Al-Qaeda was active and dangerous in North Africa during the closing months of 2013. An Egypt-based al-Qaeda affiliate group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, attacked the Egyptian military in the North Sinai provincial capital of el-Arish on 20 November 2013, killing 11 Egyptian troops.⁽²⁾ Only five days later, a Libya-based al-Qaeda faction, Ansar al-Sharia, struck against Libyan Special Forces in Benghazi, resulting in eight deaths.⁽³⁾ Al-Qaeda’s emboldened presence throughout the Maghreb region of Africa contributes to a host of security dilemmas for all the local governments. Egypt and Libya, both on the potential brink of civil war, appear to have determined that a cooperative relationship is in both states’ strategic interest in light of this mutual threat.⁽⁴⁾

Given that the two countries’ bilateral relationship can be characterised by a history of hostility, this move toward cooperation is significant. The two states view the instability across their borders as a threat to domestic security. The state of Egypt’s turmoil has impacted Libya’s increasingly chaotic environment. At the same time, loose arms caches in Libya have emboldened militant Islamist forces in Egypt that are determined to wage violence against the Egyptian military. It is probable that this relationship will be primarily defined by mutual security concerns, yet, given the weakness of the Libyan state, the future of the Egypt-Libyan alliance against Al-Qaeda is naturally uncertain.

Arab nationalism and the ‘Free Officers Movement’

Egypt and Libya gained independence from European colonial powers in 1952 and 1951 respectively.⁽⁵⁾ In 1969, Moammar Gaddafi led the ‘Free Officers Movement’, which overthrew the monarchy of King Mohammed Idris and established the Libyan Arab Republic. This revolt was inspired by the ‘Free Officers Movement’ that Egypt’s former President Gamal Abdel Nasser led in 1952 against King Farouk I of Egypt. This revolution, that marked the beginning of the Nasser regime, transformed Egypt from a monarchy into a republic.  Gaddafi hailed Nasser as a true leader, having grown up listening to him speak on the radio and invoking Nasserism as an ideology throughout his entire presidency (1969-2011).⁽⁶⁾ In turn, Nasser, who passed away 13 months after Gaddafi rose to power, stated that the Libyan leader was ‘a nice boy, but terribly naive.’⁽⁷⁾ Nasser stressed Egypt’s central role in three contexts – Arab, Muslim and African Unity. Libya’s foreign policy under Gaddafi was frequently conducted under one or the other of these banners. During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Libya provided Egypt with US$ 1 billion in military aid.⁽⁸⁾ Gaddafi believed that “if Arab countries stopped feuding and pooled their money, knowledge and military might, they would create a power bloc that could rival the superpowers and destroy the State of Israel.”⁽⁹⁾

The relationship deteriorated after 1973 when Nasser’s successor, President Anwar Sadat, made a pivot from the Soviet Union (USSR) toward the United States (US) camp in the Cold War. Meanwhile, Libya maintained military ties with the USSR, underscoring the Cold War undertones of the growing state of distrust between the two states.⁽¹⁰⁾ As Egypt’s revenue crisis worsened, President Sadat encouraged the Egyptian Military to attack Libya on 16 July 1977 with the objective of seizing oil fields in eastern Libya.⁽¹¹⁾ For nine days, in what became known as the Egyptian-Libyan War, Egypt’s air force bombed Libya.⁽¹²⁾ Washington’s opposition to Sadat’s aggression and minimal support from the Egyptian public led to a quick end to the hostilities.⁽¹³⁾

After Sadat signed the Camp David Accords of 1979, which made Egypt the first Arab state to normalise relations with Israel, antagonism between the Egyptian and Libyan governments grew. Libya led the campaign to isolate Egypt within the Arab League. In pursuit of Pan-Arab political imagery, Gaddafi advocated that all Arab states refuse to recognise Israel’s right to exist, and the Egyptian government was dismissed by Tripoli as a treacherous party to the Arabs. Although Egypt and Libya never went to war after 1977, tensions continued to deteriorate until the Gaddafi and Mubarak governments fell in 2011.⁽¹⁴⁾ The demise of the two countries’ dictators seemed to further evidence the countries’ bound histories.

‘Arab Spring’ and new security challenges

The overthrow of the Mubarak and Gaddafi governments created a new political landscape in North Africa, whereby both Egypt and Libya adjusted their relationship. The loose arms caches that spilled across Africa and the Middle East following Gaddafi’s ouster created new security dilemmas for both Egypt’s Morsi government and the military-backed interim government that took power in Egypt on 3 July 2013. Additionally, Egyptian expatriate workers in Libya were also negatively impacted by the country’s deteriorating security situation. Two and a half years after Gaddafi’s government fell to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-backed rebels, the power that was previously maintained by the central government has decentralised with various heavily-armed militias maintaining de facto rule over vast portions of Libyan territory. The nation’s weak and nascent military has been essentially powerless to control Libya’s petro-facilities, which have fallen under the control of various non-state actors. As Libya’s economy depends on the production/exportation of natural gas and oil, there will be greater prospects for partition if the various militias prolong their control over such facilities.

