan
from the late 1970s onwards to reduce southern Africa's
infrastructure quite literally to rubble. Place on a map many of
the regional infrastructure development plans for rail, road,
bridge and building repair, refurbishment and maintenance across
Angola and Mozambique, and one finds the old battle zones of the
wars and conflicts that covered those dreadful decades.
So, the divide between South Africa and the region probably extends
beyond the allocation of resources, infrastructure, the operation
of integrated networks of systems, and the legacies of greater
stability in the state economic and private sectors than
practically all of the other Southern African Development Community
(SADC) countries have experienced over the past 50 years.
The divide extends therefore to a totally different recent
experience of our combined historical legacy. South Africa's first
decade of freedom, indeed, from the very first minute of its birth,
saw a country living in a neighbourhood of close friends who have
overwhelmed us with their own generosity of spirit, despite all
that apartheid South Africa threw at them. Instead of having to
join in a society of frontline states ranged against a rogue
country in the region, we have been able to join with them in a
more constructive relationship to build the sub-continent up again.
But South Africa does that with most of its own critical
infrastructure, expertise and resources intact.
This phenomenon, I submit, is the beginning of the bridge that will
ultimately close the gap that exists between us. But it will not be
done if South Africa surges into the continent as a new
imperialist, ready to take advantage of the new atmosphere of
openness and confidence that is returning to the continent.
Government has taken note of the superb "African Development Report
2003" of the Development Bank of South Africa and the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) secretariat, as well
as the thought-provoking analysis of the operation of South Africa
companies in the rest of Africa conducted by BusinessMap. I am sure
that you will have occasion these next two days to reflect on these
findings. But I think we would all agree that the fact that strong
perceptions exist that many South African companies and enterprises
come across as arrogant, disrespectful, aloof and careless in their
attitude towards the local business community, consumers, work
seekers and even governments, is a cause for major concern. I think
we should also note that nature of South Africa investments in many
African countries, as stretching across the more traditional areas
of minerals and resource exploitation, through to services and more
and more through a retail presence.
Just last week another important gathering of experts, activists
and academics met to discuss South Africa's first decade of
freedom. Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the OAU and
now heading the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, as usual made some
salient remarks about where we are today and what challenges face
us. In drawing his conclusions, Salim noted what he called the
"pioneering dynamic that South African investment is unleashing
across the Continent. Through the medium of private investment,
South Africa he said is sharing with the rest of Africa its
relatively advanced capital and technological endowments." But he
then went on to caution that "as this country consolidates its
linkages with the rest of the Continent, it may be appropriate to
devise mechanisms for ensuring that the investments are directed
towards areas of higher social benefits and promoting sustainable
economic development." He then expressed the hope that "perhaps the
effective operationalisation of the NEPAD programme may lead to
such outcomes."
I would hope, as the Minister responsible for the activities of
most of the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa,
that Dr Salim's fears and hopes find careful reflection in the
Boardrooms of South African companies generally, but I believe they
will find echoes in the state-owned enterprises that operate in
Africa. At the same time, a close look at the infrastructure and
development agenda of NEPAD highlights new and exciting projects
that cut through the destruction of the past, and identifies
projects that rise above the calamitous past that often holds us as
a continent back. I refer in passing to the greater Inga project,
the Western Power Corridor, and the proposals for a railway linking
the Great Lakes region to southern and eastern Africa more
effectively.
I have taken the liberty of asking your permission to distribute
copies of our recent publication "Africa First!" as a shortcut to
some of these plans and projects. We believe that, working together
with colleagues in the rest of the continent on important projects
like the ones I have already mentioned, we will in fact bridge the
gap between Africa and the world.
If I may just quote from the conclusion of that booklet: "not only
is it important to revive and rebuild infrastructure that has
fallen into disuse, or has been marginalized through other
budgetary concerns, it is imperative that we explore new
opportunities to break down the definition of peripheral and
central areas within the nation-state and establish cross-border
corridors that by their very nature will redefine what is the
periphery." Because "re-ordering the arteries of economic activity
to emphasise greater access and trans-frontier contact within the
continent alongside improved corridors that link the coast of
Africa with its hinterland provides a major opportunity for
enriched trans-African trade and development in this era of
globalisation."
