Paul Biya, Cameroon’s president since 1982, is one of the six African leaders who has successfully clung to power for more than a quarter-century. Paradoxically, his country was the 15th African state to ratify the new AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, thus bringing it into force on 15th February 2012.

The new charter is an important element of the newly-established African Governance Architecture (AGA), an African Union (AU) mechanism to harmonise the continent’s countless governance initiatives. The charter commits signatory states to a set of democratic principles: promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, judicial independence, regional integration, sustainable development, political pluralism, tolerance, human security, government accountability, citizen participation, and gender balance.

The charter also commits signatory states to “regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections.” Given the post-electoral violence and power disputes in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2010, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, this clause is especially significant.

However, the charter does not have any provisions for penalising countries that do not hold free, fair, and regular elections. Sanctions are envisaged only for unconstitutional changes of government, but not for tampering with elections or abusing democratic institutions such as the judiciary or the constitution.

According to the charter, individuals and groups responsible for unconstitutional changes of power must be excluded from participating in subsequent elections and may be subjected to punitive economic measures, extradited, and brought to trial before an AU court. States that participate in or support the overthrow of another state’s government are immediately suspended from the AU and punitive sanctions must be imposed on them.

Are these measures practical and what are they likely to achieve? The new charter suspends member states for overthrowing a government illegally. As for economic sanctions, it is debatable whether these are ever effective - and even more so in the African context, where most trade takes place with partners in China, the European Union, and the United States. During the 2011 post-election battles between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire freezing of assets and banning of cocoa exports did little to resolve the struggle until the French military swept in. Perhaps the AU’s envisioned African Standby Force, scheduled to become operational in 2015, will provide it with its own means of resolving conflicts without interference from abroad.

The charter’s chance at success also seems dubious when nine of the 15 ratifying countries are “not free,” according to Freedom House’s 2011 Freedom in the World Index. Nearly three dozen other African countries have not ratified the charter, including democratic success stories such as Mauritius, Namibia, and Botswana. These countries may feel that they do not need the charter to improve their democratic practices. As the charter is the latest addition to a list of more than two dozen existing initiatives and institutions, is this a case of ratification fatigue - or a lack of belief in the AU and the ability of its members to enforce the charter?

The 2011 conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya demonstrated that the AU needs to act more decisively if it wants to provide African solutions to African problems, instead of being sidelined by outside forces. But the new charter does not seem to provide the Union with enough legal ammunition to do so. Although commendable, the charter’s principles upholding democracy and good governance will remain empty promises unless there are effective means to enforce them. Otherwise dictators like Paul Biya will continue to pretend to practice democracy.

Written by Dr John Endres, CEO of Good Governance Africa (GGA) and Yarik Turianskyi, GGA’s Head of Media and Communications.