Following advances by the Libyan military against rebel held positions in the east of the country the United Nations Security Council approved the adoption of Resolution 1973 on 18 May. The Resolution firstly demands the immediate establishment of a ceasefire between warring parties and an end to the conflict. It also authorises member states, which have notified the Secretary General to take “all necessary” means to protect civilians under the threat of attack and to implement a “No-Fly Zone” over Libyan airspace to achieve this end.

What is a no-fly zone and how does it work? A no-fly zone is essentially a militarised zone in the air in which military, and in some cases civilian, aircraft of a specific nation or group are not allowed to operate. Enforcing such a zone, however, is not as easy as just sending fighter aircraft to patrol it. It is an extremely complicated task involving the deployment of several military assets including aircraft capable of reconnaissance, airborne early warning, electronic warfare and airborne refueling, to ensure that the fighter aircraft are able to conduct 24-hour long-range operations. At first, it also entails the suppression of hostile air defences and the jamming of electronic communications before the operation can take real affect.

Are the military forces involved capable of implementing a no-fly zone? The European forces in the operation lack the capability effectively to enforce a 24-hour no-fly zone over Libya because they lack the appropriate number of support assets mentioned above. This is most probably why US forces became involved in the conflict after initial doubts about becoming engaged in another conflict. The prospects of its EU partners starting a military operation without the proper resources and then actually failing or even worsening the conflict were probably too much for Washington to contemplate.

Important questions remain: what is the imagined end-state of this conflict, and when will it be deemed appropriate for foreign forces to halt their operations? Resolution 1973 and the intervention are designed to protect civilians from military attack and to seek the implementation of a ceasefire agreement. In the past no-fly zones applied on their own failed to achieve such results. In Bosnia and in Iraq no-fly zones evolved into either a full-scale bombing operation or the execution of full-scale ground operations to achieve the necessary results.

In Libya the no-fly zone has been unable to force government forces from their positions as the Resolution does not allow for the engagement of military forces not posing a direct threat to civilians, or to coalition forces. Attacks by government forces on rebel positions have continued and the airforces of the coalition seem unable to everywhere simultaneously.

It also seems clear that whatever their formal positions, most of the leaders of the coalition seek the removal of Col Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. However, Resolution 1973 does not allow for this. Implementing a no-fly zone over Libya and stopping pro-government forces from advancing was relatively easy in military terms, replacing the Libyan regime is an enterprise of quite a different magnitude.

Rebel forces in Libya currently seem uncoordinated and are too lightly armed to be considered a competent military force. Effectively getting rid of the Gaddafi regime would entail providing actual military-based air support to rebel forces and the limited deployment of ground forces in Libya to support rebel forces. The deployment of a peacekeeping or enforcement force to Libya after the conflict can also not be excluded.

Gaddafi’s regime is still under serious political and economic pressure though and economic sanctions still might have the necessary effect, enabling rebel forces to just wait it out. Though examples such as those of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein have shown that this scenario might only be wishful thinking.

Col Gaddafi lacks the military means to hit back at coalition forces. But the longer the situation drags on, the greater the possibility for him to use his financial resources to sponsor acts of terrorism. Come what may, unless Col Gaddafi suddenly relinquishes power, which seems unlikely, we are most probably in for a protracted war.

Written by Anton Kruger, Consultant, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office