Since August 2011, Egyptian authorities have reported the seizure of large arms shipments from Libya en route to the Sinai Peninsula. Following Mubarak’s ouster, numerous al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have waged an insurgency against the Egyptian state. After the military-orchestrated ouster of President Morsi on 3 July 2013, the insurgency has intensified to near daily attacks against the Egyptian state. Five months prior to Morsi’s fall, the Egyptian Military seized 60 anti-tank missiles that were being driven from Libya to Marsa Matrouh, the capital of the Matrouh Governate, situated 240 km west of Alexandria.⁽¹⁵⁾ Since Morsi’s ouster, Egypt’s security forces claim that they have  intercepted thousands of weapons, including mines, missiles, mortars and rifles that came from Libya and were used in numerous attacks against Egyptian military facilities.⁽¹⁶⁾ Reportedly, the weapons flowing from Libya via  Egypt were partially intended for Hamas (and other militants) in the Gaza Strip.⁽¹⁷⁾

Libya’s civil war of 2011 pressured nearly half a million Egyptian workers to leave Libya.⁽¹⁸⁾ From 17 to 20 October 2013, dozens of Egyptian truck drivers were abducted by an armed group in Ajdabiya, situated 150 kms south of Benghazi.⁽¹⁹⁾ While eventually these Egyptians were freed in a deal brokered by the Egyptian and Libyan authorities, the leader of the militias holding these truckers, Ahmed al-Libi, stated that they would only be freed if Libyans detained in Egypt were released.⁽²⁰⁾ Such an episode underscores the security risks that Egyptian workers face in Libya. The important role of remittances in Egypt’s overall economy highlights Egypt’s interest in Libya returning to a stable environment whereby foreign investors and workers face fewer political risks. Certainly, Libyan officials who are encouraging the international community to invest in Libya share this interest with the Egyptian government. However, a more urgent matter for the Libyan authorities relates to taking control of the nation’s petro-facilities without triggering a civil war.

Egyptian coup d’état inflames tensions in Libya

The Egyptian military’s removal of Morsi has fuelled political drama in Libya, where tension between secular and Islamist militias threatens the state’s cohesion. Rather than take sides, the Libyan government responded to Morsi’s ouster by asserting neutrality. In an interview with the Iraqi daily Azzaman, Libya’s Ambassador to Egypt, Mohammed Fayez Jibril, stressed Tripoli’s neutrality in the conflict between General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who led the 3 July 2013 coup d'état , and his Islamist enemies. Jibril stated, in Libya: “We respect the will of the Egyptian people and distance ourselves from the internal conflict in Egypt. We do not stand by one party against the other... We refuse to intervene.”⁽²¹⁾

The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), did not follow such diplomatic niceties and instead immediately condemned the coup d’état led by General Sisi. The JCP’s leader, Bashir Alkibti, accused General Sisi of undermining democracy and overthrowing a legitimate government that Egyptians elected.⁽²²⁾ Alkibti stated that any request for asylum in Libya made by any member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood should be accepted.⁽²³⁾

Following the bloodshed that occurred on 14 August 2013, when Egyptian police broke up two Muslim Brotherhood camps in Cairo, 150 Libyans gathered in front of Egypt’s Embassy in Tripoli to protest against the Egyptian military. The demonstrators demanded that Libya’s government sever ties with Cairo until the reinstatement of Morsi’s Islamist government. The speakers included Islamist figures in Libya’s government.⁽²⁴⁾ However, the opposition to Morsi’s ouster in Libya has not been entirely expressed through peaceful methods. On 17 August 2013, an unidentified group bombed the Egyptian Consulate in Benghazi.⁽²⁵⁾ Presumably, an Islamist faction conducted this attack to send a signal to Egypt’s military.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, is not popular within many of Libya’s secular currents, which responded positively to the 3 July 2013 coup. Many of the JCP’s opponents accuse it of pursuing an international agenda in solidarity with other Muslim Brotherhood branches.⁽²⁶⁾ Celebrations of Morsi’s ouster were held in the streets of Tobruk (situated 400 kms east of Benghazi), where anti-Muslim Brotherhood sentiments have been profound.⁽²⁷⁾ Certain secular currents in Libya expressed their solidarity with General Sisi, praising the Egyptian military in its fight against ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism.’

The possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood growing increasingly radical, and Al-Qaeda continuing to make a deeper mark on that country, justifies greater concern about Egypt further destabilising into deeper political violence in the event of an Islamist uprising in major population centres and/or a civil war.⁽²⁸⁾ Unquestionably, the spillover effects in Libya could heighten the friction between the Al-Qaeda-affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, which holds influence in various corners of Libya, and the Libyan state, which desperately seeks to take control of the nation’s petro-facilities that have been held by various anti-government militias.