NEPAD itself can only find expression in the fulfilment of country,
sub-regional and regional development programmes. Participating
states have an obligation therefore to martial whatever resources
they have towards clearly defined, environmentally informed
development initiatives that derive not from the desire for grand
schemes but from what they can contribute to the future of people
themselves. Thus, the whole Inga hydroelectric project on the Congo
River may well become one of the engineering wonders of the world,
but its purpose is to power the continent so that Africans can
drive productive plants and machinery, derive energy and lighting
for domestic use, to power computers in schools, and to drill
boreholes into our thirsty soil.
NEPAD also rests, though, on a conceptual understanding that
projects must involve decisions of governments and people, of
communities and of inclusion. Governance and the improvement of
financial probity and the integrity of institutions is a sine qua
non of the whole NEPAD environment. The objective, in the words of
some NEPAD documentation, is to place Africa on a path of lasting
growth and development. The means can only come through
participation, legitimacy, probity and commitment to a
people-centred model of development.
Security, peace and stability are absolutely necessary for the
success of our projects as well. It is one thing to depend on
governments issuing mine clearance certificates before development
work can proceed in Angola or Mozambique. It is quite another to
expect people to work and to build when warlords, gangs and rebel
groups terrorise everyday existence through violence or simply by
demanding protection fees. But most important of all, instability
and insecurity themselves cause people in the affected areas to be
alienated from ownership of the projects, to say nothing of their
personal security, and shakes the foundations of confidence of any
funding agency. That is one of the reasons why peacekeeping
operations, assisted by demining efforts, and the consolidation of
legitimate government at all levels in Africa remain a critical if
underfunded activity on our continent. And that is why we should
all be concerned about developments in Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea and DRC as much as with the need to restore normalcy in
Swaziland and Zimbabwe.
In our own small way, we have instructed our SOEs to "conduct their
business in Africa with the utmost probity and with irreproachable
ethics. In countries where they operate they must consciously and
deliberately promote employment, particularly of women and the
disabled, help develop small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs),
procure goods and services, and work alongside communities at all
times to secure their well-being. At all times, due deference to
local law and custom must be central to their attitude and approach
to work. In essence, they must integrate commercial viability and
returns on investment with the need to encourage sustainable
development towards the upliftment of communities and
national/regional economies".
At this stage we do not have separate monitoring structures in
place to oversee the activity of SOEs in Africa, other than the
instructions we have given them and the requirements of the Public
Finance Management Act (PFMA). I have suggested that perhaps a
special Code of Conduct may be one way to go. Another has been the
suggestion that all SOEs operating in Africa should report
regularly to Parliament, according to specific requirements, so
that Parliament can play an oversight role. It may be, too, that
the African Parliament may be a useful instrument to act as a
guardian of all development activity in Africa.
We have however begun some work to assess the socio-economic impact
of SOE activity where they operate. Much of this work lies in the
future as social impacts emerge, but we have attempted, through
participation in environmental impact assessments and the like, to
see what can be done. At the same time, I have made a call to the
representatives of African countries to feel free at any time to
approach us if they have concerns, problems or words of advise, to
ensure that either consciously or unconsciously our SOEs do not
stray from the path we would prefer them to walk. Government can
lead to stop us becoming the new imperialists, and we trust that
most in the private sector would agree with our approach.
With those few remarks, I hope that you have fruitful discussions
on an interesting and critically important topic. No economic
processes ever move by themselves, and we would not be doing our
duty if we didn't follow these developments very, very closely, and
hopefully be able to take steps in good time to prevent problems
from arising.
It is sobering too to recall that as we celebrate 10 years of
freedom in South Africa, we must also commemorate the tenth
anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. These two events highlight
the precarious nature of our cause for freedom and
development.
I thank you.
Issued by: Ministry of Public Enterprises
29 March 2004