The recent G20 summit, held in Seoul on 11 and 12 November 2010, took place amid concerns that sharp divisions over currency and trade policies, particularly between China and the US, could overturn the momentum towards concerted solutions to the global economic crisis generated by the April 2009 London Summit. A subsequent summit in Pittsburg in September 2009 which announced that the G20 will in future replace the G8 "as the premier forum for international economic cooperation", further cast the spotlight on the grouping‘s legitimacy and effectiveness as an informal forum.

This shift aroused much debate in Africa, since a large number of select African leaders were continually invited to participate in G8 summits. With South Africa as the only African country in the G2O, most of Africa has been genuinely preoccupied with the issue of better representation, particularly against the background of the continent's diverse socio-economic realities. The inclusion of development issues in the Seoul Summit agenda intensified the representational legitimacy debate. It also increased the burden on South Africa to deliver on its promises of representing African concerns and interests at the summit. This is in spite of the fact that strictly speaking, Africa has arguably remained peripheral to the core interests and mandate of the G20.

Originally established in 1999 as a ministerial meeting in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the G20 was `upgraded' in 2008 into a summit to address the short-term impact of the global financial crisis. Not only has its impact and role during the global financial crises been questioned; its authority and legitimacy has also come under scrutiny, particularly given its status as a ‘loose' informal forum rather than a formal global governance actor.

Although the G2O symbolically reflects the growing recognition of "power shifts" in the global order and also the differing interests, values and visions of a post-Washington consensus world, the symbolic shine it heralded is rapidly waning. A clear manifestation of this could be found in the formal protest lodged with the UN Secretary General earlier in the year against it by the so-called Global Governance Group (3G), an alliance of excluded small and medium-sized countries from both the North and South (reported by the German Development Institute, 2010)

Overall, the non-participation of many global actors in the meetings of the G20 and the growing perception that the group is unlikely to cater for their interests, has raised questions about the value addition of the group, particularly with regard to African countries' development agenda. Skeptics have argued that the exclusivity of the group may hinder prospects for alternatives to the power and dominance of the G8 in the global governance architecture. These debates became more intense after the decision to adopt a development agenda at the Toronto Summit in 2010. The contention is that the Heiligendamm/L'Aquila process initiated in 2007 by the G8 and G5 already speak to many development issues germane to developing countries, especially Africa. Against this background, the broadening of focus to development at the Seoul 2010 Summit has been seen variously as: a response to growing criticism and suspicions over the G2O's agenda; a strategy to avoid losing relevance with the fading away of the financial crisis; or a legitimate response to addressing current concerns of developing countries in a more holistic manner.

While the G20's effectiveness as a crisis-management forum has been debatable, the outcomes of the Seoul Summit are instrumental to its future. The agenda for the summit was twofold: firstly, to follow up on previous issue areas, specifically macroeconomic coordination which involves the framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth; and secondly, the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The summit's development agenda was launched through the establishment of a Working Group on Development, also intended to coordinate G20 work and that of the UN in achieving the MDGs. The working group was co- chaired by South Africa, further raising hopes for tangible outcomes on African issues. Although members of the G20 have no mandate to represent the views of any country other than theirs, South Africa's public diplomacy in Seoul created the unrealistic expectations that it will represent the interests of the rest of the continent. Any failure by South Africa to live up to this could later fuel resentment from SA's continental constituencies. This is particularly so given that the G20 forum does provide individual countries with opportunities to make important national economic interest-enhancing trade-offs which could at times be at odds with group/regional interests.

South Africa's role in the Financial Stability Board is a case in point where the country cannot speak authoritatively on economic agendas of other countries. Domestic economic recovery was a priority matter, given domestic pressures for service delivery, especially ahead of the local government elections in 2011. Promoting human security back home augurs well for the ANC led government's support base, as well as its abilities to contribute to the region's development. Nonetheless, in an environment where developed countries and emerging economies do not meet as blocs representing the North and South, finding a balance between solutions to African problems, and domestic interests can be tricky.

South Africa did present the Action plan developed by the Committee of 10, (comprising finance ministers and central bankers from various African countries) with the involvement of the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission. However, these efforts are often not acknowledged. When they are recognized, they largely serve to expose South Africa's position as the sole African country at the forum, subjecting it to further scrutiny. This is arguably more a case of the G2O's under-performance and incapacity to solve African problems, as opposed to an implicit anti-South African sentiment.

The Summit discussions and resolutions culminated in a joint communiqué branded as the "Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth". According to the declaration, the consensus complements commitments toward the attainment of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and also charts implementation measures under the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development. The communiqué identifies "nine development pillars requiring action" to give more impetus to growth in developing countries. These include "Infrastructure; human resource development; trade; private investment and job creation; food security; growth with resilience; financial inclusion; domestic resource mobilization; and knowledge sharing" (G20 Seoul Summit Leaders Declaration: November 2010).

Debatably, the foregoing issues are not new; have always received broad global consensus; and have been reflected in previous G20-meetings. In actual fact, the communiqué reinforces Africa's development challenges that have remained constant on the continent's development agenda. The declarations are likely to have little effect to allay concerns about trade gaps, protectionism and ongoing currency tensions; especially without pragmatic, problem-oriented agendas, with defined implementation strategies.

The test that remains for the G20 is mainly systemic and institutional. Will members be mandated to act collectively or individually in pursuance of the goals? Have the human and financial capacities and political will issues been thoroughly interrogated, with respect to G20 member countries' implementation responsibilities? Since securing legitimacy is highlighted as a priority, what are the mechanisms for reaching out to non-member states in Africa including non-state actors?

The communiqué is as much impenetrable as it is vague and declaratory. Although it rubberstamps existing initiatives, substance on specific targets on issues most pressing to African economies (resuscitating the Doha Development Agenda; reviving dormant initiatives toward increased investment and partnerships; support to climate change adaptation among others) are lacking. Similarly, recommendations for reforming aid, including new proposals for strengthening tax regimes in developing countries, developing ‘infrastructure action plans' for lower income countries, and measures to stimulate private sector investment, are not country specific. Development cooperation arrangements should be defined, mindful of short-term tactics/targets, which can entrench dependency and underdevelopment. As the saying goes, what you get for free costs too much. How these issues are addressed and articulated in coming months will not only ascertain the usefulness of the Seoul agenda, but also the relevance of the G2O summitry to Africa's needs.

Written by: Dimpho Motsamai, Researcher: Africa Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS, Pretoria