Egypt, a model and partner for Libya?

Regardless of the security dilemmas posed by the prospects for an escalation of violence between the Egyptian military and its Islamist enemies, the military-orchestrated ouster of President Morsi on 3 July 2013 has offered Libyans an opportunity to question the relationship between their democratically-elected civilian government and their military. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya have expressed a view that a powerful military threatens democracy. Such voices contend that a military-run government will not relinquish power to a democratically elected civilian body, thus the role of the military in politics must be severely limited. To the contrary, secular voices in Libya have maintained that a strong military is necessary to prevent forces of religious fanaticism from ruling; thus, democracy depends on the armed forces to play a heavy hand in politics.⁽²⁹⁾

The ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt and Libya has taken divergent paths, yet both states face threats from similar forces. Al-Qaeda-affiliated militias have proven capable of effectively destabilising certain areas inside both states. Within this context, greater security cooperation should be expected between officials in Cairo and Tripoli. While the Libyan political order under Gaddafi sponsored non-state actors that carried out violent acts in Egypt, it appears that the current Libyan government has no interest in bringing further unrest into Egypt. Over time, heightened cooperation between the Egyptian and Libyan governments may lead to greater stability in North Africa.

This article is extracted from the January 2014 edition of CAI’s Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor (ACMM) – the brainchild of award-winning journalist and columnist, James Hall. The +-80 page report dissects conflict trends across the African continent to guide businesses, governments, academics and other stakeholders in Africa’s growth and stability. Subscribe to ACMM here.

Written by Giorgio Cafiero ⁽¹⁾

Notes:

(1) Giorgio Cafiero is a Regional Analyst with ACMM, a research analyst with Country Risk Solutions and is also affiliated with the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis in the United Arab Emirates. Giorgio has published extensively in the Huffington Post, Foreign Policy in Focus and International Policy Digest. Contact Giorgio through CAI’s Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Dominique Gilbert.     
(2) ‘Egyptian troops die in Sinai bomb attack’, BBC, 20 November 2013.
(3) ‘Libya Army in Benghazi clashes with Ansar al-Sharia’, BBC, 25 November 2013.
(4) M., Amara, ‘Libya tries to stabilise relations with Egypt’, Al-Monitor, 28 October 2013.
(5) ‘Libya profile’, BBC, 25 November 2013; ‘Egypt profile’, BBC, 26 November 2013.
(6) Blundy, D., and Lycett, A., ‘Gaddafi and the Libyan Revolution’, Little, Brown and Company (Boston), 1987.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Al-Atraqchi, F., ‘What did the Arabs really win in the 1973 war with Israel?’ The Huffington Post, 5 October 2010.
(9) Blundy, D., and Lycett, A., ‘Gaddafi and the Libyan Revolution’, Little, Brown and Company (Boston), 1987.
(10) Coban, H., ‘Libya-Egypt tension grows as USSR backs Qaddafi’, Christian Science Monitor, 20 June 1980.
(11) Rogan, E., ‘The Arabs’, Basic Books (New York), 2009.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Blundy, D., and Lycett, A., ‘Gaddafi and the Libyan Revolution’, Little, Brown and Company (Boston), 1987.
(15) Chumley, C., ‘Egypt seizes 60 anti-tank missiles smuggled from Libya’, The Washington Times, 27 February 2013.
(16) ‘Egypt intercepts convoys from Libya with “sophisticated weapons” for insurgents in Sinai’, WorldTribune.com, 24 October 2013.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Gulhane, J., ‘170 Egyptians deported from Libya’, Daily News Egypt, 13 January 2013.
(19) ‘Egyptians detained in Libya freed’, Al-Jazeera, 20 October 2013.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Amara, M., ‘Libya tries to stabilise relations with Egypt’, Al-Monitor, 28 October 2013.
(22) Wahab, A., ‘Border closed after Muslim Brotherhood head tries to flee to Libya’, Libya Herald, 4 July 2013.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Khan, U., ‘Demonstration at Egyptian Embassy against Cairo killings’, Libya Herald, 16 August 2013.
(25) ‘Bomb injures guard at Egypt's Mission in Benghazi, Libya’, Reuters, 17 August 2013.
(26) Eljarh, M., ‘Libya reacts to the turmoil in Egypt’, Foreign Policy, 15 July 2013.
(27) Wahab, A., ‘Border closed after Muslim Brotherhood head tries to flee to Libya’, Libya Herald, 4 July 2013.
(28) Sabry, M., ‘Al Qaeda emerges amid Egypt’s turmoil’, 4 December 2013.
(29) Eljarh, M., ‘Libya Reacts to the Turmoil in Egypt’. Foreign Policy, 15 July 2013.