As with every other Gauteng motorist, I am certainly not enamoured with the idea of having to pay toll fees. But as a citizen of South Africa, I am even more troubled by the lack of leadership being shown on the e-tolling issue.

True, Transport Minister Sibusiso Ndebele and his deputy, Jeremy Cronin, were handed a poisoned chalice. True, Cronin, in particular, has been consistently critical of the tolling concept, as with the Gautrain idea. Even before taking up his current position, Cronin expressed serious misgivings about Gauteng’s transport trajectory, which he felt was skewed in favour of private motorists and lacked a comprehensive mass-transit dimension.

That said, both individuals have not covered themselves in glory over the past few years in their handling of the e-tolling issue, while their treatment of the South African National Roads Agency Limited (Sanral) and its executives has been inappropriate in the extreme. Surely, if they were that unhappy with the way the project was unfolding, it was within their power to intervene decisively. Instead, they have simply kicked the can down the road and created more anxiety and uncertainty than was ever necessary.

Worse yet, they have undermined one of the few agencies developed during the democratic era that has a record of delivery. It may not be popular to say so, but an unemotional analysis of Sanral’s performance throws up the reality of a technically competent entity that not only talks about service delivery, but also actually implements.

Under CEO Nazir Alli, Sanral has even found ways around its serious funding shortfalls – a far cry from the situation in several other agencies, State-owned companies and national delivery departments that tend to hold up their hands and surrender when taxpayer funds are not forthcoming.

In fact, the entire e-tolling project has its genesis not in the minds of a few ‘rogue’ engineers. Instead, it is a direct response to the fact that the National Treasury indicated, quite soon after 1994, that there would be no additional resources for national roads. In other words, Sanral had the choice to either pursue a ‘user pays’ model and build the infrastructure it felt was required, or simply maintain what it had – which, by now, would have been the continent’s biggest parking lot. It also only moved ahead once it had gained all the necessary policy, legal and political mandates required to enable it to start raising money on the bond markets. Perhaps there was a lack of political and economic foresight.

Without doubt, the public relations could have been better handled. But it is simply unfair to present Sanral as some out-of-control technocratic fiefdom. Undermining the entity, as government has, is a disservice to the country, particularly when we sorely need implementation bodies that are actually capable of delivering. The political solution is also not that hard to achieve. First, agree on the principles: we need the infrastructure and we need to pay for it.

Then, interrogate the payment methods through the prism of South Africa’s most pressing challenge: the need to stimulate job-rich economic growth. The outcome of that analysis could show that the objective is best achieved by leaning on the general tax base. It could show, however, that the user should bear most of the burden.

Either way, it will be unpopular. But once the decision is made, Ndebele and Cronin need to have the political courage to communicate the decision, and communicate it unequivocally. In my own view, the funding could be met through a hybrid model, whereby e-tolling is implemented, but at far more affordable rates, while the balance is secured through the fuel levy.

Indeed, why not make the temporary increase instituted to pay for Transnet’s fuel pipeline permanent, and divert the proceeds to Sanral?